Chapter V: Part 5

In Paragraphs 302 to 305 the authors of the Report state the process by which this development may be expedited. Disavowing any intention of forcibly altering treaty rights, they propose to classify the States into (_a_) those that have "full authority over their internal affairs," (_b_) those "in which Government exercises through its Agents large powers of internal control," (_c_) those who are really no more "than mere owners of a few acres of land." It is further pointed out that hitherto the

"general clause which occurs in many of the treaties to the effect
that the Chief shall remain absolute Ruler of his country has not
in the past precluded and does not even now preclude 'interference
with the administration by Government through the agency of its
representatives at the Native Courts.' We need hardly say that
such interference has not been employed in wanton disregard of
treaty obligations. During the earlier days of our intimate
relations with the States British agents found themselves
compelled, often against their will, to assume responsibility for
the welfare of the people, to restore order out of chaos, to
prevent inhuman practices, and to guide the hands of a weak or
incompetent Ruler as the only alternative to the termination of
his rule. So too, at the present day, the Government of India
acknowledges as trustee, a responsibility (which the Princes
themselves desire to maintain) for the proper administration of
States during a minority, and also an obligation for the
prevention or correction of flagrant misgovernment."

And also that:

"the position hitherto taken up by Government has been that the
conditions under which some of the treaties were executed have
undergone material changes, and the literal fulfilment of
particular obligations which they impose has become impracticable.
Practice has been based on the theory that treaties must be read
as a whole, and that they must be interpreted in the light of the
relation established between the parties not only at the time when
a particular treaty was made, but subsequently."

On these grounds it is proposed to establish a Council of Princes to which questions which affect the States generally or are of concern to the Empire as a whole, or to British India and the States in common, may be referred for advice and opinion. So long as the Princes do not intervene either formally or informally in the internal affairs of British India, we have no objection to the scheme. On the other hand, we do hope some method will be found by which, with the consent of the parties interested the smaller principalities scattered all over the country may, for administrative purposes, be merged either in the British area or in the bigger Native States which possess full power of autonomy over their internal affairs. In the long run it will be comparatively easy to convert the latter to an acceptance of the modern principles of government if the number of Native States is reduced and their people achieve that solidarity which comes by community of interests and ideas. In this connection it is a happy augury for the future that some of the highest Chiefs like those of Mysore, Baroda, Gwaliar, Indore, Kashmir, Bikaner, Jodhpore, Alwar, and Patiala are alive to the importance of marching with the times. The people of British India owe them a great debt of gratitude for the moral support they have given to their claim for responsible Government by coming out openly and freely in favour of the proposed advance. We are sure that these Princes will in due time take measures to bring their own territories in line with the British provinces and thus strengthen the ties that bind them to their own peoples as well as to the other people of India. After all, there can be no manner of doubt, as the authors of the report predict,

"that the processes at work in British India cannot leave the
States untouched and must in time affect even those whose ideas
and institutions are of the most conservative and feudal
character."

It is the path of wisdom and sagacity to recognise the world forces that are at work. No amount of ancient prestige can prevent the people from coming into their own. The age of despotism is gone and the autocrats of today must sooner or later hand over their powers to the people. The more they conciliate them the longer perhaps they may be able to lead them. They may continue as leaders for a long time, but as autocratic dispensers of favours and fortunes they cannot remain, perhaps not even for their life time.

In our judgment this part of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report is no less important for the future of Indian democracy than the others that directly deal with British India, and we hope that whatever might be the policy as regards the existing States the new law will make it impossible for the Government of India and the Secretary of State to create any new States in the future. It is monstrous to transfer millions of human beings from one kind of political rule to another like so many cattle, as was done in 1911. The present rule of any Indian Maharaja may be as good or as bad as that of a British Governor or Lieutenant Governor, but the latter has in it greater democratic potentialities than the former, for the mere fact, if for no other, that, while the British are more or less amenable to world opinion, the rulers of Native States are not. It is inhuman, and not in accord with modern ideas of right and wrong to reward somebody's loyalty by giving him power of life and death over numerous fellow beings, otherwise than in due course of law. Even the mighty British Government is not the owner of the bodies and souls of its subjects in India. How, then, can it assume the right of abandoning them to the absolute rule of a single individual, however worthy or loyal he may be? We hope this stupid way of rewarding loyal services may be ended by an express provision to that effect in the statute which will be passed relating to the reorganization of the Government of India.

