Chapter XLIII: Appendix: Treaty of VIVI (2)

I have cited these two examples to show that according to the law of usage of Europe, associations which are not organised as states can, nevertheless, exercise sovereign rights. But it may be said that these orders of chivalry were privileged orders, and that they belong to an epoch when Christian civilisation was propagated at the sword’s point. Putting aside, then, the military epoch of the civilising propaganda, let us pass to the commercial era inaugurated by the discoveries of Christopher Columbus and Vasco de Gama. The theory of publicists which we have to examine is this, that a private association cannot exercise sovereign rights in a barbarous country. A learned _collaborateur_ of the _Revue de géographie_, of Paris, has formulated it in these terms: “It is a principle of law that states alone can exercise sovereign rights; that no private company can have them.”[59] It is evident that this proposition is affirmed by M. Delavand in too absolute a manner, for the facts of history contradict it. Among the members who formed the great Union of the United States of North America there were at least four which owed their origin to private associations, whose territorial sovereignty had been established before they received any charter of incorporation from the Crown of England. Everybody knows that a commercial company acquired by treaties with the natives the sovereignty of the English Indies. A similar Dutch company acquired and exercised sovereign rights in the island of Java and in the Malaccas. Should there be a different rule in Africa from that which has prevailed in America and Asia? Or should there be, for the young republics of the nineteenth century, a law of nations directly opposed to that which prevailed at the foundation of the independent States on the shores of North America—States whose federation gave birth to the parent republic of our age? I do not think so. Doubtless the national law of a country may prohibit its citizens from accepting the sovereignty of a barbarous country, but the international question must not be confounded with the question of national law, in regard to which we may say, “_Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur._”

Will it be said that these ideas are superannuated; that they do not belong to our age? I will reply by a very recent example, which has been the subject of discussion between the Governments of Spain, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. It is known that certain native chiefs on the northern coast of the island of Borneo delegated to a European, a private individual, rights implying the exercise of territorial sovereignty; that the person to whom the chiefs of the country had delegated supreme power, under the title of maharaja, ceded his rights to a private company, and that that company obtained from the English Crown a charter of incorporation. It may be said that the history of the propagation of civilisation in the seventeenth century in America is renewed in Asia and Africa in the nineteenth century. The English Government regarded this delegation of sovereign rights by native chiefs, in return for an annual subsidy, as a sufficient title to enable the company to exercise these powers, and sustained this proposition before the House of Commons. In reply to a question in regard to the granting of the charter of incorporation, Sir Henry James, Attorney General, said:

“The rights which have been accorded the company have become legally its property, and it would have been an act of confiscation if the Government of Her Majesty had attempted to deprive it of them.”

And the prime minister, Mr. Gladstone, also affirmed that the charter had not granted to the company any power to exercise rights implying sovereignty which it had not already acquired by delegation from native chiefs. A correspondent of the _Revue de géographie_ of Paris has specified these rights according to the contents of the act of delegation.[60] It is not doubtful that in virtue of this act the company, without being a state, can exercise sovereign rights over a considerable territory in the northern part of the island of Borneo. M. E. de Laveleye, before cited, says that Germany, formally consulted by the British Government in 1882, did not question the capacity of private individuals or of companies to obtain from non-civilised Sovereigns the concession of rights implying the exercise of rights of sovereignty. The Governments of the Netherlands and of Spain did not deny such power, but they claimed to have anterior rights over the northern portion of Borneo; and it was in virtue of those anterior rights that they protested against the rights claimed by the British North Borneo Company. It is, therefore, evident that the obstacles which the establishment of stations by the International Association upon the Upper Congo might meet with from European powers are not to be found in the fact that they are in contravention of any law of nations by virtue of which states alone can exercise sovereign rights, but solely in the fact that Portugal pretends, by reason of anterior rights, to deny the capacity of the native chiefs of the country to cede the sovereignty of a part of their territories without the consent of Portugal.

It appears, in the meantime, that the British Government did not yield to the pretensions raised by Holland and Spain concerning the northern part of the island of Borneo, and that the Government of the French Republic, in spite of the pretensions of Portugal, has recognised the supremacy of a native king upon the Upper Congo, and has accepted the cession of his hereditary rights. This treaty, concluded by M. Savorgnan de Brazza, as the representative of France, at Neousa, the 30th October, 1880, ceded to France a territory which was in the possession of certain chiefs, vassals of the King Makoko; and said chiefs signed the treaty, whilst the King Makoko, in his capacity as suzerain of these chiefs, ceded to France, by an act invested with his mark, his rights of supremacy over this territory. It seems, therefore, that there is no place for a suzerainty of Portugal over the regions around Stanley Pool, according to the opinion of the Government of the French Republic, for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies authorised the President of the Republic to ratify the treaty and act above mentioned, and the President has promulgated a law to give them full effect.

It might reasonably be asked, if there is any difference in principle between the right of African chiefs, admitting they are sovereigns of a territory, and the right of Asiatic chiefs to cede their territory to a private company. France, at least, has recognised the right of King Makoko, suzerain of the Batakes, to cede to a European State his rights of sovereignty, and the right of the chiefs subordinate to his authority to cede the possession of the parts of the territory they occupied. Why should it be forbidden to a native chief to cede his territory to an international European company, which, according to the law of nations, is perfectly capable of accepting and exercising such a sovereignty?

