Chapter II (3)

With regard to these problems of the Law, the people may be divided into three classes. In the first place there are people who cannot notice any doubt arising out of them, especially in things which the Law has left to be taken exoterically. These people are the greatest in number, and may be described as the masses. Then the second group of men is one which has doubts; but has not power to solve them. These are above the masses and below the learned people. It is for them that there are found in the Law allegorical sayings, and it is they whom God has censured. For there is no allegory in the Law for the learned or the common people, and it is in this light that all the allegorical sayings of the Quran should be understood. Their example as regards the Law is like the example of the bread of wheat which though a useful cereal for the large number of human beings, may prove harmful to some. Such is also the case with religious teaching: it is useful for the many but sometimes becomes harmful to some. The following words of God point to the same thing. “He will not thereby mislead any except the transgressors.”[88] But this is found only in a few verses of the Quran about a few people. Most of the verses are, however, those which speak of things invisible for which there is no example in the visible world. So they are expressed by the things nearest to them in the visible world, on account of their similarity. Some people take the illustration as the thing illustrated, and hence they fall into confusion and doubt. This is what is called allegorical in the Law, and is not meant for the learned or the common people, which in reality form two groups of men. For these are the people who are really healthy, and delicate food is only fit for them. The other group is a group of sick men who are always few in number. So God has said, “But they whose hearts are perverse will follow that which is parabolical therein, out of love of schism.”[89] These are the dogmatic and the scholastic theologians. The worst which these people have done in respect to the Law is that they have interpreted much which they thought was not to be taken literally, and then said that their interpretation was the thing intended, and that God had mentioned it parabolically only to test and try His creatures. God forbid that we should ever have such an idea about Him. The Divine Book is a miracle of clearness and lucidity. So it is far from the real purpose of the Law for one to say about a thing which is not parabolical, that it is so, and then set about interpreting it according to his own ideas, telling the people that their duty lies in believing his interpretations. They have done so in the case of the verse of Equalisation on the Throne, and others, saying that their exoteric meaning is only parabolical. On the whole many interpretations, which these people maintain to be the real purpose of the Law, when intently looked into and deciphered, are found wanting in arguments, and not serving the purpose which the exoteric meaning would have with regard to the common people. The primary purpose of knowledge for the common people is action, so that which is most useful in action is most suitable for them. But for the learned men, the purpose of knowledge is both knowledge and action. The man who interprets anything of the Law, thinking that his interpretation is the real purpose of it, and then discloses it to the common people, is like a man, who finds a medicine which an expert physician had compounded to preserve the health of all, or of a majority of the people; then there came a man with whom that medicine did not agree on account of the coarseness of his disposition. He presented it to some people, and then thought that by some drug, which the first physician had clearly specified, as composing that universally useful medicine, he did not mean the drug commonly known by that name--but another which he really meant, but used this name for it by a far-fetched metaphor. So he took out the first drug from the compound, and placed another in its stead, which he thought to be the one intended by the first physician. Then he told the people that this was the medicine intended. The people began to use that “improved” medicine, and many of them got injured by it. Then there came another group of men, who, seeing the people sick on account of that medicine, thought of curing them. So they changed some of its drugs with some other than the first one, then presented it to the people for quite another disease than that intended by the first physician. Then there appeared another group which interpreted the medicine in quite another way than the two preceding groups had done. The fourth group gave a new interpretation to the drug and prescribed it for a fourth kind of disease. So as time went on with that great medicine, the interpretations of it took hold of the people instead of the drugs, and they changed and transformed it altogether. As a result the people were attacked by many different kinds of diseases, till the usefulness of the medicine was altogether lost. Such is the condition of those sects which have risen in Islam. For every one of them has made interpretations quite different from the others, and maintained that its interpretation shows the real purpose of the Law, which was at last rent to piece, and lost its primary purpose altogether. The Prophet, knowing that a thing like this would necessarily happen among his people, said, “My people will shortly be divided into seventytwo sects. All of them will be in hell, except one.” By this one he meant the sect which followed the exoteric meanings of the Law, without making any interpretations which may be disclosed to the people. If you were to look into the Law and see the corruption which it has suffered up to this time, through interpretations, the truth of this example would become clear to you.

