Chapter II: THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMON ELEMENTS—SCHURTZ’S THEORY.—This

question has been taken up _in extenso_ by Schurtz,[14] in his work on “Age Classes and Men’s Societies.” Here, as well as in previous theoretical discussions, the presence of a number of similarities has been considered sufficient for establishing the identity of a group of ceremonies that admittedly possess a large number of specific peculiarities. But Schurtz gives us a detailed psychological exposition (and in this lies perhaps his superiority over others who have discussed the same subject) of the reasons which have prompted him to take a certain attitude toward these “similarities.” If Schurtz’s work is therefore selected in preference to that of others, it is because of the fact that, in addition to practically taking the same position as most of the other theoreticians, he has most clearly defined some of the assumptions underlying their position.

Schurtz’s line of argument seems to have been the following. An investigation of civilized as well as of primitive organizations has disclosed a number of similarities. Their historical development is unknown; but the enormous distance separating them geographically, precludes the possibility that these similarities have been due either to borrowing or to dissemination from some one original centre. They must consequently be explained by assuming that they have developed independently, as external manifestations of the unity of the human mind. We are thus led to the assumption accepted by most ethnologists to-day, that the human mind tends to express itself in similar modes of thought and action the world over. The variation in these modes is to be ascribed either to the differences in the nature of the geographical and social surroundings or to the emotional and intellectual individuality of different groups of people, or to both. We are, however, concerned here not so much with the variations as with the common modes of thought and action. It is consequently of prime importance to determine first the nature of these modes, their sequence, and the extent to which this sequence has been conditioned by the modes themselves.

We start at the very outset with an implied assumption; for by “sequence,” Schurtz distinctly understood an ordered sequence. His work is primarily an attempt to determine what this ordered sequence has been, and how it has been determined. The norm of organization in which the human race expressed itself primarily, is, according to him, the age-group. Owing to the historical development of various cultural areas, it is no longer possible to detect this “primary element;” and he consequently finds it necessary to demonstrate its existence from another point of view, which is essentially psychological.

The development of the age-group has followed a very definite sequence—definite, because it has been determined by certain inherent tendencies of the human mind. These tendencies are “the instinct for association”[15] (_Geselligkeitstrieb_) and “the sexual instinct” (_Geschlechtstrieb_). Granting the existence of these two tendencies, we have then to inquire how they have conditioned the essential similarities in the evolution of our social life, and the forms in which that social life has expressed itself.

There are two possible assumptions. We may assume that at a certain stage of cultural development groups of people possessed no social individuality sufficiently strong to determine their own development, and that the _Geselligkeitstrieb_ and _Geschlechtstrieb_ alone, or reinforced by other factors, were sufficiently strong to condition development along certain lines; or we may, on the other hand, assume that the primary modes in which people have expressed themselves are necessarily of so simple and generalized a type, that they always were the same. Schurtz has practically assumed a stage in human development when the individuality of the component units of a social group was at a minimum; when there was, so to say, a “group mind,” whose initial development is most easily explained by the influence of inherent tendencies. It must be said, in fairness to Schurtz, that the other alternative mentioned above was probably also in his mind. However, he seems to have elaborated his theory with the first alternative constantly before his eyes.

This unexpressed assumption is of the greatest possible moment in Schurtz’s interpretation, because it immediately establishes a certain fixity for his primary norm; and excluding as it does the possibility of variation, because the two tendencies, as constants, are acting upon social groups whose component members have a minimum of individuality, brings it about that the same primary norm must be simple and generalized in its nature.

Schurtz has thus given us a psychological _milieu_, and we must now proceed to investigate what are the specific norms of development, the method by which these norms have been determined, the nature of their sequence, and how this sequence has been absolutely conditioned. The first two of these points become clearer if we attack the question of sequence first.

It is apparent from Schurtz’s work that to him the necessity for an ordered sequence was self-evident. This acceptance of an ordered sequence as axiomatic was conditioned primarily by the fact that he implied at the very outset that the ordered sequence present in the evolution of biological phenomena was to be found in an essentially comparable manner in the development of civilization. In the same way Schurtz’s use of the terms “highest” and “lowest” and of “intermediate stages” is only inadequately explained when regarded as derived from the study of history. Neither can we assume that these terms were merely a reflection of the conclusion he had drawn from a comparison of the palpable differences between Europeans and “primitive” people. His whole treatment of “intermediate stages,” and of the factors he calls to his aid in explaining them,—such as divergences due to variations from a type, vestiges, functional changes,—these are all strictly biological not merely in their terminology, but likewise in their general connotation.

