Chapter X (3)

[272] JUVENAL: _Sat._ vi. 555.

[273] LUCAN, v. 111, sq.

[274]

—“Muto Parnassus hiatu
Conticuit, pressitque Deum: seu spiritus istas
Destituit fauces, mundique in devia versum
Duxit iter: seu barbarica cum lampade Pytho
Arsit, in immensas cineres abiere cavernas,
Et Phœbi tenuere viam: seu sponte Deorum
Cirrha silet fatique sat est arcana futuri
Carmine longævæ vobis commissa Sibyllæ:
Seu Pæan solitus templis arcere nocentes,
Ora quibus solvat nostro non invenit ævo.”

[275] The main argument of the third and shortest of the Delphic tracts has been already given. A brief description of its contents is added by way of note, to show its connexion with the two larger tracts. The tract takes the form of a letter from Plutarch to Serapion, who acts as a means of communication between Plutarch and other common friends. Its object is to ascertain why the letter Ε was held in such reverence at the Delphic shrine. A series of explanations is propounded, probably representing views current on the subject, varying, as they do, from those proper to the common people to those which could only have been the views of logicians or mathematicians. Theon, a close friend of Plutarch’s, maintains that the syllable is the symbol of the logical attributes of the God, Logic, whose basis is Ει (“if”), being the process by which philosophical truth is arrived at. “If, then, Philosophy is concerned with Truth, and the light of Truth is Demonstration, and the principle of Demonstration is Connexion, it is with good reason that the faculty which includes and gives effect to this process has been consecrated by philosophers to the god whose special charge is Truth.”... “Whence, I will not be dissuaded from the assertion that this is the _Tripod of Truth_, namely, Reason, which recognizing that the consequent follows from the antecedent, and then taking into consideration the original basis of fact, thus arrives at the conclusion of the demonstration. How can we be surprised if the Pythian God, in his predilection for Logic, is specially attentive to this aspect of Reason, to which he sees philosophers are devoted in the highest degree?” This connexion of Reason with Religion, a familiar process in Plutarch, is followed by a “list of the arithmetical and mathematical praises of the letter Ε” involving Pythagorean speculations, and the culmination of the whole piece lies in the splendid vindication by Ammonius of the Unity and Self-Existence and Eternity of the Deity. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of his argument is the assignation to Apollo of the functions of the Supreme Deity: an easy method of bringing Philosophy and Mythology to terms; a mode of operation perhaps not unaffected by that Mithraic worship which, on its classical side, was to culminate in Julian’s famous prayer to Helios. The tract also furnishes, as already stated, a clear example of the method by which the literal terms known in the worship of Dionysus and Apollo are refined from their grosser elements and idealized by the subtleties of the philosophic intellect, which then accepts them as appropriate designations for the various functions of the God. The pleasant seriousness, too, of all the interlocutors is worthy of note, as presenting a type of religious discussion of whose calmness and dignity the modern world knows little. It would be interesting, for example, to hear a group of classical philosophers discuss the excommunication of Professor Mivart by Cardinal Vaughan, or of Tolstoi by Pobedonostzeff.

[276] This Diogenianus does not appear to be identical with the Diogenianus of Pergamos, twice mentioned in the _Symposiacs_, although Bernardakis does not distinguish them in his Index.

[277] Philinus was an intimate friend of Plutarch’s (_Symposiacs_, 727 B; _De Sollertia Animalium_, 976 B); and, except in this Dialogue and in the _De Soll. Anim._, appears only as taking his part in the social intercourse of the _Symposiacs_, and as contributing his share to the discussion of the various quaint and curious problems forming so large a portion of the “Table Talk” of Plutarch and his friends. He has Pythagorean tendencies; eats no flesh (727 B); objects to a rich and varied diet, being of opinion that simple food is more easily digestible (660 F); explains somewhat crudely why Homer calls salt θεῖος (685 D); proves that Alexander the Great was a hard drinker (623 E); explains why Pythagoras advised his followers to throw their bedclothes into confusion on getting up (728 B, C); and tells a story of a wonderful tame crocodile which lay in bed like a human being (_De Soll. Anim._, 976 B). A very charming account of Plutarch’s friends has been given by M. A. Chenevière, in his “_De Plutarchi familiaribus_,” written as a Litt.D. thesis for a French University in 1886.

[278] 395 A.

[279] 396 D. Cf. _Symposiacs_, 628 A.

[280] 396 E. Boethus, a genial and witty man, with whom, notwithstanding his Epicureanism, Plutarch lives on terms of intimate social intercourse. In _Symposiacs_, 673 C, Boethus, now described as an Epicurean _sans phrase_, entertains, in Athens, Plutarch, Sossius Senecio, and a number of men of his own sect. After dinner the company discuss the interesting question why we take pleasure in a dramatic representation of passions whose exhibition in real life would shock and distress us. At another time he appears, together with Plutarch and a few other friends, at a dinner given by Ammonius, then _Strategos_ at Athens for the third time, and explains, upon principles of Epicurean Science (_Symposiacs_, 720 F), why sounds are more audible at night than by day.