In this connection the following observations made in a leading editorial of the _Servant of India_, Poona (February 16, 1919), are worthy of attention:

"A hundred years ago, it was decidedly in the interests of British rule, and probably also in the interests of the people of India generally, that the small, ill-governed, and eternally fighting states of India should come under the suzerainty of a single powerful power. It may be regarded as a historical misfortune that this power happened then to be foreign, though many regard this contact with a virile civilization as the making of India. This suzerainty could then be established duly by entering into treaties with these states and guaranteeing them certain rights and privileges. But these treaties have now assumed in the eyes of the descendants of the original princes an air of inspiration; they have become a kind of perpetuity. They always come in the way of any improvement. When any new policy is proposed to them, they are always prepared to say, 'This is not in the bond.' One may be allowed to speculate as to how many of these Highnesses would have survived to this day to put forward this claim in the absence of the suzerain power. Thrones in ancient days were as unstable as they are becoming now in Europe. It is hardly possible that the present popular wave in Europe would not have touched our Native States. The subjects of the states would have clamoured for a recognition of their rights, and they would have had their way. But now the princes feel quite secure. Have they not got their treaties? As a result there is no political life at all in the Native States. The most ardent advocate of Home Rule would be most violently against migration to a Native State. The real problem of the Native States is how to get over the treaties when they conflict with the interests of their subjects. The questions discussed at the Chiefs' Conference leave us comparatively cold, as they entirely neglect the people most concerned. The questions of the rights of the chiefs and their salutes or precedence are in our opinion of a very secondary importance. A renowned statesman in Europe gave at the utmost a life of a dozen years to the most solemn treaty between two countries, for in that period circumstances alter and the solid foundation for the treaty cracks. Is it not high time that the treaties with the chiefs should be revised after over a hundred years? It would indeed redound to their credit if the chiefs themselves come forward to submit to such readjustment. Perhaps their autocratic and irresponsible power may have to suffer some diminution. But if they consent to that diminution so as to give it to their subjects in the modern democratic spirit, the real power and influence of the Native States will increase incalculably. It is in this direction we wish to see a solution of the problem of the Native States which are nowadays working as a brake on our national progress."

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The _Indian Year Book_ for 1918, p. 81.

X

THE PROPOSALS

There are epochs in the history of the world when in a few raging
years the character, the destiny, of the whole race is determined
for unknown ages. This is one.

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

"Sowing the Winter Wheat." Speech delivered
at Carnarvon, to a meeting of constituents,
after becoming Prime Minister, February 3,
1917.

Part II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy they observe:

"_No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are
going to give the people of India some responsibility for their
own government._ But no one can imagine that no further
development is necessary. _It is evident that the present
machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it
works slowly and it produces irritation_; there is a widespread
demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration;
and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also."
[Italics are ours.]

The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, "the logical outcome of the past. Indians must be enabled, in so far as they attain responsibility, to determine for themselves what they want done

"... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due
only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train
both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire
them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at
short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make
good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive
demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we
have just indicated."

That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in India "the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole." With these and a few more prefatory remarks about the educational problem and the attitude of the ryot and the enunciation of the general principles on which their proposals are based they proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces.

I

The proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the following heads:

(_a_) _Financial devolution_: It is proposed that henceforth there should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for the Government of India, all others should be made over to the Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded by the latter. A certain amount of power to impose fresh taxes and to raise loans is also conceded to the provincial Governments subject to the veto of the Government of India.

(_b_) _Legislative devolution_: "It is our intention," say the authors of the report, "to reserve to the Government of India a general overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable, either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to pass legislation which may be adopted either _simpliciter_ or with modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures." It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it is hoped that "constitutional practice" will prevent the central Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for which the latter is responsible are directly affected.

(_c_) _Provincial Executive_: Article 220 gives the Governor the power to appoint "one or two additional members of his Government as members without portfolio for purposes of consultation and advice."

These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Government of India for the future government of the provinces into which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures make it still more complicated.

"Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the
executive Governments of the provinces shall be constituted. As we
have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an
Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an
Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil
Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by
twelve years' service under the Crown in India. One province,
Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a
council of three constituted in the same way. The remaining five
provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governorships of
the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief
Commissionerships of the Central Provinces and Assam are under the
administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India
a very general desire for the extension of Council government....
Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces
singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by
collective administration.

"In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in
mind the duties with which it will be charged. We start with the
two postulates; the complete responsibility for the government
cannot be given immediately without inviting a breakdown, and that
some responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have
any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting primarily
in amenability to constituents, and in the second place in
amenability to an assembly. We do not believe that there is any
way of satisfying these governing conditions other than by making
a division of the functions of the Government, between those which
may be made over to popular control and those which for the
present must remain in official hands.... We may call these the
'reserved' and 'transferred' subjects respectively. It then
follows that for the management of these two categories there must
be some form of executive body, with a legislative organ in
harmony with it....

