Chapter II (5)

So those men can have no knowledge of God, when they admit that for every action there is an actor. It being so, the agreement of the Muslims on the fact that there is no Creator but God cannot be perfect, if we understand by it the denial of the existence of an agent in the visible world. For from the existence of the agent in it, we have brought an argument for the Creator in the invisible world. But when we have once admitted the existence of the Creator in the invisible world, it becomes clear that there is no Creative agent except one by His command and will. It is also evident that we can perform our own deeds, and that one who takes up only one side of the question is wrong, as is the case with the Mutazilites and the Jabarites. Those who adopt the middle Course, like the Asharites, for discovering the truth, cannot find it. For they make no difference for a man between the trembling and the movement of his hand by intention. There is no meaning in their admitting that both the movements are not by ourselves. Because if they are not by ourselves we have no power to check them, so we are compelled to do them. Hence there is no difference between trembling of hand and voluntary movement, which they would call acquired. So there is no difference between them, except in their names, which never effect the things themselves. This is all clear by itself.

Fourth Problem:--Divine Justice and Injustice. The Asharites have expressed a very peculiar opinion, both with regard to reason and religion; about this problem. They have explained it in a way in which religion has not, but have adopted quite an opposite method. They say that in this problem the case of the invisible world is quite opposed to the visible. They think that God is just or unjust within the limits of religious actions, so when a man’s action is just with regard to religion, he also is just; and whatever religion calls it to be unjust; He is unjust. They say that whatever has not been imposed as a divinely ordained duty upon men, does not come within the four walls of religion. He is neither just or unjust, but all His actions about such things are just. They have laid down that there is nothing in itself which may be called just or unjust. But to say that there is nothing which may in itself be called good or bad is simply intolerable. Justice is known as good, and injustice as bad. So according to them, polytheism is in itself neither injustice nor evil, but with regard to religion, and had religion ordained it, it would have been just and true. Such also would have been the case with any kind of sin. But all this is quite contrary to our traditions and reason. As to tradition God has described himself as just, and denied injustice to himself. He says “God hath borne witness that there is no God but He; and the angels and those who are endowed with wisdom profess the same, who executeth righteousness;”[142] and “Thy God is not unjust towards His servants;”[143] and again, “Verily God will not deal unjustly with men in any respect; but men deal unjustly with their own souls.”[144] It may be asked, What is your opinion about misleading the people, whether it is just or unjust, for God has mentioned in many a verse of the Quran, “That He leads as well as misleads the people?” He says, “God causeth to err whom He pleaseth, and directeth whom He pleaseth;”[145] and, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction.”[146] We would say that these verses cannot be taken exoterically, for there are many verses which apparently contradict them--the verses in which God denies injustice to himself. For instance, He says, “He liketh not ingratitude (_Kufr_) in His servant.”[147] So it is clear that as He does not like ingratitude even from them, He certainly cannot cause them to err. As to the statement of the Asharites that God sometimes does things which He does not like, and orders others which He does not want, God forbid us from holding such a view about him, for it is pure infidelity. That God has not misled the people and has not caused them to err will be clear to you from the following verses: “Wherefore be thou orthodox and set thy face towards true religion, the institution of God, to which He hath created man kindly disposed;”[148] and, “when thy Lord drew forth their posterity from the lions of the sons of Adam.”[149] A Tradition of the Prophet says, “Every child is born according to the divine constitution.”

