Chapter IX: The Philippine Islands As They Are (2)

The men are of small stature, from 5 feet to 5 feet 6 inches in height, and weigh from 110 to 130 pounds. Compared with them our men from Colorado and California seemed like a race of giants. One afternoon just after we entered Manila a battalion of the insurgents fired upon the outposts of the Colorado regiment, mistaking them, as they claimed, for Spaniards. The outpost retreated to their support, and the Filipinos followed; they easily fell into an ambush and the support, numbering about fifty men, surrounded the 250 Filipinos, wrenched the guns out of their hands and marched them off as unarmed prisoners--all in the space of a few minutes. Such a force can hardly be called an army, and yet the service which it has rendered should not be underestimated. Between 2,000 and 3,000 Spanish native troops surrendered to it during the months of June and July. It constantly annoyed and harrassed the Spaniards in the trenches, keeping them up at night and wearing them out with fatigue; and it invested Manila early in July so completely that all supplies were cut off and the inhabitants as well as the Spanish troops were forced to live on horse and buffalo meat, and the Chinese population on cats and dogs. It captured the water works of Manila and cut off the water supply, and, if it had been in the dry season, would have inflicted great suffering on the inhabitants for lack of water. These results, it is true, were obtained against a dispirited army, containing a considerable number of native troops of doubtful loyalty. Yet, from August, 1896, to April, 1897, they fought 25,000 of the best regular troops sent out from Spain, inflicting on them a loss of over 150 officers and 2,500 men, killed and wounded, and they suffered still greater losses themselves. Nevertheless, from daily contact with them for six weeks, I am very confident that no such results could have been obtained against an American army, which would have driven them back to the hills and reduced them to a petty guerilla warfare. If they attack the American army this will certainly be the result, and, while these guerilla bands might give some trouble so long as their ammunition lasted, yet, with our navy guarding the coasts and our army pursuing them on land, it would not be long before they were reduced to subjection.

Insurgent Civil Administration.

In August, 1896, and insurrection broke out in Cavite, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, and soon spread to other provinces on both sides of Manila. It continued with varying successes on both sides, and the trial and execution of numerous insurgents, until December, 1897, when the Governor-General, Primo de Rivera, entered into written agreement with Aguinaldo, the substance of the document, which is in possession of Senor Felipe Agoncillo, who accompanies me to Washington, being attached hereto and marked "A." In brief, it required that Aguinaldo and the other insurgent leaders should leave the country, the Government agreeing to pay them $800,000 in silver, and promising to introduce numerous reforms, including representation in the Spanish Cortes, freedom of the press, amnesty for all insurgents, and the expulsion of secularization of the monastic orders. Aguinaldo and his associates went to Hongkong and Singapore. A portion of the money, $400,000, was deposited in banks at Hongkong, and a lawsuit soon arose between Aguinaldo and one of his subordinate chiefs, named Artacho, which is interesting on account of the very honorable position taken by Aguinaldo. Artacho sued for a division of the money among the insurgents, according to rank. Aguinaldo claimed that the money was a trust fund and was to remain on deposit until it was seen whether the Spaniards would carry out their promised reforms, and if they failed to do so it was to be used to defray the expenses of a new insurrection. The suit was settled out of court by paying Artacho $5,000.

No steps have been taken to introduce the reforms, more than 2,000 insurgents who had been deported to Fernando Po and other places are still in confinement, and Aguinaldo is now using the money to carry on the operations of the present insurrection.

On the 24th day of April Aguinaldo met the United States Consul and others at Singapore and offered to begin a new insurrection in conjunction with the operations of the United States navy at Manila. This was telegraphed to Admiral Dewey and, by his consent, or, at his request, Aguinaldo left Singapore for Hongkong on April 26th, and, when the McCullough went to Hongkong early in May to carry the news of Admiral Dewey's victory, it took Aguinaldo and seventeen other revolutionary chiefs on board and brought them to Manila Bay. They soon after landed at Cavite, and the Admiral allowed them to take such guns, ammunition and stores as he did not require for himself. With these and some other arms which he had brought from Hongkong Aguinaldo armed his followers, who rapidly assembled at Cavite and, in a few weeks, he began moving against the Spaniards. Part of them surrendered, giving him more arms, and the others retreated to Manila.