The first to make a change in the religion--the great medicine--were the Kharijites, who were followed by the Mutazilites. They were succeeded by the Asharites, after whom came the Sufis. Last of all came Al-Ghazzali, who went to the extreme and corrupted everything. He it is who explained philosophy to the common people, and disclosed to them the opinions of the philosophers as he understood them to be. This he did in a book called _Al-Maqasid_, in which he thought he was refuting them. He planned his _Refutation of the Philosophers_, and charged them with infidelity in respect to three questions, tearing them to pieces, as he thought, in regard to consensus of opinion; and calling them innovators as regards other opinions. In this book he has advanced many specious arguments and confused reasonings, which have led astray many people both from religion and philosophy. Then he said in his book _Jawahir al-Quran_ that the arguments which he had mentioned in his _Refutation_ were controversial in their nature, while in fact they were mentioned in his _Al Maznun ala Ghairi Ahlihi_. Then in his _Mishkat ul Anwar_ he mentions grades of men really knowing God. He says that all but those who believe that God is not the mover of the first heaven, and that it is not He from whom this movement originates, are precluded from it. This is an explanation from him of men learned in divine science. He has said in many places that divine science exists only by guesses, as opposed to certainties in other science. In his book _Munqidh min al Dalal_ he has gone against the philosophers and maintained that knowledge can only be acquired by privacy and meditation, and that those in this rank are all very near to the rank of the prophets. He has mentioned this very fact in his _Kimiya i Saadat_. Men have become divided into parties on account of this confusion. One party chose to censure the philosophers, while the other agreed to interpret the Law, and make it conform to philosophy. All this is wrong. The Law should be taken literally; and the conformity of religion to philosophy should not be told to the common people. For by an exposition of it we should be exposing the results of philosophy to them, without their having intelligence enough to understand them. It is neither permitted nor desirable to expose anything of the result of philosophy to a man who has no arguments to advance, for there are no arguments either with the learned people who have a mastery over both the subjects, or with the common people who follow the exoteric of the Law. So his action brought disorder in respect to both of these things, religion and philosophy, in the mind of the common people, while he saved them for the others. The disorder in religion came through his exposing those interpretations which should not be exposed; and so also the disorder in philosophy was the result of his mentioning those things in his books which should not be put in the works on philosophy. Now it was the result of his treatment of the subjects that many people do not know the difference between the two, because of his bringing both of them together. He has also insisted upon the fact that he knew the cause of doing so, as he did in his _Al Tafriqa bain al Islami wa-z Zindiqah_. In it he has noted down many kinds of interpretations and has decided that their interpreters were not infidels though they may go against the consensus of opinion. Since he has done so, he is dangerous to the Law for some reasons, to philosophy for others, and to both for some other reasons. So this man, by disclosing them, has shown that he is dangerous for both the things in reality and profitable to them only by accident. For teaching philosophy to one who is not fit for it, will either falsify philosophy or religion absolutely or will show conformity between them by accident only. The right thing would have been not to disclose philosophy to the common people at all. But if teaching of it was absolutely necessary, then only that section of the people should have been taught who saw that religion was opposed to philosophy, in order to show them that it was not so. And also it might have been taught to those people who thought that philosophy is opposed to religion. This may have been shown to either of these sections, that in reality they did not possess a knowledge of their substance and truth, that is, of religion and philosophy. Moreover, they would know that the opinion about religion, that it was opposed to philosophy was one which was either about some innovation in religion, and not about its principles, or is an error in understanding that is, a wrong interpretation of it, as was shown in the case of knowledge about particulars and other things. That is why we were compelled in this book to explain the principles of religion. These principles, when intently looked into will be found in perfect agreement with philosophy. Such is also the case with the opinion which says this philosophy is opposed to religion. It only shows that the man has not had a sufficient training in either philosophy or religion. This is the reason that we were compelled to explain it in our tractate entitled _Fasl al Maqal fi Muwafiqat il Hikmat lil Sharia_.

