Chapter III: Part 3

Before we take up the two sets of facts relied upon by them in support of either position we may express our general agreement with them as regards the gravity of the task and the immensity of the problem. The size of the country and the vastness of its population are the measure of the extent of the problem. The existence of powerful vested interests at present possessed by the ruling race which may be interfered with by extended changes in the system of Government are the measure of its gravity. "The welfare and happiness of hundreds of millions of people," which the authors say are in issue cannot be adequately provided for by any autocratic system of Government however benevolent its purpose, and however magnificent its organisation. An "absolute government" is an anachronism, but when it is foreign it is doubly so. To bring out "the best in the people" for their own "welfare and happiness" as well as for that of mankind in general, it is necessary that the people should be free to develop on their own lines, manage their own affairs, evolve their own life, subject only to such restrictions as the general interests of humanity demand; and subject to such guidance as the better placed and more experienced people of the earth can furnish.

The people of India are willing to be guided in their development towards modern democracy by the people of Great Britain and they would be grateful for their coöperation in this difficult task, but they must be made to realize that the task is their own and that they should undertake it in a spirit of courageous faith--faith in their destiny, faith in their ability to achieve it, and faith in the friendship of the great British nation. The test of all measures in relation to the Government of India in future should be, not how far the people of India can coöperate, how far they can be entrusted with responsibility, but how far it is necessary _in their interests_ to control and check them. The difference between the two points of view is fundamental and important. Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford have looked at the problem from the former point of view; the Indian leaders want them to look at it from the latter. They want the great British nation to recognise the justice of India's claim to manage her own affairs, and to keep in their hands in future only such control as is absolutely necessary (a) to enable the Indian people to conduct their business efficiently and successfully, (b) to make them fulfill their obligations to the great Commonwealth of nations of which they hope soon to be a component part. As long as British statesmen insist on looking at the problem from the former point of view, they will make mistakes and raise a not entirely unreasonable suspicion of their motives. The moment they adopt the other point of view, they remove all grounds of distrust and create an atmosphere of friendliness in which they can deal with the problem in a spirit of mutual trust, absolute frankness and candid perspicacity. There are many contentions of the British statesmen which the educated Indians would gladly admit to be valid and necessary were they sure that their admission would not be used against them by the power whom they habitually regard as their adversary. There is much in this report which could at once be struck out if both parties were actuated by feelings of mutual trust and friendliness. It cannot be denied that many of the proposed restrictions on the power of the popular assemblies and the would-be Indian Administrators are the outcome of distrust. It is no wonder then that the Indian leaders in their turn are not quite sure of the face value of the many professions of good will that characterise the scheme. It is for the removal of this distrust that we appeal as earnestly as we can to the better mind of Great Britain.

In looking at the conditions of the problem, there is another fallacy which underlies the oft-exaggerated estimates of the blessings of British rule in India by British statesmen and British publicists. They compare the India of today with the India of 1757 and at once jump to the conclusion that "the moral and material civilisation of the Indian people has made more progress in the last fifty years than during all the preceding centuries of their history." The proper comparison is of the Great Britain, the France, the United States, the Germany, the Italy and the Japan of 1757, with the India of that year and of India's progress within the last century and a half, or even within the last 50 years, with the progress of these countries in the same period. We have no desire to withhold credit for what Great Britain has done in India, but what she has misdone or could have done but failed to do, by virtue of her rule in India being absolute and thus necessarily conditioned by limitations inevitable in a system of absolute rule, should not be forgotten.

The Indian critics of British rule in India have repeatedly pointed out that what they condemned and criticised was the _system_ and not the personnel of the Government, and the distinguished authors of the Report "very frankly recognise that the character of political institutions reacts upon the character of the people" and that the exercise of responsibilities calls forth capacity for it (Paragraph 130), which mainly accounts for the conditions that serve as reasons for withholding responsible government from the Indian people. In discussing "the basis of responsibility" Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford very properly point out that the qualities necessary for it are only developed by exercise and that though "they are greatly affected by education, occupation and social organisation" "they ultimately rest on the traditions and habits of the people." "We cannot go simply to statistics for the measure of these things." Yet, unfortunately, it is exactly these statistics that seem to have influenced them largely in the framing of their half-hearted measures. The two dominating conditions which obsess them are (1) that the immense masses of the people are poor, ignorant and helpless far beyond the standards of Europe; and (2) that there runs through Indian society a series of cleavages--of religion, race and caste--which constantly threaten its solidarity.

We admit the existence of these conditions, but we do not admit that they are an effective bar to the beginnings of responsible government even on that scale on which European countries had it when the conditions of life in those countries were no better than they are now in India.