* * * * *

"We propose therefore that in each province the executive
Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise
the head of the province and an executive council of two members.
In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as
Governor.... One of the two Executive Councillors would in
practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and
the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter
should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council.
It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be
open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes.... The Governor
in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other
part of the government would consist of one member or more than
one member, according to the number and importance of the
transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected
members of the Legislative council. They would be known as
ministers. They would be members of the executive Government but
not members of the Executive Council; they would be appointed for
the life-time of the legislative council, and if reelected to that
body would be re-eligible for appointment as members of the
Executive. As we have said, they would not hold office at the will
of the legislature but at that of their constituents.

"The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be
committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers
together with the Governor would form the administration. On such
subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the
Governor's advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the
outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely
constitutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of
his ministers."

(_d_) _Provincial Legislatures_: "We propose there shall be in each province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary."

The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect of resolutions it is said that "we do not propose that resolutions, whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding."

The classification of the reserved and transferred subjects was also left to a special committee which has since concluded its labours and whose report is awaited with interest.

_Legislation on reserved subjects_:

"For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get
through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the
head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill
dealing with a reserved subject is a measure 'essential to the
discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of
the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his
responsibility for the reserved subjects.'... The Bill will be
read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative
council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a
majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government
of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the
question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject.
If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide
that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then
be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its
composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion
of the various elements in the larger body ... the grand committee
in every council should be constituted so as to comprise from 40
to 50 per cent. of its strength. It should be chosen for each
Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The
Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive
of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds
should be officials, and the elected element should be elected _ad
hoc_ by the elected members of the council on the system of the
transferable vote."

"On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by
that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a
select committee, to which body we think that the grand committee
should have power to appoint any member of the legislative council
whether a member of the grand committee or not. The select
committee will, as at present, have power to take evidence. Then,
after being debated in the grand committee and modified as may be
determined, the Bill will be reported to the whole council. The
council will have the right to discuss the Bill again generally,
but will not be able to reject it, or to amend it except on the
motion of a member of the executive council. The Governor will
then appoint a time limit within which the Bill may be debated in
the council, and on its expiry it will pass automatically. But
during such discussion the council will have the right to pass a
resolution recording any objection which refers to the principle
or details of the measure (but not, of course, to the certificate
of its character), and any such resolution will accompany the Act
when, after being signed by the Governor, it is submitted to the
Governor General and the Secretary of State."

_Provincial Budget_: "... the provincial budget should be framed
by the executive Government as a whole. The first charge on
provincial revenues will be the contribution to the Government of
India; and after that the supply for the reserved subjects will
have priority. The allocation of supply for the transferred
subjects will be decided by the ministers. If the revenue is
insufficient for their needs, the question of new taxation will be
decided by the Governor and the ministers. We are bound to
recognise that in time new taxation will be necessary, for no
conceivable economies can finance the new developments which are
to be anticipated. The budget will then be laid before the council
which will discuss it and vote by resolution upon the allotments.
If the legislative council rejects or modifies the proposed
allotment for reserved subjects, the Governor should have power to
insist on the whole or any part of the allotment originally
provided, if for reasons to be stated he certifies its necessity
in the terms which we have already suggested. We are emphatically
of opinion that the Governor in Council must be empowered to
obtain the supply which he declares to be necessary for the
discharge of his responsibilities. Except in so far as the
Governor exercises this power the budget would be altered in
accordance with the resolutions carried in council."

_Modification of the Scheme by the Government of India._ "After
five years' time from the first meeting of the reformed councils
we suggest that the Government of India should hear applications
from either the provincial Government or the provincial council
for the modification of the reserved and transferred lists of the
province; and that, after considering the evidence laid before
them, they should recommend for the approval of the Secretary of
State the transfer of such further subjects to the transferred
list as they think desirable. On the other hand, if it should be
made plain to them that certain functions have been seriously
maladministered, it will be open to them, with the sanction of the
Secretary of State, to retransfer subjects from the transferred to
the reserved list, or to place restrictions for the future on the
minister's powers in respect of certain transferred subjects....
But it is also desirable to complete the responsibility of the
ministers for the transferred subjects. This should come in one of
two ways, either at the initiative of the council if it desires
and is prepared to exercise greater control over the ministers, or
at the discretion of the Government of India, which may wish to
make this change as a condition of the grant of new, or of the
maintainance of existing, powers. We propose, therefore, that the
Government of India may, when hearing such applications, direct
that the ministers' salaries, instead of any longer being treated
as a reserved subject, and, therefore, protected in the last
resort by the Governor's order from interference should be
specifically voted each year by the legislative council; or,
failing such direction by the Government of India, it should be
open to the councils at that time or subsequently to demand by
resolution that such ministers' salaries should be so voted, and
the Government of India should thereupon give effect to such
request."