[281] 396 F.

[282] See note, p. 149.

[283] Cf. CICERO: _De Divinatione_, ii. 50.—“_Quis est enim, qui totum diem jaculans, non aliquando collineet? Totas noctes dormimus; neque ulla fere est, qua non somniemus: et miramur, aliquando id, quod somniarimus, evadere? Quid est tam incertum quam talorum jactus? tamen nemo est quin, sæpe jactans, venereum jaciat aliquando, nonnumquam etiam iterum, ac tertium_,” _&c._ Also ii. 971.—“_Casus autem innumerabilibus pæne seculis in omnibus plura mirabilia quam in somniorum visis effecerit._”

[284] 399.

[285] Cf. HERODOTUS: ii. 135.

[286] 401 E.

[287] “Pyrrhi temporibus iam Apollo versus facere desierat.”—CICERO: _De Div._, ii. 56. Plutarch, however, is able to say, “Even nowadays some oracles are published in verse,” and to cite a very interesting instance (_De Pyth. Orac._, 404 A).

[288] 408 C, D.

[289] 409 D.

[290] 404 C.

[291] _Lamprias._ The writer of this letter to “Terentius Priscus” is addressed by the name of “Lamprias” in the course of the dialogue (413 E). This Terentius is not mentioned elsewhere by Plutarch, but one may venture the guess that he was one of the friends whom, as in the case of Lucius the Etrurian, and Sylla the Carthaginian, Plutarch had met at Rome (_Symposiacs_, 727 B). Sylla and Lucius, whom we know to have been on intimate terms with Plutarch, are interlocutors in the dialogue _De Facie in Orbe Lunæ_, and one of them uses the same form of address to the writer of that dialogue as is employed by Ammonius in this passage (940 F). There is not the faintest doubt as to the genuineness of either of these two dialogues, and it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that Plutarch, desiring perhaps to pay a compliment to a relative, veils his own personality in this way: “Omnium familiarium et propinquorum ante ceteros omnes Lampriam fratrem, et ejusdem nominis avum Lampriam, eos imprimis fuisse qui Plutarchi amicitiam memoriamque obtinuerint, nobis apparet” (_De Plutarchi Familiaribus_—CHENEVIÈRE). He pays a similar compliment to his friend Theon, who sums up and concludes the argument of the _De Pythiæ Oraculis_. (For the closeness of Theon’s intimacy with Plutarch, see especially _Consolatio ad Uxorem_, 610 B, and _Symposiacs_, 725 F.) Cf. GRÉARD’S _La Morale de Plutarque_, p. 303: “Plutarque a ses procédés, qu’on arrive à connaître. D’ordinaire ils consistent à accorder successivement la parole aux défenseurs des systèmes extrèmes et à réserver la conclusion au principal personnage du dialogue. Or ce personnage est presque toujours celui qui a posé la thèse; et le plus souvent il se trouve avoir avec Plutarque lui-même un lien de parenté.”—Plutarch delights to such an extent to bring his friends into his works, that it has even been suggested that no work is authentic without this distinguishing mark. Readers of Plutarch know that one characteristic of his style is the avoidance of hiatus, and that he puts himself to all kinds of trouble to secure this object. In this connexion, Chenevière remarks: “Mirum nobis visum est quod, ne in uno quidem librorum quos hiatus causa G. Benseler Plutarcho abjudicavit, nullius amici nomen offenditur. Scripta autem quæ nullo hiatu fœdata demonstrat, vel amico cuidam dicata, vel nominibus amicorum sunt distincta.” (The work by Benseler referred to is, of course, his _De Hiatu in Oratoribus Atticis et Historicis Græcis_.)

[292] Plutarch does not, of course, wish to convey the suggestion that Apollo’s shrine is still the centre of the earth, and that Britain is as far away in one direction as the Red Sea is in another. The oracle’s repulse of Epimenides, who wished to be certain on the point, indicates that the question is one surrounded with difficulty, and that the wise man will do best to leave it alone. Bouché-Leclerq has a startling comment: “_Plutarque ajoute que, de son temps, la mesure avait été verifiée par deux voyageurs partis l’un de la Grande Bretagne et l’autre du fond de la mer Rouge_” (_La Divination_, iii. p. 80).

[293] 410 A, B. Cf. note, p. 90.

[294] 411 E.

[295] The cessation of the oracles was only comparative. WOLFF, in his _De Novissima Oraculorum Ætate_, examines the history of each oracle separately, and comes to a conclusion that the oracles were not silent even in the age of Porphyry (born A.D. 232): “_Nondum obmutuisse numina fatidica Porphyrii tempore. Vera enim ille deorum responsa censuit; quæ Christianis opposuit, ne soli doctrinam divinitus accepisse viderentur._” Strabo alludes to the failure of the oracle at Dodona, and adds that the rest were silent too (STRABO: vii. 6, 9). Cicero alludes with great contempt to the silence of the Delphic oracles in his own times: “_Sed, quod caput est, cur isto modo jam oracula Delphis non eduntur, non modo nostrâ ætate, sed jamdiu; ut modo nihil possit esse contemtius? Hoc loco quum urgentur evanuisse aiunt vetustate vim loci ejus, unde anhelitus ille terræ fieret, quo Pythia, mente incitata, oracula ederet.... Quando autem ista vis evanuit? An postquam homines minus creduli esse cœperunt_” (_De Div._, ii. 57). When Cicero wrote this passage he had probably forgotten the excellent advice which the oracle had once given him when he went to Delphi to consult it (PLUT.: _Cicero_, cap. 5).