Soon afterwards two ships, which were the private property of Senor Agoncillo and other insurgent sympathizers, were converted into cruisers and sent with insurgent troops to Subig Bay and other places, to capture provinces outside of Manila. They were very successful, the native militia in Spanish service capitulating with their arms in nearly every case without serious resistance. On the 18th of June Aguinaldo issued a proclamation from Cavite establishing a Dictatorial Government, with himself as Dictator. In each village or pueblo a Chief (Jefe) was to be elected, and in each ward a Nendrum (Cabeza); also in each pueblo three delegates, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. These were to constitute the Junta, or Assembly, and after consulting the Junta the Chiefs of pueblos were to elect a Chief of Province and three Counsellors, one of Police, one of Justice, and one of Taxes. They were also to elect one or more Representatives from each Province to form the Bevolutionary Congress. This was followed on June 20th by a decree giving more detailed instructions in regard to the elections. On June 23d another decree followed, changing the title of the Government from Dictatorial to Revolutionary, and of the chief officer from Dictator to President; announcing a Cabinet with a Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marine and Commerce, another of War and Public Works, another of Police and Internal Order, Justice, Instruction and Hygiene, and another of Taxes, Agriculture and Manufactures; the powers of the President and Congress were defined, and a code of military justice was formulated. On the same date a manifesto was issued to the world explaining the reasons and purposes of the Revolution. On June 27th another decree was issued containing instructions in regard to elections. On August 6th an address was issued to Foreign Governments, stating that the Revolutionary Government was in operation and control in fifteen Provinces, and that in response to the petition of the duly elected Chiefs of these Provinces an appeal is made for recognition of belligerency and independence. Translations of these various documents are all apended, marked "B," "C," "D," "E," "F," "G" and "H."

The scheme of Government is set forth in the decree of June 23d, marked "D." An examination of this document shows that it provides a Dictatorship of the familiar South American type. All power is centered in the President, and he is not responsible to any one for his acts. He is declared to be "the personification of the Philippine public, and in this view cannot be held responsible while he holds office. His term will last until the Revolution triumphs." He appoints not only the heads of the departments, but all their subordinates, and without reference to Congress. This body is composed of a single Chamber of Representatives from each Province. The election is to be conducted by an agent of the President, and the qualifications of electors are "those inhabitants most distinguished for high character, social position and honorable conduct."

If any Province is still under Spanish rule its Representative is to be appointed by the President. Congress is to deliberate on "all grave and transcendental questions, whose decision admits of delay and adjournment, but the President may decide questions of urgent character, giving the reasons for his decision in a message to Congress." The acts of Congress are not binding until approved by the President, and he has power of absolute veto.

Congress was to hold its first session at Saloles about September 28th.

While this scheme of Government is a pure despotism, yet it claims to be only temporary, and intended to "prepare the country so that a true Republic may be established." It also provides a rude form of governmental machinery for managing the affairs of the Provinces. To what extent it has actually gone into operation it is difficult to say. Aguinaldo claims, in his address of August 6th, that it is in force in fifteen Provinces, whose aggregate population is about 2,000,000. They include the island of Mindoro and about half of Luzon. None of those (except Cavite) have yet been visited by Americans, and all communication with them by the Spanish Government at Manila has been cut off since May 1st.

In the province of Cavite and that portion of the Province of Manila outside of the city and of its suburbs, which was occupied by the insurgent troops as well as those of the United States, their military forces, military headquarters, etc., were very much in evidence, occupying the principal houses and churches in every village and hamlet, but there were no signs of Civil Government or administration. It was reported, however, that Aguinaldo's agents were levying taxes or forced contributions not only in the outside villages, but (after we entered Manila) by means of secret agents, in the market places of the city itself. At Aguinaldo's headquarters, in Bacoor, there were signs of activity and business, and it was reported that his Cabinet officers were in constant session there.

