Chapter XV: Events of the Spanish-American War (2)

"General Toral knew just as well as I did that I knew just what he had--that he was on his last rations, and that nothing but plain rice, that we had his retreat cut off, that we had the town surrounded, that he could not hurt us, while we could bombard him and do some little damage, perhaps, and that it was only a question of a few days.

"I found out a few days later what the hitch was which caused the delay, for General Toral had told me that he had been authorized by Blanco, the Governor-General, to enter into negotiations and make terms for surrender, and in Cuba you know General Blanco was in supreme command. His authority was such that he could even set aside a law of Spain. Knowing that, I felt sure that after very little delay they would surrender. They desired to get permission from the Madrid government to return to Spain. It was that that delayed them. Immediately upon receiving the permission to return to Spain they surrendered.

"I had in line when the fighting was going on, about 13,000 men--not more than that at any time. Inside the Spanish trenches there were about 10,000. There were 11,500 surrendered, and I think about 1,500 of them were sick. The disproportion, considering the difference of situation, is not very great. In fact, I think that 10,000 American soldiers could have kept 100,000 Spaniards out had they been in the same position (applause), although I do not wish to disparage the bravery of the Spanish troops. They are gallant fellows, but they have not the intelligence and do not take the initiative as do the American soldiers; and they have not the bull-dog pluck that hangs on day after day.

"Toral made the first proposition to surrender. He said if I would let him take his men and such things as they could carry on their persons and on a few pack mules that they had and guarantee him safe conduct to Holguin, which was fifty-two miles away to the north and in the interior, they would march out. I told him, of course, that was out of the question; that I could not accept any such terms as that, but I would submit it to the President. I did so, and was very promptly informed that only unconditional surrender would be received, but I was at liberty to say to General Toral that if they would surrender they would be carried, at the expense of the United States government, back to Spain. When that proposition was made to him I could see his face lighten up and the faces of his staff, who were there. They were simply delighted. Those men love their country intensely, they had been brought to Cuba against their will, and had stayed there three years, poorly clad, not paid at all, and not well fed, and the prospect of going back to their homes had as much to do with conforming their views to our wishes as anything that was done during the campaign.

"Meanwhile ten or twelve days had elapsed and I had received quite a number of volunteer regiments--two from Michigan, the First District of Columbia, a Massachusetts regiment, and an Ohio regiment, the Eighth Ohio--all splendid troops and well equipped, and while they were not there at the hardest of the fighting they were there during the suffering, and everything that soldiers were called upon to do they did like men.

"It is a great deal harder to stand up day after day and see companions go from sickness and disease than it is to face the perils of battle.

"When I told General Toral that we would carry his men back he said: 'Does that include my entire command?' I said: 'What is your command and where are they?' He replied the Fourth Army Corps; 11,500 men in the city, 3,000 twenty miles in the rear of us; 7,500 he said were up the coast less than sixty miles, and about 1,500 125 to 150 miles off on the northeastern coast.

"There were 3,440 odd, and at a place less than sixty miles east there were 7,500 and a few over, because we counted them and took their arms. The result of that surrender was as unexpected to us as probably it was to every person in the United States. There was simply a little army there, which had gone down to assist the navy in getting the Spanish fleet out and capturing that town, and we expected no other result from it than victory at the spot at the utmost, but in attacking the limb we got the whole body. It was expected that, beginning about the first of October, the objective point of the campaign was to be Havana, where we knew there were from 125,000 to 150,000 men, and it was expected that about the first of October a large army would be sent over there, and the battle that would decide the war would be fought in the vicinity of Havana. I think that was the universal feeling. The loss of that city and of those 24,000 men--23,376, to be accurate--so dispirited them that within a week the proposition of Spain to close the war was made, and, happily, the war was ended.

"The difficulties of that campaign were not in the fighting. That was the easiest part of it. The difficulties were in getting food and medicine to the front. There was but a single road, a muddy and terrible road, and with five or six wagons going over it the sixth wagon would be on the axle tree, and in taking up some artillery I had fourteen horses on one battery that was usually drawn by four, and even with that number it went out of sight, and we had to leave it and dig it out after the water had subsided."