[296] 412 D.

[297] Some of these points of grammar which attracted the scorn of Heracleon were whether βάλλω loses a λ in the future; and what were the positives from which the comparatives χεῖρον and βέλτιον, and the superlatives χεῖριστον and βέλτιστον were formed (412 E).—“_Quelques années après les guerres médiques, le pinceau de Polygnote couvrit la Lesché des Cnidiens à Delphes de scènes empruntées au monde infernal._” (Bouché-Leclerq: iii. 153.)—It would have been more interesting to a modern student if Heracleon had replied that the pictures of Polygnotus were quite sufficient to keep one mentally alert, and had seized the opportunity to give us an exact description of the scenes depicted and the meaning they conveyed to the men of his time. “‘Not all the treasures,’ as Homer has it, ‘which the stone threshold of the Far-darter holds safe within, would now,’ as Mr. Myers says, ‘be so precious to us as the power of looking for one hour on the greatest work by the greatest painter of antiquity, the picture by Polygnotus in the Hall of the Cnidians at Delphi, of the descent of Odysseus among the dead.’”

[298] Didymus, “surnamed Planetiades,” is a picturesque figure, evidently drawn from life. It is interesting to compare his attitude with that imposed upon the ideal cynic of Epictetus: “It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say, like Socrates, ‘Men, whither are you hurrying? what are you doing, wretches? Like blind people you are wandering up and down: you are going by another road, and have left the true road: you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are not, and if another shows you where they are you do not believe him’” (LONG’s _Epictetus_, p. 251). Planetiades certainly endeavours to play this _rôle_ on the occasion in question, though he is doubtless as far below the stoic ideal as he is above the _soi-disant_ cynics whom Dion met at ALEXANDRIA.

[299] Cf. BLOUNT: _Apollonius of Tyana_, p. 37. Blount collects a number of ancient and modern parallels to the thought of Plutarch here. HORACE, _Epist._ i. 16. 59, readily occurs to the memory. (For the Pindaric fragment, see W. Christ, p. 225.)

[300] 413 D.

[301] “Plutarch does not mean to say that Greece was not able at all to furnish 3000 men capable of arms, but that if burgess armies of the old sort were to be formed they would not be in a position to set on foot 3000 ‘hoplites.’”—MOMMSEN.

[302] 414 C.

[303] 417 A, B. Cf. _De Facie in Orbe Lunæ_, 944 C, D.

[304] 431 B.

[305] 436 F.

[306] 437 F.

[307] _De Pythiæ Orac._, 398 B.

[308] _De Defectu Orac._, 418 E.

[309] _De Defectu Orac._, 438 D.

[310] Plutarch, in reply to Boethus the Epicurean, uses an interesting example to illustrate the two opposite views maintained on this point. “Even you yourself here are beneficially influenced, it would seem, by what Epicurus wrote and spoke three centuries ago; and yet you are of opinion that God could not supply a Principle of Motion or a Cause of Feeling, unless He took and shut Himself up in each individual thing and became an intermingled portion of its essence” (398 B, C).

[311] “As to Plutarch’s theology, he was certainly a monotheist. He probably had some vague belief in inferior deities (demons he would have called them) as holding a place like that filled by angels and evil spirits in the creed of most Christians; _yet it is entirely conceivable that his occasional references to these deities are due merely to the conventional rhetoric of his age_” (ANDREW P. PEABODY: Introduction to a translation—already referred to—of the _De Sera Numinis Vindicta_). It is a little difficult to be patient with the ignorance displayed in the italicized part of this citation. That Plutarch’s “references to these deities” are not “occasional” is a matter of fact; that they are not “due merely to conventional rhetoric” it is hoped that the analysis in the text—incomplete as it may be in other respects—has at least made sufficiently clear. It is, however, gratifying to find that this American translator, unlike Dr. Super, of Chicago, recognizes that Plutarch “was certainly a monotheist.”