Aguinaldo never himself failed to claim all the prerogatives due to his alleged position as the de facto ruler of the country. The only general officer who saw him or had any direct communication with him was General Anderson. He did much to thwart this officer in organizing a native wagon train and otherwise providing for his troops, and he went so far, in a letter of July 23d (copy herewith marked "J"), as to warn General Anderson not to land American troops on Philippine soil without his consent--a notice which, it is hardly necessary to say, was ignored. The day before the attack on Manila he sent staff officers to the same General, asking for our plans of attack, so that their troops could enter Manila with us. The same request had previously been made to me by one of his Brigade Commanders, to which I replied that I was not authorized to give the information desired.

Aguinaldo did not call upon General Merritt on his arrival, and this enabled the latter to avoid any communication with him, either direct or indirect, until after Manila had been taken. General Merritt then received one of Aguinaldo's staff officers in his office as Military Governor. The interview lasted more than an hour. General Merritt referred to his proclamation as showing the conditions under which the American troops had come to Manila and the nature of the Military Government, which would be maintained until further orders from Washington. He agreed upon the lines outside of the city of Manila, up to which the insurgent troops could come, but no further with arms in their hands. He asked for possession of the water works, which was given, and, while expressing our friendship and sympathy for the Philippine people, he stated very positively that the United States Government had placed at his disposal an ample force for carrying out his instructions, and even if the services of Aguinaldo's forces had been needed as allies he should not have felt at liberty to accept them.

The problem of how to deal with Aguinaldo's Government and troops will necessarily be accompanied with embarrassment and difficulty, and will require much tact and skill in its solution. The United States Government, through its Naval Commander, has, to some extent, made use of them for a distinct military purpose, viz.: to harass and annoy the Spanish troops, to wear them out in the trenches, to blockade Manila on the land side, and to do as much damage as possible to the Spanish Government prior to the arrival of our troops, and for this purpose the Admiral allowed them to take the arms and munitions which he had captured at Cavite, and their ships to pass in and out of Manila Bay in their expeditions against other Provinces. But the Admiral has been very careful to give Aguinaldo no assurances of recognition and no pledges or promises of any description. The services which Aguinaldo and his adherents rendered in preparing the way for attack on Manila are certainly entitled to consideration, but, after all, they were small in comparison with what was done by our fleet and army.

There is no reason to believe that Aguinaldo's Government has any elements of stability. In the first place, Aguinaldo is a young man of twenty-three years. Prior to the insurrection of 1896 he had been a schoolmaster, and afterward Gobernadorcillo and Municipal Captain in one of the pueblos in the Province of Cavite. He is not devoid of ability, and he is surrounded by clever writers. But the educated and intelligent Filipinos of Manila say that not only is he lacking in ability to be at the head of affairs, but if an election for President was held he would not even be a candidate. He is a successful leader of insurgents, has the confidence of young men in the country districts, prides himself on his military ability, and if a Republic could be established the post he would probably choose for himself would be General-in-Chief of the Army.

In the next place, Aguinaldo's Government, or any entirely independent Government, does not command the hearty support of the large body of Filipinos, both in Manila and outside, who have property, education and intelligence. Their hatred of the Spanish rule is very keen and they will co-operate with Aguinaldo or any one else to destroy it. But after that is done they fully realize that they must have the support of some strong nation for many years before they will be in a position to manage their own affairs alone. The nation to which they all turn is America, and their ideal is a Philippine Republic, under American protection--such as they have heard is to be granted to Cuba. But when it comes to defining their ideas of protection and the respective rights and duties of each under it, what portion of the Government is to be administered by them and what portion by us; how the revenues are to be collected, and in what proportion the expenses are to be divided; they have no clear ideas at all; nor is it expected that they should have, after generations of Spanish rule without any experience in self government. The sentiment of this class, the educated native with property at stake, looks upon the prospect of Aguinaldo's Government and forces entering Manila with almost as much dread as the foreign merchants or the Spaniards themselves.