These being contradictions in this problem we should try to reconcile them so that they may agree with reason. The verse, “Verily God will cause to err whom He pleaseth, and will direct whom He pleaseth” refers to the prearranged divine will, with which all things have been endowed. They have been created erring, that is, prepared to go astray by their very nature, and led to it by inner and outer causes. The meaning of the verse, “If we had pleased, we have given unto every soul its direction,” is that He thought of not creating people ready to err, by their nature, or by the outer causes or by both, He could have done so. But as the dispositions of men are different the words may mislead the one and direct the other. For these are the verses which speak of misleading the people. For instance, “He will thereby mislead many, and will direct many thereby: but He will not mislead any thereby except the transgressors”[150]; and, “We have appointed the vision which we showed thee, and also the tree cursed in the Quran,”[151] and the verses about the number of angels of hell. “Thus doth God cause to err whom He pleaseth and He directeth whom He pleaseth.”[152] It means that for evil natures, these verses are misleading, as for the sick bodies even good drugs are injurious. But some one may object and ask, what was the need of creating a class of men already prepared to err, for this is the worst kind of injustice? We would say that divine wisdom designated it so. The injustice would have consisted in its being otherwise. For the nature and constitution of men, in His very creation, are such that they require some men, though very few, to be wicked and evil by their nature. Such is also the case with the outer causes, made for directing the people to the right path, which requires that some men must be bad. If many had been good then the divine law would not have been fulfilled, because either there had not been created things in which there is little evil and much good, for the good would have disappeared on account of that little evil; or there had been created things with much good and little evil. Now it is well known that the existence of many good ones with a few evil ones, is better than the non-existence of much good for the sake of little evil. This very evil was the thing which remained hidden to the angels when God informed them that He was going to create upon the earth, a vicegerent, that is, a man. “When God said to the angels, I am going to place a substitute on earth, they said, wilt thou place there one who will do evil therein, and shed blood? but we celebrate thy praise, and sanctify Thee. God answered, Verily I know that which ye know not.”[153] He means that the thing which is hidden from them is that when there is found both good and evil in a thing, and good overpowers the evil, reason requires the creation of the one for the destruction of the other. So from all these it is clear how misleading can be attributed to Him, in spite of His justice, and injustice disproved. The causes of misleading are created, because from them appear the causes of direction to good. For some people have not been given causes of direction to good in which there is found nothing which may lead to erring. Such is the condition of the angels. So also the causes of good have those evil, though in their nature much evil be not found; this applies to man. It may be asked: What is the use of these contradictory verses, thus compelling the people to take refuge in interpretations, which you have absolutely forbidden? We would say that to explain this problem to the common people, they have been compelled to adopt this method. For they should know that God is just, and that He is the Creator of all good and evil, instead of believing, as many nations have done, that there are two Gods, the creator of good, and the creator of evil. So now they know that He is the Creator of both. As misleading is evil, and as there is no Creator but He, it was necessary that it should be attributed to Him, like the creation of evil. But this should be done without qualifying it, that is, that He created good for its own sake, and evil for the sake of good--on account of their connection with one another. In this way His creation of evil would be quite just. To illustrate: fire has been made because of its necessity for the existence of things, and without it they could not have existed at all. It also destroys things by its very nature. But if you think of the destruction and evil which it causes, and compare it to the advantages which we derive out of it, you will find that its existence is better than non-existence, that is,--good. Now the verse of the Quran “No account shall be demanded of him for what He shall do; but an account shall be demanded of them,” means that He does nothing because it is incumbent upon him for it is degrading to him, to need doing a thing. If it be so, God needs that thing for His own existence, because of necessity or to be more perfect in His Being--and God is free from such imperfections. Man is just because he gains something good by being so, which he cannot gain otherwise. God is just, not that He may become more perfect by His justice, but because His perfection requires him to be just. When we understand it in this way it would be evident, that He is not just in the same way as man is just. But it is not right to say that He is not just at all, and that all His actions are neither just nor unjust, as the Mutakallimuns have thought. For it cannot be understood by human intellect, and is at the same time falsifying religion. These people knew the meaning but were misled. For if we say that He is not at all just, we falsify the principle that there are things which are just and good in themselves and others which are evil and unjust. Again, if we suppose that He is just in the same way as man is, it becomes necessary to admit there is some defect in him. For one who is just, his existence is for the sake of things for which he is just, and so he is dependent upon another.

It should now be known that it is not necessary for all the people to be told this interpretation in its entirety. Only those should be told it who have some doubts about this problem. For not every one among the common people is confronted by these contradictions in the universal verses, and Tradition. Such people must believe in the exoteric meanings of them. There is another reason for these verses. The common people cannot differentiate between possible and impossible, while to God is not ascribed power over the impossible. If they be told what is impossible (_Mustahil_) and they think that God has power over it, and then told that God has no power, they begin to think that there is some defect in God, because He cannot do a certain thing and hence He is weak. As the existence of things free from evil was possible according to the masses, God has said, “If we had pleased, we had certainly given every soul its direction; but the word which hath proceeded from Me must necessarily be fulfilled, when I said, Verily I will fill the hell with genii and men, altogether.”[154] This verse means one thing to the common people, and the other to the learned. The former take it to mean that it is not incumbent upon him that He should create a class of men to whom evil may be attached. But it really means: Had we thought we could create men with whom evil could not be attached, but would have been good in all and all, and hence every one had been given his guidance. This much is enough for this problem. Now we would deal with the fifth question.

