Chapter X (2)

[71] MARTHA: _L’Examen de Conscience chez les Anciens_ (“études morales sur l’Antiquité”).—“Ce poème, attribué par les uns à Pythagore lui-même, par d’autres à Lysis, son disciple, par d’autres encore ou à Philolaüs ou à Empédocle, ne remonte pas sans doute à une si haute antiquité, mais il est certainement antérieur au christianisme, puisque des écrivains qui ont vécu avant notre ère, entre autres le Stoïcien Chrysippe, y ont fait quelquefois allusion ... Hieroclès dit formellement que les _Vers d’or_ ne sont pas l’œuvre d’un homme, mais celle de tout le sacré collège pythagoricien.”—The author of the verses is, doubtless, unknown, but their general attribution in antiquity to a Pythagorean source is in harmony with the universal recognition that they cohere with the ethical doctrine of the school. M. Martha subjects ancient philosophers and critics to a severe reprehension on the ground that they saw in these verses a mere inculcation of the practice of the memory—“Un certain nombre d’anciens sont tombés dans la plus étrange méprise. Ils ont cru qu’il s’agissait ici d’un exercice de mémoire.” But, giving all the force which M. Martha assigns to the passages he quotes in support of this view, we must not leave out of consideration the important part which a good memory was believed to subserve in practical ethics. See the pseudo-Plutarchic tract _De Educatione Liberorum_, 9 F. Cf. EPICTETUS, lib. iii. cap x.

SENECA (_De Ira_, 3, cap. 36) learned the practice inculcated by the golden verses from Sextus, who was claimed as a Pythagorean (RITTER and PRELLER, 437).

[72] PLATO: _Republic_, 600 B.

[73] PLUTARCH: _Adversus Coloten_, 1126; cf. _D. L._, ix. 23. See also PLATO’S _Parmenides_, and cf. UEBERWEG on Parmenides.

[74] LESLIE STEPHEN: _The Science of Ethics_ (concluding sentence).

[75] For a brief expression of this identity, see DION. CH. _De Exilio_, xiii. p. 249.—“_To seek and strive earnestly after Virtue—that is Philosophy._” Cf. SENECA: _Epist._, i. 37; _et passim_.

[76] See MARTHA: _La prédication morale populaire_ (“Les moralistes sous l’empire romain,” pp. 240, 241).—“A cette époque la philosophie était une espèce de religion qui imposait à ses adeptes au moins l’extérieur de la vertu. Les sophistes se reconnaissent à leur mœurs licencieuses et à leurs manières arrogantes, les philosophes à la dignité de leur conduite et de leur maintien. On entrait dans la philosophie par une sorte de conversion édifiante: on ne pouvait en sortir que par une apostasie scandaleuse.” See the passages referred to by M. MARTHA, and, in addition, DION’S account of his “conversion” in _Oratio_ xiii. (_De Exilio_), and his comparisons between the sophist and the peacock, and the philosopher and the owl, in _Oratio_ xii. (_De Dei Cognitione_).

[77] CICERO: _Acad. Poster._, i. 4. (Reid’s translation.) Cf. RITTER and PRELLER: sec. 204, note “a” on XENOPHON: _Memorabilia_, iv. 3. 1, and i. 4. 4.—“Socratem quodam modo naturæ studuisse vel ex nostro loco luculenter cernitur, ubi deprehendis eum teleologicam quæ dicitur viam ingressum, quæ ratio transiit ad Socraticos. Inde corrigendus Cicero _Acad. Poster._, i. 4.” Cf. BENWELL’S Preface to his edition of the _Memorabilia_: “Quam graviter de Dei providentia et de admirabili corporis humani structura Socratem disserentem inducit!”—It must be conceded, however, that in Xenophon’s account Socrates is described as discussing natural phenomena still with a view to ethical edification. (_Memorab._, iv. 3.)

[78] PLATO: _Timæus_, 59 C.

[79] W. S. LANDOR: _Diogenes and Plato (Imaginary Conversations)_.—“Draw thy robe around thee; let the folds fall gracefully, and look majestic. That sentence is an admirable one, but not for me. I want sense, not stars.” Cf. Dr. MARTINEAU: _Plato (Types of Ethical Theory)_.—“The perfection which consists in contemplation of the absolute, or the attempt to copy it, may be the consummation of Reason, but not of character.”

[80] Cf. LANDOR: _loc. cit._—“The bird of wisdom flies low, and seeks her food under hedges; the eagle himself would be starved if he always soared aloft and against the sun. The sweetest fruit grows near the ground, and the plants that bear it require ventilation and lopping.”

[81] ARCHER-HIND: _The Phædo of Plato_, Appendix I.

[82] Cf. MARTINEAU: “Types of Ethical Theory”: _Plato_, p. 97, vol. i.—“For the soul in its own essence, and for great and good souls among mankind, Plato certainly had the deepest reverence; but he had no share in the religious sentiment of democracy which dignifies man _as man_, and regards with indifference the highest personal qualities in comparison with the essential attributes of common humanity.—He rated so high the difficulty of attaining genuine insight and goodness that he thought it much if they could be realized even in a few; and had no hope that the mass of men, overborne by the pressure of material necessity and unchastened desires, could be brought, under the actual conditions of this world, to more than the mere beginnings of wisdom.”

[83] ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, i. cap. 3. Cf. i. 6 and i. 8.

[84] _Ethics_, i. 3, 4, where also the verse from the _Works and Days_ is quoted; cf. sec. 6.

[85] _Ethics_, i. 8.

[86] GRANT’S _Aristotle_, vol. i. p. 155.

[87] See RITTER and PRELLER, sec. 392, for the authorities on this head.

[88] _A Voice from the Nile_, by JAMES THOMSON. An Epicurean would have heartily responded to the verse following those quoted in the text from this fine poem—“And therefore Gods and Demons, Heaven and Hell.”

[89] DIOGENES LAERTIUS (RITTER and PRELLER, 380. Cf. CIC.: _De Finibus_, i. 7).

[90] Cf. PSEUDO-PLUTARCH: _De Placitis Philosophorum_. 877 D.

[91] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, x. 142. Cf. CIC.: _De Finibus_, i. 19.—“Denique etiam _morati melius erimus_ quum didicerimus _quid natura desideret_.” (RITTER and PRELLER, p. 343).

[92] Cf. the statement of SENECA (_Epist._, 89, 9).—“Epicurei duas partes philosophiæ putaverunt esse, naturalem atque moralem: rationalem removerunt.”

[93] “Through the great weight which, both in theory and in their actual life with each other, was laid by the Epicureans on Friendship (a social development which only became possible after the dissolution of the bond which had so closely united each individual citizen to the Civil Community), Epicureanism aided in softening down the asperity and exclusiveness of ancient manners, and in cultivating the social virtues of companionableness, compatibility, friendliness, gentleness, beneficence, and gratitude, and so performed a work whose merit we should be careful not to under-estimate.”—UEBERWEG: _Grundriss_. Cf. HORACE: _Sat._, I. iv. 135—“dulcis amicis.” The other elements of the Epicurean ideal are also realized in Horace’s character, as his writings have left it to us.