_Periodic commissions_: ... Ten years after the first meeting of
the new councils established under the Statute a commission should
be appointed to review the position. Criticism has been expressed
in the past of the composition of Royal Commissions, and it is our
intention that the commission which we suggest should be regarded
as authoritative and should derive its authority from Parliament
itself. The names of the commissioners, therefore, should be
submitted by the Secretary of State to both Houses of Parliament
for approval by resolution. The commissioners' mandate should be
to consider whether by the end of the term of the legislature then
in existence it would be possible to establish complete
responsible government in any province or provinces, or how far it
would be possible to approximate it in others; to advise on the
continued reservation of any departments for the transfer of which
to popular control it has been proved to their satisfaction that
the time had not yet come; to recommend the retransfer of other
matters to the control of the Governor in Council if serious
maladministration were established; and to make any
recommendations for the working of responsible government or the
improvement of the constitutional machinery which experience of
the systems in operation may show to be desirable....

"There are several other important matters, germane in greater or
less degree to our main purpose, which the commission should
review. They should investigate the progress made in admitting
Indians into the higher ranks of the public service. They should
examine the apportionment of the financial burden of India with a
view to adjusting it more fairly between the provinces. The
commission should also examine the development of education among
the people and the progress and working of local self-governing
bodies. Lastly the commission should consider the working of the
franchise and the constitution of electorates, including the
important matter of the retention of communal representation.
Indeed, we regard the development of a broad franchise as the arch
on which the edifice of self-government must be raised; for we
have no intention that our reforms should result merely in the
transfer of powers from a bureaucracy to an oligarchy...."

"In proposing the appointment of a commission ten years after the
new Act takes effect we wish to guard against possible
misunderstanding. We would not be taken as implying that there can
be established by that time complete responsible government in the
provinces. In many of the provinces no such consummation can
follow in the time named. The pace will be everywhere unequal,
though progress in one province will always stimulate progress
elsewhere; but undue expectations might be aroused, if we
indicated any opinion as to the degree of approximation to
complete self-government that might be reached even in one or two
of the most advanced provinces. The reasons that make complete
responsibility at present impossible are likely to continue
operative in some degree even after a decade."

II

The proposals regarding the Government of India called the Central Government may be thus summed up:

(_a_) _General_: "We have already made our opinion clear that
pending the development of responsible government in the provinces
the Government of India must remain responsible only to
Parliament. In other words, in all matters which it judges to be
essential to the discharge of its responsibilities for peace,
order, and good government it must, saving only for its
accountability to Parliament, retain indisputable power."

(_b_) _The Governor General's Executive Council_: "We would
therefore abolish such statutory restrictions as now exist in
respect of the appointment of Members of the Governor General's
Council, so as to give greater elasticity both in respect to the
size of the Government and the distribution of work."

At present there is one Indian member in the Viceroy's Executive Council consisting of six ordinary members and one extraordinary besides the Viceroy. This scheme recommends the appointment of another Indian.

(_c_) _The Indian Legislative Council_.

I. Legislative Assembly: "We recommend therefore that the strength
of the legislative council, to be known in future as the
Legislative Assembly of India, should be raised to a total
strength of about 100 members, so as to be far more truly
representative of British India. We propose that two-thirds of
this total should be returned by election; and that one-third
should be nominated by the Governor General, of which third not
less than a third again should be non-officials selected with the
object of representing minority or special interests.... Some
special representation, we think, there must be, as for European
and Indian commerce, and also for the large landlords. There
should be also communal representation for Muhammadans in most
provinces and also for Sikhs in the Punjab."

II. The Council of State: "We do not propose to institute a
complete bi-cameral system, but to create a second chamber, known
as the Council of State, which shall take its part in ordinary
legislative business and shall be the final legislative authority
in matters which the government regards as essential. The Council
of State will be composed of 50 members, exclusive of the Governor
General, who would be President, with power to appoint a
Vice-President who would normally take his place: not more than 25
will be officials, including the members of the executive council,
and 4 would be non-officials nominated by the Governor General.
Official members would be eligible for nomination to both the
Legislative Assembly and the Council of State. There would be 21
elected members of whom 15 will be returned by the non-official
members of the provincial legislative councils, each council
returning two members, other than those of Burma, the Central
Provinces and Assam which will return one member each....