Problem fifth: Of the Conditions of the Day of Judgment:--The Day of Judgment is a thing in which all the religions are agreed, and all the learned men have proved it by arguments. The religions differ about the conditions of its existence; nay, in reality they do not differ about its condition, but about the visible things by which they should explain to the common people the conditions of the unseen. There are some religions which have made it only spiritual, that is, meant only for the souls; while others have thought it to be both physical and spiritual. The reconciliation in this matter depends upon the testimony of divine revelation, and the necessary arguments of all the learned men, that is, that for a man there are two blessings: of the present world, and of the world to come, which is itself established upon principles, admitted by all to be true. One of them is that when it is clear that all the existent things have not been created in vain, but for some particular work assigned to them, which is the sum total of their life, then man is far fitter to be placed under this category. God himself has warned us of the existence of this purpose in all the created things. He says in the Quran, “We have created the heavens and the earth, and whatever is between them, in vain. This is the opinion of the unbelievers.”[155] Again, He says, describing and praising the learned men, who have understood, the real and inner purpose of this existence, “Who remember God standing, and sitting, and lying on their sides; and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth, saying, O Lord, thou hast not created this in vain; far be it from thee therefore, deliver us from the torment of hell fire.”[156] The ultimate purpose in the creation of man is still more evident in him, than in other things. God has informed us of it in many a verses of the Quran. He says, “Did ye think that we had created you in sport; and that ye should not be brought again before us,”[157] and, “Doth man think, that he shall be left at full liberty, without control?”[158] and further on He says, “I have not created genii and men for any other end, but that they should serve me.”[159] That is the genius out of all creation which could know him. Again, He says, informing us of the importance of knowing God, “What reason have I that I should not worship him who hath created me? for unto him shall ye return.”[160] Now it being clear that man has been created for a certain work, it is evident that the work should be of a particular kind. For we see that everything has been created for a certain work, which is found in it, and in none other; that is, it is specialised in it. This being so, it is necessary that the real purpose of man’s creation be those deeds which are found in him, and in no other animal. These deeds pertain to his rational powers. As there are two portions of the rational powers,--practical and theoretical--it is evident that the first kind of thing is demanded of him. That is, that his faculties of knowledge and science should be found in their perfection. The deed by which soul acquires perfection in those two faculties are goodness and virtue, and those that retard it are evil and wicked. And as these actions are most of them fixed by divine revelation, religions appeared to fix them. With that there also appears a knowledge of those qualities, exhorting the people towards them. They ordered men to act upon goodness, and shew evil. They taught them the quantity of the deeds which will be good for all the people, both in practice and in knowledge taken together. They also taught them the theoretical knowledge of things, which all the people should know, such as the knowledge of God, angels, of higher creation, and of goodness. In this way they also taught them the quantity of the acts which would be necessary to make the souls excel in virtue. This is especially the case with our religion, Islam, for when compared with other religions, it is found that it is absolutely _the_ best religion. Hence it was the last of divine dispensations.