The _Comité d’Études_ of the Upper Congo—for it is necessary to distinguish between the association which occupies the Lower Congo and the association which occupies the Upper Congo—has made, through Mr. Stanley, with the native chiefs, treaties, which in regard to their tenor resemble more closely the treaties concluded by the British Society with the Sultans of Brunei and Sooloo, in the island of Borneo, than the treaties concluded by the native chiefs of the Upper Congo with M. Savorgnan de Brazza. Take for example the treaty which Captain Eliot, agent of Mr. Stanley, concluded with the Chief Manipembo, the 20th of May of this year. The first three articles declare that the Chief Manipembo cedes and abandons to the committee of the Upper Congo, in full property, certain territories in return for a present the receipt of which is acknowledged, and he solemnly declares that these territories form an integral part of his State, and that he can freely dispose of them. It is clearly evident from the tenor of these articles that the Chief Manipembo recognises no superior chief. Article IV. of the treaty states that the cession of territory carries with it the abandonment by the above-named chief, and the transfer to the committee of all his sovereign rights.

Was this transmission of sovereign rights to the committee of the Upper Congo illegal according to the law of nations? It is indisputable that the Chief Manipembo was legally capable of concluding treaties with European Powers, for the French Republic, through M. Cordier, on the 12th of March of this year, concluded with him and with the King of Loango treaties by which all the left bank of the river Quillou,[61] which empties into the Bay of Loango, is placed under the protectorate of France.

Concerning the exercise of sovereign rights by the committee of the Upper Congo, acquired by treaties with native chiefs, if reliance can be placed upon an article in the _Journal l’Export_, which professes to have its facts from good authority, the committee has instructed its representatives, in case of expeditions from any nation seeking to establish themselves there, to give them gratuitously the necessary land. The committee wishes especially to create colonies at the stations of the Congo, and to see developed there a new kind of free cities. An idea which may throw some light on the future of the Upper Congo is this: An International Protectorate of the Lower Congo, under the presidency of Portugal, and a system of free cities for the Upper Congo.

History teaches us that the march of the caravans which traverse the sandy deserts of Northern Africa has been rendered possible by the existence of certain spots where nature has made provision of water and vegetation where travellers and camels can rest and refresh themselves. Why should not a philanthropic association be permitted to imitate this foresight of nature, and to establish, like these oases, free cities at certain distances upon the banks of the great river of Equatorial Africa, to facilitate the progress of a humane civilisation and the development of a beneficent commerce?

The institution of free cities in Germany greatly accelerated the progress of the arts and civilisation in Europe, and the rapid development of these cities in the fourteenth century teaches us that by means of such an organisation a nearly barbarous country can be erected into a civilised body upon an industrial and commercial basis. These cities, either through their origin or by virtue of the charters granted them by sovereign powers, secured to themselves a free government, which assured to their citizens personal liberty and the ownership of their property under the protection of their own magistrates.

The traveller in the free city of Bremen, on arriving at the marketplace, will see before him a great stone column which is called the Rolands Saule. This column supports the colossal figure of a man, holding in his right hand a sword, and crushing under his feet the head and hand of a man. This is emblematical of the right of the city to dispose of the lives and labour of its inhabitants. The present column was erected in 1412, but it replaced a wooden column which dated back to the period of the First Crusade, and whose origin is unknown. Other monuments of analogous character to this are found in many of the cities of Germany, and they are symbols of the right which the magistrates of these cities had to exercise both civil and criminal jurisdiction. They bear witness that these cities were _sui juris_ in regard to the power to make and execute their laws. Should an institution which contributed so much to attach the North of Europe to the civilisation of the South, which rooted itself so firmly upon the shores of the North Sea and the Baltic that its vitality withstood the strain of wars and civil dissensions for six centuries,—should that be regarded as an innovation in the usages of nations when transplanted into Equatorial Africa?

When the Dutch Provinces of Spain revolted against the Spanish Crown, and the Prince of Orange granted letters of mark to individuals, to make reprisals against Spain, the Spanish Government refused to recognise the legality of these letters of mark, upon the pretext that a republic could not exercise rights of admiralty which belonged exclusively to crowned heads. This is the origin of the term of opprobrium, _quex de mer_, which the Spaniards employed to degrade the Dutch, but which the Dutch adopted as a title of honour. In the same way as now, it was then attempted to make it appear that under the law of nations states alone could exercise sovereign rights. But the facts contradicted this proposition. The suggestion recalls the fable of the hare and the tortoise. According to the principles of pure mathematics the tortoise should never be able to catch the hare, but the problem is simplified enormously when recourse is had to the proof of the facts. To use a scholastic expression, “Experience discovers the truth”—_solvitur ambulando_. For example, the right of the International African Association to hoist a flag upon its steamboats upon the Lower Congo cannot be denied, while the English society, in possession of the rights of the Sultans of Brunei and Sooloo, implying the exercise of rights of sovereignty, has raised its flag, and the British admiralty has been authorised to recognise it.