Admiral Sampson's report, dated August 3d, was published October 23d, and covers the conduct of the fleet under his command, in its operations in the West Indies, for about two months prior to the destruction of Admiral Cervera's ships on July 3. It was made up largely of official dispatches and the movements of the fleet, with explanations and comment by the Admiral, and begins with a statement of the determination reached by the Navy department to send a squadron to the Windward Passage for the purpose of observation, because of the information received of the sailing, on April 29, of Admiral Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verde Islands.

On the voyage eastward from the naval base at Key West, which began on May 4, Admiral Sampson reports there was experienced endless trouble and delay because of the inefficiency of the two monitors accompanying the other ships, and which had to be taken in tow. Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident that they must either frequently coal or be towed. The Admiral says:

"Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere. Subsequently, when engaging the batteries of San Juan, it was evident that their shooting was bad.

"Owing to the quick rolling of these vessels, even in a moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any degree of accuracy."

Among the telegrams received by the Admiral from the department at Washington when off Cape Haytien was the following:

Washington, D.C., May 6.--Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V., Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side. _Long_.

It was determined to go to Porto Rico, and the squadron arrived off San Juan on the morning of the 12th and the bombardment of that place ensued. Regarding his action at this place the Admiral says:

"It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative.

"I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana."

Several telegrams are here presented, based on reports that Cervera's squadron had returned to Cadiz and they had in view "to return and capture San Juan, the desire to do so and occupy the place being assured in the event of Admiral Cervera's failure to cross the Atlantic."

Shortly after news was received that the Spanish fleet had appeared off Curacao, West Indies, and the squadron under orders from the department proceeded to Key West, to which place the flying squadron under Commodore (now Admiral) Schley had already been ordered.

Arrangements were then hurriedly made and the flying squadron, augmented by the other vessels under Commodore Schley, was sent off Cienfuegos, where it was believed the enemy would go, in which case an effort was to be made to engage and capture him. Sampson was given the choice either of the command of the blockading squadron off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron.

From messages received by the Admiral from the department about May 20 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos.

On May 21 instructions were written by Samnson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead regarding the possibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago. They are in part as follows:

United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Key West, Fla., May 21.--Sir: Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago de Cuba--four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants--fishermen or others--to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.

The Admiral said he felt much concerned as to the delivery of these orders and sent a duplicate by the Hawk with an additional memorandum. The Admiral suggested that if the information did not reach Commodore Schley before daylight of May 23 to mask the real direction he should take as much as possible. He adds: "Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take."

The Admiral off Havana gives copies of orders of battle which were to be followed in the event that Cervera left Santiago on the approach of Schley's fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise around the coast to Havana, in which case the Havana squadron would attempt to intercept him by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santiren and Nicholas Channels. Strict orders were given for screening lights and to see that none were accidentally shown.

The squadron was to cruise generally to the eastward in the day and westward during the night.

On May 23, as shown by the report, Commodore Schley expressed the belief that the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 27th the Admiral sent word to Schley, directing him to proceed with all possible speed to Santiago because of information received that the Spaniards were there. The same time orders were sent to have the collier Sterling dispatched to Santiago with an expression of opinion that the Commodore should use it to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into the harbor.

The details of the plan were left to the Commodore's judgment, as he (Sampson) had "the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wished him good luck."

Sampson apparently felt certain of the presence of the Spaniards at Santiago and urged that the harbor must be blockaded at all hazards. Schley in the meantime had proceeded to Santiago, although it appears not the same day Admiral Sampson expected.

At one time Commodore Schley contemplated going to Key West with the squadron for coal, but this was abandoned, his collier having been temporarily repaired, and the necessity for a trip to Key West being avoided Santiago was then blockaded.

Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago June 1st. June 8 the Admiral urged upon the department, as he had previously done, to expedite the arrival of the troops for Santiago, the difficulty of blockading the Spanish ships daily increasing.

In a memorandum dated June 15, the Admiral says:

"The Commander-in-Chief desires again to call the attention of the commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance of the entrance to Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be exceeded.

"If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in its movements it must nevertheless keep within this distance. If at any time the flagship makes signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flagship or retreating vessel to a point where it can read the signal.

"Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with little opposition.

"The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order."

In the order of battle incidental to the landing of Shafter's army corps June 22, when ships were sent to shell the beach and cover the landing of the men" the following occurs:

"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon."