"Inasmuch as the Council of State will be the supreme legislative
authority for India on all crucial questions and also the revising
authority upon all Indian legislation, we desire to attract to it
the services of the best men available in the country. We desire
that the Council of State should develop something of the
experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen; and we
suggest therefore that the Governor General in Council should make
regulations as to the qualification of candidates for election to
that body which will ensure that their status and position and
record of services will give to the Council a senatorial
character, and the qualities usually regarded as appropriate to a
revising chamber."

III. Legislative procedure: "Let us now explain how this
legislative machinery will work. It will make for clearness to
deal separately with Government Bills and Bills introduced by
non-official members. A Government Bill will ordinarily be
introduced and carried through all the usual stages in the
Legislative Assembly. It will then go in the ordinary course to
the Council of State, and if there amended in any way which the
Assembly is not willing to accept, it will be submitted to a joint
session of both Houses, by whose decision its ultimate fate will
be decided. This will be the ordinary course of legislation. But
it might well happen that amendments made by the Council of State
were such as to be essential in the view of the Government if the
purpose with which the Bill was originally introduced was to be
achieved, and in this case the Governor General in Council would
certify that the amendments were essential to the interests of
peace, order, or good government. The assembly would then not have
power to reject or modify these amendments, nor would they be open
to revision in a joint session.

"We have to provide for two other possibilities. Cases may occur
in which the Legislative Assembly refuses leave to the
introduction of a Bill or throws out a Bill which the Government
regarded as necessary. For such a contingency we would provide
that if leave to introduce a Government Bill is refused, or if the
Bill is thrown out at any stage, the Government should have the
power, on the certificate of the Governor General in Council that
the Bill is essential to the interests of peace, order, or good
government, to refer it _de novo_ to the Council of State; and if
the Bill, after being taken in all its stages through the Council
of State, was passed by that body, it would become law without
further reference to the Assembly. Further, there may be cases
when the consideration of a measure by both chambers would take
too long if the emergency which called for the measure is to be
met. Such a contingency should rarely arise; but we advise that in
cases of emergency, so certified by the Governor General in
Council, it should be open to the Government to introduce a Bill
in the Council of State, and upon its being passed there merely to
report it to the Assembly."

IV. Powers of dissolution, etc.: "The Governor General should in
our opinion have power at any time to dissolve either the
Legislative Assembly or the Council of State or both these bodies.
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that the Governor General and
the Secretary of State should retain their existing powers of
assent, reservation, and disallowance to all Acts of the Indian
legislature. The present powers of the Governor General in Council
under section 71 of the Government of India Act. 1915, to make
regulations proposed by local Governments for the peace and good
government of backward tracts of territory should also be
preserved; with the modification that it will in future rest with
the Head of the province concerned to propose such regulations to
the Government of India."

V. Fiscal legislation: "Fiscal legislation will, of course, be
subject to the procedure which we have recommended in respect of
Government Bills. The budget will be introduced in the Legislative
Assembly but the Assembly will not vote it. Resolutions upon
budget matters and upon all other questions, whether moved in the
Assembly or in the Council of State, will continue to be advisory
in character."

(d) Privy Council: "We have a further recommendation to make. We
would ask that His Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve
the institution of a Privy Council for India.... The Privy
Council's office would be to advise the Governor General when he
saw fit to consult it on questions of policy and administration."

(e) Periodic commissions: "At the end of the last chapter we
recommended that ten years after the institution of our reforms,
and again at intervals of twelve years thereafter, a commission
approved by Parliament should investigate the working of the
changes introduced into the provinces, and recommend as to their
further progress. It should be equally the duty of the commission
to examine and report upon the new constitution of the Government
of India, with particular reference to the working of the
machinery for representation, the procedure by certificate, and
the results of joint sessions."

III

INDIA OFFICE IN LONDON

The principal proposals under this head may be thus summarized;

"We advise that the Secretary of State's salary, like that of all
other Ministers of the Crown, should be defrayed from home
revenues and voted annually by Parliament. This will enable any
live questions of Indian administration to be discussed by the
House of Commons in Committee of Supply.... It might be thought to
follow that the whole charges of the India Office establishment
should similarly be transferred to the home Exchequer; but this
matter is complicated by a series of past transactions, and by the
amount of agency work which the India Office does on behalf of the
Government of India; and we advise that our proposed committee
upon the India Office organization should examine it and taking
these factors into consideration, determine which of the various
India Office charges should be so transferred, and which can
legitimately be retained as a burden on Indian revenues.