[312] Plutarch found the existence of the Dæmons recognized in each of the three spheres which contributed to the formation of religious beliefs—in philosophy, in popular tradition, and in law. STOBÆUS: _Tit._ 44, 20 (“_On Laws and Customs_”—_Tauchnitz_ edition of 1838, vol. ii. p. 164) has an interesting quotation, headed “_Preamble of the Laws of Zaleucus_,” in which the following passage occurs:—“If an Evil Dæmon come to any man, tempting him to Vice, let him spend his time near temples, and altars, and sacred shrines, fleeing from Vice as from an impious and cruel mistress, and let him pray the gods to deliver him from her power.” Zaleucus may, of course, have been embodying the teaching of his Pythagorean colleagues, but the fact remains that the belief in the influence of Dæmons on human life received the authority of a celebrated system of law, unless we are to be more incredulous than Cicero himself—_Quis Zaleucum leges scripsisse non dixit?_ (_Ad Atticum_, vi. 1).—(“His code is stated to have been the first collection of written laws that the Greeks possessed.”—_Smaller Classical Dictionary_, Smith and Marindin, 1898.)

[313] _Adversus Coloten_, 1124 D. The religious value of the belief in Dæmonology is indicated in an interesting passage in the “_De Iside et Osiride_” in which Isis, by her sufferings, is described as “having given a sacred lesson of consolation to men and women involved in similar sorrows.” 361 E. (In the next sentence she and Osiris are raised from the dæmonic rank to the divine.)

[314] Accepting Bernardakis’ first emendation—εἰς θεοὺς ἐπαναφέρει τὰς τῶν πράξεων ἀρχὰς. 580 A.

[315] 581 F.—Phidolaus would not have been at home among Xenophon’s troops (_Anabasis_, iii. 2, 9).

[316] 588 C, D.

[317] 588 E.

[318] 589 D.

[319] 586 A.

[320] 589 F.

[321] 591 A.

[322] 594.

[323] _De Defectu_, 415 B, C. In the _De Facie quæ apparet_ the connexion between mankind and the dæmons in described in similar terms to those employed in the _De Dæmonio Socratis_. The Dæmons do not spend all their time on the moon; they take charge of oracles, assist at initiatory rites, punish evildoers, help men in battle and at sea, and for any want of fairness or competence in the discharge of these duties they are punished by being driven again to earth to enter human bodies once more (944 D; cf. 944 C).

[324] That this truth is one which appeals to the Imagination more cogently than to the Reason, resembling in that respect the belief in the soul’s immortality, is evident to Plutarch. It is on this account that he illustrates it by Myth instead of arguing it by Reason, and takes every precaution to prevent his readers from regarding it as a complete and final presentation of a logically irrefutable belief.

[325] _Non posse suaviter_, &c., 1101 B, C.

[326] 1101 D.

[327] 1102 B.

[328] _De Audiendis Poetis_ 34 B.

[329] _Conjugalia Præcepta_, 140 D. Champagny sees a reference here to Christianity. But why not also in PLATO’s _Laws_, 674 F, and 661 C?—It is quite in harmony with Plutarch’s love of openness in Religion that to the general reticence displayed by the Greeks on the subject of their religious Mysteries, he seems to add a personal reticence peculiarly his own. Considering how anxiously he hovers about the question of the soul’s immortality (see above, p. 118, and cf. _Consolatio ad Apollonium_, 120 B, C: “_If, as is probable, there is any truth in the sayings of ancient poets and philosophers ... then must you cherish fair hopes of your dear departed son_”—a passage curiously similar in form and thought to TACITUS, _Agric._ 46: “_Si quis piorum manibus locus, si, ut sapientibus placet_,” _&c._), it is remarkable that only once—and then under the stress of a bitter domestic bereavement—does he specifically quote the Mysteries (those of Dionysus) as inculcating that doctrine (_Ad Uxorem_, 611 D). His adoption of an unknown writer’s beautiful comparison of Sleep to the Lesser Mysteries of Death (_Consol. ad Apoll._, 107 E), and his repetition of the same idea elsewhere (see above, p. 118), may also be indications how naturally the teaching of the Mysteries suggested the idea of immortality. But he most frequently alludes to the Mysteries as secret sources of information for the identification of nominally different deities (_De Iside et Osiride_, 364 E), or for the assignation of their proper functions to the Dæmons (_De Defectu_, 417 C), who are regarded as responsible for what Mr. Andrew Lang (“Myth, Ritual, and Religion,” _passim_) calls “the barbaric and licentious part of the performances” (_De Iside et Osiride_, 360 E, F). We should perhaps conclude, from the few indications which Plutarch gives of his views on this subject, that he regarded the Mysteries in a twofold light; they were a source of religious instruction, or consolation, respecting the future state of the soul, and they were also a means of explaining and justifying the crude legends which so largely intermingled with the purer elements of Greek religion. Though, as Plutarch hints, many of these barbaric legends were not suited to discussion by the profane, yet the mind, when purified by sacred rites, and educated to the apprehension of sacred meanings, could grasp the high and pure significance of things which were a stumbling-block to the uninitiated, and could make them an aid to a loftier moral life.

[330] “_Das eigentlich einzige und tiefste Thema der Welt- und Menschengeschichte, dem alle übrigen untergeordnet sind, bleibt der Conflict des Unglaubens und des Aberglaubens._”—GOETHE, _Westöstlicher Divan_ (quoted by THOLUCK).

[331] 165 C.

[332] 165 D.