It is said that 226 of 244 millions of people in British India live a rural life: "agriculture is the one great occupation of the people" and "the proportion of these who even give a thought to matters beyond the horizon of their villages is very small." We ask did not similar conditions exist in Great Britain, France and Germany before the inauguration of the Industrial Revolution, and if they did, did they stand in the way of their people getting responsible government or parliamentary institutions? Everyone knows what the conditions in France were in years immediately preceding the Revolution. Italy was no better off in the middle of the nineteenth century. Perhaps it is not much better even today. The masses of the people in these and other countries of Europe, including Great Britain, were far more ignorant, poor and helpless when these countries obtained parliamentary government than they are in India today. And the authors of the report are not unaware that similar concerns are perhaps the main interests of the population of some country districts in the United Kingdom even today. In several of the Balkan States, Roumania, Serbia and Bulgaria--in Italy and in the component parts of Russia--the conditions are no better, yet their right to autonomous government, nay, even to absolute independence, is hardly questioned. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Mr. Sidney Webb,

"It is a mistake to assume that a land of villages necessarily
means what is usually implied by the phrase, a people of
villagers. In truth, India, for all its villages, has been also,
at all known periods, and to-day still is, perhaps, to a greater
extent than ever before, what Anglo-Saxon England, for instance
was _not_ or the South African Republic in the days before gold
had been discovered, and what the Balkan peninsula even at the
present time may perhaps not be, namely a land of flourishing
cities, of a distinctly urban civilization, exhibiting not only
splendid architecture, and the high development of the
manufacturing arts made possible by the concentration of
population and wealth, but likewise--what is much more
important--a secretion of thought, an accumulation of knowledge,
and a development of literature and philosophy which are not in
the least like the characteristic products of villages as we know
them in Europe or America. And to-day, although the teeming crowds
who throng the narrow lanes of Calcutta or Benares, Bombay or
Poona, Madras or Hyderabad, or even the millions who temporarily
swarm at Hardwar or Allahabad or Puri may include only a small
percentage of the whole population, yet the Indian social order
does not seem to be, in the European understanding of the phrase,
either on its good or on its bad side, essentially one of the
villagers. The distinction may be of importance, because the Local
Government developed by peoples of villages, as we know of them in
Anglo-Saxon England, in the early days of the South African
Republic, and in the Balkan States, is of a very different type
from that which takes root and develops, even in the villages, in
those nations which have also a City life, centers of religious
activity, colleges and universities, and other 'nodal points,'
from which emanate, through popular literature, pilgrimages, and
the newspaper press, slow but far-spreading waves of thought and
feeling, and aspirations which it is fatal to ignore."[1]

We have also quoted, in the chapter on "Democracy in India," the statement of Morse Stephens, about the condition of the people of Europe in the eighteenth century.

EDUCATIONAL BACKWARDNESS

"The Educational returns," remark the authors of the Report, "tell us much the same story," viz., the appalling dissimilarity of conditions in Europe and in India. While it is painfully true that the percentage of illiteracy in India is greater than in any of the countries of Europe, we cannot admit that that fact is a fatal bar to the beginnings of responsible government in India or to the granting of a democratic constitution to the country. Literacy is, no doubt, a convenient, but by no means a sure index of the intelligence of the people, even much less of their character. The political status of a country is determined more by intelligence and character than by literacy. In these the people of India are inferior to none. By that we do not mean that they are possessed of the same kind of political responsibility as the people of the United Kingdom or of France or of Germany or of the United States, but only that by intelligence and character they are quite fitted to start on the road to responsible government, at least to such kind as was conceded for the first time to Canada, Australia, Italy, the Balkan States, Austria, Hungary, etc. The illiteracy of the masses may be a good reason for not introducing universal suffrage, but it is hardly a valid reason for refusing a kind of constitution which may place India in the same position, in the matter of responsible Government, as Great Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Italy and the United States were when those countries showed the same percentage of illiteracy. Literacy has nowhere been the test of political power. Burma had almost no illiteracy when the British took possession of it; its population was absolutely homogeneous and the solidarity of the nation ran no risk from "cleavages of religion, race and caste." Even today Burma has the highest figures of literacy in the whole of British India. In that respect it occupies a higher position than Roumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, many of the Russian States and perhaps even Italy and Hungary and possibly some of the South American Republics. In the matter of race and religion, too, its position is better than that of the countries mentioned, yet the authors of the Report do not propose to concede to it even such beginnings of responsible government as they are prepared to grant to the other provinces of India. The fact is that mere literacy does not play an important part in the awakening of political consciousness in a people. It is a useful ingredient of character required for the exercise of political power but by no means essential.