"But the transfer of charges which we propose, although it will
give reality to the debates on Indian affairs, will not ensure in
Parliament a better informed or a more sustained interest in
India. We feel that this result can only be accomplished by
appointing a Select Committee of Parliament on Indian affairs."

The above in substance is the proposed scheme. In India it has met with varied response. The European community does not approve of it. They think it is too radical. The European Services have struck a note of rebellion threatening to resign in case of its acceptance by Parliament. The Indian politicians are divided into two camps. Their views are best represented by the following tabular statement which we reproduce from the Indian newspapers.

A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO THE REFORM PROPOSALS PASSED

_Ordinary Rights of Citizens_

BY THE SPECIAL CONGRESS BY THE MODERATE CONFERENCE

Resolution IV. The Government of (V) This Conference urges that
India shall have undivided legislation of an exceptional
administrative authority on character having the effect of
matters directly concerning curtailing ordinary rights such
peace, tranquillity and defence as the freedom of the press and
of the country subject to the public meetings and open
following: judicial trial, should not be
carried through the Council of
That the Statute to be passed by State alone, or in spite of the
Parliament should include the declared opinion of the
Declaration of the Rights of the Legislative Assembly of India,
people of India as British except in a time of war or
citizens: internal disturbance, without
the approval of the Select
(a) That all Indian subjects of Committee of the House of
his Majesty and all the subjects Commons proposed to be set up
naturalized or resident in India under the Scheme unless such
are equal before the law, and legislation is of a temporary
there shall be no penal nor character and limited to a
administrative law in force in period of one year only, the
the country whether substantive said legislation being in any
or procedural of a case made renewable without such
discriminative nature. approval in the last resort.

(b) That no Indian subject of
his Majesty shall be liable to 10
suffer in liberty, life,
property or of association, free (c) All racial inequalities in
speech or in respect of writing, respect of trial by jury, the
except under sentence by an rules made under the Arms Act,
ordinary Court of Justice, and etc. should be removed and the
as a result of a lawful and open latter should be so amended as
trial. to provide for the possession
and carrying of arms by Indians
(c) That every Indian subject under liberal conditions.
shall be entitled to bear arms,
subject to the purchase of a (d) A complete separation of
licence, as in Great Britain, judicial and executive functions
and that the right shall not be of all district officers should
taken away save by a sentence of be made, at least in all major
an ordinary Court of Justice. provinces, at once, and the
judiciary placed under the
(d) That the Press shall be jurisdiction of the highest
free, and that no licence nor court of the province.
security shall be demanded on
the registration of a press or a
newspaper.

(e) That corporal punishment
shall not be inflicted on any
Indian serving in his Majesty's
Army or Navy save under
conditions applying equally to
all other British subjects.

_Fiscal Autonomy_

Resolution V. This Congress (VI) Saving such equal and
is strongly of opinion that equitable Imperial obligations
essential for the welfare of the as may be agreed upon as resting
Indian people that the Indian on all parts of the Empire, the
Legislature should have the Government of India, acting
same measure of fiscal autonomy under the control of the
which the self-governing dominions Legislature, should enjoy the same
of the Empire possess. power of regulating the fiscal
policy of India as the Governments
of the self-governing dominions
enjoy of regulating their fiscal
policy.

_Reform Proposals_

Resolution VI. That this (III) 'This Conference cordially
Congress appreciates the earnest welcomes the Reform Proposals of
attempt on the part of the Right the Secretary of State and the
Hon. the Secretary of State and Viceroy of India as constituting
his Excellency the Viceroy to a distinct advance on present
inaugurate a system of conditions as regards the
responsible government in India, Government of India and the
and, while it recognizes that Provincial Governments and also
some of the proposals constitute a real step towards the
an advance on the present progressive realization of
conditions in some directions, "responsible government" in the
it is of opinion that the Provincial Government in due
proposals are as a whole fulfillment of the terms of the
disappointing and announcement of August 20, 1917.
unsatisfactory, and suggests the As such this Conference accords
following modifications as its hearty support to those
absolutely necessary to proposals, and, while suggesting
constitute a substantial step necessary modifications and
towards responsible government: improvements therein, expresses
its grateful appreciation of the
earnest effort of Mr. Montagu
and Lord Chelmsford to start the
country on a career of genuine
and lasting progress towards the
promised goal.'