[333] BERNARDAKIS adopts Bentley’s emendation βαπτισμούς, which _might_ be an allusion to Christianity, but would more probably refer to such a process as that already described in the words βάπτισον σεαυτὸν εἰς θάλασσαν. We have previously discussed the general question involved (see p. 45), but may here add the opinion of so unprejudiced a Christian writer as Archbishop Trench, “_strange to say. Christianity is to him (Plutarch) utterly unknown._”—(See also note, p. 202).

[334] 166 B.

[335] 166 B.

[336] 168 F.

[337] Bello primo, Aristodemum Messeniorum regem per superstitionem animum ac spes omnes despondisse, seque ipsum interfecisse, narrat etiam Pausanias, iv. 3.—WYTTENBACH.

[338] 169 C. _Iliad_, vii. 193, 194.

[339] 170 A. Trench quotes Seneca _Epist._, 123—“Quid enim interest utrum deos neges, an infames?”

[340] 170 F.

[341] To the numerous citations made by Gréard (p. 209), we may add an expression of opinion by Dr. Tholuck, given with special reference to Plutarch’s views on Superstition:—“Wir haben in Alterthum einen hohen Geist, Plutarch, welcher dem, was das Alterthum Aberglaube nannte, viele Betrachtungen gewidmet hat, dem Gegenstande zwar nicht auf den Grund gekommen, _aber in der Betrachtuug desselben doch so tiefe religiöse Wahrheiten ausgesprochen_, dass wir nicht umhin können, ihn hier ausführlicher dem Leser vorzuführen” (_Ueber Aberglauben und Unglauben_).

[342] WYTTENBACH bases this possibility on the 150th entry in the Lamprian catalogue, “_On Superstition, against Epicurus._” (Entry No. 155 in the catalogue as given in BERNARDAKIS, vol. vii. pp. 473-7.) But the discussion on this point in the _Non posse suaviter_ forms so important a part of that tract that the title “_On Superstition, against Epicurus_” would be no inapt title for the whole treatise.

[343] The view taken in the text as to the character of this strenuous and noble sermon on _Superstition_ is, of course, quite at variance with the opinion of Prof. Mahaffy, who regards it as “one of those sophistical exercises practised by every one in that age—I mean, the defence of a paradox with subtlety and ingenuity, _taking little account of sober truth in comparison with dialectical plausibility_.”—_Greeks under Roman Sway_, p. 318.

[344] _Pharsalia_, viii. 831.

[345] APULEIUS, _Meta_: Lib. xi. Lucius (a descendant of Plutarch, by the way), in his pious gratitude, enters the service of the goddess who had _uncharmed_ him.—Rursus donique, quam raso capillo, _collegi vetustissimi et sub illis Sullæ temporibus conditi_ munia, non obumbrato vel obtecto calvitio, sed quoquoversus obvio, gaudens obibam.

[346] 364 E.

[347] 354 C.

[348] 355 B.

[349] Cf. _De Pyth. Orac._, 400 A.

[350] 355 D.

[351] 358 E. Mr. Andrew Lang justly remarks, “Why these myths should be considered ‘more blasphemous’ than the rest does not appear” (_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, vol. ii. pp. 116, 117).

[352] 358 F. This is a difficult passage. It seems necessary to read ἀνακλάσει for ἀναχωρήσει (cf. ἀνάκλασις δή που περὶ τὴν ἶριν, _Amatorius_, 765 E), but even then the meaning is difficult to elicit, and it is not confidently claimed that the rendering in the text has elicited it. Three translations are appended: “_For as mathematicians assure us that the rainbow is nothing else but a variegated image of the sun, thrown upon the sight by the reflexion of his beams from the clouds, so ought we to look upon the present story as the representation, or reflexion rather, of something real as its true cause_” (Plutarchi _De Iside et Osiride_ Liber: Græce et Anglice, by SAMUEL SQUIRE, A.M., Cambridge, 1744).—“_Und so wie die Naturforscher den Regenbogen für ein Gegenbild der Sonne erklären, das durch das Zurücktreten der Erscheinung an die Wolke bunt wird, so ist hier die Sage das Gegenbild einer Wahrheit, welche ihre Bedeutung auf etwas anderes hin abspiegelt_” (Plutarch _über Isis und Osiris_ herausgegeben von G. PARTHEY, Berlin, 1850).—_Legendum ἀναχρώσει vel ἀνακλάσει, ut Reisk._ “_Et quemadmodum mathematici arcum cælestem Solis tradunt esse imaginem variatam visus ad nubem reflexu: Sic fabula hoc loco indicium est orationis alio reflectentis intellectum._”—WYTTENBACH.

[353] _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, vol. ii. p. 120.