POVERTY

The argument based on poverty is of still less force. On the other hand, it is the best reason why the people of India should have the power to determine and carry out their fiscal policy. We hope the admissions made in Paragraph 135 of the Report which we bodily reproduce[2] will once for all dispose of the silly statement, so often repeated even by men who ought to know better, that materially India has been highly prosperous under British rule. If so, how is it that in the language of the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy "enormous masses of the population have little to spare for more than the necessaries of life"? What about the prosperity of a province, one of the biggest in India (the United Provinces), in which the number of landlords (not tenants and farmers) whose income derived from their proprietary holdings exceeds £20 ($100 a year, which comes to 30 cents a day for the whole family), is about 126,000 out of a population of 48 millions!

Acceptance of the argument of poverty as sufficient to deprive people of political right is putting a premium on it which is hardly creditable to the political ethics of the twentieth century. It is the poorest and the most ignorant in the community who most egregiously suffer at the hands of autocracy. It is they who require protection from it. The wealthy and the educated know how to placate the bureaucrat and get what they want. It is the poor who pay the penalty of political helplessness, yet, curiously, it is for them and in their interest that the English Government in India proposes to withhold the power of the purse from the proposed Indian Councils and insists on denying the Indian people even the elements of responsible government. While we admit the general justice and accuracy of the observations made under the head of "extent of interest in political questions," "political capacity of the rural population," we fail to see anything in them which justifies the conclusion that the interests of the classes not politically minded will be safer in the hands of the British officer, and on the whole better protected by him than by his educated countrymen who are likely to get the power in case of responsible government being conceded now. In our judgment no greater argument for the immediate grant of a substantial step in the direction of complete responsible government throughout India and in all spheres of government, could be advanced than what is involved in the following observation of the authors of the joint Report:

"The rural classes have the greatest stake in the country because
they contribute most to its revenues; but they are poorly equipped
for politics and do not at present wish to take part in them.
Among them are a few great landlords and a larger number of yeoman
farmers. They are not ill-fitted to play a part in affairs, but
with few exceptions they have not yet done so. But what is perhaps
more important to appreciate than the mere content of political
life in India is its rate of growth. No one who has observed
Indian life during even the past five years can doubt that the
growth is rapid and is real. It is beginning to affect the large
landholders: here and there are signs of its beginning to affect
even the villages. But recent events, and above all the war, have
given it a new earnestness and a more practical character. Men are
coming to realise more clearly that India's political future is
not to be won merely by fine phrases: and that it depends on the
capacity of her people themselves to face difficulties and to
dispose of them. Hence comes the demand for compulsory education,
for industries, for tariffs, for social reform, for social, public
and even military service."

In the next paragraph, the authors approvingly give an extract from an official report in which it is frankly admitted that the rural population "may not be vocal, but they are certainly not voiceless." The last meeting of the Indian Congress was attended by 700 farmer delegates. Thousands of farmers have joined the Home Rule Leagues. The statement that "hitherto they have regarded the official as their representative in the Councils of the Government" is entirely devoid of any truth. In their eyes the official is the Government itself. Some of them may think that the official _represents_ the Government, but to say that they regard the official as "_their representative_ in the Councils of the Government" is a mere travesty of truth. The paragraph on the "interests of the ryot" bristles with so many unwarranted assumptions that we must enter an emphatic protest against its misleading nature.

But it gives us pleasure to accord our whole-hearted support to the following statement with which the paragraph opens:

"It is just because the Indian ryot is inarticulate and has not
been directly represented in our deliberations that we feel bound
to emphasise the great claim he has upon our consideration. The
figure of the individual cultivator does not often catch the eye
of the Governments in Simla and Whitehall. It is chiefly in the
mass that they deal with him, as a consumer of salt or of
piece-goods, or unhappily too often as the victim of scarcity or
disease."

It is true that "the district officer and his lieutenants" are in a position to know the difficulties that beset the ryot and his very human needs. But of what good is this knowledge of the district officer and his lieutenants to him if it has neither provided for the education of his children nor made any provision for his employment in occupations other than agriculture; nor saved him from the intricacies of the law; nor protected him from the ubiquitous salt tax; nor raised his wages proportionately to the increase of prices; nor yet put him in a position to assert his human rights and to obtain redress for his human, too human, wrongs. If we examine a little more carefully the merits of what is claimed to have been done for him so far by "an official Government," we will find that the claim is by no means established.