The Admiral says trouble was experienced in the landing of Shafter's army on account of the wandering proclivities of some of the transports. The progress of the disembarkation was rendered somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, the heaviest during the three weeks the fleet had been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica.

According to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated June 26, the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success. He would not do this, he says, were the present force to be kept there; as it then insured a capture, which he believed would terminate the war.

There was contemplated at this time sending a fleet to the Spanish coast; and this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie, and they were to go to the Azores for orders, en route to Tangier, Morocco. The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.

On June 30 the Admiral received a communication from Major-General Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning, and asking that he (Sampson) bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry, and make such demonstrations as he thought proper at the harbor's mouth, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.

This request was complied with, and on July 1 General Shafter asked that the Admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front. On July 2 the following was received from General Shafter.

"Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer."

A reply was telephoned General Shafter from Admiral Sampson, through Lieutenant Stanton, which said the Admiral had bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire, and asked whether he (Shafter) wanted further firing on the Admiral's part. The explanation was made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared of mines--a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by the troops. To this General Shafter replied:

"It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and at great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay."

On the 2nd of July, Sampson wrote to Shafter.

"An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of attempting to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.

"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.

"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.

"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.

"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.

"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port."

The Admiral says he began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place.

He adds: "I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault an either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet."

The Admiral says of the sortie and destruction of Cervera's fleet:

"This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost exactly two months."

The error of Commodore Schley as to the location of Cervera's fleet, his hesitation in accepting the report of the Spaniards' presence at Santiago, appears to have caused the advancement of Admiral Sampson and subordinated Schley. Out of this came differences of opinion about facts among the close friends of the two distinguished officers. Schley was close at hand when Cervera's run from Santiago took place, while Sampson was out of the way on other duty, and Schley has been charged with an evasive movement of the New York just then that lost valuable time. It is related by the Washington staff correspondent of the Chicago Times-Herald that just after the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley went aboard the Iowa and hailed Captain Evans with the remark that it had been a great day for the American navy.

"But why didn't you obey orders and close in on the mouth of the harbor instead of heading out to sea?" inquired Evans.

Commodore Schley's reply was that he was afraid the Vizcaya would ram the Brooklyn. This colloquy referred to a striking maneuver of the flagship Brooklyn early in the engagement at Santiago, which has been commented on before. In justice to Commodore Schley the navy department officers admit the Spanish officers after the battle said that it had been their purpose, on emerging from the harbor, to have the Vizcaya ram the Brooklyn, believing that the Spanish cruisers could outrun the remaining vessels in the American fleet, most of which were battleships, supposed to be of a lower rate of speed than the Spanish cruisers.

The action of the Vizcaya as she headed toward the Brooklyn indicated her determination to carry out this programme. But the remark of Captain Evans to the nominal commander of the squadron would under ordinary circumstances have been an act of insubordination and only illustrates the feeling of some of the captains of the fleet toward the Commodore.

It has been said that Schley, being ordered to Key West when Cervera appeared in Cuban waters, "proceeded to Cienfuegos, which was thought to be the destination of the Spanish warships. That port commanded the only direct railroad connection with Havana, and had the Spanish fleet gone there Admiral Cervera could have relieved General Blanco with money and munitions of war and received in return supplies necessary for his squadron. It is believed even now that had the Spanish ships been properly supplied and equipped they would have gone to Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago. But subsequent developments have shown that Admiral Cervera was permitted to take only enough coal to carry him to the nearest port, Santiago."

Schley credited Cervera with knowing enough to know that Cienfuegos was the better port for his purposes, and therefore adhered to his opinion, and Sampson was made his superior officer. So important have the differences seemed that the Wainwright Board was convened to investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley. But in official phrase this board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and courses of the ships engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.

The report is:

"U.S.F.S. New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8, 1898.--Sir: In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven different times.

"These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows:

"No. 1, 9:35 a.m.--Maria Teresa came out of the harbor.

"No. 2, 9:50 a.m.--Pluton came out.

"No. 3, 10:15 a.m.--Maria Teresa turned to run ashore.

"No. 4, 10:20 a.m.--Oquendo turned to run ashore.

"No. 5, 10:30 a.m.--Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore.

"No. 6, 11:05 a.m.--Vizcaya turned to run ashore.