[354] In our spelling of this name we use the freedom of choice so graciously accorded by Xylander—_Si Euhemerus mavis, non repugno._

[355] _De Placitis Philosophorum_, 880 D. Cf. CICERO, _De Natura Deorum_. i. 42. “Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturæ demonstrantur deorum. Utrum igitur hic confirmasse videtur religionem, an penitus totam sustulisse?” See MAYOR’s note on this passage. The references to Lactantius and Eusebius and many others bearing on the question are collected by Corsini in his first dissertation on the _De Placitis_. Zimmerman is very indignant with Plutarch on account of the charge here brought against Euhemerus and Diagoras, and has defended them against our author with great energy and spirit. (_Epistola ad Nicolaum Nonnen qua Euemerus Messenius et Diagoras Melius ab Atheismo contra Plutarchum aliosque defenduntur._)

[356] 360 A.

[357] The language here seems curiously outspoken in view of the now established apotheosis of the Emperors.

[358] 360 D.

[359] 356, 357. Cf. _De Dædalis Platæensibus_.

[360] 364 A.

[361] 366 C.

[362] 364 D.

[363] 367 D.

[364] 368 D.

[365] 369 C. It is clear from a careful examination of the text that Plutarch gives only a critical examination of this theory: he does not adopt it as his own, as has frequently been asserted.

[366] 369 D. “It is impossible,” argued these ancient thinkers, “that moral life and death, that good and evil, can flow from a single source. It is impossible that a Holy God can have been the author of evil. Evil, then, must be referred to some other origin: it must have had an author of its own.”—“_Some Elements of Religion_,” by Canon LIDDON (Lecture iv. sect. i.).

[367] 370 E.

[368] 371 A.

[369] See especially the quotations from Plato in 370 F, and the application of Platonic terms in the interpretation of the Isiac and Osirian myth in 372 E, F, 373 and 374. Hesiod, too, is made to agree with this Platonic explanation of the Egyptian legend (374 C), and the Platonic notion of matter is strained to allow of its being identified with Isis (372 E, 374 F). In 367 C, a parallelism is pointed out between Stoic theology and an interpretation of the myth; and in 367 E the death of Osiris on the 17th of the month is used to illustrate, if not to explain, the Pythagorean ἀφοσίωσις of that number.

As regards the identification of particular deities in this tract, reference may be made to 364 E, F and 365 A, B, where Dionysus is identified with Osiris; and to 365 F, where Mnaseas of Patara is mentioned with approval as associating with Epaphus, not only Dionysus, but Serapis and Osiris also. Anticleides is also referred to as asserting that Isis was the daughter of Prometheus and the wife of Dionysus. In 372 D, Osiris is identified with the Sun under the name of Sirius, and Isis with the Moon, in 375, a fanciful philology is called in to aid a further identification of Greek and Egyptian deities; but not much importance is attached to similarities derived in this way. In the next sentence Isis is stated to have been identified with Athene by the Egyptians; and the general principle of identity is boldly stated in 377 C:—“_It is quite legitimate to regard these gods as common possessions and not the exclusive property of the Egyptians—Isis and the deities that go in her train are universally known and worshipped. The names, indeed, of certain of them have been borrowed from the Egyptians, not so long ago; but their divinity has been known and recognized for ages._”

[370] 378 A.

[371] There is a strain of mysticism in the _De Osiride_ which is alien from the cheerful common sense which usually marks Plutarch; a remark which also applies to the _De Facie quæ apparet in Orbe Lunæ_. But the same strain appears in others of his authentic tracts, though mostly operating through the medium of Platonic dreams and myths, _e.g._ the story of Thespesius in the _Sera Num. Vindic._, and that of Timarchus in the _De Dæmonio Socratis_. Besides, one would not ceteris paribus deny the authenticity of Browning’s “_Childe Roland_” because he had written “_The Guardian Angel_,” or that of “_The Antiquary_” because Scott was also the author of “_The Monastery_.” The tract was probably composed after that return from Alexandria to which Plutarch so charmingly alludes in _Sympos._, 678 C. Moreover, the very nature of the subject, and the priestly character of the lady to whom it was addressed, as well as the mysterious nature of the goddess whose ministrant she was, are all parts of a natural inducement to mysticism. We must admit that Plutarch here participates in that spirit of mysticism which, always inherent in Platonism, was kept in check by his acutely practical bent, to be revived and exaggerated to the destruction of practical ethics in the dreams and abstractions of the Neo-Platonists.

