Chapter XXXI: Appendix: B

THE CRISIS OF DECEMBER, 1916

THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MR. ASQUITH AND MR. LLOYD GEORGE

_Memorandum of Mr. Lloyd George to Prime Minister, December 1st, 1916._
WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.

1. That the War Committee consist of three members—two of whom must be the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War, who should have in their offices deputies capable of attending to and deciding all departmental business—and a third Minister without portfolio. One of the three to be Chairman.

2. That the War Committee shall have full powers, subject to the supreme control of the Prime Minister, to direct all questions connected with the war.

3. The Prime Minister, in his discretion, to have the power to refer any question to the Cabinet.

4. Unless the Cabinet, in reference by the Prime Minister, reverses decision of the War Cabinet, that decision to be carried out by the Department concerned.

5. The War Committee to have the power to invite any Minister and to summon the expert advisers and officers of any Department to its meetings.

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_January 1st, 1916._

_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

I have now had time to reflect on our conversation this
morning, and to study your memorandum.

Though I do not altogether share your dark estimate and forecast
of the situation, actual and perspective, I am in complete
agreement that we have reached a critical situation in the war,
and that our methods of procedure, with the experience which we
have gained during the last few months, call for reconsideration
and revision.

The two main defects of the War Committee, which has done
excellent work, are:

(1) That its numbers are too large.

(2) That there is delay, evasion, and often obstruction
on the part of the Departments in giving effect to its
decisions.

I might with good reason add (3) that it is often kept in
ignorance by the Departments of information, essential and even
vital, of a technical kind, upon the problems that come before
it: and (4) that it is overcharged with duties, many of which
might well be relegated to subordinate bodies.

The result is that I am clearly of opinion that the War
Committee should be reconstituted, and its relation to and
authority over the Departments be more clearly defined and more
effectively asserted.

I come now to your specific proposals.

In my opinion, whatever changes are made in the composition and
functions of the War Committee, the Prime Minister must be its
Chairman. He cannot be relegated to the position of an arbiter
in the background or a referee to the Cabinet.

In regard to its composition, I agree that the War Secretary and
the First Lord of the Admiralty are necessary members. I am
inclined to add to the same category the Minister of Munitions.
There should be another member, either without portfolio or
charged only with comparatively light departmental duties. One
of the members should be appointed Vice-Chairman.

I purposely do not in this letter discuss the delicate and
difficult question of personnel.

The Committee should, as far as possible, sit _de die diem_, and
have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to
the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the
Departments.

The reconstitution of the War Committee should be accompanied by
the setting up of a Committee of National Organisation, to deal
with the purely domestic side of war problems. It should have
executive powers within its own domain.

The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916._

_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

Such productions as the first leading article in to-day’s
_Times_, showing the infinite possibilities for misunderstanding
and misrepresentation of such an arrangement as we considered
yesterday, make me at least doubtful as to its feasibility.
Unless the impression is at once corrected that I am being
relegated to the position of an irresponsible spectator of the
war, I cannot possibly go on.

The suggested arrangement was to the following effect. The Prime
Minister to have supreme and effective control of War Policy.

The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to him; its
Chairman will report to him daily; he can direct it to consider
particular topics or proposals; and all its conclusions will be
subject to his approval or veto. He can, of course, at his own
discretion attend meetings of the Committee.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

WAR OFFICE, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I have not seen the _Times’_ article. But I hope you will
not attach undue importance to these effusions. I have had these
misrepresentations to put up with for months. Northcliffe
frankly wants a smash. Derby and I do not. Northcliffe would
like to make this and any other rearrangement under your
Premiership impossible. Derby and I attach great importance to
your retaining your present position—effectively. I cannot
restrain, or, I fear, influence Northcliffe. I fully accept in
letter and in spirit your summary of the suggested
arrangement—subject, of course, to personnel.

Ever sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, S.W.
_December 4th, 1916_

_Secret_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

Thank you for your letter of this morning.

The King gave me to-day authority to ask and accept the
resignation of all my colleagues, and to form a new Government
on such lines as I should submit to him. I start therefore with
a clean slate.

The first question which I have to consider is the constitution
of the new War Committee.

After full consideration of the matter in all its aspects, I
have come decidedly to the conclusion that it is not possible
that such a Committee could be made workable and effective
without the Prime Minister as its Chairman. I quite agree that
it will be necessary for him, in view of the other calls upon
his time and energy, to delegate from time to time the
Chairmanship to another Minister as representative and _locum
tenens_; but (if he is to retain the authority, which
corresponds to his responsibility as Prime Minister) he must
continue to be, as he always has been, its permanent President.
I am satisfied, on reflection, that any other arrangement (such
as, for instance, the one which I indicated to you in my letter
of to-day) would be found in experience impracticable and
incompatible with the retention of the Prime Minister’s final
and supreme control.

The other question, which you have raised, relates to the
personnel of the Committee. Here again, after deliberate
consideration, I find myself unable to agree with some of your
suggestions. I think we both agree that the First Lord of the
Admiralty must, of necessity, be a member of the Committee.

I cannot (as I told you yesterday) be a party to any suggestion
that Mr. Balfour should be displaced. The technical side of the
Board of Admiralty has been reconstituted, with Sir John
Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. I believe Mr. Balfour to be, under
existing conditions, the necessary head of the Board.

I must add that Sir Edward Carson (for whom personally and in
every other way I have the greatest regard) is not, from the
only point of view which is significant to me (namely, the most
effective prosecution of the war) the man best qualified among
my colleagues present or past to be a member of the War
Committee.