"No. 7, 1:15 p.m.--Colon surrendered.

"The chart selected by the board for plotting is H.O. chart No. 716, 1885, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama Islands, with part of Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection was made after a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the positions of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances between them on it agree more nearly with the observation of members of the board than those given by any other.

"The positions of the United States ships were established by known bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception of the New York, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of its engines during a run of forty-five minutes cast from its position, southeast half south of the Morro, 6,000 yards. Position at No. 2 is plotted by all ships according to their relative bearings from each other, the operations of their engines from 9:35 to 9:50, the evidence of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in firing at the Spanish ships. Position No. 3 is plotted from observations of the officers of the United States ships, with regard to their nearness to each other, and relative bearings of themselves from Teresa, with ranges in use at the time, the performance of the engines, and general heading of the ships. Position No. 4 same as No. 3, substituting Oquendo for Teresa. Position Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are plotted on the same general plan.

"Before plotting these positions the board took each ship separately and discussed the data for the position under consideration--this data being obtained from the report of the commanding officers, notes taken during the action, and the evidence of the members of the board. In reconciling differences of opinion in regard to distances, bearings, ranges, etc., full liberty was given to the representative of the ships under discussion to bring in any argument or data he considered necessary, and the board submits this report with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement. Very respectfully,

"_Richard Wainwright_, "Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Senior Member. "_S.P. Comly_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "_L.C. Heilner_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "_W.H. Schuetze_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "_A.C. Hodgson_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "_W.H. Allen_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "_Edward E. Capehart_, "Lieutenant, U.S.N.

"To the Commander-in-Chief."

Measurements upon the chart showing the positions of the vessels at the specified times named in the report will give as fair an idea of the work of the board as can be made without the chart itself.

"Position No. 1, 9:35 a.m. When the Maria Teresa came out of the harbor the New York was nine miles east of Morro, accompanied by the Hist and Ericsson. The Brooklyn was three miles southwest of Morro, being two and two-tenths miles from the shore west of the mouth of the harbor. The Texas was eight-tenths of a mile east of the Brooklyn; the Iowa one and eight-tenths miles east and south of the Brooklyn, and the Oregon a half mile east of the Iowa, the Iowa being three miles directly south of Morro. The Indiana was two and two-tenths miles southwest of Morro and the Gloucester one mile almost directly north of the Indiana, a mile and four-tenths from Morro.

"Position No. 2, 9:50 a.m. When the Pluton came out all the Spanish vessels had come out of the harbor and their positions were: Maria Teresa two and a half miles southwest of Morro, the Vizcaya, Colon and Oquendo, in the order named, behind the Teresa and from four-tenths to half a mile apart. The position of the American vessels were: The New York had moved up two and one-tenth miles westward. The Brooklyn had started north, swerved to the northeast and toward the mouth of the harbor, and was turning east on the swing it made to the right and around to the westward course; it was eight-tenths of a mile from the Vizcaya. At position No. 2 the Texas first went east a half mile, swinging toward the harbor, then turning to the left it is at No. 2 a half mile directly north of the first position. The Iowa moved by a varying course northwest and was a mile and four-tenths from the Vizcaya, the Oregon being two-tenths of a mile behind the Iowa, the Indiana three-tenths behind the Iowa. The Gloucester's first start was half a mile directly away from the harbor, but swinging to the right, had advanced toward the Spanish ships, being one and seven-tenths miles from the nearest, the Oquendo.

"Position No. 3, 10:15 a.m. Maria Teresa turned to run ashore. It was five and one-half miles from Morro. The Vizcaya was two and three-tenths miles westward from the Teresa, the Oquendo one and two-tenths miles, and the Colon one and four-tenths miles in advance of the Teresa. The American vessels were as follows: The New York had come within three miles of Morro, being southeast of that point. The Brooklyn had made its swing to the westward, crossing its track, and was two and one-half miles south and west of the Teresa, and one and three-tenths miles directly south of the Colon, and one and one-tenth miles and a little behind the Vizcaya, one and three-tenths miles and a little in advance of the Oquendo. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles from the Teresa, a little behind it, and one and four-tenths miles from and behind the next Spanish ship, the Oquendo. The Iowa was one and one-tenth miles from the Teresa and a little closer in, but not quite as far west as the Texas. The Oregon had pulled up and passed the Texas and Iowa, being a little further in shore than the Texas and a little further out than the Iowa. It was in advance of the Teresa, being one and seven-tenths miles from that vessel, six-tenths of a mile from and directly in the line of the Oquendo, seven-tenths of a mile from the Colon, and one and two-tenths miles behind the Vizcaya. The Indiana was two miles from the Texas and two and six-tenths miles from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish vessel. The Gloucester had moved up six-tenths of a mile and was just a mile directly south of Morro.