[94] This breaking away of the barriers between the teaching of various schools was, doubtless, largely due to the increasing importance which they universally attached to Ethics. The fact, at any rate, is indisputable. Every history of Greek philosophy, from the Third Century onward, is freely scattered with such phrases as these from Ueberweg:—“The new Academy returned to Dogmatism. It commenced with Philo of Larissa, founder of the Fourth School.... His pupil, Antiochus of Ascalon, founded a Fifth School, by combining the doctrines of Plato with certain Aristotelian, and more particularly with certain Stoic theses, thus preparing the way for the transition to Neo-Platonism.”—“In many of the Peripatetics of this late period we find an approximation to Stoicism.”

[95] As regards Epicureanism, see the _Adversus Coloten_, the _De latenter vivendo_, and the _Non posse suaviter viri secundum Epicurum_. Plutarch’s polemic against Stoicism is specially developed in the three tracts, _Stoicos absurdiora Poetis dicere_, _De Stoicorum Repugnantiis_, and _De communibus Notitiis_. Plutarch’s attitude is purely critical: he is by no means constructive. His criticism has been severely dealt with by H. Bazin in his dissertation, _De Plutarcho Stoicorum Adversario_. It is worthy of note that Plutarch deals entirely with the founders of the two schools, not with the later developments of their teachings.

[96] Thiersch, who regards Plutarch as the inaugurator of that moral reformation which, as we attempt to show in the next chapter, was operating before he was born, asserts that at the time when Plutarch began his work, the prevailing manner of life was based upon an Epicurean ideal. (_Der Epikureismus war die Popularphilosophie des Tages, denn in ihr fand die herrschende Lebensweise ihren begrifflichen Ausdruck._—THIERSCH: _Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verhältniss, etc._, Marburg, 1853.) If this be so, and we willingly make the admission, there was little need for reform here, although, as Seneca found (_Ad Lucilium_, xxi. 9), it may have been necessary to explain to a misunderstanding world what Epicureanism really was. Whatever Plutarch, as nominal Platonist, may polemically advance against Epicureanism, the ideal of Epicurus and Metrodorus is realized in the conduct of the group of people whose manner of life is represented in the _Symposiacs_.

[97] For some considerations on this subject see the concluding chapter.

[98] _E.g._, Dr. August Tholuck.—At the termination of an article, “_Ueber den Einfluss des Heidenthums aufs Leben_,” in which he ransacks classical authors and Christian fathers for anything which may serve to exhibit the degradation of Pagan society, he quotes the words of Athanasius to give expression to the conclusion referred to in the text. The whole of Champagny’s brilliant and fascinating work on the Cæsars is dominated by the same spirit, a spirit utterly inconsistent with that attitude of philosophical detachment in which history should be written, (_Études sur l’Empire Romain_, tome iii., “_Les Césars_.”) Archbishop Trench, too, says of our period that it “was the hour and power of darkness; of a darkness which then, immediately before the dawn of a new day, was the thickest.” (_Miracles_, p. 162.) Prof. Mahaffy, in the same uncritical spirit, refers to the “singular” and “melancholy” spectacle presented by Plutarch in his religious work, “_clinging to the sinking ship, or rather, trying to stop the leak and declare her seaworthy_.” (_Greeks under Roman Sway_, p. 321.)

[99] See Dean Merivale, _Romans under the Empire_, vol. vii.

[100] See “St. Paul and Seneca” (Dissertation ii. in Lightfoot on “Philippians”) for a full account of the question from the historical and critical standpoints. The learned and impartial Bishop has no difficulty in proving that the resemblances between Stoicism and Christianity were due to St. Paul’s acquaintance with Stoic teaching, and not to Seneca’s knowledge of the Christian faith.

Theodoret, bishop of Cyrus, in Syria (consecrated A.D. 420), appears to have been the first to assert the operation of Christian influences on Plutarch:—“_Plotinus, Plutarch, and Numenius, and the rest of their tribe, who lived after the Manifestation of our Saviour to the Gentiles, inserted into their own writings many points of Christian Theology._” (Theodoretus, _Græcarum affectionum curatio_—Oratio ii., De Principio.) In another place he makes a still more definite assertion: “_Plutarch and Plotinus undoubtedly heard the Divine Gospel._” (Oratio x., De Oraculis.) Rualdus, in the ninth chapter of his _Vita Plutarchi_, given towards the end of the first volume of the Paris edition of 1624, dare not be so emphatic as Theodoret:—“_There are, in the writings of Plutarch, numerous thoughts, drawn from I cannot say what hidden source, which, from their truth and importance, could be taken for the utterances of a Christian oracle. I do not hesitate, therefore, to say of him, as Tertullian said of Seneca, that he is ‘often our own man.’_” And he even goes so far as to admit that, though Plutarch never attacked the Christian faith, and might have read the New Testament as well as the Old, it is quite impossible to claim him as a believer.—Brucker, in a slight account of Plutarch in his _Historia Critica Philosophiæ_, takes a more critical view.—“The fact that Plutarch, in his numerous writings, nowhere alludes to the Christians, I do not know whether to attribute to his sense of fairness, or even to actual favour, or whether to regard it as an indication of mere neglect and contempt.” That Brucker is inclined to the alternative of contempt is shown by a comment in a footnote on Tillemont’s assertion (_Histoire des Empereurs_), that Plutarch ignored the Christians, “not daring to speak well, not wishing to speak ill.” “It appears to me,” says Brucker, “that the real reason was contempt for the Christians, who were looked upon as illiterate.”

Of modern examples of this tendency one may be sufficient. In the introduction to an American translation of the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_, the editor, after enumerating the arguments against any connexion between Plutarch and Christianity, concludes:—“Yet I cannot doubt that an infusion of Christianity had somehow infiltrated itself into Plutarch’s ethical opinions and sentiment, _as into those of Seneca_.” (“Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice,” translated, with an introduction and notes, by ANDREW P. PEABODY, Boston, 1885.)

[101] See DION: _Ad Alexandrinos_, p. 410 (Dindorf). See also p. 402. Cf. PHILOSTRATUS: _Vitæ Sophistarum_, i. 6.

[102] E.g., _Conjugalia Præcepta_, 140 A.—“_Those who do not associate cheerfully with their wives, nor share their recreations with them, teach them to seek their own pleasures apart from those of their husbands._”

[103] TIBULLUS: _Eleg._, i. 1. Cf. PROPERTIUS: _Eleg._, iii. 15. “Dum nos fata sinunt, oculos satiemus amore: Nox tibi longa venit, nec reditura dies.”

[104] TIBULLUS: _Eleg._, i. 3. “Quod si fatales iam nunc explevimus annos,” to the end of the Elegy.

[105] TIB. i. 3 (sub finem).

[106] PROPERTIUS: _Eleg._, ii. 13, 28; iv. 5, 23 sqq.; iv. 4.

[107] TIB., i. 10.

[108] LUCAN: _Pharsalia_, i. 670.

[109] The basis of the work of Augustus, and of the religious reforms inaugurated or developed by him, is laid in the recognition of a fact noted by Balbus in CIC., _De Nat. Deorum_, lib. ii. 3. “Eorum imperiis rempublicam amplificatam qui religionibus paruissent. Et si conferre volumus nostra cum externis, ceteris rebus aut pares aut etiam inferiores reperiemur; religione, id est, cultu deorum, multo superiores.” Cf. HORACE: _Od._, iii. 6, vv. 1-4; LIVY, xlv. 39.