Now that this has become clear we would return to our former theme. The only problem which remains for us to solve, out of those which we proposed is that of Divine Vision. It is thought for some reasons, that it forms a part of the problem which we have just discussed, on account of the words of God, “The sight comprehendeth him not, but He comprehendeth the sight.”[90] And hence the Mutazilites have denied it, setting aside the arguments found in the Law, in spite of their greatness in number and fame, a very shameful act on their part. The cause of this doubt of the Law that since the Mutazilites denied physical attributes, and believed in exposing their ideas to every one, it became necessary for them to deny direction also. And having once denied direction they must also deny the Vision, for the thing seen must be in some direction to one who sees it. To prove their point they are constrained to set aside the traditional religion. They neglected the Traditions because they were only isolated things which should not be believed, if found opposed to the teachings of the Quran, that is, opposed to the verse, “The sight comprehendeth Him not.” The Asharites tried to mix together the two beliefs, that is, the denial of physical attributes, and the possibility of vision of One having no body, by means of our senses. It became difficult for them to prove it, and they took refuge in many sophistical and conjectural arguments, that is arguments which are thought to be correct but are in reality wrong. It is so because it is possible to have the same grades in arguments as there are among men. Just as there may be found men with perfect excellence and those below them, till we may have a man who thinks himself learned and yet he is not, being only a pedant, so there are arguments which are extremely certain, and those below them, then, there are specious arguments, and those which though really false seem to be true. The statements of the Asharites in regard to this question are of two kinds: those refuting the arguments of the Mutazilites, and those proving the possibility of the Vision of One having no body, and that there is no difficulty in our believing it. The statements by which they have opposed the Mutazilites in their argument, that the thing seen must have a direction for one who sees it, is that some of them say that it is applied only to the visible, and not to the invisible, world; and that it is not one of those cases in which the condition of the one can be applied to the other. According to them it is possible for a man to see an object having no direction, for he sees by his power of sight only that which comes before his eyes. In this they have mixed together the senses of sight with intelligence, for the latter can perceive that which has no direction, that is, no space; but for the perception of the eye there is a condition, that the thing to be perceived be in a direction, not only that but a particular direction too. So if we take the eye to be endowed with the power of seeing, then it is not possible except under very limited conditions. These are three in number-light, the intervention of a transparent body between the eye and the object seen, and the possession of necessary colours by the object. A refutation of these conditions in the eyes is also a refutation of those primary principles of knowledge which are known to all. It would be a refutation of the sciences of philosophy and mathematics. The Asharites also maintain that one of the conditions as we have said, for example, is that every rational being has a life, it being apparent in the visible world as a condition for knowledge. Hence we say to them that these are also conditions for seeing things in the visible world. So according to their own principle is the case of the visible and the invisible. In his book _Al Maqasid_ Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) intended to oppose the premise that every object perceivable must be in some direction to the one seeing it. He says that a man sees himself reflected in a mirror and sees himself not in any other direction but the opposite one. Hence he can see his self in an opposite direction too. But this is a mistake, because what he sees is not his self but only an image of it. This image is in the opposite direction, being in the mirror, placed there.