Finally, it must be remembered that this is purely a Tagalo insurrection. There are upwards of thirty races in the Philippines, each speaking a different dialect, but five-sixths of the entire Christian population is composed of the Tagalos and Visayas. The former live in Mindoro and the southern half of Luzon, and the latter in Cebu, Iloilo and other islands in the center of the group. The Tagalos are more numerous than the Visayas, but both races are about equal in civilization, intelligence and wealth. It is claimed by Aguinaldo's partisans that the Visayas are in sympathy with his insurrection and intend to send representatives to the congress. But it is a fact that the Visayas have taken no active part in the present insurrection nor in that of 1896, that the Spanish Government is still in full control at Cebu and Iloilo, and in the Viscayas islands, and that Aguinaldo has as yet made no effort to attack them. The Visayas number nearly 2,000,000, or about as many as the population of all the Tagalo Provinces, which Aguinaldo claims to have captured. There is no evidence to show that they will support his pretensions, and many reasons to believe that on account of racial prejudices and jealousies and other causes they will oppose him.

Upon one point all are agreed, except possibly Aguinaldo and his immediate adherents, and that is that no native government can maintain itself without the active support and protection of a strong foreign government. This being admitted it is difficult to see how any foreign government can give this protection without taking such an active part in the management of affairs as is practically equivalent to governing in its own name and for its own account.

United States Troops and Navy.

I assume that the reports received at the War and Navy Departments give all the desired information in regard to the military forces of the United States.

At the time I left (August 30th) the Eighth Corps consisted of two divisions, numbering in all about 12,000 men, with 16 field guns and 6 mountain guns. No wagons or animals had then arrived.

One regiment was stationed within the walled city guarding its gates, and the captured guns and ammunition; a small force was at Cavite, and the bulk of the troops were in Manila, outside of the walled city. They were quartered in the Spanish barracks, which were all in good condition, and in convents and private houses. The health of the troops was excellent, notwithstanding the extraordinary hardships to which they had been subjected in the trenches before entering Manila.

Admiral Dewey had under his command the Charleston, Monterey and Monadnock, which arrived in July and August, the Callao and Leyte, which had been captured from the Spaniards, and the ships which were in the battle of May 1st, viz: Olympia, Boston, Baltimore, Raleigh, Concord, Petrel and McCullough. The health of the squadron was excellent. The Olympia and Concord were being docked and cleaned at Hongkong. Permission to use the docks at Nagansaki during the suspension of hostilities had been declined.

United States Civil Administration.

We entered Manila on the afternoon of August 13th. On the 14th the capitulation was signed, and the same day General Merritt issued his proclamation establishing a Military Government. On the 15th General McArthur was appointed Military Commander of the walled city and Provost Marshal General of the City of Manila and its suburbs, and on the 17th I was appointed to take charge of the duties performed by the intendente General de Hacienda, or Minister of Finance, and all fiscal affairs. Representatives of the Postoffice Department had arrived on the Steamship China in July and they immediately took charge of the Manila Post-office, which was opened for business on the 16th. The Custom House was opened on the 18th, with Lieutenant-Colonel Whittier as Collector, and the Internal Revenue office, with Major Bement as Collector on the 22nd. Captain Glass of the Navy was appointed Captain of the Port, or Naval Officer, and took charge of the office on August 19th. The collections of customs during the first ten days exceeded $100,000. The collection of internal revenue was small owing to the difficulty and delay in ascertaining what persons had or had not paid their taxes for the current year. The administration of Water Works was put in charge of Lieutenant Connor, of the Engineers, on August 25th, the Provost Court with Lieutenant-Colonel Jewett, Judge Advocate United States Volunteers, sitting as Judge, was appointed and held its first session on August 23rd.