[110] HOR.: _Od._, iii. 6.

[111] See BOISSIER: _Religion Romaine_, vol. i. cap. 5.—_Le Sixième Livre de l’Enéide_. St. Augustine must surely have felt the _religious_ influence of the Æneid when he experienced the emotion which he describes in the well-known passage in the First Book of the Confessions—_plorare Didonem mortuam (cogebar), quia se occidit ob amorem: cum interea meipsum morientem, Deus Vita mea, siccis occulis ferrem miserrimus_. (Lib. i. cap. xiii.)

[112] OVID: _Fasti_, 4, 203; cf. _Meta._, i. sec. 8.

[113] See the Life of Persius, included, with the Lives of Terence, Horace, Juvenal, Lucan, and Pliny the Elder, in the writings of Suetonius.

[114] MACLEANE’S _Persius_.—Introduction.

[115] PERSIUS: _Sat._, v. 62-64.—_At te nocturnis juvat impallescere chartis, Cultor enim juvenum purgatas inseris aures Fruge Cleanthea._

[116] _Pharsalia_, ix. 554-555.

[117] _Pharsalia_, ix. 570. We have not been able to refrain from quoting these—as other—well-known verses in the text. They are the highest expression of the Stoic Pantheism. “_Virtus_” has the appearance of a rhetorical climax; but has it been noticed that the great modern poet of Pantheism—for what else was Wordsworth?—also makes humanity the highest embodiment of that “presence ... Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, And the round ocean and the living air, And the blue sky, _and in the mind of man_?”

[118] _Quis labor hic superis_, &c., vi. 490, _et passim_.

[119] _Felices errore suo_, &c., i. 459.

[120] Scrutabitur scholas nostras, et obiiciet philosophis congiaria, amicas, gulam: ostendet mihi alium in adulterio, alium in popina, alium in aula.—SENECA: _Epist._, i. 29.

[121] PHILOSTRATUS, i. 7. The quaint turn of the version in the text is from BLOUNT’S 1681 translation of the _Life of Apollonius_.

[122] DION: _Oratio_ 32, pp. 402-3 (Dindorf).

[123] See DION: _De Cognitione Dei_ (pp. 213-4) for an interesting comparison between the owl and the philosopher on the one hand, and the sophist and the peacock on the other. (Cf. _Ad Alexandrinos_, p. 406, where the sufferings of the faithful philosopher are in implied contrast to the rewards that await the brilliant sophist.)

[124] _Iliad_, ix. 312-3 (Chapman’s translation). This actual text is quoted in PHILOSTRATUS’ _Lives of the Sophists_ (i. 25) as a criticism on some of the false and fantastic exercises of the Sophists. The “distant lapse” referred to in the text is constantly evident in the dramas of the best Athenian period. And history shows that there was a strong tendency in the Hellenic character agreeing with that indicated by the evidence of the dramatists, notwithstanding the outcry raised when Euripides summed up the whole matter in his famous line in the Hippolytus (_Hipp._ 612).

[125] PHILOSTRATUS: _Vitæ Sophistarum_, lib. i. sec. 24.

[126] E.g., _De Stoic. Repug._, 1033 A, B; _De Audiendo_, 43 F.

[127] See frequent passages in Seneca’s letters to Lucilius, e.g. _Ep._ i. 16, 20. Cf. _De Vita Beata_, cap. 18, where Seneca defends himself and other philosophers against the charge “_aliter loqueris: aliter vivis_.” He will not be deterred from the pursuit of virtue by any truth human weakness may have to admit in the charge.

This note is well marked in both Aurelius and Epictetus (ii. 19. Cf. AULUS GELLIUS, xvii. 19). The praise of Ulysses at the end of the _De Deo Socratis_ of Apuleius is couched in the same strain.

[128] CATULLUS, xvi. 4, 5; OVID: _Tristia_, ii. 353-4; MARTIAL, i. 5.

[129] PLINY: _Ep._ v. 3. Plutarch, also, is legitimately offended at the loose language of the founders of Stoicism (see _De Stoic. Repug._, 1044 B), and his expressions, as are those of Pliny’s friends, are quite in harmony with the modern attitude on the question. Apuleius defends himself against a similar charge to that brought against Pliny by a similar display of great names.—“Fecere tamen et _alii talia_” (De Deo Socratis).

[130] HORACE: _Ep._ i. 1, 14.

[131] EPICTETUS: _Encheir._, 49; _Discourses_, iii. 2; i. 17.

[132] SENECA: _Epist. ad Lucilium_, i. 21. Here are a few of the _egregia dicta_ which Seneca takes from the teachings of Epicurus, or Metrodorus, or _alicujus ex illa officina_.—“_Honesta res est læta paupertas_,” “_Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus_,” “_Philosophiæ servias oportet ut tibi contingat vera libertas_,” “_Si cui sua non videntur amplissima, licet totius mundi dominus sit, tamen miser est_,” “_Quid est turpius, quam senex vivere incipiens?_” “_Is maxime divitiis fruitur, qui minime divitiis indiget_,” “_Immodica ira gignit insaniam_,” “_Sic fac omnia, tanquam spectet Epicurus_,” “_Initium est salutis, notitia peccati_,” &c. Yet Seneca was the _acerrimus Stoicus_ of Lactantius (_Div. Inst._, i. 5).

[133] Fragment 120 in Bergk’s third edition, 144 in his fourth edition, and 107 in Böckh’s edition. W. Christ includes it in his selections—ἐξ ἀδήλων εἰδῶν (No. 4).

[134] _Iliad_, ix. 498; xi. 3, 73; iv. 440.

[135] _Amatorius_, 763 C, sqq.; cf. _De Placitis Philosoph._, lib. i. 879-880 A. This tract cannot be quoted as authority for Plutarch’s views; it is in several places distinctly, even grossly, anti-Platonic, and in other places even more distinctly Epicurean. As an example of the reverence with which Plutarch constantly alludes to Plato, the first conversation in the Eighth Book of the _Symposiacs_ may be quoted. The conversation arises out of a celebration of Plato’s birthday, and Plutarch gives a sympathetic report of the remarks of Mestrius Florus, who is of opinion that those who impute the philosopher’s paternity to Apollo do not dishonour the God. Cf. this and hundreds of other similar examples with the bitterly contemptuous expressions in the _De Placitis_, 881 A, a section which concludes with an emphatic exposition of that Epicurean view which Plutarch exerts himself so strenuously to confute in the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_. Bernardakis “stars” the _De Placitis_, though Zimmerman quotes it as evidence against the sincerity of Plutarch’s piety (_Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen_, cap. 7: “aperte negat providentiam”). Wyttenbach says the _De Placitis_ was “e perditis quibusdam germanis libris compilatum.” Christopher Meiners (_Historia Doctrinæ de Vero Deo_, p. 246) attacks the boldness of the writer, “quâ deorum numen et providentiam impugnavit, quæque a Plutarchi pietate et moribus longe abhorret.” Corsini seems to think that the incredible labour involved in the compilation makes it worthy of Plutarch. His edition, with notes, translation, and dissertations, makes a very handsome quarto, which is a monument of combined industry and simplicity. He makes no comment on the anti-Platonic expressions alluded to above (CORSINUS: _Plutarchi De Placitis Philosophorum_, libri v., Florence, 1759), nor does Mahaffy either, who regards the _De Placitis_ as genuine, though he calls it jejune. I have been unable to see a copy of Beck’s 1787 edition, which Volkmann highly praises. It may be observed with regard to the passage referred to at the head of this note that Plutarch would never have limited the contribution of philosophy to the knowledge of God to τὸ φυσικόν. Dion Chrysostom (_De Dei Cognitione_, 393, sqq.) mentions the same three sources of the knowledge of the Divine nature as Plutarch, but also postulates a primeval and innate cognition of God.