To return to the objection of certain publicists that a State alone can exercise sovereign rights. The free cities of ancient Rome and of the empire of Germany (to distinguish it from the present empire) were not subjects of the Emperor, but vassals of the empire, and when the free city of Strasbourg capitulated, in the year 1681, the King of France received it under his royal protection, and it preserved all its privileges and its magistrates with civil and criminal jurisdiction, as a free republic, with a territorial zone, under the protection of France, until the French Revolution.

What are the obstacles which delay the establishment of a system of free cities on the banks of the Upper Congo, and which prevent the powers whose subjects have establishments on the Lower Congo from coming to an agreement as to an international protectorate of the river? There is a European power which arrogates to itself, in virtue of a discovery of the mouth of the river Congo in the year 1484, the sovereignty of all territory watered by this river and its affluents. I do not speak of the pretensions of this power over all the territory of the west coast of Africa, between 5°, 12´, and 8° south latitude—pretensions which have been contested by France, by Holland, and even by England since the slave trade was abolished by conventions between the British and Portuguese Governments. So long as the slave trade existed, everybody hunted Negroes in common in the regions of the Congo. Since the slave trade was abolished the maritime powers of Europe have treated the pretensions of Portugal with courtesy, but not one has admitted them.

I affirm, with all the respect due to the country of Prince Henry the Navigator, that this is the condition of things upon the Congo, although the Portuguese Government, in a circular dispatch, written in reply to a resolution of the Institute of International Law, has asserted that its rights are not disputed.

In support of this assertion of the Portuguese Government the author of the dispatch cites an incident of the last Franco-German war. During the war a French corvette captured a German merchant vessel, the _Hero_, lying at anchor in Banana Creek, inside the mouths of the Congo. The circular dispatch states that the German Government requested the Portuguese Government to demand the rendition of the prize, as captured in Portuguese waters; but it does not say that the Portuguese Government took any steps before the French prize courts, or that the French Government acceded thereto. The statement of facts stops there. Then, the dispatch says that “the news soon reached Europe that the French governor of Gaboon, the port into which the captor had carried his prize, had set at liberty the crew, and caused the German ship to be taken back to Banana Creek, where it remained at anchor till the close of the war.”

The author of the dispatch appears to me the victim of the paralogism described by the phrase _post hoc, propter hoc_, for he attempts to draw from these facts the “irresistible conclusion” that the Governor of Gaboon recognised the waters of Banana Creek as Portuguese waters. It appears, on the contrary, that the ship was set at liberty by the Governor of Gaboon, _motu suo proprio_, and in no manner on account of any demand of the Portuguese Government; and the only legitimate conclusion from the premises is this: The Governor of Gaboon recognised that the capture of the ship had been effected in territorial waters, where, whether they belonged to a native King or to a European power, France had not the right as a belligerent power to capture the enemy’s ships.[62] The Governor of Gaboon conducted himself loyally without waiting special instructions from his Government. This fact, which the author of the dispatch cites as a proof of Portuguese sovereignty over the territories of the west coast of Africa, between 5°, 12´, and 8°, south latitude, comprising the mouths of the Congo, has absolutely no significance as an argument.

Another event which the dispatch of the Portuguese Government recalls is that of the 1st of May, 1877, which had previously acquired considerable notoriety by the publication of the correspondence between the Portuguese Government and the Government of her Britannic Majesty. Several old slave-traders, established at Punta da Lenha, were carrying on a regular and legal commerce with the natives, but, at the same time, were slave-owners. In consequence of an incendiary attempt upon a Dutch factory, the residents of Punta da Lenha made a “_noyade_” (drowning of several persons at the same time) of Negroes in the river opposite Boma. The British consul, who resides ordinarily at Saint Paul de Loando, which city is under the jurisdiction of the Portuguese crown, wished to make inquiries at the scene of the crime in regard to the summary execution of twenty-nine Negroes by order of their masters, but he did not dare to disembark at Punta da Lenha because of the threats of the inhabitants. Under these circumstances, the Portuguese Government conducted itself in a very proper manner. At the instance of Consul Hopkins, of Loando, the governor of the Portuguese province of Angola sent a gunboat to Punta da Lenha, and arrested a British subject named Scott, implicated in the _noyade_, and was perfectly willing to try the accused according to the laws of Portugal with the consent of the English consul; but the correspondence between the two governments shows that the English Government was unwilling to admit Portuguese sovereignty over the banks of the Congo. It is surprising that the author of the circular dispatch should have cited this incident as indicating the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty by the English Government, when the correspondence presented to the British Parliament in regard to the matter proves precisely the reverse. Here, for example, are the terms of a dispatch of Sir Julian Pauncefote, under secretary of state, to the English consul at Loando, which closes the correspondence:

“The territory in which these outrages have been committed has long been claimed by the Portuguese Government, and this claim is renewed in the correspondence with the Portuguese authorities inclosed in your dispatches. Her Majesty’s Government, however, as you are aware, have always contested and opposed that claim, and cannot, therefore, admit the jurisdiction of the Portuguese tribunals to deal with the case of Scott.”[63]