Of the arguments which they advance to prove the vision of an object having no body, two are famous ones. Of these the more famous is one which says that an object seen is either because it has some colour, or because it has a body, or it is a colour, or because it is existent. Sometimes they mention many other causes than really do exist. They say that it is wrong to suppose that it must be a body, otherwise, no colour would be visible, it being also incorrect to suppose the space to be the colour. Now when all the kinds of suppositions in the premise have been refuted we shall have to believe that only an existent object will be seen. The mistake in this statement is quite clear. For an object is visible because of itself. This is the case with the colour and the body: the colour being visible by itself, and the body through the colour. That is why a thing which has no colour cannot be seen. Had the existence of a thing been the only condition of visibility, it would have been possible to see the sound and the senses. In that case seeing, hearing, in fact all the five senses would have been only one, which is quite contrary to our reason. This problem and others like it have obliged the Mutakallimun to admit that it is possible to _hear_ the colour, and _see_ the sounds. But this is against nature, as man has understood it to be. For it is absolutely evident that the sense of seeing is quite different from that of hearing. Their actions are quite distinct from one another, and the organ of the one cannot work as the organ of the other. It is just as impossible to turn hearing as to turn colour into sound. Those who say that sometimes sound can be seen, should be asked to define the sense of seeing. They would necessarily answer that it is a faculty which perceives those things which can be seen, such as colour and so on. Then they should be asked to define the sense of hearing. They would surely say that it is one sense by which sounds can be heard. Then they should be asked whether at the time of sound it is the sense of hearing only or seeing too. If they say that it is hearing only, they admit that it cannot perceive colours. If they say that it is seeing only, then it cannot hear sounds. If it is neither alone, for it perceives colours, then it is seeing and hearing both. But in this way everything can be proved to be one, even in the case of contradictory things. This is a thing which our Mutakallimun admit or they are compelled to do so. But it is clear that it is a philosophical opinion which is only fit for those ancient people famous for it.

Now the second method which Mutakallimun have adopted for proving the possibility of Divine Vision is that which has been mentioned by Abul Maali in his book, _Al Irshad_. It says that the senses can only feel the substance (_Zat_) of things, but that which separates the existent thing from one another is not to be found in the substance only. So the senses cannot perceive the substance, which is common to all the existent things. They can only perceive a thing because it exists. But all this is absurd, which is quite clear from the fact that if sight were only able to perceive things then it would not have been possible for it to differentiate between white and black, for there is no difference between things about those qualities which are common to all. This also becomes impossible as regards all the other senses. The sense of seeing could not perceive different kinds of colours; the sense of hearing cannot differentiate between tastes. It would be necessary that the objects perceived by the senses be all of a kind, and there should be no difference between objects perceived by seeing and apprehended by hearing. This is contrary to that which man commonly understands. In reality the senses perceive the substance of things by the power which is vouchsafed to them. The cause of this mistake lies in the fact that that which perceives a substance, is thought to be the thing perceived. Had there not been said so much about these things, and so much respect for those who said it, it would not have satisfied anybody with a strong common sense.

The cause of such a perplexing situation in the Law, which has compelled its votaries to take refuge in such worthless arguments, as would bring a smile to the lips of anybody who has made the least effort to distinguish between different kinds of arguments, is the exposition of anthropomorphic qualities of God to the common people, a fact which has been prohibited by God and His Prophet. It is so because it is very difficult for a man to believe at the same time that there exists One without a body, who can be seen with our eyes. For the things which the senses comprehend are in the bodies or the bodies themselves. Hence the Mutakallimun have tried to prove that the Divine Vision will be an addition to our existing qualities at that moment. This also should not have been disclosed to the common people. For since their intellect cannot go beyond their imagination that which they cannot imagine is non-existent for them. To imagine a thing which has no body is not possible, and hence a belief in the existence of an object which they cannot imagine, is impossible for them. It was for this reason that the Law refused to disclose this secret to them, and described God, for their sake, in terms which they can imagine, ascribing to him the attributes of hearing, seeing, having a face, &c. &c., at the same time telling them that He is not like anything which can be imagined. Had the intention of the Law been to make clear to the masses the fact of His having no body, it would not have mentioned these things in detail. But as light was the highest of imaginable things, it was given to them as an illustration of God, for it is the best known of the things both to the senses and to the imagination.