I have only to say, in conclusion, that I am strongly of opinion
that the War Committee (without any disparagement of the
existing Committee, which in my judgment is a most efficient
body, and has done and is doing invaluable work) ought to be
reduced in number: so that it can sit more frequently, and
overtake more easily the daily problems with which it has to
deal. But in any reconstruction of the Committee, such as I
have, and have for some time past had in view, the governing
consideration to my mind is the special capacity of the men who
are to sit on it for the work which it has to do.

That is a question which I must reserve for myself to decide.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.
_December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I received your letter with some surprise.

On Friday I made proposals which involved not merely your
retention of the Premiership, but the supreme control of the
war, whilst the executive functions, subject to that supreme
control, were left to others. I thought you then received these
suggestions favourably. In fact, you yourself proposed that I
should be the Chairman of this Executive Committee, although, as
you know, I never put forward that demand. On Saturday you wrote
me a letter in which you completely went back on that
proposition. You sent for me on Sunday, and put before me other
proposals; these proposals you embodied in a letter written on
Monday:

“The Prime Minister to have supreme and effective
control of war policy.

“The agenda of the War Committee will be submitted to
him; its Chairman will report to him daily; he can
direct it to consider particular topics or proposals;
and all its conclusions will be subject to his approval
or veto. He can, of course, at his own discretion,
attend meetings of the Committee.”

These proposals safeguarded your position and power as Prime
Minister in every particular. I immediately wrote you accepting
them “in letter and in spirit.” It is true that on Sunday I
expressed views as to the constitution of the Committee, but
these were for discussion. To-day you have gone back on your own
proposals.

I have striven my utmost to cure the obvious defects of the War
Committee without overthrowing the Government. As you are aware,
on several occasions during the last two years I have deemed it
my duty to express profound dissatisfaction with the
Government’s method of conducting the war. Many a time, with the
road to victory open in front of us, we have delayed and
hesitated whilst the enemy were erecting barriers that finally
checked the approach. There has been delay, hesitation, lack of
forethought and vision. I have endeavoured repeatedly to warn
the Government of the dangers, both verbally and in written
memoranda and letters, which I crave your leave now to publish
if my action is challenged; but I have either failed to secure
decisions or I have secured them when it is too late to avert
the evils. The latest illustration is our lamentable failure to
give timely support to Roumania.

I have more than once asked to be released from my
responsibility for a policy with which I was in thorough
disagreement, but at your urgent personal request, I remained in
the Government. I realise that when the country is in the peril
of a great war, Ministers have not the same freedom to resign on
disagreement. At the same time I have always felt—and felt
deeply—that I was in a false position, inasmuch as I could
never defend in a whole-hearted manner the action of a
Government of which I was a member. We have thrown away
opportunity after opportunity, and I am convinced, after deep
and anxious reflection, that it is my duty to leave the
Government in order to inform the people of the real condition
of affairs, and to give them an opportunity, before it is too
late, to save their native land from a disaster which is
inevitable if the present methods are longer persisted in. As
all delay is fatal in war, I place my office without further
parley at your disposal.

It is with great personal regret that I have come to this
conclusion. In spite of mean and unworthy insinuations to the
contrary—insinuations which I fear are always inevitable in the
case of men who hold prominent but not primary positions in any
administration—I have felt a strong personal attachment to you
as my Chief. As you yourself said on Sunday, we have acted
together for ten years and never a quarrel, although we have had
many a grave difference on questions of policy. You have treated
me with great courtesy and kindness: for all that I thank you.
Nothing would have induced me to part now except an overwhelming
sense that the course of action which has been pursued has put
the country—and not merely the country, but throughout the
world, the principles for which you and I have always stood
throughout our political lives—in the greatest peril that has
ever overtaken them.

As I am fully conscious of the importance of preserving national
unity, I propose to give your Government complete support in the
vigorous prosecution of the war; but unity without action is
nothing but futile carnage, and I cannot be responsible for
that. Vigour and vision are the supreme need of this hour.

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._

_Private_
MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

I need not tell you that I have read your letter of to-day
with much regret.

I do not comment upon it for the moment, except to say that I
cannot wholly accept your account of what passed between us in
regard to my connection with the War Committee.

In particular, you have omitted to quote the first and most
material part of my letter of yesterday.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.

In the meantime, I feel sure that you will see the obvious
necessity, in the public interest, of not publishing, at this
moment, any part of our correspondence.

WAR OFFICE, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

I cannot announce my resignation without assigning the
reason. Your request that I should not publish the
correspondence that led up to and necessitated it places me
therefore in an embarrassing and unfair position. I must give
reasons for the grave step I have taken. If you forbid
publication of the correspondence, do you object to my stating
in another form my version of the causes that led to my
resigning?

Yours sincerely,
(Sd.) D. LLOYD GEORGE.

As to the first part of your letter, the publication of the
letter would cover the whole ground.

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.
_December 5th, 1916._

MY DEAR LLOYD GEORGE,

It may make a difference to you (in reply to your last
letter) if I tell you at once that I have tendered my
resignation to the King. In any case, I should deprecate in the
public interest the publication in its present form at this
moment of your letter to me of this morning.

Of course, I have neither the power nor the wish to prevent your
stating in some other form the causes which led you to take the
step which you have taken.

Yours very sincerely,
(Sd.) H. H. ASQUITH.