The justification for equating the processes which have played a large part in historical and biological evolution seemed, indeed, apparent. In the cultural history of any people, we find elements splitting up and giving rise to innumerable variations. In this divergence we meet again and again with two phenomena,—first, that of the general decay of cultural elements, of their total disappearance in some cases and of their persistence as vestigial remains in others; and, secondly, that of the incessant change, of the re-adjustment and re-interpretation of cultural phenomena, so that elements often take upon themselves functions which they originally did not possess, while these original functions are either partially or totally obscured. Numerous other points, more specific in nature, could be adduced to demonstrate more fully the essential similarity of cultural and biological phenomena.

The comparability of the data of civilization and biology brought in its train, however, the natural corollary that the general course of their development was the same. Such an assumption fitted in admirably with the psychological presuppositions of Schurtz, and with the inferences he felt justified in drawing from the historical data. Neither Schurtz, nor, for that matter, any theoretician of his time, ever made any attempt to prove that the method of biological evolution was the same as that of the historical. It was commonly assumed to have been the same; but, quite apart from this acceptance of a fact that seemed to need no proof, the similarity in the evolution of biological and historical phenomena was by implication conditioned by his psychological assumptions. The number of norms are necessarily reduced to a minimum when inherent tendencies are acting on a “group mind,” for it would be tacitly admitting a large range for personal individuality, to assume the existence of many norms; but if there are only a few norms, or, as Schurtz concludes, one norm,—that of the age-group,—variations can only have arisen as differentiations of this norm, due to influences either from within or from without.

We are consequently reduced to a condition exactly parallel to that which we find, according to the theory of evolution, in biology. Variations are the result of a differentiation of some unit. It is the object, in the classification of biological data, to demonstrate, by means of a series of ascending forms, the evolution of the most highly differentiated from the least differentiated. In thus arranging the data, it followed that the least-differentiated forms contained the simple general manifestations of life, and that at the same time the most highly-differentiated forms likewise contained all these simple general manifestations, although they were here, as a rule, so changed as to be entirely obscured, if not unrecognizable.

In a manner almost exactly parallel to the above, Schurtz sought to classify the phenomena of social organization. The highest must contain within itself the simple and general phenomena of the lowest form. Having thus demonstrated to his satisfaction the existence and the necessity of an ordered sequence, he turned his attention to demonstrating that this sequence was psychologically as well as historically conditioned. His line of argument here can best be shown by analyzing the first few chapters of his book.

At the basis of all social organizations lie two elementary forces,—the “instinct for association” and the “sexual instinct.” The sexual instinct is primary, because it is obviously an essential condition of life. The instinct for association is secondary in so far as its expression in outward form is concerned. It is as old as the sexual instinct; but, since at the initial stage of human development the sexual instinct is so strong a force, the instinct of association had no observable influence on the actions of men.

The forms of social organization which the sexual instinct conditions are those based upon certain kinds of blood relationship. These forms are primary. To establish the priority of the forms thus imposed by blood relationship, we have but to remember that, as the relationship of individuals to one another preceded everything else, so the social forms based upon blood relationship must have preceded all other social forms. We are therefore to regard as the earliest stage of social organization that of groups bound together by blood relationship. But what has been the force differentiating these groups? Obviously not the same sexual instinct that has caused the formation of these primary groups. To explain the factors that have caused this differentiation we must call to our aid two phenomena,—first, that of sexual solidarity; and, secondly, that of the instinct for association.

Sexual solidarity has its roots in the nature of man and woman, and is possessed by them in equal intensity. The instinct for association is, however, a specifically masculine trait. It is found among women only in a minimal degree. An important corollary follows from this fact: If women societies are found anywhere, they are to be considered merely as imitations of men’s societies. If women are found as members in a society, this is to be regarded as secondary and purely adventitious. These, and some more specific points to be enumerated later, must be borne in mind continually, as Schurtz makes a far-reaching use of them.

The instinct for association, he goes on to say, expresses itself, however, between those of like interests; that is, between those who would most likely be of the same age. It is not likely, for instance, to occur between married and unmarried men. We have here two apparently organically determined classes. In the earliest stages of social development, however, when the norms of social expression conditioned by the sexual instinct were still of paramount importance, insistence was most naturally placed upon the most important stage of man’s physiological development,—the age of puberty. The strong line of demarcation between the period preceding and following sexual maturity was so ever-present a fact to the mind of primitive man, that it found expression in the multitude of initiatory rites. In these initiatory rites we have another of the specific “symptoms” with which we shall have to deal afterward.

When the instinct for association developed more strongly, the differences due to age, plus the physiological factor, conditioned the natural formation of two classes,—one of men before puberty, and one of men after puberty. This natural twofold division was also strengthened by another factor; for until the age of puberty, boys were under the influence of women, and were therefore to be reckoned as one with them.