No one accuses Portugal of wishing to impede the free navigation of the Congo, but it is to be regretted that, being powerless to insure that navigation to its own subjects, it is unwilling to consent to a friendly agreement with the powers whose subjects have factories upon the north bank, to put the navigation of the river beyond risk of danger. I have said advisedly that Portugal is powerless to insure the navigation of the river to _its own subjects_. I have already spoken of the tribes which inhabit the borders of Pirates’ Bay, upon the north bank of the river, against whom the English commander, Hewitt, had to organise an expedition in 1875, because they had plundered an English merchant ship and massacred the crew. But there is, on the south bank, a considerable tribe who practise piracy on a large scale, and do not even respect Portuguese vessels. The pirates especially infest San Antonio, at the southern extremity of the mouth, in the immediate neighbourhood of the column of Point del Padron. The author of a book entitled _Four Years on the Congo_,[64] published in Paris, describes an attack by these pirates upon a Portuguese brig. The account is interesting, but I will not now go into details. What it imports is, the powerlessness of the Portuguese Government to suppress the piracy of this tribe and to punish the guilty ones. I cite an extract from this work which gives the history of the Portuguese expedition sent to punish the Mussorangos who had attacked the Portuguese brig:

“On the 15th of November two corvettes and the frigate _La Guadiana_ left Loando. The little fleet, commanded by M. Viegas de C——, headed for the Congo. The commander hoped to surprise the Negroes. Arrived at a place considered sacred, and which is called the “Stone of the Fetish,” they anchored, and M. Viegas himself, with one company, ascended the creek in a steam gunboat and effected a landing, which the savages endeavoured at first to oppose; but soon afterwards, dislodged by the showers of grape shot from the frigate, moored a few cables’ length only from the shore, they retired in good order. Meanwhile, the little band of whites, finding no serious resistance, advanced. The corvettes shelled the villages in sight. Some groups of Mussorangos, who had stood firm till then, feeling themselves vanquished fled in every direction, returning and stopping, from time to time, behind trees to discharge their guns at the whites. The commander burned all the villages he found. That was all that could be done. It would not have been prudent to march at a venture into an unknown country in search of an unapproachable enemy, always fleeing. It was necessary to re-embark; the ships came back to Banana, where they remained some days, and then returned to Saint Paul.”

This is a very recent occurrence, which does not very well bear out the assertions of the Portuguese Government relative to the efficacy of its jurisdiction as remedy for the disorders of the Congo.

“The Congo [says the author of the circular dispatch] and the territories bordering its mouth are already the seat of an important commerce, and of European establishments of diverse nationalities, but there is no security either for life or property, no police, no courts, nor any of the institutions so necessary to all civilised people, and which can only be established under a recognised and effective jurisdiction. And such jurisdiction can only be exercised by Portugal, because no other nation possesses or claims any rights of sovereignty over these territories.”[65]

I repeat, the good intentions of Portugal are not in dispute. What is wanting is energy and material power; and it is necessary to have these in order to civilise the country discovered by the agents of the International Association. Four centuries have elapsed since Diego Cam, a Portuguese cavalier, erected a column upon the Point del Padron, the end of the south bank of the river’s mouth, in commemoration of the fact that a subject of the crown of Portugal had discovered the great river Congo. This same point is to-day in the hands of a native tribe, which not only does not recognise the sovereignty of Portugal, but openly defies it. Nevertheless, the author of the circular finds much fault with the resolution of the Institute of International Law, because that resolution implies, according to him, forgetfulness of the rights of Portugal. What rights? There exist rights based upon the discovery of the country, but considering that the fleets of Pharaoh Neco, King of Egypt, made the circuit of Africa, we cannot admit that the legal discovery of the Congo was effected by Diego Cam. But rights founded upon the discovery of the country are only imperfect rights; occupation should follow, within a reasonable time, to render them perfect; otherwise the discovery becomes inoperative, like an abandoned title. Has Portugal occupied both banks of the Congo to acquire possession of its waters? Have we the proof of it? On the contrary, the very territory where Cam erected this column is to-day in the power of a native tribe, who have always resisted Portuguese sovereignty, and who openly claim to be (a thing almost incredible) the enemies of the human race (_hostes humani generis_). And, on the other hand, England, which pretends to no sovereignty over the waters of the Congo, has been obliged to land a force upon the north bank to chastise an act of piracy committed by the inhabitants of the creeks in the neighbourhood of Banana.

It is evident that very soon the problem of the free navigation of the Congo will assume such proportions that the solution cannot be longer deferred. Should this solution wait upon a state which up to now has only demonstrated its powerlessness to civilise the countries on the south bank of the Lower Congo, its sovereignty over which is not disputed by any European state?

LONDON, November 21, 1883.

FOOTNOTES:

[57] The Schloss Hauptmann of the Castle of Marienbourg, formerly the palace of the grand master of the order, is now appointed by the King of Prussia.

[58] The old Teutonic Order was suppressed in the year 1809 at the peace of Luneville, when the grand master of the order was secularised for the archduke to be chosen by the emperor. It may be said of the Teutonic Order that it was renewed in 1824 and reorganised in 1840 and 1865, but that it is the shadow of a great glory—_magni stat nominis umbra_.

[59] Vol. xii. of the _Revue_ above cited, p. 224.

[60] Mr. A. J. Wauters, assistant secretary of the International Congress of Commercial Geography, 1879. First number of the _Revue_, July 1, 1883, p. 63.

[61] Niadi-Kwilu.

[62] The _Times_ of the 5th November, 1882, in which an English translation of the circular dispatch of the Portuguese Government is published, says: “Unquestionably because the Government _perceived_ that the capture had been made improperly.”