(V) 'This Conference regards all
attempts at the condemnation or
rejection of the Reform Scheme
as a whole as ill advised, and
in particular protests
emphatically against the
reactionary attitude assumed
towards it by the Indo-British
Association and some European
public bodies in this country
which is certain to produce, if
successfully persisted--in, an
extremely undesirable state of
feeling between England and
India and imperil the cause of
ordered progress in this
country. This Conference,
therefore, most earnestly urges
his Majesty's Government and
Parliament of the United Kingdom
to give effect to the provisions
of the Scheme and the suggestion
of its supporters in regard
thereto as early as possible by
suitable legislation.'

_Government of India_

(1) That a system of reserved (V) (a) 'This Conference, while
and transferred subjects similar making due allowance for the
to that proposed for the necessities or drawbacks of
provinces, shall be adopted for transitional scheme, urges that,
the Central Government. having regard to the terms of
the announcement of August 20,
(2) That the reserved subjects 1917, and in order that the
shall be foreign affairs progress of India towards the
(excepting relations with the goal of a self-governing unit of
colonies and dominions) army, the British Empire may be
navy, and relations with Indian facilitated and not unduly
Ruling Princes, and subject to delayed or hampered, as also
the declaration of rights with a view to avoid the
contained in resolution IV, the untoward consequences of a
matters directly affecting legislature containing a
public peace, tranquillity and substantially elected popular
defence of the country, and all element being allowed merely to
other subjects shall be indulge in criticism unchecked
transferred subjects. by responsibility, it is
essential that the principle of
(3) The allotments required for responsible government' should
reserved subjects should be the be introduced also in the
first charge on the revenues. Government of India,
simultaneously with a similar
(4) The procedure for the reform in the provinces. There
adoption of the budget should be should, therefore, be a division
on the lines laid down for the of functions in the Central
provinces. Government into 'reserved' and
'transferred' as a part of the
(5) All legislation should be by present instalment of reforms
Bills introduced into the and the Committee on division of
Legislative Assembly, provided functions should be instructed
that, if, in the case of to investigate the subject and
reserved subjects, the make recommendations.
Legislative Council does not
pass such measures as the (b) While, as suggested above,
Government may deem necessary, some measures of transfer of
the Governor General-in-Council power to the Indian Legislature
may provide for the same by should be introduced at the
regulations, such regulations to commencement, provision should
be in force for one year but not be made for future progress
to be renewed unless 40 per towards complete responsible
cent. of the members of the government of the Government of
Assembly present and voting are India by specifically
in favour of them. authorizing the proposed
periodic Commissions to inquire
(6) There shall be no Council of into the matter and to recommend
State, but if the Council of to Parliament such further
State is to be constituted, at advance as may be deemed
least half of its total strength necessary or desirable in that
shall consist of elected behalf.
members, and that procedure by
certification shall be confined (c) The power of certification
to the reserved subjects. given to the Governor-General
should be limited to matters
(7) At least half the number of involving the defence of the
Executive Councillors (if there country's foreign and political
be more than one) in charge of relations, and peace and order
reserved subjects should be and should not be extended to
Indians. 'good government' generally or
'sound financial
(8) The number of members of the administration.'
Legislative Assembly should be
raised to 150 and the proportion (e) This Conference recommends
of the elected members should be that the composition of the
four-fifths. Council of State should be so
altered as to ensure that one
(9) The President and the half of its total strength shall
Vice-President of the consist of elected members.
Legislative Assembly should be
elected by the Assembly. (f) The Indian element in the
Executive Government of India
(10) The Legislative Assembly should be one-half of the total
should have power to make or number of that Government.
modify its own rules of business
and they shall not require the
sanction of the Governor
General.

(11) There shall be an
obligation to convene meetings
of the Council and Assembly at
stated intervals, or on the
requisition of a certain
proportion of members.

(12) A statutory guarantee
should be given that full
responsible government should be
established in the whole of
British India within a period
not exceeding 15 years.

(13) That there should be no
Privy Council for the present.

_Provincial Governments_

1. There should be no additional (e) The proposal to appoint an
members of the Executive additional Member or Members
Government without portfolios. from among the senior officials,
without portfolios and without
2. From the commencement of the vote for purposes of
first Council the principle of consultation and advice only,
responsibility of the ministers but as _Members of the Executive
to the legislature shall come Government_, in the provinces
into force. should be dropped.