Such is also the case in respect to the possibility of their understanding the things of the Day of Judgment. These have also been mentioned in terms which they can imagine. So now when the Law has adopted this course about the apparent description of God, there arises no doubt about him. For when it is said that He is Light or that there is a curtain of light upon Him, as is mentioned in the Quran and authentic Traditions, and when it is said that the Faithful will see Him on the Day of Judgement as they see the sun, there arises no doubt or suspicion out of it for the common or the learned people. It is so because to the learned it is quite clear that that condition will be an addition to our former knowledge. But when this is disclosed to the common people, they cannot understand it, and hence they either disbelieve the whole of the Law, or consider its exponent to be an infidel. So one who adopts a method other than that laid down by the Law in this respect, certainly goes astray. If you look a little intently it will become clear to you, that in spite of the fact that the Law has not given illustration of those things for the common people, beyond which their imagination cannot go, it has also informed the learned men of the underlying meanings of those illustrations. So it is necessary to bear in mind the limits which the Law has set about the instruction of every class of men, and not to mix them together. For in this manner the purpose of the Law is multiplied. Hence it is that the Prophet has said, “We, the prophets, have been commanded to adapt ourselves to the conditions of the people, and address them according to their intelligence.” He who tries to instruct all the people in the matter of religion, in one and the same way, is like a man who wants to make them alike in actions too, which is quite against apparent laws and reason.

From the foregoing it must have become clear to you that the divine vision has an exoteric meaning in which there is no doubt, if we take the words of the Quran about God as they stand, that is, without proving or disproving the anthropomorphic attribute of God. Now since the first part of the Law has been made quite clear as to God’s purity, and the quantity of the teaching fit for the common people, it is time to begin the discussion about the actions of God, after which our purpose in writing this tractate will be over.

OF THE ACTIONS OF GOD

In this section we will take up five questions, around which all others in this connection revolve. In the first place a proof of the creation of the universe; secondly, the advent of the prophets; thirdly, predestination and fate; fourthly, Divine justice and injustice; and fifthly, the Day of Judgment.

First Problem: the Creation of the Universe:--The Law teaches that the universe was invented and created by God, and that it did not come into being by chance or by itself. The method adopted by the Law for proving this is not the one upon which the Asharites have depended. For we have already shown that those methods are not specially certain for the learned, nor common enough to satisfy all the classes of men. The methods which are really serviceable are those which have a very few premises, and the results of which fall very near to the commonly known ideas. But in instructing the common people the Law does not favour statements composed of long and complete reasonings, based upon different problems, So everyone who, in teaching them, adopts a different course, and interprets the Law according to it, has lost sight of its purpose and gone astray from the true path. And so also, the Law in giving illustrations for its reasonings uses only those which are present before us. Whatever has been thought necessary for the common people to know, has been explained to them by the nearest available examples, as in the case of the Day of Judgment. But whatever was unnecessary for them to know, they have been told that it was beyond their knowledge, as the words of God about the Soul.[91] Now that we have established this, it is necessary that the method adopted by the Law for teaching the creation of the universe to the common people be such as would be acknowledged by all. It is also necessary that since there cannot be found anything present to illustrate the creation of the universe the Law must have used the examples of the creation of things in the visible world.