[136] Cf. the Pseudo-Plutarchic _De Placit. Phil._, 880 A.

[137] Λόγον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας μυσταγωγὸν ἀναλαβόντες. _De Iside et Osiride_, 378 A, B. “_Un lien pieux se formait entre le myste et son mystagogue, lien qui ne pouvait plus se rompre sans crime._”—Maury, vol. ii. cap. xi. For the saying of Theodorus about “taking with the left hand what is offered with the right,” see _De Tranquillitate Animi_, 467 B.

[138] _De Iside et Osiride_, and _De Superstitione_, passim.

[139] Cf. DIOG. LAERT. vii. 134 (RITTER and PRELLER, sect. 404).—“God, by transformation of His own essence, makes the world.”—Grant’s _Aristotle_, Essay vi., “_The Ancient Stoics._” Cf. PLUT: _De Stoic. Repugn._ 1053.

[140] _De Ε apud Delphos_, 388 F.

[141] _Quomodo Adulator_, 78 E. Cf. EUNAPIUS on _Historians of Philosophy_. “No one has written any careful account of the lives of philosophers, among whom we count not only Ammonius, teacher of divinest Plutarch, but also Plutarch himself, the darling and delight of all Philosophy.” Eunapius thinks that the _Parallel Lives_ were Plutarch’s finest work, but adds that “all his writings are thickly sown with original thoughts of his own, as well as with the teachings of his Master.”

[142] 393 E.

[143] Plutarch elsewhere comments upon the εὑρησιλογία of the Stoics in finding explanations of the various names of the popular Deities (_Quomodo Adolescens_, 31 E). CICERO (_De Natura Deorum_, iii. 24) represents Cotta as charging the Stoics with supporting the crudest superstitions of the popular faith by the skill which they displayed in finding a mysterious significance in the current names and legends:-“Atque hæc quidem et ejusmodi ex vetere Græcia fama collecta sunt; quibus intelligis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones. Vestri autem non modo hæc non repellunt, verum etiam confirmant, interpretando quorsum quidque pertineat.”

[144] _Iliad_, xv. 362-4.

[145] In another place Plutarch expresses the view that the original Creator of the world bestowed upon the stuff of the phenomenal world a principle of change and movement by which that stuff often dissolves and reshapes itself under the operation of natural causes without the intervention of the original Creator (_De Defectu Orac._, 435-6).

[146] Plutarch, in this Essay, distinctly places himself in opposition to Plato, whose views, for the purposes of contrast, may be summarized from two well-known passages of the Republic. In 337 B, C, the greater part of the myths current in the popular poets are repudiated. Then, after that famous series of criticisms applied to particular passages taken from Homer and Hesiod and other poets, after his analysis of the various kinds of “narration,” and his implicit inclusion of the great poets of Greece among the masters of that kind of imitative narration which a man will the more indulge in, the more contemptible he is, Plato concludes with that ironical description of the reception which a Homer or a Hesiod would have to meet in a state founded on the Platonic ideal. “_We shall pay him reverence as a sacred, admirable, and charming personage; we shall pour perfumed oil upon his head and crown him with woollen fillets; but we shall tell him that our laws exclude such characters as he, and shall send him away to some other city than ours._”—398 A, B (Davies and Vaughan’s translation). Plutarch, however, takes the world as it is. He admits that poetry is a siren, but refuses to stop the ears of the young people who listen to her fascinating strains. Lycurgus was mad in thinking he could cure drunkenness by cutting down the vineyards; he should rather have brought the water-springs nearer to the vines. It is better to utilize the vine of poetry by checking and pruning its “fanciful and theatrical exuberance” than to uproot it altogether. We must mingle the wine with the pure water of philosophy, or, to use another image, poetry and philosophy must be planted in the same soil, just as the mandragora, which moderates the native strength of the wine, is planted in vineyards (_Quomodo Adolescens_, 15 E).

August Schlemm, in his _De fontibus Plutarchi Commentationum De Aud. Poetis et de Fortuna_ (Göttingen, 1893), subjects the structure of the _De Audiendis_ to a very close and careful analysis, and comes to the conclusion that the main sources of Plutarch’s material are to be found in the writings of Stoic and Peripatetic philosophers. He notes that Plutarch’s examples are taken from the same Homeric, verses as Plato’s, and adds, “Quæ cum ita sint, quomodo hæ Plutarchum inter et Platonem similitudines ortæ sint dubium jam esse non potest. Plutarchus, ut in eis quæ antecedunt, ita etiam hic, usus est libro Peripatetici cujusdam, qui, _ut criminationes a Platone poetis factas repelleret_, hujus modi fictiones in natura artis poeticæ positas esse demonstravit et commentationi suæ inseruit poetarum versus a Platone vituperatos.” Chrysippus had composed a work on _How to study Poetry_, Zeno one entitled _On Poetical Study_, and Cleanthes another, called _On the Poet_.

The opinion of so conscientious a scholar on Plutarch’s “appropriations” is worth quoting:—“tenendum est ... Plutarchum non eum fuisse qui more compilatorum libros aliorum ad verbum exscriberet sed id egisse ut ea quæ legisset atque collegisset referret, sed ita ut modo sua intermisceret, modo nonnulla omitteret vel mutaret.”

[147] _De Iside et Osiride_, 353 E.

[148] _De Ε apud Delphos_, 393 D. Cf. _De Defectu_, 433 E. Ammonius is here evidently referring to a remark made (386 B) by “one of those present” to the effect that “practically all the Greeks identify Apollo with the Sun.” The words of Ammonius quoted in the text are strikingly similar in spirit to the famous verses in the “In Memoriam:”—

“O thou that after toil and storm
May’st seem to have reached a purer air,
Whose faith has centre everywhere,
Nor cares to fix itself to form,

“Leave thou thy sister when she prays,
Her early Heaven, her happy views;
Nor thou with shadowed hint confuse
A life that leads melodious days.

“Her faith through form is pure as thine,
Her hands are quicker unto good:
Oh, sacred be the flesh and blood
To which she links a truth divine!”

[149] _Consolatio ad Apollonium_, 102 A.—“He was a very sage and virtuous youth, conspicuous for the reverence which he paid to the gods, to his parents, and to his friends.” This is nearly the old Hellenic ideal as expressed, _e.g._, in the lines from the “Antiope” of Euripides, preserved by Stobæus, “On Virtue”—

“There be three virtues for thy practice, child:
Honour the gods, revere thy loving parents,
Respect the laws of Greece.”