The Provost Marshal General has charge of the Police, Fire, Health and Street Cleaning Departments, and the issuing of licenses. The Guardia Civil, or Gendarmerie of the City, proving indifferent and inefficient, they were disarmed and disbanded; the 13th Minnesota regiment was detailed for police duty, and one or more companies stationed in each Police Station, from which patrolmen were sent out on the streets to take the place of the sentries who had constantly patrolled them from the hour of entering the city.

The shops were all closed when we entered on Saturday afternoon, the 13th; on Monday some of them opened, and by Wednesday the Banks had resumed business, the newspapers were published, and the merchants were ready to declare goods at the Custom House, the tram cars were running and the retail shops were all open and doing a large business. There was no disorder or pillage of any kind in the city. The conduct of the troops was simply admirable, and left no ground for criticism. It was noted and commented upon by the foreign naval officers in the most favorable terms, and it so surprised the Spanish soldiers that a considerable number of them applied for permission to enlist in our service.

At the time I left General McArthur fully established his office as Provost Marshal General, and was organizing one by one the various bureaus connected with it, all with United States military officers in charge; the Provost Court was in daily session, sentencing gamblers and persons guilty of petty disturbances, and a military commission had just been ordered to try a Chinaman accused of burglary.

In various public offices I collected the following Spanish funds:

At the General Treasury $795,517.71
At the Mint 62,856.08
At the Internal Revenue Office 24,077.60
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$882,451.39

Of this amount there was in

Gold Coin $ 4,200.00
Gold Bars 3,806.08
Silver Coin 190,634.81
Copper Coin 297,300.00
Spanish Bank Notes 216,305.00
Accepted Checks 170,205.50
-----------
$882,451.39

The money was counted by a board of officers and turned over to Major C. H. Whipple, Paymaster U. S. A as custodian of Spanish Public Funds. A few thousand dollars in other public offices were still to be collected.

The money received at the Custom House and other offices is turned in daily, at the close of business, to Major Whipple. Money for current expenses is furnished to heads of departments on their requisition, by warrant drawn by the Intendente General on the Custodian of Spanish Public Funds. The heads of the departments are to submit their vouchers and accounts monthly to an auditing department, which was being organized when I left.

All these public offices and funds were surrendered to me only on threat of using force and on granting permission to file a formal written protest. None of these had been received at the time I left, but the ground of verbal protest was that the officials recognized no authority in these islands but the Governor General appointed by the King of Spain, and without his order they were unwilling to surrender them. On the other hand, I recognized no authority of the Spanish Governor General who was merely a prisoner of war; I acted under the orders of General Merritt as the United States Military Governor, and in accordance with the terms of capitulation. The claim will probably be made by the Spanish officials that as we captured Manila a few hours after the peace protocol had been signed at Washington, this property still belongs to the Spaniards. But I believe that the law in such cases was clearly defined in decisions made by the United States Supreme Court in 1815. We captured Manila, and the capitulation (under which these funds became United States property) was signed by both parties, before either had received any notice of the protocol of suspension of hostilities.

On the opening of the Custom House several important questions arose for immediate decision. The first was in regard to Mexican dollars. The importation of these has for several years been prohibited, with a view of forcing the Spanish coinage (which contains less silver) into circulation. The large English banks represented that there was a scarcity of currency, owing to the amount which had been hoarded and sent away during the seige, and they agreed in consideration of being allowed to import Mexican dollars free of duty, to guarantee the notes and accepted checks of the Spanish bank, which should be received by us in payment of customs up to $200,000 at any one time. The Spanish bank was in difficulty, owing to the enormous amount which the Government had taken from it under the form of a forced loan, and any discrimination on our part against it would result in its failure, entailing widespread financial disturbance. As there seemed no reason against allowing the importation of Mexican dollars and many in favor of it, I recommended that the Custom House continue to receive the notes and checks of this bank in payment of customs (for which we were amply protected by the guarantee of the strong English banks) and with General Merrill's approval wrote to these banks authorizing them to import Mexican dollars free of duty until further notice.