Now divine revelation has informed us in all the religions that the soul will live, and all the argument of the learned people have established the same. The souls are freed from physical desires after death. If they be pure, their purity is doubled by this freedom from desires. If they be evil this separation increases their depravity, for they are troubled by the evil which they have already earned, and their regret increases about the opportunities which they lost before their separation from the body, for this purification is not possible without it. It is to this that following verse refers:--A soul would say, “Alas, for that I have been negligent in my duties towards God: Verily I have been one of the scorners.”[161] All the religions agree about this condition of man, and call it his last goodness or misery. This being so, there could not be found in the visible world anything which may be given as an illustration, so there is a difference in its description in the revelations given to different prophets. We mean to say, that there is a difference in illustrating the condition of the good and bad soul on that occasion. There are some which have not given any illustrations of that happiness or misery which the good and bad souls will have there. They have only said that the conditions there would be only spiritual, and pleasures angelic. Others have given instances from the visible world; that is, they have given the examples of the pleasures here for the pleasures of the next world, after deducting the trouble borne in acquiring them, and in the same way, they have illustrated the misery there, by the example of misery here, after deducting the pleasure which we derive from it. Either the people of these religions received from God revelations which those did not receive who made the next world purely spiritual, or they saw, that illustrations from things visible are best understood by the common people and that they are best led so or checked from an action through them. So they said that God will put back the good souls in their respective bodies, and the best possible ease--in paradise. The bad souls will also return to their bodies, where they will be in the worst possible misery, which they call hell-fire.

This is true of our religion, Islam, in illustrating the conditions of the next world. There are many verses of the Quran which contain arguments as to the possibilities of the conditions of that world, which can be understood and verified by all. For our reason cannot apprehend these things more than the possibility of knowing which is common to all, and which is of the kind of analogy of the existence of the like from the being of the like, that is of its coming into being. It is an analogy of the coming into being of the small from the existence of the big and the great. For instance, God says, “And He propoundeth unto us a comparison and forgetteth His Creation.”[162] In these verses the argument used is the analogy of the return of the beginning, when both are equal. In the following verse the argument of those is refuted who differentiate between the real and _return_ of the same thing. He says, “He giveth you fire out of a green tree.”[163] The doubt is that the birth was from heat and moisture, while the return will be from cold and dryness. So this doubt is met by the fact that God can create the contrary from the contrary, as He can create the like from the like. The analogy is drawn from the existence of the little from the great. For example, God says, “Is not He who has created the Heavens and the earth able to create new creatures like unto them! yea, certainly; for He is the wise Creator.”[164] These verses have two arguments for proving the resurrection and at the same time refuting the arguments of those denying it. Were we to quote the verses which give this proof our discourse would be lengthened. But all of them are of the kind we have mentioned.

So, as we have already said, all the religions are agreed that there is a blessing or misery for the human soul after death, but differ in illustrating the conditions of that moment and in explaining it to the common people. It seems that the illustration in our religion is the most perfect of all for the understanding of the people, and at the same time most inciting of them all to gain for their souls the advantages of that day. And it is the many with whom lies the primary purpose of religion. The spiritual illustration would be least inciting to the common people for desiring the things of hereafter. So they would have little liking for it, while they would fear the physical illustration. So it seems that the physical illustration would be most exciting to them, than the spiritual, while the latter would appeal only to the controversialists among the scholastic theologians, who are always very few in number. Hence we find that the Muslims have been divided into three parties about the meaning of the conditions of the Day of Judgment. One party says that that existence would be just like our present one, as regards pleasures and enjoyments, that is, they think that both are of the same genius, but differ in perpetuity and termination: the one is for ever and the others come to an end. The other party thinks that the two existences are different. But this is again subdivided into two parties. The one thinks that that existence with our present faculties is spiritual, but has been described as physical. For this there are many religious arguments which it would be useless to repeat here. The other party says that that existence is physical only; but they at the same time believe, that the body will be different from our present body. This is only transient, that will be eternal. For this also there are religious arguments. It seems that even Abdullah B. Abbas held this view. For it is related of him that he said, “There is nought in this world of the hereafter, but names.” It seems that this view is better suited to the learned men because its possibility is based upon principles, in which there is no disagreement according to all men: the one being that the soul is immortal, and the second is that the return of the souls into other bodies does not look so impossible as the return of the bodies themselves. It is so because the material of the bodies here is found following and passing from one body to another, i. e.; one and the same matter is found in many people and in many different times. The example of bodies cannot be found, for their matter is the same. For instance a man dies and his body becomes dissolved into earth. The earth ultimately becomes dissolved into vegetable, which is eaten by quite a different man from whom another man comes into being. If we suppose them to be different bodies, then our aforesaid view cannot be true.