[150] _Amatorius_, 756 B.

[151] _Amatorius_, 762 A.

[152] _De Defectu Orac._, 435 E.

[153] _Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 612. Cf. _De Defectu Orac._, 437 A.

[154] Supplying, as Bernardakis does after Wyttenbach, καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοῶ ὁτι ταῦτα πολλὰς ἔχει ἀπορίας.

[155] _De Pythiæ Orac._, 409 C. Cf. _De Rep. Ger._, 792 F.

[156] Plutarch puts these words into the mouth of Theon, a literary man, and a most intimate friend of his own. But Theon is here a mere modest disguise of Plutarch, just as “Lamprias” is in the _De Defectu Oraculorum_. The argument is, in any case, not affected—the statement is clearly Plutarch’s own. (See the note on that dialogue in a subsequent chapter.)

[157] _De Pythiæ Orac._, 409 B.

[158] The antiquarian regret of Propertius for the old simple worships of Rome—“Nulli cura fuit externos quærere divos Cum tremeret patrio pendula turba sacro” (_Eleg._, v. 1)—touched a chord which very few Romans would have responded to in Plutarch’s time.

[159] _De Exilio_, 602 E. This recognition of the sacred character of the Emperor does not preclude criticisms of individual rulers, _e.g._, Nero: _De Sera Num. Vindicta_, 567 F; and Vespasian: _Amatorius_, 771 C.

[160] _De Pythiæ Orac._, 408 B.

[161] Cf. the fate of Chæroneia under Antony, as told by Plutarch’s grandfather (see _Life of Antony_, 948 A, B).

[162] 814 A.

[163] _Præcepta Reip. Ger._, 813, et passim:—He insists, however (814 E, F), that subservience must not go too far, and he is also careful to point out such brilliant openings for political ambition as are left by the peculiar conditions of the time (805 A, B).

[164] Plutarch states that the aim of his political advice is to enable a man not only to become “a useful citizen,” but also “to order his domestic affairs with safety, honour, and justice” (_De Unius in Repub._, &c., 826 C).

[165] _Præcepta Reip._, 824 C.

[166] _Præcepta Reip._, 813 F.

[167] PROPERTIUS, iv. 11. “Hæc Di condiderant, hæc Di quoque mœnia servant.” Plutarch’s essay reads like an exposition of this text of the Roman poet.

[168] “Et hoc verbo monere satis est, Τύχης nomine contineri omnem rerum actionumque efficientiam, quæ a Virtute disjuncta, nec in hominis potestate posita est; sive illa ut casus et temeritas, sive ut divina providentia informetur.”—WYTTENBACH. Schlemm says that this tract and the _De Alexandri sive virtute sive fortuna_ are “meræ exercitationes rhetoricæ in quibus certam quandam philosophiam persequi in animo non habebat.” Yet the rhetoric of the _De Fortuna Romanorum_ is in wonderful harmony with Plutarch’s mature opinion as deliberately expressed in the _De Republica Gerenda_.

[169] VIRGIL: _Georgics_, ii. 534; PLUT: _De Fortuna Romanorum_, 316 E. This may be a conscious reminiscence of Virgil’s line. If Plutarch had not read Virgil, he may have heard so famous a verse quoted by his friends at Rome. He himself translates a passage from “the poet Flaccus” in his _Life of Lucullus_ (518 C—HORACE: _Ep._, i. 6, 45). The question of Plutarch’s acquaintance with Latin is very important for investigations into the historical sources of his “Lives;” but it lies beyond our present limits. It is fully dealt with by WEISSENBERGER in his _Die Sprache Plutarchs_ (1895). He exculpates Plutarch from some of the grosser mistakes in Latinity imputed to him by Volkmann.

[170] 317 B, C.

[171] CICERO: _Quæst. Tusc._, i. 23.

[172] _Amatorius_, 762 A.

[173] One need scarcely go so far as Professor Lewis Campbell, who says that the main result of the “Ethics” of Plutarch is to show “how difficult it was for a common-sense man of the world to form distinct and reasonable opinions on matters of religion in that strangely complicated time” (_Religion in Greek Literature_, 1898). But Professor Campbell is also of opinion that “the convenient distinction between gods and demons, which he (_i.e._ Plutarch) and others probably owed to their reading of Plato, is worth dwelling on _because it was taken up for apologetic purposes by the early Christian fathers_.” Surely its religious value to an age which did not anticipate the coming of “the early Christian fathers” makes the distinction worth study from a point of view quite different from that represented in Christian apologetics.

[174] See MAURY, vol. i. p. 352.—“Pythagore admet l’existence de démons bons et mauvais comme les hommes, et tout ce qui lui paraissait indigne de l’idée qu’on devait se faire des dieux, il en faisait l’œuvre des démons et des héros.” (For a fuller discussion of this question see the chapters on Dæmonology.)

[175] Plutarch devotes so much of his work to an exposition of his views of the Divine character, that one feels inclined to regard him less as a philosopher in the general sense than as a theologian. A kindly piece of description of his own (see _De Defectu Orac._, 410 A), in which he mentions Cleombrotos of Lacedemon as “a man who made many journeys, not for the sake of traffic, but because he wished to see and to learn,” and says that as a result of his travels and researches he was compiling a practically complete _corpus_ of philosophical material, the end and aim of philosophy being, as he used to put it, “_Theology_”—may be spoken with equal truth of Plutarch himself. We cannot, perhaps, do better than apply the term Θεόσοφος to him, and support the appellation with an interesting passage from M. Maury, in which he deals with the distinction between theosophs and philosophers in the early stages of Greek philosophy and religion:—“Les uns soumettant tous les faits à l’appréciation rationelle, et partant de l’observation individuelle, pour expliquer la formation de l’univers substituaient aux croyances populaires un système créé par eux, et plus ou moins en contradiction avec les opinions du vulgaire: c’étaient les philosophes proprement dits. Les autres acceptaient la religion de leurs contemporains, ... ils entreprenaient au nom de la sagesse divine, dont ils se donnaient pour les interprètes, _non de renverser mais de réformer les notions théologiques et les formes religieuses_, de façon à les mettre d’accord avec leurs principes philosophiques” (MAURY, vol. i. p. 339). Cf. C. G. SEIBERT, _De Apologetica Plutarchi Theologia_ (1854):-“Finis autem ad quem tendebat ipsa erat religio a majoribus accepta, qua philosophiæ ope purgata æqualium animos denuo implere studebat.” He thinks Plutarch was a theologian first and a philosopher after. (In the passage quoted above from the _De Defectu_ it is difficult not to regard Mr. Paton’s emendation of φιλόθεος μὲν οὖν καὶ φιλόμαντις as more in accordance with the character of Cleombrotos than the φιλοθεάμων καὶ φιλομαθής of Bernardakis’ text, although, of course, he was a great traveller and an ardent student.)

[176] _De E_, 392 A. Cf. PLATO: _Laches_, 240 C.

[177] 393 A-D.

[178] 394 C.

[179] _De Defectu_, 413 D.

[180] 433 D, E.

[181] 426 B.

[182] 1051 E.

[183] 1052 E.