We have no desire to deny that among the foreign officers of the British Government in India there are and have been a great many who were genuinely anxious to help the ryot and do all which is claimed to have been done for him in this paragraph, but that they have been unable to do anything worth mentioning will be admitted by every right-minded official.[3] The reasons for their failure were not of their making. The laws of the land made by the British legislators fresh from the Inns of Court, the spirit of the administration and the system of land taxation have effectively prevented them from doing many of the things which they might otherwise have liked to do. We are sorry that the eminent statesmen responsible for the report should have been the unconscious instruments of producing an entirely wrong impression by the statements in this paragraph. If the statements are true, India must be a veritable paradise and the lot of the Indian ryot enviable. But we know, and the authors of the Report knew it as well, and they have stated in so many words that it is not so. We can quote any number of authorities to show that the Indian ryot is the most pitiable figure in the whole length and breadth of India, if not in the whole world. This is not the place to quote the easily accessible opinions of eminently qualified and highly trustworthy British writers and administrators on the subject.[4] The English official Government has no doubt _professed_ to do all it claims to have done for the ryot, but how far it has benefited him in these directions is another story. To ask credit for having provided him with a system of law "simple, cheap and certain," or for having established schools and dispensaries within reasonable distance of his residence; or for even having looked after his cattle, by the provision of grazing lands; or for having supplied wood for his implements is to run violently in the face of facts to the contrary. These are verily his principal complaints against British rule. The official Government is certainly entitled to some credit for having started the coöperative credit societies and a few coöperative rural banks for the benefit of the peasantry, but the reform is so belated and at present plays such an insignificant part in the rural economy of India that it seems hardly worth mentioning or discussing.[5]

But even assuming that the official Government has so far done all that for the ryot, what reason is there to insinuate that the Government of the people will fail to do it for him in the future or will not do it so well as or even better, than has been heretofore done by the bureaucracy? It is quite a gratuitous assumption that in future he will be required to do all these things for himself. Even in the most advanced democracies in the world the peasantry or the masses of the people do not do these things for themselves. Most of these things are done by officials. The only difference is that in a responsible government the officials are the servants of the people while in an absolute government they are their masters. We are really surprised at the presumption of the British bureaucrat, in posing as the special friend of the Indian masses as against their own educated countrymen. The experience of the past does not support the claim and there is absolutely no reason to assume that it will be different in the future. A mere cursory glance at the resolutions of the Indian National Congress passed continuously for a period of thirty years, will show how persistently and earnestly the educated classes have been pleading _inter alia_ for (a) compulsory and free education, (b) for technical instruction in vocations, (c) for the reduction of the salt tax and the land tax, (d) for the raising of the minimum incomes liable to income tax, (e) for the provision of pasture lands, (f) for the comforts of the third-class railway travelling public, (g) for the milder administration of the forest laws, (h) for the reform of the Police, etc. All these years the bureaucracy did nothing for the ryot and now they pose as his special friends, whose continuance in power and in office is necessary for his protection from the politically minded middle classes. We are a friend neither of the landlord nor of the capitalist. We believe that the ryot and the working men in India as elsewhere are being exploited and robbed by the classes in possession of the means of production and distribution. We would wholeheartedly support any scheme which would open a way to a just and righteous distribution of wealth and land in India and which would insure the ryot and the working man his rightful place in the body politic. We would not mind the aid of the foreign bureaucracy toward that end if we could be sure that the bureaucracy would or could do it. But we have no doubts in the matter that it cannot be done. The bureaucracy has so far played into the hands of the plutocrat. They have served first their own capitalists and then the capitalists and landlords of India. Some among them have tried to do a little for the submerged classes, the poor ryot and the ill-paid sweated laborer, but their efforts were of no consequence. They have failed and their failure is writ large on the face of the ryot. We are not sanguine that the politically minded classes when they get power will immediately rehabilitate the ryot and give him his due. We have no hope of that kind. Yet we unhesitatingly support the demand of the politically minded classes for a responsible government in India. In our judgment, that is the only way to raise the masses to a consciousness of their rights and responsibilities. The experience of the West tells us that in that way and in that way alone lies salvation. Political consciousness must travel from the classes to the masses and the longer the inauguration of popular Government is delayed, the greater the delay in the awakening of the ryot and the working man. Absolutism must first give way and transfer its power to the politically minded classes, then will come the turn of the masses to demand their rights and compel compliance. We can see no risk of a greater harm or injury to the masses of India from the transference of power from the hands of a close bureaucracy of foreigners into the hands of the educated and propertied oligarchy of their own countrymen. Even in countries like Great Britain, America and France it is the educated and the propertied classes who rule. Why then this hubbub about the impropriety and danger of giving power to the same classes in India? Why are the representatives of landlordism and capitalism in the British House of Lords and among the ranks of Imperial Anglo-Indians so solicitous of the welfare of the Indian masses, when they have for so long persistently denied justice to the proletariat of their own country? It is a strange phenomenon to see the champions of privilege and status, the defenders of capitalism and landlordism, the advocates of the rights of property, the upholders of caste in Great Britain, spending so much powder and shot to _protect_ the Indian ryot from the prospective exploitation of him by the Indian Brahmin and the Indian Banya[6] (the priest and the capitalist). Let the British Brahmin and the British Banya first begin by doing justice to the proletariat of their own country and then it will be time for them to convince the Indian of their altruism and honesty of purpose in obstructing the inauguration of responsible government in India in the interests of the Indian proletariat. In this connection the authors of the Report make some pertinent observations which deserve to be quoted. After speaking of "religious animosities and social cleavages" and the duty of discouraging them the authors say:

"Nor are we without hope that the reforms will themselves help to
provide the remedy. We would not be misunderstood. Representative
institutions in the West, where all are equal at the ballot box,
have checked but not abolished social exclusiveness. We do not
make a higher claim for similar institutions in India than that
they will help to soften the rigidity of the caste-system. But we
hope that these incidents of it which lead to the permanent
degradation and ostracism of the lowest castes will tend to
disappear in proportion to the acceptance of the ideas on which
the new constitution rests. There is a further point. An
autocratic administration, which does not share the religious
ideas of the people, obviously finds its sole safe ground in
leaving the whole department of traditional social usage severely
alone. In such matters as child-marriage, it is possible that
through excess of caution proper to the regime under which it
works, it may be actually perpetuating and stereotyping customs
which the better mind of India might be brought, after the
necessary period of struggle, to modify. A government, in which
Indians themselves participate, invigorated by a closer touch with
a more enlightened popular opinion, may be able with all due
caution to effect with the free assent or acquiescence of the
Indians themselves, what under the present system has to be
rigorously set aside."

Nor are the authors unmindful of the effect of free institutions on the character of the people as they themselves over and over again recognise.

"Free institutions have, as we have said, the faculty of reacting
on the adverse conditions in which the start has to be made. The
backwardness of education may embarrass the experiment at the
outset; but it certainly ought not to stop it, because popular
government in India as elsewhere is sure to promote the
progressive spread of education and so a widening circle of
improvement will be set up."[7]

Among the authors' reasons for what they call a gradual advance they state the following also: (a) "We find it freely and widely admitted that they (i.e. the Indians) are not yet ready." This admission may legitimately be used against the total withdrawal of all control of Indian affairs by the Parliament. Firstly, it is questionable whether any such admission is really "freely and widely" made. Secondly, the admission justifies the retention of the powers of vital, general supervision and general control and also the retention of some Europeans in the higher services, but not the total denial of all responsibility for maintaining law and order and of all power to control the central Executive. (b) That the responsibility of India's defence is the ultimate burden which rests on the Government of India; and this duty is the last which can be intrusted to inexperienced or unskilful hands.

"So long as India depends for her internal and external security
upon the army and navy of the United Kingdom, the measure of
self-determination which she enjoys must be inevitably limited. We
cannot think that Parliament would consent to the employment of
British arms in support of a policy over which it had no control
and of which it might disapprove. The defence of India is an
Imperial question: and for this reason the Government of India
must retain both the power and the means of discharging its
responsibilities for the defence of the country and to the Empire
as a whole."

The defence of India involves, (a) men for the army and the navy, (b) officers, (c) war materials and war ships, (d) experts in strategy, (e) money. That India pays for her defense and also contributes towards the defence of the Empire are facts which cannot be questioned. That she shall continue to do so in the future may also be assumed. That it is extremely desirable that in the matter of war supplies she should be self-dependent has been freely admitted. The permanent Indian army as constituted in pre-war days contained two-thirds Indians and one-third British. If the present strength of the Indian army be examined it will be found that the proportion of British troops is still smaller. There is absolutely no need of British soldiers in India for the purposes of defence, but if the British Government wants to keep them as safeguards against mutiny among the purely Indian army or against the spirit of rebellion that at any time may exhibit itself among the Indian people, then the British exchequer must pay for them as it did in the case of British garrison in South Africa or as the United States does in the case of American troops in the Philippines. It is adding insult to injury to argue that we should not only pay for British troops but that the fact that British troops form a constituent element of the Indian army should be used against us for denying us full responsibility even in civil affairs. The armies of the various Asiatic Governments surrounding India have no European elements in them and the Indian soldier is as efficient a fighter as is needed as a protection. That the Indian army should be almost exclusively officered by the British is a survival of the policy of mistrust, jealousy and racial discrimination which has hitherto prevailed. It is time that the Indian army should in future be mainly officered by the Indians. Until that is achieved it must continue as a tentative measure to be officered by the British, and the Indian Revenues must bear the burden. But that is hardly any reason for denying us full responsible government even on the civil side. The Indians do not desire nor demand the transfer of the control over the Army or the Navy until the Army is principally officered by the Indians and an Indian Navy has been built to supplement the Imperial Navy. From this criticism of the reasons advanced by the authors for a very mild "advance" (called "gradual") it is with pleasure that we turn to the brighter side of the picture showing the favorable features of the situation. The position of the educated Indian is described fairly and squarely in Paragraph 140.