The truth about this question is that man should follow that which he himself has thought out but anyhow it should not be the view which may deny the fundamental principle altogether. For this would be denying its existence. Such a belief leads to infidelity, on account of a distinct knowledge of this condition being given to man, both by religion and by human reason, which is all based upon the eternal nature of the soul. If it be said whether there is any argument or information in the Law about this eternal nature of the soul, we would say that it is found in the Quran itself. God says, “God taketh unto himself the souls of men at the time of their death; and those which die not He also taketh in their sleep.”[165] In this verse sleep and death have been placed upon the same level, on account of the change in its instrument, and in sleep on account of a change in itself. For had it not been so it would not have come to its former condition after awakening. By this means we know that this cession does not effect its essence, but was only attached to it on account of change in its instrument. So it does not follow that with a cessation of the work of the instrument, the soul also ceases to exist. Death is only a cessation of work, so it is clear that its condition should be like that of sleep. As someone has said that if an old man were to get the eyes of the young, he would begin to see like him.

This is all that we thought of in an exposition of the beliefs of our religion, Islam. What remains for us is to look into things of religion in which interpretation is allowed and not allowed. And if allowed, then who are the people to take advantage of it? With this thing we would finish our discourse.

The things found in the Law can be divided into five kinds. But in the first place, there are only two kinds of things: indivisible and the divisible. The second one is divided into four kinds. The first kind which is mentioned in the Quran, is quite clear in its meanings. The second is that in which the thing mentioned is not the thing meant but is only an example of it. This is again divided into four kinds. First, the meanings which it mentions are only illustrations such that they can only be known by the far-fetched and compound analogies, which cannot be understood, but after a long time and much labour. None can accept them but perfect and excellent natures; and it cannot be known that the illustration given is not the real thing; except by this far-fetched way. The second is just the opposite of the former: they can be understood easily, and it can be known that the example is just what is meant here. Thirdly, it can be easily known that it is merely an illustration, but what it is the example of is difficult to comprehend. The fourth kind is quite opposite to the former. The thing of which it is an example, is easily understood; while it is difficult to know that it is an example at all. The interpretation of the first kind is wrong without doubt. The kind in which both the things are far-fetched: its interpretation particularly lies with those who are well-grounded in knowledge; and an exposition of it is not fit for any but the learned. The interpretation of its opposite--that which can be understood on both the sides--is just what is wanted, and an exposition of it is necessary. The case of the third kind is like the case of the above. For in it illustration has not been mentioned because of the difficulty for the common people to understand it: it only incites the people to action. Such is the case with the tradition of the prophet; “The black stone is God’s action on Earth,” etc. etc. That which can be easily known that is an example, but difficult to know of which it is example, should not be interpreted but for the sake of particular persons and learned men. Those who understand that it is only an illustration, but are not learned enough to know the thing which it illustrates, should be told either that it is allegorical and can be understood by the well-established learned men; or the illustration should be changed in a way which might be near to their understanding. This would be the best plan to dispel doubts from their minds.

The law about this should be that which has been laid down by Abu Hamid (Al Ghazzali) in his book, _Al Tafriga bainal Islam wal Zindiga_. It should be understood that one thing has five existences which he calls by the name of _essential_ (_Zati_); sensual (_Hissi_); rational (_Agli_); imaginative (_Khayali_) and doubtful (_Shilbhi_). So at the time of doubt it should be considered which of these five kinds would better satisfy the man who has doubts. If it be that which he has called _essential_ then an illustration would best satisfy their minds. In it is also included the following traditions of the Prophet, “Whatever the earlier prophets saw I have seen it from my place here, even heaven and hell.” “Between my cistern of water and the pulpit, there is a garden of paradise;” and “The earth will eat up the whole of a man except the extremity of the tail.” All these, it can easily be known are but illustrations, but what is the thing which they illustrate, it is difficult to comprehend. So it is necessary in this case to give an instance to the people which they may easily understand. This kind of illustration, when used on such an occasion is allowable; but when used irrelevantly it is wrong. Abu Hamid has not decided about the occasion when both the sides of the question--the illustration and the illustrated--be both far-fetched and difficult to understand. In this case there would apparently be a doubt, but a doubt without any foundation. What should be done is to prove that the doubt has no basis, but no interpretation should be made, as we have shown in many places in our present book against the Mutakallimun, Asharites and the Mutazalites.