[184] _De Defectu Orac._, 420 E.

[185] ÆSCHYLUS: _Prometheus Vinctus_, 210.

[186] _De Iside et Osiride_, 352 A. We need not here trouble with Plutarch’s fanciful philology, almost as fanciful as that of some modern Aryanists. His meaning is clear—Absolute Being is the object of the worship of Isis—cf. MAX MÜLLER: _Selected Essays_, vol. i. p. 467: “Comparative philologists have not yet succeeded in finding the true etymology of Apollo.” (Plato’s derivations are given in the _Cratylus_, 266 C.)

[187] _Iliad_, xiii. 354. (Chapman’s translation.)

[188] _De Iside et Osiride_, 351 E.

[189] _Neoplatonism_, by C. BIGG, D.D. (“Chief Ancient Philosophies”), p. 216.

[190] Cf. the _De Placitis Philosophorum_, 881 B.

[191] _De Ε apud Delphos_, 384 F.

[192] 386 E.

[193] Alluding to HESIOD—_Works and Days_, 735 sq.

[194] _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_, 562 B.

[195] _De Ε_, 393 A.

[196] _De Ε_, 387 B, C.

[197] PLATO: _Philebus_, 39 E.

[198] ARISTOTLE: _Ethics_, viii. 12.

[199] _De Superstitione_, 167 E.

[200] _De Defectu Orac._, 423 E.

[201] PLUTARCH on _The Delay of the Deity in Punishing the Wicked_: revised edition, with notes, by Professors H. B. Hackett and W. S. Tyler. (New York, 1867.)

[202] _Sur les Délais de la Justice Divine dans la punition des coupables_, par le Comte JOSEPH DE MAISTRE. (Lyons et Paris, 1856.)—“_J’ai pris_,” says de Maistre, “_j’ai pris quelques libertés dont j’espère que Plutarque n’aura point se plaindre_;” and, speaking of the _jeunesse surannée_ of Amyot’s style, he adds: “_Son orthographe égare l’œil, l’oreille ne supporte pas ses vers: les dames surtout et les étrangers le goûtent peu._” Another French critic justly remarks on these “liberties” of de Maistre: “_C’est trop de licence. Plutarque n’est pas un de ces écrivains qui laissent leurs pensées en bouton_” (Gréard, p. 274). Yet it is upon de Maistre’s “paraphrase” that Gréard bases his own analysis!

[203] WYTTENBACH: _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_ (_Præfatio_). It is pleasant to repeat the praise which Christian writers have poured on this tract. “_Diese Schrift_” says Volkmann, “_gehört meines Erachtungs unbedingt mit zu dem schönsten, was aus der gesammten nachclassischen Litteratur der Griechen überhaupt auf uns gekommen ist_.” (VOLKMANN, vol. ii. p. 265.) One may wonder a little, perhaps, at the limitation conveyed in the _nach_ of _nachclassischen_.—Trench says that some of Plutarch’s arguments “would have gone far to satisfy St. Augustine, and to meet the demands of his theology.”

[204] The Epicurean author of the _De Placitis_, still inveighing against “that tall talker, Plato,” is bitterly emphatic on this point.—“_If there is a God, and human affairs are administered by His Providence, how comes it that bareness prospers, while the refined and good fall into adversity?_” And he instances the murder of Agamemnon “_at the hands of an adulterer and an adultress_,” and the death of Hercules, that benefactor of humanity, “_done to death by Dejaniras drugs_.” (881 D.)

[205] _Symposiacs_, 642 C, 700 E.

[206] _Symposiacs_, 654 C.

[207] THUCYD., iii. 38. Cleon’s famous speech on the Mytilenean question.

[208] “Hujus rei aut omnino Lycisci ne vestigium quidem uspiam reperi.”—WYTTENBACH.

[209] In allusion, of course, to the famous verse of an unknown poet:—

Ὀψὲ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπτὰ.

[210] 540 E.

[211] Deleting ἢ after ῥάδιον with BERNARDAKIS. 549 F.

[212] Note the change of number: θεῶν—εἰδὼς.

[213] Cf. the well-known passage in the _Timæus_ (_Timæus_, 29 C, D).

[214] 550 D. “Etsi hæc sententia disertis verbis in Platone, quod sciam, non exstet, ejus tamen ubique sparsa sunt vestigia.” WYTTENBACH adds: “Summam autem hominum virtutem et beatitudinem in eo consistere, ut imitatione Deorum eis similes evadant, communis fere omnium Philosophorum fuit sententia.”

[215] Plutarch has another well-known passage of the _Timæus_ in his memory here.—_Timæus_, 29 D.

[216] “Neque hoc disertis verbis in Platone legere me memini; sed cum variis locis ... confer.”—WYTT.

[217] 551 D.

[218] 553 A, 553 F.

[219] _Laws_, 728 C. The reference is to HESIOD: _Works and Days_, 265, 266, though Plutarch quotes verse 265 in a form different from the vulgate. GOETTLING (_Ap._ Paley) thinks Plutarch’s version “savours more of antiquity.” ARISTOTLE: _Rhetoric_, iii. 9, quotes the vulgate.

[220] 554 D. Literally, “_they were not punished when they grew old, but grew old in punishment_.”

[221] 555 E, F.

[222] STOBÆUS: _Anthologion_, Tit. 79, 15.

[223] 557 D. Cf. the sarcasm of the Academic COTTA in the _De Natura Deorum_, iii. 38: “Dicitis eam vim Deorum esse ut, etiam si quis morte pœnas sceleris effugerit, expetantur eæ pœnæ a liberis, a nepotibus, a posteris. O miram æquitatem Deorum!”

[224] 558 F.

[225] 559 E.

[226] 560 C. WYTTENBACH quotes LUCRETIUS, iii. 437 and 456: “Ergo dissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai Naturam ceu fumus in altas aeris auras.” He might have added, iii. 579, sqq.: “Denique, cum corpus nequeat perferre animai Discidium, quin id tetro tabescat odore, Quid dubitas quin ex imo penitusque coörta, Emanarit uti fumus diffusa animæ vis?” Plutarch is probably thinking of Plato’s “intelligent gardener” (PHÆDRUS, 276 B), although, as Wyttenbach says, “_Horti Adonidis proverbii vim habent._” The English reader will think of Shakespeare’s beautiful lines—

“_Thy promises are like Adonis’ gardens,_
_That one day bloom’d, and fruitful were the next._”

_Henry VI._, Pt. 1, act i. sc. 6.

[227] 560 F.

[228] 561 A.

[229] 564 C.