"The old assumption that the interests of the ryot must be
confided to official hands is strenuously denied by modern
educated Indians. They claim that the European official must by
his lack of imagination and comparative lack of skill in tongues
be gravely handicapped in interpreting the thoughts and desires of
an Asiatic people.... Our educational policy in the past aimed at
satisfying the few, who sought after English education, without
sufficient thought of the consequences which might ensue from not
taking care to extend instruction to the many. We have in fact
created a limited _intelligentsia_, who desire advance; and we
cannot stay their progress entirely until education has been
extended to the masses. It has been made a reproach to the
educated classes that they have followed too exclusively after one
or two pursuits, the law, journalism or school teaching: and that
these are all callings which make men inclined to overrate the
importance of words and phrases. But even if there is substance in
the count, we must take note also how far the past policy of
Government is responsible. We have not succeeded in making
education practical. It is only now, when the war has revealed
the importance of industry, that we have deliberately set about
encouraging Indians to undertake the creation of wealth by
industrial enterprise, and have thereby offered the educated
classes any tangible inducement to overcome their traditional
inclination to look down on practical forms of energy. We must
admit that the educated Indian is a creation peculiarly of our
own; and if we take the credit that is due to us for his strong
points we must admit a similar liability for his weak ones. Let us
note also in justice to him that the progressive Indian appears to
realise the narrow basis of his position and is beginning to
broaden it. In municipal and university work he has taken a useful
and creditable share. We find him organising effort not for
political ends alone, but for various forms of public and social
service. He has come forward and done valuable work in relieving
famine and distress by floods, in keeping order at fairs, in
helping pilgrims, and in promoting co-operative credit. Although
his ventures in the fields of commerce have not been always
fortunate, he is beginning to turn his attention more to the
improvement of agriculture and industry. Above all, he is active
in promoting education and sanitation; and every increase in the
number of educated people adds to his influence and authority."

The authors also say:

"We must remember, too, that the educated Indian has come to the
front by hard work; he has seized the education which we offered
him because he first saw its advantages; and it is he who has
advocated and worked for political progress. All this stands to
his credit. For thirty years he has developed in his Congress and
latterly in the Muslim League free popular convocations which
express his ideals. We owe him sympathy because he has conceived
and pursued the idea of managing his own affairs, an aim which no
Englishman can fail to respect. He has made a skilful, and on the
whole a moderate, use of the opportunities which we have given him
in the legislative councils of influencing Government and
affecting the course of public business, and of recent years, he
has by speeches and in the press done much to spread the idea of a
united and self-respecting India among thousands who had no such
conception in their minds. Helped by the inability of the other
classes in India to play a prominent part he has assumed the place
of leader; but his authority is by no means universally
acknowledged and may in an emergency prove weak."

In face of these observations about the politically minded classes of India it is rather unkind of the authors to insinuate later on that in the interests of the foreign merchant, the foreign missionary and the European servants of the state it is necessary that the Government of India should yet remain absolute and that, in the provinces as well, important branches of the administration should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the popular assemblies.

To sum up, while we are prepared to concede that the conditions of the problem may justify the withholding of absolute autonomy,--political, fiscal, and military,--for some time, there is nothing in them which can in any way be deemed sufficient to deny full political, and, if not complete, at least substantial fiscal autonomy to the Indian people at once.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Village Government in British India_, by JOHN MATTHAI. Preface by SIDNEY WEBB, p. xv.

[2] "The Indian Government compiles no statistics showing the distribution of wealth, but such incomplete figures as we have obtained show that the number of persons enjoying a substantial income is very small. In one province the total number of persons who enjoy an income of £66 a year derived from other sources than land is 30,000; in another province 20,000. The revenue and rent returns also show how small the average agricultural holding is. According to one estimate, the number of landlords whose income derived from their proprietary holdings exceeds £20 a year in the United Provinces is about 126,000, out of a population of forty-eight millions. It is evident that the curve of wealth descends very steeply, and that enormous masses of the population have little to spare for more than the necessaries of life."

[3] See _Punjab in Peace and War_, by S. S. THORBORN, London, 1904.

[4] They are collected in _England's Debt to India_, by the present author. New York, B. W. Huebsch, 1917.

[5] See Sir D. HAMILTON, _Calcutta Review_, July, 1916.

[6] "Banya" in Hindustan means "trader."

[7] In this connection the pertinent observations of the AGA KHAN in his book _India in Transition_ may be read (Chapter XXV), Putnam, New York.

VI

THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN INDIA

The governing consideration, therefore, in all these cases
[speaking of German colonies] must be that the inhabitants should
be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to
themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their
exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or
Governments.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"The War Aims of the Allies." Speech delivered
to delegates of the Trades Unions, at the
Central Hall, Westminster, January 5, 1918.