"Position No. 4, 10:20 a. m. Oquendo turned to run ashore. Only five minutes elapsed from position No. 3. All vessels had been running westward without material changes in their positions. The Colon had run one and three-tenths miles, the Vizcaya about one-tenth of a mile less, and swerved to the left, bringing it to within one and one-tenth miles of the Brooklyn. The Iowa was the same distance, but almost directly astern, and the Oregon was one and three-tenths miles from the Vizcaya, but farther out to sea. The Iowa was eight-tenths of a mile from the Oquendo, the Oregon nine-tenths of a mile from the same vessel, and both somewhat in advance of the doomed Spanish ship. The Indiana had advanced eight-tenths of a mile and was two and six-tenths miles away from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish ship. The New York had advanced nearly a mile, but was not yet abreast of Morro. The Gloucester had run over two miles and was now well west of Morro, but five miles east of the Oquendo.

"Position No. 5, 10:30 a. m. Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore. This is ten minutes later than position No. 4. The Gloucester had run a little more than two miles, and was four-tenths of a mile from the Furor and but little further from the Pluton. The New York had run two and two-tenths miles, and was three and three-tenths miles from the Furor, the nearest Spanish ship, and two and two-tenths miles south and a little west of Morro. The Colon had run two and nine-tenths miles, and the Vizcaya two and seven-tenths miles. The Brooklyn had run two and three-tenths miles, and was one and two-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and one and six-tenths miles from the Colon, which was running nearer the shore. The Oregon had sailed two and a half miles, and was one and one-half miles from the Vizcaya, and about the same distance from the Colon. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles astern of the Oregon, two and four-tenths miles from the Oregon. The Indiana was one and one-half miles astern of the Texas.

"Position No. 6, 11:05 a.m. Vizcaya turned to run ashore. In thirty-five minutes the Vizcaya had sailed about seven miles, and was off the mouth of the Aserradero River. The Colon had run five and one-half miles further, and was more than that distance in advance of any of the American vessels. The Brooklyn was one and three-tenths miles distant from the Vizcaya and slightly behind it. The Oregon was one and a half miles from the Vizcaya, but nearer the shore and somewhat more astern of the enemy. The Texas was two and seven-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and directly astern of the Oregon. The Iowa was three and two-tenths miles directly astern of the Vizcaya. The New York was five miles behind the Iowa. The Ericsson had kept along with the New York all the time, and was, at this position, one-half a mile in advance of it. The Indiana was nearly four miles behind the Iowa.

"Position No. 7, 1:15 p.m. The Colon surrendered. In the two hours and ten minutes from the last position given the vessels had coursed westward a great distance. The Colon had run twenty-six and one-half miles and was off the Tarquino River. The Brooklyn was the nearest American vessel. It had sailed twenty-eight and one-half miles and was three and four-tenths miles from the Colon. The Oregon was four and one-half miles from the Colon and more in shore than the Brooklyn. The Texas was three and four-tenths miles behind the Oregon. The New York was nine and one-half miles from the Colon. No one of the other vessels had come up save the Vixen, which was abreast of the New York. This little vessel in the beginning of the fight steamed out to sea and sailed westward on a course about two and one-quarter miles from that of the nearest Spanish ships.

"The tracings of the chart show that the Spanish vessels sailed on courses not more than three-tenths of a mile apart until the Oquendo ran ashore. Then the Vizcaya veered out to sea and the Colon kept nearer the shore, their courses being about seven-tenths of a mile apart. Up to the time the Oquendo went ashore the Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas sailed on courses within three-tenths of a mile of each other, the Iowa being the nearest and the Texas the farthest from the course of the Spanish ships. The Brooklyn's course was from three-tenths to one-half of a mile outside that of the Texas. The swing to the right which the Brooklyn made at the beginning of the engagement shows an oval four-tenths of a mile across. It crossed the courses of the Texas, Oregon, and Indiana twice while making the turn, but before these vessels had gone over them. The course of the New York after passing Morro was nearer the shore than any other United States vessel except the Gloucester, and a mile behind where the Oquendo turned to run ashore it passed inside the courses of the Spanish vessels. Ten miles west of the Vizcaya disaster it crossed the Colon's track, but followed close the course of that vessel until the latter surrendered.