[230] Cf. _Timon of Athens_, act iii. sc. 1: “_Let molten coin be thy damnation._”

[231] 561 A.—In the long extract, preserved by Stobæus, from Plutarch’s _De Anima_ (_Anthologion: Tit. 120, 28._—The _Tauchnitz_ edition of 1838, however, ascribes this passage to Themistius, perhaps by confusion with extract No. 25), Plutarch allows his imagination to play freely with the fortunes of the soul in the afterworld. In a beautiful passage, Timon compares death to initiation into the Great Mysteries—an initiation in which gloom and weariness and perplexity and terror are followed by the shining of a wondrous light, which beams on lovely meadows, whose atmosphere resounds with sacred voices that tell us all the secret of the mystery, and whose paths are trod by pure and holy men. Timon concludes with Heraclitus that, if the soul became assuredly convinced of the fate awaiting it hereafter, no power would be able to retain it on earth. But Plutarch himself is not convinced: he is charmed and seduced, but Reason holds him back from accepting as certainties the “airy subtleties and wingy mysteries” of Imagination. Under the stress of a desire to console his wife for the loss of her little daughter, he reminds her that the “hereditary account” and the Mysteries of Dionysus—in which, he says, both of them were initiated—equally repudiate the notion that the soul is without sensation after death (_Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 611 D). In his polemic against the Epicureans he chiefly emphasizes the emotional aspect of the desire for immortality;—the Epicurean denial of immortality destroys “the sweetest and greatest hopes of the majority of mankind”—one of these “sweetest and greatest hopes” being that of seeing retribution meted out to those whose wealth and power have enabled them to flout and insult better men than themselves; it robs of its satisfaction that yearning of the thoughtful mind for unstinted communion with the great masters of contemplation; and deprives the bereaved heart of the pleasant dream of meeting its loved and lost ones in another world (_Non posse suav._, 1105 E). There is no doubt that Plutarch wished to believe in the immortality of the soul, but the evidence is not conclusive that he did; at the most it is with him a “counsel of perfection,” not an “article of faith.”

[232] “_It it not clear from the writings of Plutarch to what extent he was a monotheist._” This is the opinion of Charles W. Super, Ph.D., LL.D., and it is supported by the irrefragable proof that Plutarch “_uses θεὸς both with and without the article_.” This judgment is given, of all places in the world, at the conclusion of a translation (a very indifferent one, by the way) of the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_. (“Between Heathenism and Christianity:—Being a Translation of Seneca’s _De Providentia_ and Plutarch’s _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_.” by Charles W. Super, Ph.D., LL.D., Chicago, 1899.)

[233] Plutarch himself is ignorant of its origin, and does not know whether it was Magian, Orphic, Egyptian, or Phrygian. (_De Defectu Orac._, 415 A. Cf. _Isis and Osiris_, 360 E, “following the Theologians of old.”) Those who believed, like Rualdus, that Plato had read the Old Testament (see note, page 45), had no difficulty in assigning the doctrine of Dæmons to a Jewish source. Wolff, speaking of the systematic dæmonology constructed by the neo-Platonists, alludes to this passage in Plutarch, and says:—“Hæc omnia artificiosa interpretatione ex Platonis fluxerunt fabulis; ex oriente fere nihil assumebatur. Namque Judæi aliis principiis, ac reliqui, profecti decem dæmonum genera constituerant; Chaldæi vetustiores non dæmonum genera, sed septem archangelos planetis præfectos colebant; nec credendum Plut., _De Defectu Orac._, 415 A. Studebat enim Plutarchus, _præsertim in Comm: de Iside et de Socratis dæmonio, Græcorum placita ad Ægypti Asiæque revocare sapientiam_, et quum ab Orpheo et Atti sancta quædam mysteria dicerentur profecta esse, arcanis his ritibus summam de diis doctrinam significari suspicabatur” (Wolff, _op. cit._).—Volkmann, who had carefully studied Plutarch’s relationship both to his philosophical predecessors and to foreign forms of religious faith, had previously arrived at a different conclusion from that embodied in the words italicized above.—“Er war darum kein Eklektiker oder Synkretist, und was man nun gar von seiner Vorliebe für Orientalische Philosophie und Theologie gesagt hat gehört ledeglich in das Gebiet der Fabel. Plutarchs philosophisch-allegorische Auslegung aber der Ægyptischen Mythen von Isis und Osiris geht von der ausdrücklichen Voraussetzung aus _dass diese Gottheiten wesentlich Hellenische sind_” (Volkmann, vol. ii. p. 23). But these varying views are simply two different ways of regarding the real fact, which is that Plutarch regards foreign myths and Greek alike as different expressions of the conception of Divine Unity—such Unity not being either Hellenic or Egyptian, but simply absolute (see subsequent analysis of the _De Iside et Osiride_).

[234] DIOGENES LAERTIUS, viii. 32. RITTER and PRELLER also refer to APULEIUS’ _De Deo Socratis_: “Atenim Pythagoricos mirari oppido solitos, si quis se negaret unquam vidisse Dæmonem, satis, ut reor, idoneus auctor est Aristoteles.” (Below this passage in my edition of Apuleius (the _Delphin_, of 1688) appears the note “Idem scribit Plutarch, in libello περὶ θαυμασίων ἀκουσμάτων.” This _libellus_ I cannot identify with any enumerated in the catalogue of Lamprias.)

[235] “Plato, ne Anaxagoræ aut Socratis modo impietatis reus succumberet, præterea ne sanctam animis hebetioribus religionem turbaret, intactos reliquit ritus publicos et communem de diis dæmonibusque opinionem; quæ ipse sentiat, significat quidem, sed, ut solet in rebus minus certis _et a mera dialectica alienis_, obvoluta fabulis” (WOLFF, _De Dæmonibus_, _loc. cit._). Is it permissible to suppose that the third consideration—that expressed in the italicized words—operated more strongly on Plato than either or both of the first two? Aristotle, at any rate, takes up a much firmer attitude in face of the popular mythology, which he regards as _fabulously introduced for the purpose of persuading the multitude, enforcing the laws, and benefiting human life_ (_Metaphysics_, xi. (xii.) 8, T. Taylor’s translation). This famous passage is as outspoken as Epicureanism.

[236] PLATO: _Politicus_, 271 D. A similar “dispensation” is provided in the _Laws_, 717 A.

[237] PLATO: _Symposium_, 202 E.

[238] HERODOTUS: ii. 53.

[239] _De Defectu Orac._, 415 B.

[240] HESIOD: _Works and Days_, 122-125 (Elton’s translation).

[241] _Works and Days_, 253. Cf. the beautiful fragment from Menander preserved by Plutarch, _De Tranquillitate Animi_, 474 B:—

“By every man, the moment he is born,
There stands a guardian Dæmon, who shall be
His _mystagogue_ through life.”

[242] _Works and Days_, 141-2.

[243] _De Defectu Oraculorum_, 445 B.—Pluto, too, though perhaps not quite with the innocent purpose of Homer, gives “dæmons” as an alternative to “gods”—_Timæus_, Sec. 16. (A passage charged with the most mordant irony against the national religious tradition.)

[244] _De Defectu Orac._, 416 C.

[245] Cf. WOLFF: “Neque discrepat hac in re communis religio: multi enim dæmones mali Græcorum animos terrebant, velut Acco, Alphito, Empusa, Lamia, Mormo, sive Mormolyce,” &c.—Considering the numerous references made to the subject of Dæmonology by Greek poets and philosophers from Hesiod and Empedocles downwards, with all of which, as is clear from the citations made in our text, Plutarch is perfectly familiar, Prof. Mahaffy’s note on this point is a little mysterious.—“Mr. Purser points out to me that Plutarch rather popularized than originated this doctrine, and himself refers it to various older philosophers.” (Mahaffy, p. 313.)—It needs no very close study of Plutarch to see for one’s self that he does not claim to have originated the doctrine, and that he knows himself to be dealing with a long-standing and widespread tradition.