The fourth kind of occasion is quite opposite to the former. In this it is very difficult to understand that it is an example, but when once understood, you can easily comprehend the thing illustrated. In the interpretation of this also, there is a consideration: about those people who know that if it is an example, it illustrates such and such a thing; but they doubt whether it is an illustration at all. If they are not learned people, the best thing to do with them is not to make any interpretation, but only to prove the fallacy of the views which they hold about its being an illustration at all. It is also possible that an interpretation may make them still distant from the truth, on account of the nature of the illustration and the illustrated. For these two kinds of occasions if an interpretation is given, they give rise to strange beliefs, far from the law which when disclosed are denied by the common people, Such has been the case with the Sufis, and those learned men who have followed them. When this work of interpretation was done by people who could not distinguish between these occasions, and made no distinction between the people for whom the interpretation is to be made, there arose differences of opinion, at last forming into sects, which ended in accusing one another with unbelief. All this is pure ignorance of the purpose of the Law.

From what we have already said the amount of mischief done by interpretation must have become clear to you. We always try to acquire our purpose by knowing what should be interpreted, and what not, and when interpreted, how it should be done; and whether all the difficult portions of the Law and Traditions are to be explained or not. These are all included in the four kinds which have already been enumerated.

The purpose of our writing this book is now completed. We took it up because we thought that it was the most important of all purposes--connected with God and the Law.

FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 25: A translation of _Al-Kashf’an Manhij i’l Adillah fi Aqaid il Millah, we Tarif ma Waqa fiha bi Hasb i’l Ta’wil min Shubhi’l Muzighah wa Bid’ill Mudillah_.]

[Footnote 26: Quran ii, 19.]

[Footnote 27: Quran xiv, 11.]

[Footnote 28: Quran xxxix, 39.]

[Footnote 29: Quran vi, 75.]

[Footnote 30: Quran xvi, 42.]

[Footnote 31: Quran ii, 282.]

[Footnote 32: Quran xxix, 69.]

[Footnote 33: Quran viii, 29.]

[Footnote 34: Quran xxii, 72.]

[Footnote 35: Quran vii, 184.]

[Footnote 36: Quran lxxvii, 6-16.]

[Footnote 37: Quran xxv, 62.]

[Footnote 38: Quran lxxx, 24.]

[Footnote 39: Quran lxxxvi, 6.]

[Footnote 40: Quran lxxxviii, 17.]

[Footnote 41: Quran xxii, 72.]

[Footnote 42: Quran vi, 79. The story referred to will be found in the preceding verses.]

[Footnote 43: Quran ii, 19.]

[Footnote 44: Quran xxxvi, 33.]

[Footnote 45: Quran iii, 188.]

[Footnote 46: Quran vii, 171.]

[Footnote 47: Quran iii, 16.]

[Footnote 48: Quran xvii, 46.]

[Footnote 49: Quran xxi, 22.]

[Footnote 50: Quran xxiii, 93.]

[Footnote 51: Quran xvii, 44.]

[Footnote 52: Quran ii, 256.]

[Footnote 53: Quran xvii, 45, 46.]

[Footnote 54: Quran lxxvii, 14.]

[Footnote 55: Quran vi, 59.]

[Footnote 56: Quran xix, 65.]

[Footnote 57: Quran xvi, 42.]

[Footnote 58: Quran xlii, 50.]

[Footnote 59: Quran liii, 8, 10.]

[Footnote 60: Quran iv, 162.]

[Footnote 61: Quran xix, 43.]

[Footnote 62: Quran xxi, 67.]

[Footnote 63: Quran v, 77.]

[Footnote 64: Quran xlii, 9.]

[Footnote 65: Quran xvi, 17.]

[Footnote 66: Quran xxv, 60.]

[Footnote 67: Quran ii, 256.]

[Footnote 68: Quran xx, 54.]

[Footnote 69: Quran xxxv, 39.]

[Footnote 70: Quran xxx, 29.]

[Footnote 71: Quran xxxv, 41.]

[Footnote 72: Quran ii, 256.]

[Footnote 73: Quran xlii, 9.]

[Footnote 74: Quran xliv, 2.]

[Footnote 75: Quran xxxv, 10.]