Until now the European servants of the British Government have ruled India quite autocratically. The powers delegated to and the discretion vested in them have been so large that they could do almost anything they liked. They could make or mar the fortunes of millions; they could further their happiness or add to their misery by the simple fiat of their will. The only limitation on their power was their own sense of duty and justice. That some of them did let themselves go is no wonder. The wonder is that the instances of unbridled oppression and tyranny were not more numerous than they have actually been. Speaking of the European services generally, we have nothing but admiration for their general character. The particular branch of the Public Services that has been all along entrusted with the general administration of the country is known as the Indian Civil Service. It is recruited in England and is overwhelmingly European in personnel. On April 1, 1913, only forty-six of the 1319 civilians on the _cadre_ were natives of India.

Speaking of the executive organizations that have so far ruled India, the eminent authors of the Report for the reorganization of the Government of India remark that it may "well be likened to a mere system of official posts, actuated _till_ now by impulses of its own, but affected by the popular ideas which impinge on it from three sources--the British Parliament, the legislative councils and the local boards." The sentence would have been correct if in place of "but affected" the authors had said "and affected but little." "The system," they add, "has in the main depended for its effectiveness on the experience, wisdom and energy of the services themselves. It has, for the most part, been represented by the Indian Civil Service which, though having little to do with the technical departments of government, _has for over 100 years in practice had the administration entrusted to its hands, because, with the exception of the offices of the Governor General, Governors, and some members of the executive councils, it has held practically all the places involving superior control_. It has been in effect much more of a government corporation than of a purely civil service in the English sense. It has been made a reproach to the Indian Civil Service that it regards itself as the Government; but a view which strikes the critic familiar with parliamentary government as arrogant is little more than a condensed truth." [The italics are ours.]

The Indian Civil Service has thus developed all the characteristics, good and bad, of a caste. It has been a powerful bureaucracy, as exclusive, proud, arrogant and self-sufficient,--if not even more so,--as the original Brahmin oligarchy of the land, except that while the Brahmin oligarchy had ties of race, religion and culture with the rest of the population, the Indian Civil Service is almost entirely composed of aliens. The ancient Brahmins were, however, kept in check by the military caste. The mutual jealousies of these two castes afforded some kind of protection to the people in general. But in the case of the British Indian Civil Service, the military have given entire support to their civilian fellow-countrymen and have been completely under their will.

The Brahmins of India have left a monumental record of their labors. They produced great thinkers, writers, legislators, administrators and organizers. In their own time they were as wise, energetic and resourceful as any bureaucracy in the world has ever been or will ever be. Yet the system of life they devised cut at the roots of national vitality. It dried almost all the springs of corporate national life. It reduced the bulk of the population to a position of complete subservience to their will, of blind faith in their wisdom, of absolute dependence on their initiative. It deprived the common people of all opportunities of independent thought and independent action. It brought about a kind of national atrophy. And this, in spite of the fact that they began by imposing a rigorous code of self-denial on themselves and their class. For themselves they wanted nothing but a life of poverty and asceticism. Their economic interests were never in theory or in practice in conflict with those of the rest of the body politic.

A Brahmin was forbidden to engage in trade or otherwise accumulate wealth. His life was a life of strict self-abnegation. This cannot be said of the Indian Civil Servant. He receives a handsome salary for his services, expects and receives periodic promotion until he reaches a position which, from an economic point of view, is not unenviable. After retirement he is free to engage in trade and otherwise accumulate wealth. But over and above this, what distinguishes an Indian Civil Servant from an old Brahmin bureaucrat is the fact that in India he represents a nation whose economic interest may not always be in harmony with those of the people of India. He is thus supposed to be the guardian of the interests of his countrymen, and is expected to further them as much as he can without altogether endangering the safety of British rule in India. Looked at from this angle, we have no hesitation in saying that the work of the Indian Civil Service, too, has in its way, been monumental. As a rule, they have proved capable administrators, individually honest, hardworking and alert. They have organized and tabulated India in a way, perhaps, never done before. But after all has been said in their praise, it cannot be denied that they have done India even more harm than the Brahmin oligarchy in its time, did, by the support they lent to economic exploitation of the country by men of their own race and religion. Now, in this latter respect, we want to guard against being misunderstood. The Indian Civil Service has, in the course of about a century, produced a fairly good number of men who have honestly and fearlessly stood for the protection of Indian interests against those of people of their own race and religion. In doing so they have sometimes ruined their own prospects of promotion and advancement. Whenever they failed in their self-imposed task, and more often they failed than not, they failed because the authorities at the top were forced by considerations of domestic and imperial policy to do otherwise. On the whole, the defects of the bureaucratic administration were more the defects of the system than of the individuals composing it.