[63] _Parliamentary Papers_, Africa, No. 2, 1882, p. 86.

[64] Paris, G. Charpentier & Co., 1883.

[65] I quote the text of the circular as published in the _Indpendance Belge_ of the 7th November, 1883.

ARGUMENT OF PROFESSOR ÉGIDE ARNTZ

Can independent chiefs of savage tribes cede to private citizens the whole or part of their states, with the sovereign rights which pertain to them, conformably to the traditional customs of the country?

This question, as it is propounded, presents two aspects. It must be considered:

I. From the point of view of the right of the one who cedes.
II. From the point of view of the one to whom the cession is made.

I

In examining this question from the standpoint of international law, we must first ask if the chiefs of savage tribes can, generally, make treaties, conventions, cessions of territories; in other words, if the tribes which they represent are considered as states, having the capacity to make international treaties, which would be respected as such by all civilised or non-civilised nations.

From the fifteenth century till early in the nineteenth century, the rules of international law were regarded as being to some extent an exclusive privilege of Christian peoples, for the establishment of regular relations between them. With regard to pagan peoples, they were not considered as participating in the political community which international law established between Christians; and it was only by Article VII. of the treaty of Paris of the 30th of March, 1856, that the Sublime Porte was admitted “to participate in the advantages of the European concert.”

We can easily understand that Christian nations could not admit to participation in the advantages of international law the people of nations who did not recognise this law as binding upon themselves, and who did not practise its precepts. Publicists and moralists teach that in their relations with pagan and savage populations, Christian sovereigns should always conduct themselves honestly, and observe the rules of justice, equity, and Christian morality.

It would be too long to enter here into the details of the discussions which the authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had on the subject of the conduct of European nations in regard to the Indians. We shall limit ourselves to saying that the relations of the states of Europe with other nations had no fixed rules, that they varied much, according to the power and importance of the foreign nations, according to the communications more or less numerous which Europeans had with them, and according to the manners and customs practised by them.[66]

Thanks to the progress of humanitarian ideas, of a better practice of Christian morality, and the greater influence of principles of international justice, feeble people, almost savage, although not possessed of the benefits of civilisation, are no longer considered in our days, as destined to serve as a mine for civilised nations to “work.” All those having a human face, turned towards the heavens, are considered as members of the great human family, children of the common Father, animated by the same Divine breath, having the same destiny to accomplish, and meriting the respect due to human dignity.

These ideas have prevailed with jurisconsults and publicists, have permeated their doctrines, and happily have guided their practices. Savage tribes, although living in very imperfect communities, as well as their territories, are no longer regarded to-day as things without a master, and belonging to the first occupier, that is, to the first comer stronger than themselves. Want of civilisation can no longer serve as a pretext to civilised nations to put them under subjection, or to control them by violence.

The law of nations is a science still imperfectly moulded or stereotyped, and especially is it a science which ought not to be, and cannot be, formulated _a priori_. Its fundamental principle is, no doubt, philosophy, but it has its positive base in the facts of history and authoritative doctrine.

What are the conditions to enable a state to exist, as such, and to qualify it to treat?

“A certain number of men and families, who, being united, in a country, and having fixed their abode there, associate and submit themselves to a common chief, with the intention of providing for the safety of all, form a state,” says Klüber,[67] and to the same effect says G. F. Von Marten.[68]

“Sovereignty [continues Klüber[69]] in this extended sense consists in the _ensemble_ of rights belonging to a state, independent as regards its object. It comprises, first, the entire independence of the state in the face of foreign nations; second, legitimate power of the Government or of the authority which the purpose of the state demands.”

The same author says[70]:

“Sovereignty is acquired by a state either at its foundation or when it separates itself legitimately from the dependence under which it was. To be valid, it does not need to be _recognised or guaranteed_ by any foreign power whatever, provided its possession is not faulty (_vicieuse_).”

It is useless to multiply extracts. The principles summarised by Klüber on the sovereignty, the independence, and the equality of states, from the legal point of view, are equally professed by all authors. We will limit ourselves to the following: Heffter, par. 15, 16, pp. 32-34; par. 23, pp. 42, 43; par. 26, 27, pp. 47-49. Wheaton, vol. i., pp. 32, 43. Vattel, lib. i., chap. i., sec. 4. W. E. Hall, _International Law_, par. 2, 4, pp. 16-20; par. 6-8, pp. 34-37; par. 9, 10, pp. 39-42. Calvo, _Droit international_, par. 39-41, pp. 143-147.

Tribes inhabiting determined territory, represented by their chiefs, form, therefore, independent states.

From this the first consequence is that the territories which they occupy are not things without masters (_res nullius_), and cannot be occupied by other states. It is only territories _without master_, that is to say, upon which no sovereign power is yet established, that can be the object of occupation.

As regards the right of _occupation_, see the following authors:

“Christian people cannot rightfully take possession of lands which savages already really occupy,” says George Frederick von Marten.[71]

Klüber[72] says: “A state can acquire things which belong to no one (_res nullius_) by _occupation_ (_original_), and the goods of others by means of _conventions_ (derivative occupation) ... In order that the occupation may be legitimate, the thing itself should be susceptible of exclusive property and belong to no one. (A) The state should have the intention of acquiring the property thereof.”