3. The status and salary of the (1)
ministers shall be the same as
that of the members of Executive (a) The status and emoluments of
Council. Ministers should be identical
with those of Executive
4. At least half the number of Councillors, and the Governor
Executive Councillors in charge should not have greater power of
of reserved subjects (if there control over them than over the
be more than one) should be latter.
Indians.
(b) Whatever power may be given
5. The Budget shall be under the to the Governor-in-Council to
control of the Legislature interfere with the decisions of
subject to the contribution to the Governor and Ministers on
the Government of India, and the ground of their possible
during the life-time of the effects on the administration of
reformed Councils, to the the reserved subjects,
allocation of a fixed sum for corresponding power should be
the reserved subjects; and given to the Governor and
should fresh taxation be Ministers in respect of
necessary, it should be imposed decisions of the
by the provincial Governments, Governor-in-Council affecting
as a whole for both transferred directly or indirectly the
and reserved subjects. administration of the
transferred subjects.
LEGISLATURE
(d) Heads of provincial
1. While holding that the people Governments in the major
are ripe for the introduction of provinces should ordinarily be
full provincial autonomy the selected from the ranks of
Congress is yet prepared with a public men in the United
view to facilitating the passage Kingdom.
of the Reforms, to leave the
departments of Law, Police and (e) No administrative control
Justice, (prisons excepted) in over subjects vested in
the hands of the Executive provincial Governments should be
Government in all provinces for 'reserved' in the central
a period of six years. Executive Government particularly in
and Judicial Departments must be respect of 'transferred' heads.
separated at once.
(f) The Government of India
2. The President and the should have no power to make a
Vice-President should be elected supplementary levy upon the
by the Council. provinces; they may only take
loans from the latter on
3. That the proposal to occasions of emergency.
institute a Grand Committee
shall be dropped. The Provincial (2) This Conference recommends
Legislative Council shall that the largest possible number
legislate in respect of all of subjects should be included
matters within the jurisdiction in the 'transferred' list in
of provincial Government, every province as the progress
including Law, Justice and and conditions of each province
Police but where the Government may justify and that none
is not satisfied with the mentioned in the Illustrative
decision of the Legislative List No. 11 appended to the
Council in respect of matters Report should, as far as
relating to Law, Justice and possible, be 'reserved' in any
Police, it shall be open to the province.
Government to refer the matter
to the Government of India. The IX (c) The Legislative Councils
Government of India may refer should have the right to elect
the matter to the Indian their own Presidents and
Legislature and the ordinary Vice-Presidents.
procedure shall follow. But if
Grand Committees are instituted, VIII (b) The elected element in
this Congress is of opinion, the Provincial Legislative
that not less than one-half of Councils should be four-fifths
the strength shall be elected by of the total strength of the
the Legislative Assembly. Councils at least in the more
advanced provinces.
4. The proportion of elected
members in the Legislative IX. 1 (a) It should be provided
Council shall be four fifths. that when a Council is dissolved
by the Governor, a fresh
ELECTIONS election should be held and the
new Council summoned not later
5. Whenever the Legislative than four months after the
Assembly, the Council of State, dissolution.
or the Legislative Council is
dissolved, it shall be VIII (a) The Franchise should be
obligatory on the Government as as wide and the composition of
the case may be, to order the the Legislative Council should
necessary elections, and to be as liberal as circumstances
resummon the body dissolved may admit in each province, the
within a period of three months number of representatives of the
from the date of dissolution. general territorial electorates
being fixed in every case at not
6. The Legislative Assembly less than one-half of the whole
should have power to make or council.
modify its own rules of business
and they shall not require the (c) The franchise should be so
sanction of the broad and the electorates so
Governor-General. devised as to secure to all
classes of tax-payers their due
7. There should be an obligation representation by election and
to convene meetings of the the interests of those
Council and Assembly at stated communities or groups of
intervals, or on the requisition communities in Madras and the
of a certain proportion of Bombay Deccan and elsewhere who
members of the Assembly. at present demand special
electoral protection should be
8. No dissolution of the adequately safeguarded by
legislature shall take place introducing a system of plural
except by way of an appeal to constituencies in which a
the electorate and the reason reasonable number of seats
shall be stated in writing should be reserved for those
countersigned by the Ministers. communities.

(e) In the case of any community
for which separate special
electorates may be deemed at
present necessary, participation
in the general territorial
electorates, whether as voters
or candidates, should not be
permitted.

(f) It shall be left to the
option of an individual
belonging to a community which
is given separate representation
to enrol himself as a voter
either in the general or the
communal electorate.

_Parliament and India Office_