"The Iowa, Indiana, and Ericsson did not go further west than where the Vizcaya ran ashore. The Gloucester stopped by the Maria Teresa and Oquendo, as also did the Hist. The latter vessel was not able to keep pace with the New York and Ericsson, the vessels it was with at the beginning of the battle."

Major General Nelson A. Miles was carrying on, as master of the art and science of war, a prospering campaign in Porto Rico, when the protocol of peace between the United States and Spain was signed, and "the war drum throbbed" no longer. It is the testimony of those who have studied the management of the invasion of Porto Rico by the military head of the army, that it was going on guided with consummate skill when the war closed. The American forces had the pleasure in Porto Rico of moving in a country that had not been desolated as Cuba was. The island was a tropical picture of peace, only the glitter of armies breaking the spell. The defenders had the help of good roads, by which they could, on the inner lines, shift their columns with rapidity and ease. But the Porto Rico people were largely favorable to United States sovereignty--just as the Cubans would be if it were not for the selfishness and jealousies, hatreds and scheming, regardless of the favor or prosperity of the people, that the most deplorable warfare known in the later years of the earth has engendered. It was on October 18, 1898, that the American flag was raised over San Juan de Porto Rico. The telegram of the Associated Press contained this announcement of the ceremony and symbol by which was announced the glorious initial chapter of a new dispensation that adds to America's territory one of the loveliest islands of the sea:

San Juan de Porto Rico, Oct. 18.--Promptly at noon to-day the American flag was raised over San Juan. The ceremony was quiet and dignified, unmarred by disorder of any kind.

The Eleventh Regular Infantry, with two batteries of the Fifth Artillery, landed this morning. The latter proceeded to the forts, while the infantry lined up on the docks. It was a holiday for San Juan, and there were many people in the streets.

Rear Admiral Schley and General Gordon, accompanied by their staffs, proceeded to the palace in carriages. The Eleventh infantry Regiment and band, with Troop H of the Sixth United States Cavalry, then marched through the streets and formed in the square opposite the palace.

At 11:40 a. m. General Brooke, Admiral Schley, and General Gordon, the United States Evacuation Commissioners, came out of the palace, with many naval officers, and formed on the right side of the square. The streets behind the soldiers were thronged with townspeople, who stood waiting in dead silence.

At last the city clock struck the hour of 12 and the crowds, almost breathless and with eyes fixed upon the flagpole, watched for developments. At the sound of the first gun from Fort Morro, Major Dean and Lieutenant Castle, of General Brooke's staff, hoisted the Stars and Stripes, while the band played the "Star Spangled Banner."

All heads were bared and the crowds cheered. Fort Morro, Fort San Cristobal, and the United States revenue cutter Manning, lying in the harbor, fired twenty-one guns each.

Senor Munoz Rivera, who was President of the recent autonomist council of secretaries, and other officials of the late insular government, were present at the proceedings.

Congratulations and handshaking among the American officers followed, Ensign King hoisted the Stars and Stripes over the intendencia, but all other flags on the various public buildings were hoisted by military officers. Simultaneously with the raising of the flag over the Captain General's palace many others were hoisted in different parts of the city.

Washington, D. C., Oct. 18.--The War Department has received the following to-day:

"San Juan, Porto Rico, Oct. 18.--Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.: Flags have been raised on public buildings and forts in this city and saluted with national salutes. The occupation of the island is now complete.

"_Brooke_, Chairman."

The two Spanish fleets--of the East and West Indies, were annihilated, the former May 1st, and the latter July 2nd, two months and two days between the events. The respective fleets in Manila bay were as follows:

_American Fleet_.