In the note (A) the author says: “Property thus is acquired rightfully by an occupation without flaw; it is preserved by continuous possession. In consequence no nation is authorised, no matter what its pretensions, especially if of a higher degree of culture, to seize upon the property of another nation. It cannot even take it from savages or nomads.”

The author cites in support of this, Gunther, _Völkerrecht_, vol. ii., p. 10 _et seq._ See also the beautiful and energetic passage from Heffter, _Le droit international public_, vol. i., par. 70, pp. 141, 142: “Droit d’Occupation.”

To give validity of occupation it is necessary that the property should be without master, and that the intention to acquire the domain should be joined to the fact of an effective taking possession. Let us examine each of the three conditions:

1. Occupation is only to be applied to property which, although susceptible of being possessed, has no master. It does not extend to persons, who can only be the object of a submission, whether voluntary or forced. Occupation is to be applied notably to countries and islands uninhabited or not entirely occupied; but no power on earth has the right to impose its laws upon wandering or even savage peoples. Its subjects can seek to establish commercial relations with these latter, can remain among them, in case of necessity can demand of them indispensable articles of provisions, and even negotiate with them the voluntary cession of a portion of the territory, with the object of colonising it. Nature, it is true, does not forbid nations to extend their empire upon the earth; but it does not give the right to a single one among them to establish its dominion anywhere wherever it chooses to do it. The _propaganda_ of civilisation, the development of commercial and industrial interests, the putting into activity of unproductive values, do not justify it either. All that can be accorded on the subject is, that in the interest of the preservation of the human kind, it may be permitted to nations to unite in order to open by common accord the ports of a country hermetically sealed to their commerce.

See, to the same effect, Bluntschli, _Droits des gens, codifié_, par. 20, p. 63.

Similar citations could be multiplied.

Communities of non-civilised tribes, forming according to the law of nations, as to-day admitted, independent states, the first logical consequence which follows is that these states cannot be acquired by reason of occupation by other states. A second consequence which necessarily follows from the same premises is, that these states, or their chiefs, can make international _treaties_ of every kind—treaties which have obligatory force for the contracting parties, and which should be respected by all other states, if they do not interfere with existing rights.

We would remark here, with Calvo,[73] that “international treaties may be concluded, even with nomadic peoples, having no territory of their own nor fixed domicile, when they have an expressed political organisation and a common council by the intermediary of their chiefs or their assemblies.” “In this category [adds the same author] may be classed the Bedouins, scattered over the deserts of Arabia, Syria, Egypt, and barbarous Africa, and the Turcomans, who wander over the plains of Central Asia.”

“There are conglomerated populations which do not compose a state.... But the nomads and the savages have, either among themselves or with civilised people, an international law which is observed equally with the international law of civilised nations,” say Funck, Brentano, and Sorel.[74]

By still stronger reasoning the tribes composing states dwelling in determined territory can make international treaties. Savage African tribes, possessing determined territories, _can make all kinds of treaties_. _Their chiefs_ can therefore _cede territory_, in whole or in part, _to whom_, we will see under No. 2. This rule, or rather this consequence, cannot be impeached _in theory_.

“Sovereignty of a state, in the sense of international law [says Klüber, _Droits des gens moderne de l’Europe_, p. 22], consists essentially in independence of all foreign control in relation to the exercise of rights of sovereignty; it ought by its nature even to be exercised independently of the antiquity of the state, or the form of its constitution of government, or the order established for the succession to the throne, or the rank, title, or state of its sovereign; of the extent of its territory; of its population, political importance, manners, religion, state of culture in general, the commerce of its inhabitants,” etc.

And the same author, par. 127, says:

“In regard to public domain, the state has, over the things which form part thereof, all rights of property, not only of exclusive possession and the right to enjoy it as owner, but also that of disposing freely thereof. The conventions or arrangements which it may make in this respect, whether with its subjects or with foreigners, are absolutely independent of other Governments. Nothing forbids it alienating its property, its putting it in pledge, or abandoning it. It has the capacity to acquire by accession.”[75]

Without going back to antiquity, modern history, since the seventeenth century up to our own days, furnishes us numerous examples of treaties, of cessions of territories, etc., concluded between civilised states on the one hand and savage tribes on the other. It is sufficient to recall the most noted cases:

In 1620 the English Puritans embarked on board the _Mayflower_, after establishing themselves in the northern part of Virginia, concluded with the chief or sachem of the Indians, Massasoit, a treaty of friendship, the most ancient treaty concluded by New England.[76]

In 1639 the founders of the colony of New Hampshire concluded with the Indians conventions for the purchase of land situated between the Piscataqua and the Merrimac, and there established the town of Exeter.[77]

Later, William Penn made treaties with chiefs of Indians. It is useless to cite here the numerous treaties between the different States of New England and the chiefs of Indian tribes.

Wheaton[78] recounts that some of these Indian tribes have recognised by conventions that they held their existence entirely at the will of the State within the limits of which they resided, and that others preserved a limited sovereignty and the absolute dominion of the territory inhabited by them; and he adds that by two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1831 and 1832, the Cherokee Nation, residing within the limits of the State of Georgia, are held to constitute a distinct political society; that numerous treaties made by this nation with the United States recognise it as a people capable of maintaining relations of peace and war; that the English Government, having preceded the United States, bought their lands by contracts of sale, freely assented to, and never forced them to make sale against their will.