So the method adopted by Law is that the universe was made by God. If we look intently into the verse pertaining to this subject we shall see that the method adopted is that of divine solicitude, which we know to be one of those which prove the existence of God. When a man sees a thing made in a certain shape, proportion and fashion, for a particular advantage is derived from it, and purpose which is to be attained, so that it becomes clear to him, that had it not been found in that shape, and proportion, then that advantage would have been wanting in it, he comes to know for certain that there is a maker of that thing, and that he had made it in that shape and proportion, for a set purpose. For it is not possible that all those qualities serving that purpose be collected in that thing by chance alone. For instance, if a man sees a stone on the ground in a shape fit for sitting, and finds its proportions and fashion of the same kind, then he would come to know that it was made by a maker, and that he had made it and placed it there. But when he sees nothing in it, which may have made it fit for sitting then he becomes certain that its existence in the place was by chance only, without its being fashioned by any maker. Such is also the case with the whole of the universe. For when a man sees the sun, the moon, and all the stars, which are the cause of the four seasons, of days and nights, of rain, water and winds, of the inhabitation of the parts of the earth, of the existence of man, and of the being of all the animals and the plants and of the earth being fit for the habitation of a man, and other animals living on it; and the water fit for the animals living in it; and the air fit for birds, and if there be anything amiss in this creation and edifice, the whole world would come to confusion and disorder, then he would come to know with certainty that it is not possible that this harmony in it for the different members of the universe--man, animals, and plants--be found by chance only. He will know that there is one who determined it, and so one who made it by intention, and that is God, exalted and magnified may He be. He would know with certainty that the universe is a created thing, for he would necessarily think that it is not possible that in it should be found all this harmony, if it be not made by some one, and had come into existence by chance alone. This kind of argument is quite definite and at the same time clear, and some have mentioned it here. It is based upon two principles which are acknowledged by all. One of them being, that the universe, with all its component parts, is found fit for the existence of man and things; secondly, that which is found suitable in all its parts, for a single purpose, leading to a single goal, is necessarily a created thing. So those two principles lead us naturally to admit that the universe is a created thing, and that there is a maker of it. Hence “the argument of analogy” leads to two things at one and the same time, and that is why it is the best argument for proving the existence of God. This kind of reasoning is also found in the Quran in many verses in which the creation of the universe is mentioned. For instance, “Have We not made the earth a bed, and the mountains for shelter to fix the same? And have We not created you of two sexes; and appointed your sleep for rest and made the night a garment to cover you, and destined the day to a gaining of a livelihood; and built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp? And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance, that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees.”[92] If we ponder over this verse it would be found that our attention has been called to the suitability of the different parts of the universe for the existence of man. In the very beginning we are informed of a fact well-known to all--and that is that the earth has been created in a way which has made it suitable for our existence. Had it been unstable, or of any other shape, or in any other place, or not of the present proportion, it would not have been possible to be here, or at all created on it. All this is included in the words, “Have We not made the earth a bed for you?” for in a bed are collected together all the qualities of shape, tranquility, and peace, to which may be added those of smoothness and softness. So how strange is this wonderful work and how excellent this blessedness, and how wonderful this collection of all the qualities! This is so because in the word _mihad_ (bed) are brought together all those qualities, which are found in the earth, rendering it suitable for the existence of man. It is a thing which becomes clear to the learned after much learning and a long time, “But God will appropriate His mercy unto whom He pleaseth.”[93] Then as to the divine words, “And the mountains for stakes,”--they tell us of the advantage to be found in the tranquility of the earth on account of the mountains. For had the earth been created smaller than it is now, that is, without mountains it would have been quivered by the motion of other elements, the water and the air, and would have been shaken and thus displaced. This would naturally have been the cause of the destruction of the animal world. So when its tranquility is in harmony with those living on it, it did not come into being by chance alone, but was made by some one’s intention, and determination. Certainly it was made by One who intended it, and determined it, for the sake of those living on it. Then He calls our attention to the suitability of the existence of night and day for animals. He says, “And made the night a garment to cover you; and destined the day to a gaining of your livelihood.” He means to say that He has made the night like a covering and clothing for all the things, from the heat of the sun. For had there been no setting of the sun at night, all the things, whose life has been made dependent upon the sun, would have perished--that is, the animals and the plants. As clothing protects the people from the heat of the sun, in addition to its being a covering, so God likened the night to it. This is one of the most beautiful of the metaphors. There is also another advantage in the night for the animals: their sleep in it is very deep, after the setting of the sun, which keeps faculties in motion, that is, wide awake. So God has said, “And appointed your sleep for rest,” on account of the darkness of the night. Then He says, “And built over you seven heavens, and placed therein a burning lamp.” Here by the word building He means their creation, and their harmony with the created things, and their arrangement and system. By strength He means that power of revolution and motion which is never slackened, and never overtaken by fatigue; and they never fall like other roofs and high edifices. To this refer the words of God, “And made the heaven a roof well-supported.”[94] By all this He shows their fitness in number, shape, fashion, and movement, for the existence of those who live on the earth round it. Were one of the heavenly bodies, not to speak of all, to stop for a moment all would be chaos on the face of the earth. Some people think the blast of the last trumpet, which will be the cause of the thunderbolt, will be nothing but a stop in the revolution of the heavenly bodies. Then He tells us of the advantage of the sun for those living on the earth and says, “And placed therein a burning lamp.” He calls it a lamp because in reality it is all darkness, and light covers the darkness of the night, and if there be no lamp, man can get no advantage out of his sense of sight at night time; and in the same way if there were no sun the animals can have no benefit of their sense of seeing. He calls our attention to this advantage of the sun, ignoring others because it is the noblest of all the advantages and the most apparent of all. Then He tells us of His kindness in sending down rain, for the sake of the plants and the animals. The coming down of rain in an appointed proportion, and at an appointed season, for the cultivated fields cannot be by chance alone, but is the result of divine solicitude for us all. So He says, “And do We not send down from the clouds pressing forth rain, water pouring down in abundance that We may hereby produce corn and herbs, and gardens planted thick with trees.” There are many verses of the Quran on this subject. For instance, He says, “Do ye not see how God hath created the seven heavens, one above another, and hath placed the moon therein for a light, and hath appointed the sun for a taper? God hath also provided and caused you to bring forth corn from the earth.”[95] If we were to count all such verses and comment upon them showing the kindness of the Creator for the created, it would take too many volumes. We do not intend to do it in this book. If God should grant us life and leisure we shall write a book to show the kindness of God to which He has called our attention.