[Footnote 76: Quran lxx, 4.]

[Footnote 77: Quran lxxxix, 23.]

[Footnote 78: Quran xvii, 87.]

[Footnote 79: Quran ii, 260.]

[Footnote 80: Quran xxiv, 35.]

[Footnote 81: He also saw him another time, by the lote-tree, beyond which there is no passing: near it is the garden of eternal abode. _When the lote-tree covered that which it covered_, his eye-sight turned not aside, nor did it wander: and he really beheld some of the greater signs of his Lord. (Quran lii, 16, 18.) The lote-tree is the limit beyond which neither angel nor man can pass. It stands in the seventh heaven, on the right hand of the Throne of God.]

[Footnote 82: Quran lxix, 17.]

[Footnote 83: Quran xxxii, 2.]

[Footnote 84: Quran lxx, 4.]

[Footnote 85: Quran lxvii, 16.]

[Footnote 86: Quran xl, 59.]

[Footnote 87: Quran iii, 5.]

[Footnote 88: Quran ii, 24.]

[Footnote 89: Quran iii, 5.]

[Footnote 90: Quran vi, 103.]

[Footnote 91: They will ask the concerning the Soul: answer, The Soul was created at the command of my Lord: but ye have no knowledge given unto you, except a little.--(Quran xxii, 85.)]

[Footnote 92: Quran lxxvii, 3, et. seq.]

[Footnote 93: Quran ii, 99.]

[Footnote 94: Quran xxi, 33.]

[Footnote 95: Quran lxxi, 14-16.]

[Footnote 96: Quran xxvii, 90.]

[Footnote 97: Quran lxvii, 3.]

[Footnote 98: Quran iii, 88.]

[Footnote 99: Quran xi, 9.]

[Footnote 100: Quran vii, 52.]

[Footnote 101: Quran xli, 10.]

[Footnote 102: Quran iii, 5.]

[Footnote 103: Quran ii, 8.]

[Footnote 104: Quran xvii, 92-95.]

[Footnote 105: Quran, xvii, 61.]

[Footnote 106: Quran xvii, 90.]

[Footnote 107: Quran xi, 16.]

[Footnote 108: Quran iv, 161, 162.]

[Footnote 109: Quran xlvi, 8.]

[Footnote 110: Quran iv, 173.]

[Footnote 111: Quran iv, 168.]

[Footnote 112: Quran iv, 160.]

[Footnote 113: Quran iv, 164.]

[Footnote 114: Quran xxix, 47.]

[Footnote 115: Quran lxii, 2.]

[Footnote 116: Quran vii, 156.]

[Footnote 117: Quran vii, 156.]

[Footnote 118: Quran liv, 49.]

[Footnote 119: Quran xiii, 9.]

[Footnote 120: Quran lvii, 22.]

[Footnote 121: Quran xlii, 32.]

[Footnote 122: Quran xlii, 32.]

[Footnote 123: Quran x, 28.]

[Footnote 124: Quran ii, 278.]

[Footnote 125: Quran xli, 16.]

[Footnote 126: Quran iii, 159.]

[Footnote 127: Quran iii, 160.]

[Footnote 128: Quran iv, 81.]

[Footnote 129: Quran iv, 80.]

[Footnote 130: Quran xiii, 12.]

[Footnote 131: Quran lxxxv, 22.]

[Footnote 132: Quran xxvii, 67.]

[Footnote 133: Quran vi, 59.]

[Footnote 134: Quran lxvii, 14.]

[Footnote 135: Quran xvi, 12.]

[Footnote 136: Quran xxviii, 71.]

[Footnote 137: Quran xviii, 73.]

[Footnote 138: Quran xlv, 12.]

[Footnote 139: Quran xiv, 37.]

[Footnote 140: Quran xxii, 72.]

[Footnote 141: “Hast thou not considered him who disputed with Abraham concerning his Lord, because God had given him the Kingdom? When Abraham Said, My Lord is He who giveth life and killeth: he answered, I give life and kill, Abraham said, verily God bringeth the sun from the east do thou bring it from the west; whereupon the infidel was confounded; for God directeth not the ungodly people.” Quran ii, 260.]

[Footnote 142: Quran iii, 16.]