Let us pass from America to Africa and Asia. In the course of the last fifty years England has concluded with the chiefs of countries adjacent to the Congo thirteen treaties, of which we mention specially two, one concluded the 11th of February, 1853, with the King and chiefs of Cabinda, the other concluded the 20th June, 1854, with divers chiefs of the river Congo.

The treaty concluded by M. Savorgnan de Brazza with the King Makoko is of public notoriety.

To terminate the series of historical documents in support of the theory that chiefs of savage tribes can validly make treaties and cessions of territories in full sovereignty, let us recall further the recent treaties of the 29th of December, 1877, and the 22nd of January, 1878, by which the Sultans of Brunei and of Sulu, in the island of Borneo, ceded a part of their territory to Mr. Alfred Dent and Baron Overbeck.

If, from the point of view of international law, it is indisputable that no state, civilised or not, has the right to arbitrarily trouble the chiefs of savage tribes in the possession of their sovereignty, the same prohibition applies to those to whom they have conceded, _whoever they may be_.

The _cessionnaires_ have the same rights as the ceders. Under what pretext could another state trouble them? Their cession is valid, and thus all motive, or even all pretext for trouble is wanting; or, the cession is null, according to the law of nations, and then the sovereign who made the cession has, _in right_, preserved all his sovereignty, and no other state has the right to trouble it, or even to intervene to make good the nullity of the cession.

II

Let us take the second question. Can a cession be made to a _private citizen_?

We are happy to be able to abridge this part of our work by referring to the article, “The Free Navigation of the Congo,” published by our eminent colleague of the Institute, Sir Travers Twiss, in the sixth number of the _Revue du droit international_ for 1883.

It is true that Sir Travers Twiss occupies himself with the question whether those associations which are not organised as States can exercise sovereign rights, rather than whether these rights of sovereignty can be conceded to private individuals; but the argument which he invokes in support of his thesis applies in great part to cessions made to individuals.

When writers establish their point of departure to arrive at a demonstration they commence often by saying:

“It is an established principle,” etc. Or, “It is a principle of law,” etc. And they employ this form when their principles are the most contestable. In the article we have just cited, Sir Travers Twiss mentions an article in the _Revue de géographie_ of Paris,[79] in which Mr. Delavand says: “It is a principle of law that states alone can exercise sovereign rights, and that no private company can have them.” He (Sir Travers Twiss) adds, with reason, that this proposition is affirmed in too absolute a manner, and he proves conclusively by historical facts that his criticism is just.

Doubtless an individual, _as such_, and a private society, _in that capacity_, are not sovereigns, and exercise no act of sovereignty. This needs no demonstration. But, in virtue of what principle of international law is it sought to be shown that one who is a private citizen to-day cannot become a sovereign to-morrow, and be in possession of the plenitude of sovereignty? Such a principle does not exist. No author of international law has ever sustained it, and all the history of humanity, from the earliest down to modern times, denies it.

_Individuals can become sovereigns, and exercise the rights of sovereigns, in two ways_:

First. By creating themselves into a state—that is to say, by establishing themselves upon a territory which belongs to them, and forming themselves into a community with a regular government, and legal organs of public power—in a word, with all the constituent elements of a state.

Most of the states of antiquity, according to legends and traditions, or positive historical information, have been created in no other way.

The states of the Middle Ages had the same origin. The Franks, the Visigoths, the Ostrogoths, the Burgundians, and others, were only nomadic peoples, composed of chiefs who, in the eyes of international law, were only individuals, but who founded states.

The Italian republics of the Middle Ages were only municipalities without international sovereignty, and they have become sovereign states. Simple individuals, poor fishermen, caused the republic of Venice to rise from the waves of the Adriatic and to become its queen.

Almost all the States of New England, in America, have been founded by individuals.[80]

States, to _exist_, have no need to be recognised by other states. Those who have founded them are the _sovereigns_, and therefore have the right to exercise the rights of sovereignty in so far as this exercise has not been delegated to an authority instituted under the constitution of the state.

And a revolution which has for result the detaching from a state of one of its parts, is it not at the commencement the work of individuals? And those individuals, if they unite themselves in their enterprise, can erect a simple province or provinces into a new and sovereign state, and exercise then sovereign rights.

And if to-day, simple individuals should establish themselves on a desert island, or on territory unoccupied by another state, they can establish a new state, with all the rights of sovereignty. We have seen Texas thus formed.

Second. An individual can become sovereign by succeeding to another sovereign in the exercise of the sovereignty of a state. From a private individual he becomes a sovereign.

The question whether a private individual can accept a sovereignty when the interior laws of his state forbid him is outside of our subject, and we do not treat of it.

Philip, Duke of Anjou, great-grandson of Louis XIV., was, from the point of view of international law, a simple individual. After the death of Charles II., by the treaty of Utrecht the states belonging to the Crown of Spain were dismembered, and Philip V. was recognised as the King of Spain, and acquired part of the states of the Spanish monarchy. Other examples might be cited.

When a prince was elected King of Germany he became a sovereign from a private individual that he was.