It should be known that this kind of argument is just contrary to that which the Asharites think leads to the knowledge of God. They think that the creation does not lead us to the knowledge of God through any of His goodness, but through possibility, that is, the possibility which is found in all things, which we can understand to be of his shape or of quite a contrary one. But if this possibility be found alike in both the cases, then there is no wisdom in the creation of the universe, and there is found no harmony between man and the parts of it. For, as they think, if it is possible for the things to have any other form than they have now, then there can exist no harmony between man and other existent things by the creation of which God has obliged man and commanded him to be thankful to Him. This opinion, by which the creation of man, as a part of the universe, is just as possible, for instance, as his creation in the void, is like the opinion of those who say that man exists but he could have been created in quite a different shape, and yet could perform actions like a man. According to them it is also possible that he may have formed the part of another universe quite different from the existing one. In that case the blessing of the universe can have no obligation for man, for they are not necessary for his purpose. Hence man is quite careless of them and they of him. So their existence is no blessing to him. This is all against the nature of man.

On the whole, a man who denies the existence of the effects arranged according to the causes in the question of arts, or whose wisdom cannot understand it, then he has no knowledge of the art of its Maker. So also a man who denies the existence of an order of effects in accordance with causes in this universe, denies the existence of the Creator altogether. Their saying that God is above these causes, and that they cannot have any bearing on the effects by His command, is very far from the true nature of philosophy, nay, it is a destroyer of it. For if it is possible to have the same effects with other than the prescribed causes just in the same degree as by them, then where is the greatness in producing the effects from the known Causes? It is so because the effects from the causes have one of the following three reasons. Either the existence of the causes will be in place of the effects by compulsion, as a man’s taking his food; or their being more perfect that is, the effect becoming better and more perfect through them, as a man’s having two eyes, or they may have neither a better nor a more compulsive effect. In this case the existence of the effect and the cause would be by chance, without any intention at all; and hence, there would be no greatness found in it. For instance, if the shape of human hand, the number of the fingers, and their length be neither necessary nor adding any perfection in its work in seizing things of different kind, then the actions of the hand from this shape, and number of parts, would be by chance alone. If it be so, then it makes no difference whether a man is given a hand or a hoof, or something else, like the different animals, for their particular actions. On the whole, if we ignore the causes and their effects, then there remains nothing to refute the arguments of those who believe in the creation of the universe by chance alone, that is, those who say that there is no Creator at all, and that which has come into being in this universe is the result of material causes. For taking one of the two alternatives it is not more possible that it may have happened by chance, than done by an independent Actor. So when the Asharites say that the existence of one or more possibilities shows that there is a particular Maker of these things, they can answer and say that the existence of things by one of these possibilities was by chance alone, for intention works as one of the causes, and that which happens without any means or cause is by chance. We see that many things come into being in this way. For example, the elements mix together by chance, and then by this unintentional mixing there is produced a new thing. They mix again, and this quite unintentionally produces quite a new thing. In this way every kind of creation may be said to have come into existence by chance.