[246] For a similar process, cf. the quotation from Dr. JACKSON’s _Treatise on Unbelief_, given by Sir WALTER SCOTT in _Demonology and Witchcraft_, p. 175, _note_: “Thus are the Fayries, from difference of events ascribed to them, divided into good and bad, when it is but one and the same malignant fiend that meddles in both.”

[247] Cf. GÖTTE: _Das Delphische Orakel: “In Zeiten, wo dasselbe keine Bedeutung mehr hatte, wo es nur dazu dienen konnte, den finstersten Aberglauben fortzupflanzen und zu erhalten, und die Menschen über die wahre Leitung der Dinge in der Welt, über die wahren Mittel, durch welche sich Jeder sein Glück bereitet, zu täuschen, wurde das Orakelwesen von den frommen Vätern unserer Kirche für die Ausgeburt des Teufels angesehen,” &c._—Cf. also, 1 Corinthians x. 20-22.

[248] See, for these illustrations, SCOTT’s _Demonology and Witchcraft_, PATER’s _Apollo in Picardy_, and HEINE’s _Gods in Exile_. (“_Unter solchen Umständen musste Mancher, dessen heilige Haine konfisciert waren, bei uns in Deutschland als Holzhäcker taglöhnern und Bier trinken statt Nektar._”)

[249] 361 A. sqq.

[250] The author of the _De Placitis_ (882 B.) gives a very vague and slight account of the history of Dæmonology, probably from motives of Epicurean contempt, if one may judge from the curt sentence which concludes his brief note:—“Epicurus admits none of these things.”—He merely says that Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, and the Stoics asserted the existence of spirits called “Dæmons,” and adds that the same philosophers also maintained the existence of Heroes some good, some bad. The distinction between good and bad does not apply to the Dæmons. The identical words of this passage in the _De Placitis_ are used by Athenagoras (_Legat: pro Christ._, cap. 21) to express a definite statement about Thales, who is asserted to have been the first who made the division into God, dæmons, heroes.

[251] Plutarch has here preserved some very beautiful verses of Empedocles, in which this punishment is described. Another fragment of verse from Empedocles (_De Exilio_, 607 C) depicts with equal force and beauty the punishment by the Dæmons of one who has been handed over to them to atone for his crimes.

[252] Here should be noted the tendency to assimilate the good Dæmons to the gods—a tendency to which reference has already been made.

[253] _De Defectu Orac._, 419 A.

[254] _De Defectu Orac._, 419 A.

[255] 419.—Mrs. Browning could hardly have read the _De Defectu_ when she stated that her fine poem “The Dead Pan” was “partly founded on a well-known tradition mentioned in a treatise of Plutarch (‘_De Oraculorum Defectu_’), _according to which, at the hour of the Saviour’s agony, a cry of ‘Great Pan is dead!’ swept across the waves in the hearing of certain mariners,—and the oracles ceased_.” (It was one of the mariners who uttered the cry, “The great Pan is dead!” having been thrice requested by a supernatural voice to do so. But such errors of detail are unimportant in view of the fact that the whole spirit of the story is misunderstood by the poetess.)

[256] So one may conjecture from the description given by Demetrius, who “sailed to the least distant of these lonely islands, which had few inhabitants, and these all held sacred and inviolable by the Britons.” Plutarch’s Demetrius has been identified with “Demetrius the Clerk” who dedicated, “to the gods of the imperial Palace,” a bronze tablet now in the Museum at York.—See King’s translation of the _Theosophical Essays_ in the “Bohn” series, p. 22.

[257] 420 B.

[258] 360 D.

[259] 361 E. We shall see elsewhere that, just as a good Dæmon may be promoted to the rank of a god, so a good man may be lifted to the status of a Dæmon, like Hesiod’s people of the Golden Age. (_De Dæmonio Socratis_, 593 D. Cf. _De Defectu Orac._, 415 B.)

[260] 361 F. 364 E.

[261] Cf. APULEIUS, _De Deo Socratis_.—“Neque enim pro majestate Deûm cælestium fuerit, ut eorum quisquam vel Annibali somnium pingat, vel Flaminio hostiam conroget, vel Accio Nævio avem velificet, vel sibyllæ fatiloquia versificet, etc. Non est operæ Diis superis ad hæc descendere. Quad cuncta” (he says elsewhere) “cælestium voluntate et numine et auctoritate, sed Dæmonum obsequio et opera et ministerio fieri arbitrandum est.”

[262] _De Ε apud Delphos_, 394 A.

[263] _De Fato_, 572 F, sqq.—Bernardakis “stars” this tract as doubtfully Plutarch’s. But the passage quoted, at any rate, is not discrepant from Plutarch’s views elsewhere, though expressing them more concisely, and with more appearance of system than usual with him. The similarity to Plato’s tripartite division of the heavenly powers in the _Timæus_ is, of course, evident, but the text has a note of sincerity which is lacking in the Platonic passage.

[264] _De Defectu_, 417 C. (For the verse quoted in the original, cf. W. CHRIST’s _Pindar_, p. 232.)

[265] 417 D.

[266] The nearest approach to this identification is made by the mysterious stranger whom Cleombrotus finds near the Red Sea, who appeared once every year among the people living in that neighbourhood, and who gave the pious traveller much information concerning Dæmons and their ways; which he was well fitted to do, as he spent most of his time in their company and that of the pastoral nymphs. He said that Python (whom Apollo slew) was a dæmon; that the Titans were dæmons; that Saturn may have been a dæmon. He then adds the significant words, “There is nothing to wonder at if we apply to certain Dæmons the traditional titles of the gods, since a Dæmon who is assigned to a particular god, deriving from him his authority and prerogatives, is usually called by the name of that same god” (421 E). But this somewhat daring testimony is, we are not surprised to find, preceded by a hint that in these matters we are to drink from a goblet of mingled fact and fancy.—(421 A.)

[267] _De Defectu Orac._, 426 D.

[268] _Isis and Osiris_, 360 E.

[269] _Isis and Osiris_, 360 F.

[270] _Isis and Osiris_, 361 C. The passage in the “Banquet” referred to has been already quoted (see p. 123).

[271] It would be otiose to illustrate by examples the universal and splendid fame of the Delphic oracle. One may perhaps be given which is not commonly quoted. Pliny the elder, who in one passage sneeringly includes the _oraculorum præscita_ among the _fulgurum monitus, auruspicum prædicta, atque etiam parva dictu, in auguriis sternutamenta et offensiones pedum_, by means of which men have endeavoured to discover hints of divine guidance, nevertheless, in another passage, quotes two wise oracles as having been “velut ad castigandam hominum vanitatem a Deo emissa.” (Lib. ii. cap. 5, and vii. cap. 47.)—The political, religious, and moral influence of the Delphic oracle has been exhaustively dealt with by Wilhelm Götte in the work already cited (see p. 127, _note_), and by Bouché-Leclerq in the third volume of his “_Histoire de la Divination dans l’Antiquité_.” On the general question of divination it would, perhaps, be superfluous to consult anything beyond this monumental work, with its exhaustive references and its philosophic style of criticism.