The three groups—men before puberty, unmarried men after puberty, and married men—are thus built upon the basis of age distinction and common interest. They are the norms of primitive social organization, and, as we have seen, their origin is due to inherited instincts. By implication Schurtz has here also assumed the existence of a definite sequence; for the division into pre- and post-puberty groups is a consequence of the sexual instinct, and is therefore primary. Differentiation into the groups of married and unmarried men thereupon followed; but the initiation, which is synchronous with the age of sexual maturity, has introduced another factor, that of promiscuous sexual intercourse; and the regulation that this has demanded is found outwardly expressed in the “men’s house.” The common interests that drew men together into groups have thus far been those conditioned largely by age. In the development of society, however, interests became more and more diversified, and resulted, first, in the disappearance of the age factor as the essential element for associations, and, secondly, in the necessity for more closely organized units with specific characteristics. To obtain this close organization, one of the essential elements was secrecy, and thus developed out of the “men’s house” those innumerable clubs and secret societies which we find so common to-day.

In such manner we have constructed an ascending evolutionary series. It must not be forgotten that in such a series the highest stage is but a differentiated lower stage. It must likewise be remembered that there is a tendency for intermediate stages to leave vestigial remains wherever they developed into higher stages. We may consequently expect to find traces of “age groups” and “men’s houses” all over the world. In addition, we must remember that a number of “symptoms”—such as “the exclusion of women” from a society, the presence of “an initiation,” of “degrees,” and of “secrecy”—have always been associated with certain stages of growth. They may serve us for criteria of this growth and of the stages thereof, and they constitute proofs of historical identity. They will often appear unassociated with the definite stage assigned to them; but that is immaterial, for their almost universal presence is a sufficient guaranty of their significance. It is not necessary to inquire into their individual significance among definite societies, because a negative answer would prove nothing, as differences from the general scheme outlined can be interpreted most easily in terms of some functional change.

It must of course be remembered that the various points of view from which Schurtz approached his problem were so inextricably interwoven, that it is unwarranted to assume that every position he took was as distinctly analyzed as I have attempted to show.

From two points of view, a psychological and a biological one, Schurtz obtained similar conclusions. It is now only necessary, after we have seen how he established his psychological _milieu_ and his sequence of norms, to investigate the manner in which he approached the ethnological data themselves.

Schurtz claims to have reached his interpretation from an inductive study of the available data. We have seen that there is good reason to suppose that he approached the data with certain preconceptions, the most important of which was the necessity of “ascending stages” in the evolution of society. He had to determine, before everything else, the initial stage of social evolution, and to look for it or for as close an approximation to it as might still be found to-day. However, as soon as we accept what Schurtz thought were the necessary consequences of the two tendencies,—of the instinct for association and of the sexual instinct,—obviously, then, that organization which conforms closest to the conditions there imposed would be the most primitive.

He thereupon found himself confronted with the relatively easy task of finding such an organization. He found it in Australia, and selected it as the starting-point of his series. In justice to Schurtz and other theoreticians, it should, however, be said that the Australian cultures impressed many then, and continue to impress many now, as cultures that either had been stunted in their growth, or had developed only as far as the most primitive stages. From that point on, the construction of a series was a simple task.

Such, in brief, is the position of Schurtz.

He wished to convey the impression that his theory was based entirely upon an inductive study of the data; but we have seen that, by means of two powerful tendencies, he in reality based his interpretation upon a deductive study. He does, it is true, claim that the existence of these tendencies was established inductively; but even if we were to grant this, it is apparent that he subsequently disassociated the tendencies from the data, and used them as new entities from which to re-interpret the facts.

It has been pointed out before that Schurtz did not believe that the absence of any or all of the “symptoms” constituted an argument against his theory. In the same way, any evidences of convergent evolution, of the appearance of “symptoms” of higher stages associated with those of a lower stage, would not militate against his position. Such phenomena were to be regarded as purely adventitious. Dissemination of cultures, he held, was possible; but, although similarities due to such an agency might obscure the normal development, this normal development could hardly be fundamentally disarranged thereby.

* * * * *

The theory of Schurtz might be examined from two points of view. One might critically examine the validity of the assumptions _per se_, and the justifiability of his inferences; or one might temporarily lay aside the theory entirely, and examine the data individually. It is the latter method of approach that I shall here adopt.

With this purpose in view, I have selected for examination and interpretation the data furnished by the Ojibwa-Menominee Midewiwin, the Winnebago Medicine Dance, and the Omaha Shell and Pebble Societies. The investigation of specific data will, however, not have any general validity, unless it can be shown that their specific content is the result of certain very general psychological tendencies.

The common elements in the ceremonial complexes have led to the predication of their identity, and it will be best therefore to begin our study with an analysis of them.