The next question was in regard to the rate of duties on imports and exports. After a careful consideration of the matter, I recommended that the tariff be not changed until the question had been fully studied and ample notice given. General Merritt approved this and the customs are being collected on the Spanish tariff.

About a week after the Custom House was opened certain parties came to me representing that Consul General Wildman, of Hongkong, had informed them that United States goods would be admitted free of duty in Manila, that acting on this they had purchased a cargo of American illuminating oil in Hongkong, and that the payment of the heavy duty on it ($30 per ton, or about 8c per gallon) would ruin them. On consulting Lieutenant Colonel Crowder, Judge Advocate of the Eighth Army Corps, he pointed out the language of paragraph 5 of General Merritt's proclamation, which followed literally the instructions of the President, viz: "The Port of Manila will be open while our military occupation may continue, to the commerce of all neutral nations as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, and upon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of the importation."

Under this there was clearly no authority for discriminating in favor of American goods, either coming direct from a United States Port or by transshipment at Hongkong.

The Collector of Customs was directed to act accordingly.

Another question was in regard to the importation of Chinamen into Manila. The Consul at Hongkong telegraphed to know if they would be admitted. As there had been no time for examining the treaties and laws in force on this subject, I replied with General Merritt's approval that for the present it was not practicable to admit Chinese laborers into Manila.

Another very important question which arose was in regard to trade with the other Philippine islands. Nearly all the hemp and the greater part of the sugar is grown in the Visayas. The hemp is bought by foreign merchants in Manila, who bring it there from the other islands, and export it, paying large duties to the Manila Custom House. These merchants were anxious to bring up their stock, of which a large amount had accumulated during the war, and ship it abroad. The ships engaged in this island trade were idle in the Pasig. They belonged to a Spanish corporation, owned entirely by Scotch capital, and had a Spanish Register. The owners were ready to transfer them to the American flag. Could these vessels be allowed to clear for the ports of Cebu and Iloilo, which were in Spanish possession? The Judge Advocate advised me that they could not, without the express authority of the President. I so notified the owners of the ships and the hemp merchants. The day before I left Manila, however, Admiral Dewey received a cable from the Navy Department stating that Spanish ships had been granted the privilege of trading to American ports during the suspension of hostilities, and that American ships could be granted a similar privilege for Spanish ports. I understood that on the strength of this cable General Otis intended to allow the United States Consul at Manila to grant these vessels an American Register and then allow them to clear for the other islands. I do not know what the arrangement, if any was made, in regard to the payment of export duties at Iloilo. Clearly the hemp cannot pay export duties at both Iloilo and Manila, and the Spaniards are not likely to allow it to leave Iloilo free while we collect an export duty on it at Manila. Incidentally, this illustrates the complications and loss that will arise if the islands are subdivided. The principal merchants for all the islands are at Manila, and 90 per cent, of the duties in imports and exports are collected at its Custom House. A large part of the imports are redistributed through the islands; and all the hemp and sugar, which form the principal exports, come to Manila from other islands. If, then, we retain Luzon and give the other islands back to Spain or some other nation, that nation will impose import and export duties on everything coming from or to Manila. The foreign trade of that city as a distributing and collecting point for all the islands will be lost, and its prosperity will be destroyed; moreover, the Government revenue from that trade will be lost.

In view of the fact that Spanish officials declined to co-operate or assist in any way in the American government of Manila, the ease and rapidity with which order was maintained, the machinery of government put in operation and business reestablished, after our entry into Manila is very remarkable. For every position in the Government service, legal, administrative, financial, mechanical, clerical, men could be found in our volunteer ranks who were experienced in just that class of work at home, and they took charge of their Spanish positions with promptness and confidence.

Even in the matter of language no serious difficulty was encountered, for no less than 30 good interpreters were found in the California and Colorado regiments.

The Military Government as now organized and administered, fulfills all the requirements of preserving order and collecting the public revenue.

The civil courts, however, have yet to be organized, and their organization will present many difficulties.