[372] A very slight acquaintance with Plutarch’s writings will serve to dispose of the charge of Atheism brought against him by Zimmerman, the professor of Theology in the Gymnasium of Zurich:—Credo equidem Plutarchum inter eos fuisse qui cum Cicerone crediderint eos qui dant philosophiæ operam non arbitrari Deos esse.—It is true that Zimmerman supports his case by quoting the pseudo-Plutarchean _De Placitis_ (Idem de providentia non minus male loquitur quam ipsi Epicurei), and seems himself afraid to accept the conclusion of his own demonstrations:—Atheum eum fuisse non credo, sed quomodo asserere potuerit Superstitione Atheismum tolerabiliorem esse, simul tamen eos, quos atheos fuisse minime probare potuit, Superstitioni autem inimicissimos, omnem malorum mundum intulisse, consociare nequeo.—But the learned author is too intent on exculpating _Noster Euhemerus_ from Plutarch’s “injustice” to have justice to spare for Plutarch himself.—(J. J. ZIMMERMAN, _Epistola ad Nonnen_). Gréard quotes other authors of this charge against Plutarch (p. 269).—We cannot allow this opportunity to pass of protesting against the attitude of those who assumed, even in the Nineteenth Century, that it was a sign either of moral depravity, or mental incapacity, in Plutarch not to have been a believer in the Christian faith. Even Archbishop Trench, who admits, concerning such writers as our author, that “many were by them enabled to live their lives after a far higher and nobler fashion than else they would have attained” cannot rid himself of the notion that had Plutarch actively opposed Christianity he would have committed an offence which our generosity might have pardoned, though our justice must recognize that it _needed_ pardon. “Plutarch himself may be entirely acquitted of any _conscious_ attempt to fight against that truth which was higher than any which he had” (p. 13).—“I have already mentioned that, _through no fault of his own_, he stood removed from all the immediate influences of the Christian Church” (p. 89). But suppose the facts to have been just the opposite of those indicated in the words we have italicized, it would involve the loss of all sense of historical perspective to draw the conclusion which would clearly have been drawn by Trench himself. The use of similar language by Prof. Mahaffy has already been noted. (Pref. p. xii.) The position assumed by writers who maintain this view, is one quite inappropriate for historical discussion, and its natural expression, if it must be expressed at all, is through the medium of such poetical aspirations as that breathed in the epigram of John, the Metropolitan of Euchaita:—

“If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall save
From wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,
Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the cause
Their speech supported: Thine, too, were the laws
Their hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blind
To recognize Thee Lord of human kind,
Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shown
To bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.”

[373] Dr. Martineau (_Types of Ethical Theory_, vol. i. p. 91) thinks that “we must go a little further than Zeller, who decides that Plato usually conceived of God as if personal, yet was restrained by a doctrine inconsistent with such conception from approaching it closely or setting it deliberately on any scientific ground,” and devotes several closely-reasoned pages to show that, although there was no room for a personal god in Plato’s philosophy, Plato himself was in distinct opposition to his own views as systematically expounded in his writings. “We may regard him as fully aware of the conditions of the problem, and, though unable to solve it without lesion of his dialectic, yet deliberately pronouncing judgment on the side of his religious feeling.” But _pace tantorum virorum_ it will be admitted that the personality of God is not very evident in Plato when those who understand him best can only maintain that it is not essentially interwoven with his philosophy, having only an indirect and accidental existence which is not possible “without lesion of his dialectic.”

[374] “Abstractedly, the theology of the Stoics appears as a materialistic pantheism; God is represented as a fire, and the world as a mode of God.” (GRANT, _The Ethics of Aristotle_, vol. i. p. 265.) In the famous “hymn of Cleanthes,” preserved, like so many other of the great wonders of classical literature, by Stobæus, Grant sees an emphatic recognition of the personality of God, but it is equally natural to regard the hymn as a more detailed expression of that necessity of submitting to Destiny—of living in accordance with nature—which Cleanthes enounces in that other famous fragment which Epictetus would have us hold ready to hand in all the circumstances of life:—

“Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O Destiny,
The way that I am bid by you to go:
To follow I am ready. If I choose not,
I make myself a wretch, and still must follow.”

—EPICTETUS, _Encheir._ lii. (Long’s translation.) Epictetus, indeed, and Seneca, late comers in the history of Stoicism, have undoubtedly attained to a clear recognition of the personality of God.

[375] See the “_De cohibenda ira_,” “_de cupiditate divitiarum_,” “_de invidia et odio_,” “_de adulatore et amico_.”

[376] “_De garrulitate_,” “_de vitioso pudore_,” “_de vitando aere alieno_,” “_de curiositate_.”

[377] “_De amicorum multitudine_,” and “_de adulatore et amico_”; “_de fraterno amore_,” “_de amore prolis_”; “_conjugalia præcepta_,” “_de exilio_,” “_consolatio ad uxorem_,” “_consolatio ad Apollonium_.” (“I can easily believe,” says Emerson, “that an anxious soul may find in Plutarch’s ‘Letter to his Wife Timoxena,’ a more sweet and reassuring argument on the immortality than in the Phædo of Plato.”)

[378] Zeller says that “the most characteristic mark of the Plutarchian Ethics is their connexion with religion.”—(_Greek Philosophy_, translated by Alleyne and Abbott.)

[379] _De Virtute Morali_, 440 E.

[380] 444 C, D. (Cf. 451.)

[381] 444 D. Cf. _Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat_, 15 E.

[382] 445 C.

[383] “_An virtus doceri possit_,” “_de virtute et vitio_,” 101, C, D.