We say that it is necessary that there be found order and arrangement, the more perfect and finished than what can be imagined. This mixing together of elements is limited and prearranged, and things produced by them are sure to happen, and no disorder has ever happened in them. But all this could not happen by chance alone, for that which happens in this way by chance is of the least value. It is to this that God refers, “It is the work of the Lord, who has rightly disposed all things.”[96] I would like to know what completeness can be found in things made by chance, for such things are by no means better than their opposites. To this God refers in the following words, “Thou canst not see in the Creation of the most Merciful any unfitness or disproportion. Lift thy eyes again to heaven, and _look whether thou seest any flaw_.”[97] But what defect can be greater than that all the things can be found with any other quality than they really possess. For the non-existent quality may be better than the existing one. In this way, if one thinks that were the Eastern movement to become Western and vice versa, there would be no difference in the universe, then he has destroyed philosophy altogether. He is like a man who thinks that were the right side of the animals to become left, and vice versa, there would be no difference at all for one of the two alternatives is there. For as it is possible to say that it is made according to one alternative by an independent Maker, so it is possible to assert that it was all made by chance alone. For we see so many things coming into being by themselves.

It is quite clear to you that all the people see that lower kinds of creation could have been made in a different way from that in which they really are and as they see this lower degree in many things they think that they must have been made by chance. But in the higher creation they know that it is impossible to have been made in a more perfect and excellent form than that given to it by the Creator. So this opinion, which is one of the opinions of the Mutakallimun is both against the Law and philosophy. What we say is that the opinion of possibility in creation is closer to a complete denial of God, than leading us nearer to Him. At the same time it falsifies philosophy. For if we do not understand that there is a mean between the beginnings and ends of the creation, upon which is based the ends of things, then there can neither be any order nor any method in it. And if they be wanting then there can be no proof of the existence of an intelligent and knowing Maker; for taking them together with cause and effect we are led to the fact that they must have been created by wisdom and knowledge. But on the other hand the existence of either of two possibilities shows that they may have been performed by a not-knowing Maker and by chance alone. Just as a stone falling on the earth may fall in any place, on any side, and in any form. It will show the want of the existence either of a creator at all or at least of a wise and knowing Creator. The thing which has compelled the Mutakallimun of the Asharites to adopt this opinion is a denial of the action of those natural forces which God has put in all things, as He has endowed them with life, power and so forth. They avoided the opinion that there was any other creator but God, and God forbid that there be any other, for he is the only creator of the causes and they are made effective by His command only. We will talk of this in detail when discoursing on Fate and Predestination. They were also afraid that by admitting the natural causes they might be accused of saying that the universe came into being by chance only. They would have known that a denial of it means a denial of a great part of the arguments, which can be advanced for a proof of the existence of God. One who denies any part of God’s creation denies His work which falls very near to a denial of a part of His attributes. On the whole as their opinion is based upon hasty conclusions, which come to the mind of a man by superficial thought and as apparently it appears that the word “intention” can be applied to one who has power to do bad or otherwise, they saw that if they did not admit that all the creation is possible, they would not be able to say that it came into existence by the action of an intending creator. So they say that all the creation is possible so that they may prove that the creator is an intelligent one. They never thought of the order which is necessary in things made, and with that their coming from an intelligent creator. These people have also ignored the blame they will have to bear in thus denying wisdom to the creator; or maintaining that chance should be found governing creation. They know, as we have said, that it is necessary, on account of the order existent in nature, that it must have been brought into being by some knowing creator, otherwise the order found in it would be by chance. When they were compelled to deny the natural forces, they had to deny with them a large number of those forces which God has made subservient to His command for the creation and preservation of things. For God has created some things from causes which He has produced from outside, these are the heavenly bodies; there are other things which He has made by causes placed in the things themselves, that is, the soul, and other natural forces, by which he preserves those things. So how wicked is the man who destroyeth philosophy, and “inventeth a lie about God.”[98]