[Footnote 143: Quran xli, 46.]

[Footnote 144: Quran x, 45.]

[Footnote 145: Quran xiv, 4.]

[Footnote 146: Quran xxxii, 11.]

[Footnote 147: Quran xxxix, 9.]

[Footnote 148: Quran xxx, 29.]

[Footnote 149: Quran vii, 171.]

[Footnote 150: Moreover, God will not be ashamed to propound in a parable of a great, or even a more despicable thing: for they who believe will know it to be true from their Lord; but the unbelievers will say, what meaneth by this parable? He will thereby mislead etc. (Quran ii, 24).]

[Footnote 151: Quran xvii, 62. By the _vision_ may be meant the Prophet’s night journey to heaven or the vision which he saw at Hudaibiyyah, seeing himself entering Mecca or his vision about the Omayyeds.]

[Footnote 152: Quran lxxiv, 34.]

[Footnote 153: Quran ii, 28.]

[Footnote 154: Quran xxxii, 14.]

[Footnote 155: Quran xxxviii, 26.]

[Footnote 156: Quran iii, 188.]

[Footnote 157: Quran xxiii, 117.]

[Footnote 158: Quran lxxv, 36.]

[Footnote 159: Quran li, 56.]

[Footnote 160: Quran xxxvi, 21.]

[Footnote 161: Quran xxxix, 57.]

[Footnote 162: Quran xxxvi, 78.]

[Footnote 163: Quran xxxvi, 80.]

[Footnote 164: Quran xxxxvi, 81.]

[Footnote 165: Quran xxxix, 43.]

Transcriber’s Notes

The cover image was created by the transcriber, and is placed in the Public Domain. Obvious typographical errors and variable spelling were corrected. Quran reference formatting has been made uniform to e.g. “Quran xxv, 60.” The following corrections have been made to the text:

Page Original New ---------------------------------------------------------------- 14 cogniscance cognisance 28 heavena heavens 30 concensus consensus 53 cogniscance cognisance 60 necessarry necessary 60 shonld should 60 interpretes interprets 64 Qnran Quran 67 tbe the 69 Mutazalites Mutazilites 71 Mutakallimum Mutakallimun 76 he be 91 upo upon 97 nevertheles nevertheless 98 nonexistent non-existent 129 no not 135 s is 137 controvertialist controversialist 143 Mutakalimun Mutakallimun 147 bows bows’ 161 Quran Quran xxx, 28. [Footnote 46] 162 Quran Quran xxxv, 41. [Footnote 47] 166 ii 10 [Footnote 51] 174 Maati Maali 186 by be 193 Quran Quran vi, 103. [Footnote 66] 194 th the 198 imposible impossible 207 excep except [Footnote 67] 219 beeause because 222 pre-arranged prearranged 244 there-of thereof 251 repeatsd repeated 251 appearence appearance 257 Qnran Quran [Footnote 93] 259 distingished distinguished 261 Quran LIVI Quran liv, 262 Quarn Quran [Footnote 102] 265 Mutazlites Mutazilites 265 intellegible intelligible 266 perfom perform 266 use us 269 YXVII XXVII [Footnote 108] 270 things things: 274 [Removed duplicate footnote 111. Numbers of the subsequent footnotes corrected.] 276 [118] [Removed second, unused footnote anchor] 277 alsays always 277 in an 278 thay they 278 their there 278 there their 279 Injusitce Injustice 280 [Added footnote anchors, footnotes on next page] 282 [Added footnote anchors] 282 Quran, XXXV, 9 [Removed footnote, as no matching quran quote was found in the text] 283 [Added footnote anchors] 285 in-spite in spite 285 [Added footnote anchor] 286 contradictary contradictory 286 Crertor Creator 286 attributd attributed 289 131 Quran, XXX, 14. 131 Quran, XXXII, 14. 292 that That 293 theoratical theoretical 295 that is, ... world; [Removed duplicate part] 296 mirsery misery 296 possiblities possibilities 299 divded divided 300 enternal eternal 300 reilgious religious 304 farfetched far-fetched 305 than then 306 occassion occasion 306 irrelevently irrelevantly 306 Mutazalites Mutazilites 307 man men 308 interperetation interpretation