[384] Trench follows Zeller in regarding Plutarch as a forerunner of the Neo-Platonists:—“Plutarch was a Platonist, with an oriental tinge, and thus a forerunner of the new Platonists, who ever regarded him with the highest honour. Their proper founder, indeed, he, more than any other man, deserves to be called, though clear of many of the unhealthy excesses into which, at a later date, many of them ran” (Trench, p. 90). We hope our pages have done something towards putting Plutarch in a different light from that which surrounds him here. As a matter of fact, did the “new Platonists regard him ever with the highest honour?” The testimony of Eunapius we have already quoted (p. 67, note). Himerius is equally laudatory. “Plutarch, who is the source of all the instruction you convey.”—_Eclogæ_, vii. 4. “I weep for one who, I fondly hoped, would be gifted with speech excelling Minucianus in force, Nicagoras in stateliness, Plutarch in sweetness” (_Orat._ xliii. 21—Monody on his son’s death). But this is rather late in the history of Neo-Platonism. What about Plotinus, and Porphyry, and Proclus? Trench gives no references in proof of his statement, and we have been unable to find any.

[385] Theodoretus: _De Oraculis_, 951.—“_Plutarch of Chæronea, a man who was not Hebrew, but Greek—Greek by birth and in language, and enslaved to Greek ideas._” Cf. MOMMSEN: _The Provinces, from Cæsar to Diocletian_, Lib. viii. cap. vii.—“In this Chæronean the contrast between the Hellenes and the Hellenized found expression; such a type of Greek life was not possible in Smyrna or in Antioch; it belonged to the soil like the honey of Hymettus. There were men enough of more powerful talents and of deeper natures, but hardly any second author has known how, in so happy a measure, to reconcile himself serenely to necessity, and how to impress upon his writings the stamp of his tranquillity of spirit, and of his blessedness of life.”

[386] Dr. Bigg calls him a renegade, as the Church has called Julian an apostate. A comment of M. Martha’s on this uncharitable practice is worthy of frequent repetition:—“Ainsi donc, que l’on donne à Julien tous les noms qu’il plaira, qu’on l’appelle insensé, fanatique, mais qu’on cesse de lui infliger durement ce nom d’apostat, de peur qu’un historien, trop touché de ses malheurs, ne s’avise un jour de prouver que l’apostasie était excusable.” (“_Un chrétien devenu païen._”—_Études Morales_.)

[387] See note, p. 45.

[388] Though having also carefully studied both Zeller and Vacherot (ZELLER: _Die Philosophie der Griechen_, vol. iii.; VACHEROT: _Histoire critique de l’Ecole d’Alexandrie_), we have specially used for the purposes of the text the close analysis of the various aspects of Neo-Platonism presented by Dr. Bigg in his “Neo-Platonism,” and the interesting account given by M. Saisset in his article “De l’Ecole d’Alexandrie,” written for the “Revue des Deux Mondes,” of September, 1844, as a review of Jules Simon’s work on the Alexandrian School.—For the Neo-Platonist Dæmonology we have largely consulted Wolff.

[389] “In so far as the Deity is the original force, it must create everything. But as it is raised above everything in its nature, and needs nothing external, it cannot communicate itself substantially to another, nor make the creation of another its object. Creation cannot, as with the Stoics, be regarded as the communication of the Divine Nature, as a partial transference of it into the derivative creature; nor can it be conceived as an act of will. But Plotinus cannot succeed in uniting these determinations in a clear and consistent conception. He has recourse, therefore, to metaphors.”—ZELLER.

[390] “In the year 1722, a Sheriff-depute of Sutherland, Captain David Ross, of Littledean, took it upon him to pronounce the last sentence of death for witchcraft which was ever passed in Scotland. The victim was an insane old woman who had so little idea of her situation as to rejoice at the sight of the fire which was destined to consume her.”—Sir W. SCOTT: “_Demonology and Witchcraft_,” cap. 9.

[391] See Volkmann, vol. i. cap. i.

[392] Cf. M. MARTHA, “Un chrétien devenu païen,” in his _Études Morales_: “La philosophie prit tout à coup des allures mystiques et inspirées, elle entoura de savantes ténèbres la claire mythologie compromise par sa clarté; à ses explications symboliques elle mêla les pratiques mystérieuses des cultes orientaux, à sa théologie subtile et confuse les redoutables secrets de la magie: elle eut ses initiations clandestines et terribles, ses enthousiasmes extatiques, ses vertus nouvelles souvent empruntées au christianisme, ses bonnes œuvres, ses miracles même. En un mot, elle devint la théurgie, cet art sublime et suspect qui prétend pouvoir évoquer Dieu sur la terre et dans les âmes. Le christianisme rencontrait donc non plus un culte suranné, facile à renverser, mais une religion vivante, puisant son énergie dans sa défaite, défendu par des fanatiques savants dont le sombre ferveur et l’éloquence illuminée étaient capables d’entraîner aussi une armée de prosélytes.”

[393] As it was, the later Neo-Platonists had to content themselves with Apollonius of Tyana, instead of Jesus Christ.—“Apollonius of Tyana, who was no longer a mere philosopher, _but a being half-human, half-divine_” (EUNAPIUS, _op. cit._).

[394] See Emerson’s “Introduction” to Goodwin’s translation of the “Morals.”

[395] Saisset, _op. cit._

[396] DANTE: _Inferno_, Canto iii.