The Indian Civil Servant, like the old Brahmin, is autocratic and dictatorial. He dislikes any display of independence by the people put under his charge. He discourages initiative. He likes to be called and considered the _Mai bap_ (mother and father) of his subjects. On those who literally consider him such he showers his favors. The others he denounces and represses. This has, in the course of time, led to national emasculation. That is our chief complaint against the Indian Civil Service. Of the other services we would rather not speak. They have by no means been so pure and high-minded as the I. C. S., nor perhaps so autocratic and dictatorial. The number of men who misused their powers and opportunities to their own advantage has been much larger in services other than the I. C. S. Yet they all have done a certain amount of good work for India; whether one looks at the engineering works designed and executed by them, or the researches they have made in the science of healing and preventing disease, or the risks they have run in preserving order or maintaining peace one cannot but admire their efficiency and ability. The grievances of the Indian Nationalists against the Public Services in India may be thus summarized:

(_a_) That the services monopolize too much power and are practically uncontrolled by and irresponsible to the people of the country.

(_b_) That the higher branches of the services contain too many foreigners.

(_c_) That these are recruited in England, and from some of them the Indians are altogether barred.

(_d_) That even when doing the same work Indians are not paid on the same scale as the Europeans.

(_e_) That the Government has often kept on men of proved inefficiency and of inferior qualities.

(_f_) That, considering the economic conditions of India, the higher servants of the Government are paid on a scale unparalleled in the history of public administration in the world.

(_g_) That the interests of the services often supersede those of the country and the Government.

(_h_) And last, but not least, that by the gathering of all powers of initiative and execution in their hands they have emasculated India.

As regards (_a_) we have already quoted the opinion of the eminent authors of the report. The principle laid down in the announcement of August 20, and the scheme proposed are supposed to do away with the element of irresponsibility. It is obvious that with the introduction of the principle of popular control into the Government, the power of individual servants of the executive will not remain what it is now, or has been in the past. Much that is vested in and done by the service will be transferred to public bodies elected by popular vote. This will naturally affect (_b_) and (_c_) also. We will here stop to quote again from the Report:

"In the forefront of the announcement of August 20 the policy of
the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the
administration was definitely placed. It has not been necessary
for us, nor indeed would it have been possible, to go into this
large question in detail in the time available for our inquiry. We
have already seen that Lord Hardinge's Government was anxious to
increase the number of Indians in the public services, and that a
Royal Commission was appointed in 1912 to examine and report on
the existing limitations in the employment of Indians.... The
report was signed only a few months after the outbreak of war, and
its publication was deferred in the hope that the war would not be
prolonged. When written, it might have satisfied moderate Indian
opinion, but when published two years later it was criticised as
wholly disappointing. Our inquiry has since given us ample
opportunity of judging the importance which Indian opinion
attaches to this question. While we take account of this attitude,
a factor which carries more weight with us is that since the
report was signed an entirely new policy toward Indian government
has been adopted, which must be very largely dependent for success
on the extent to which it is found possible to introduce Indians
into every branch of the administration."

The authors of the Report then proceed to state the limitations of the process, subject to the general remark that at the present moment there are few Indians (we do not admit this) trained in public life, who can replace the Europeans, and thus to alter the personnel of a service must be a long and steady process. They admit that:

"If responsible government is to be established in India there
will be a far greater need than is even dreamt of at present for
persons to take part in public affairs in the legislative
assemblies and elsewhere; and for this reason the more Indians we
can employ in the public services the better. Moreover, it would
lessen the burden of Imperial responsibilities if a body of
capable Indian administrators could be produced. We regard it as
necessary, therefore, that recruitment of a largely increased
proportion of Indians should be begun at once."

In the next paragraph they state why, in their judgment, it is necessary that a substantial portion of the services must continue to be European. Their reasons may be gathered from the following:

"The characteristics which we have learned to associate with the
Indian public services must as far as possible be maintained and
the leaven of officers possessed of them should be strong enough
to assure and develop them in the service as a whole. The
qualities of courage, leadership, decision, fixity of purpose,
detached judgment and integrity in her public servants will be as
necessary as ever to India. There must be no such sudden swamping
of any service with any new element that its whole character
suffers a rapid alteration."

On these grounds they make the following recommendations:

"I. That all distinctions based on race be removed, and that
appointments to all branches of the public service be made without
racial discrimination" (Paragraph 315).

"II. That for all the public services, for which there is
recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there
must be a system of appointment in India, ... and we propose to
supplement it by fixing a definite percentage of recruitment to be
made in India."

"III. We have not been able to examine the question of the
percentage of recruitment to be made in India for any service
other than the Indian Civil Service. The Commission recommended
that 25 per cent. of the superior posts of that service should be
recruited for in India. We consider that changed conditions
warrant some increase in that proportion, and we suggest that 33
per cent. of the superior posts should be recruited for in India,
and that this percentage should be increased by 1-1/2 per cent.
annually until the periodic commission is appointed which will
re-examine the whole subject.... We have dealt only with the
Indian Civil Service, but our intention is that there should be in
all other services now recruited from England a fixed percentage
of recruitment in India, increasing annually."