Or, again, when a chief of an African tribe, forming a sovereign state, cedes to an individual in full sovereignty a part of his state, does he do other than to call another person to the exercise of rights of sovereignty over one part of his state, erected into a new state? What difference is there between the case of a European prince who is called as sovereign to a state, or part of a state, and that where an African chief calls upon an individual to exercise sovereign powers over part of his state? In the _fact_ undoubtedly there is much difference, but in _law_ there is none; and that is the question. It is a question of law (_droit_) we have to study here.

It is even possible that an individual may remain _a subject of the state_ to which he belongs, and may be the _sovereign of another country_. The sovereign, therefore, can have a double personality. Thus, Ernest Augustus, and George V., Dukes of Cumberland, were subjects of Queen Victoria and peers of England and at the same time Kings of Hanover. In 1787 the sovereign bishop of the principality of Osnabruck, the Duke of York, sat as a peer of England in the House of Lords.[81]

The question which has been laid down at the head of this opinion is a novel one. It has not been foreseen or treated in works of international law. Many authors treat a question which touches upon this one, but which differs from it a good deal. They ask if an individual can make in his own name an act of occupation of a territory newly discovered without a master. They reply negatively to this question, and, in their line of ideas, they are right; for those who discover new territories are almost always navigators, travelling in a public ship, often public officers or individuals commissioned by their governments—agents of the government—and they cannot occupy in their own name.

A recent event furnishes a powerful support to the theory that rights of sovereignty can be ceded to individuals, namely, the treaty between the Sultans of Borneo and Sulu and Mr. Dent and Baron Overbeck, who, in their turn, have ceded their rights to a private British company, the “British North Borneo Company.” This fact has importance in itself, as a new event which enlarges juridical science; but what especially gives strong support to our thesis is the manner in which this event has been appreciated, be it inferentially or explicitly, by several governments, by jurisconsults, and by eminent statesmen whose opinions can be invoked as having authority.

The opinions of jurisconsults and publicists are ranged among the sources of international law.[82]

In the first place, the Governments of Holland and of Spain, who believed themselves most directly affected by the concessions, accorded by the two Sultans of Borneo, did not deny the principle of the capacity of individuals or of associations to have ceded to them rights of sovereignty, but they raised reclamations against these treaties by invoking rights previously acquired.

Let us reproduce here the passage written by M. de Laveleye upon the discussion to which the giving of a charter of incorporation to the British North Borneo Company gave rise in the English Parliament[83]:

“Certain members of the left, adversaries of what is called in England the imperial policy, that is to say of the policy which seeks extension of territory and of influence, criticised the measure because it created a new responsibility for the country; but no one contested the right of individuals or of the company—rights resulting from treaties concluded with indigenous chiefs. In the reply made in the House of Commons by the attorney-general, Sir Henry James, we read:

“‘These rights were conceded to the company and became legally its property. The Government of Her Majesty had no power to enter into a general examination of the propriety of the occupation of Borneo by a commercial company. It would have been an act of confiscation if, after what had happened, the Government had interfered, and had endeavoured to take from it the rights which it had acquired. ... The only thing the Government had to decide was whether or not it was necessary to leave the company to act without impediment and entirely without control.’

“Mr. Gladstone was not less affirmative. Said he, at the same sitting:

“‘The charter has not conferred upon the company a single privilege above and beyond what it had already acquired by virtue of a title sufficient to enable it to exercise all these powers.’

* * * * *

“From the explanations given by Lord Granville in the House of Lords, the 13th March, 1882, it appears that if Holland and Spain have protested against the rights invoked by the Overbeck-Dent Company, it was because of anterior rights which these states pretend to have over the northern part of Borneo; but, no more than Germany, formally consulted in the matter by the British Government, have they raised any doubt as to the capacity of individuals and companies to obtain from non-civilised sovereigns the cession of rights implying the exercise of sovereignty. This capacity also was not denied by the members on the opposition side of the House of Commons.”

Thus, the opinion of four Governments, the opinion of two English ministers, Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone, and of the attorney-general, Sir Henry James, that of Sir Travers Twiss, and of M. de Laveleye, to which we would add the considerations developed in the open letter addressed, the 23d April, 1883, by a member of the African International Association to the _Courrier des États-Unis_, form an assemblage of authorities of a nature to fortify us in our conviction if we had any doubts.

We conclude with these observations:

1. It is evident that if some powers have raised against similar concessions, made by chiefs of savage tribes to individuals and associations, reclamations founded upon rights _previously acquired_, there would be ground to submit these pretensions to serious examination, or perhaps they might be submitted to arbitration, as Great Britain and Portugal, in 1875, submitted to the arbitration of the President of the French Republic, M. MacMahon, the contest in regard to certain lands situated on the bay of Delagoa.

2. _New sovereignties, at the head of which are individuals or associations, the concessionaries of the chiefs of savage tribes, exist of themselves, of their own right and their own strength, without having need of the recognition of other States._ (See Klüber, par. 24; Heffter, par. 23, p. 42, and par. 51, p. 104; Bluntschli, pars. 28 and 38; and all the authors.)

It depends upon the _convenance_ of other States to recognise or not to recognise these new sovereignties. But whatever may be their determination in this respect, the want of recognition does not give them the right to act as if these sovereignties did not exist, and to consider their territories susceptible of _occupation_.