Name Class Armanent Men and Officers Olympia Protected Cruiser Four 8-in., ten 5-in., 24 R.F. 466 Baltimore Protected Cruiser Four 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R.F. 395 Boston Par. Ptd. Cruiser Two 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R.F. 272 Raleigh Protected Cruiser One 6-in., ten 5-in., 14 R.F. 295 Concord Gunboat Six 6-in., 9 R.F. 150 Petrel Gunboat Four 6-in., 7 R.F. 100 McCulloch Revenue Cutter Four 4-in 180

_Spanish Fleet_.

Name. Class. Armament. Men and Officers *Rema Cristina Steel Cruiser Six 6.2-in., two 2.7, 13 R.F. 370 Castilla Wood Cruiser Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4, two 2.9, 12 R.F. 300 Don Antonio de Ulloa Iron Cruiser Four 4.7, 5 R.F. 173 Don Juan de Austria Iron Cruiser Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 R.F. 173 Isla de Luzon Steel Ptd. Cruiser Six 4.7, 8 R.F 164 Isla de Cuba Steel Ptd. Cruiser Six 4.7, 8 R.F 164 Velasco Iron Cruiser Three 6-in., two 2.7, two R.F. 173 Marques del Duero Gunboat One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R.F. 98 General Lezo Gunboat One 3.5, 1 R.F. 97 El Correo Gunboat Three 4.7, 4 R.F. 116 Quiros Gunboat 4 R.F. 60 Villalobos Gunboat 4 R.F. 60 Two torpedo boats and two transports.

The American squadron was thus officered:

Acting Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander-in-Chief.

Commander B.P. Lamberter, Chief-of-Staff.

Lieutenant L.M. Brumby, Flag Lieutenant.

Ensign H.H. Caldwell, Secretary.

_Olympia_ (Flagship).

Captain, Charles V. Gridley.

Lieutenant-Commander, S. C. Paine.

Lieutenants: C.G. Calkins, V.S. Nelson, G.S. Morgan, S.M. Strite.

Ensigns: M.M. Taylor, F.B. Upham, W.P. Scott, A.G. Kavanagh, H.V. Butler.

Medical Inspector, A.F. Price; Passed Assistant Surgeon, J.E. Page; Assistant Surgeon, C.H. Kindleberger; Pay Inspector, D.A. Smith; Chief Engineer, J. Entwistle; Assistant Engineer, S.H. DeLany; Assistant Engineer, J.F. Marshall, Jr.; Chaplain, J.B. Frazier; Captain of Marines, W.P. Biddle; Gunner, L.J.G. Kuhlwein; Carpenter, W. Macdonald; Acting Boatswain, E.J. Norcott.

_The Boston_.

Captain, F. Wildes.

Lieutenant-Commander, J.A. Norris.

Lieutenants: J. Gibson, W.L. Howard.

Ensigns: S.S. Robinson, L.H. Everhart, J.S. Doddridge.

Surgeon, M.H. Crawford; Assistant Surgeon, R.S. Balkeman; Paymaster, J.R. Martin; Chief Engineer, G.B. Ransom; Assistant Engineer, L.J. James; First Lieutenant of Marines, R. McM. Dutton; Gunner, J.C. Evans; Carpenter, L.H. Hilton

_U. S. Steamship Baltimore_.

Captain, N. M. Dyer.

Lieutenant-Commander, G. Blocklinger.

Lieutenants: W. Braunersreuther, F. W. Kellogg, J. M. Ellicott, C. S. Stanworth.

Ensigns: G. H. Hayward, M. J. McCormack, U. E. Irwin.

Naval Cadets, D. W. Wurtsbaugh, I. Z. Wettersoll, C. M. Tozer T. A. Karney; Passed Assistant Surgeon, F. A. Heiseler; Assistant Surgeon, E. K. Smith; Pay Inspector, E. Bellows; Chief Engineer, A. C. Engard; Assistant Engineers, H. B. Price, H. I. Cone; Naval Cadet (engineer), C. P. Burt; Chaplain. T. S. K. Freeman; First Lieutenant of Marines, D. Williams; Acting Boatswain, H. R. Brayton; Gunner, L. J. Connelly; Acting Gunner, L. J. Waller; Carpenter, O. Bath.

_U. S. Steamship Raleigh_.

Captain, J. B. Coghlan.

Lieutenant-Commander, F. Singer.

Lieutenants: W. Winder, B. Tappan, H. Rodman, C. B. Morgan,

Ensigns: F. L. Chidwick, P. Babin.

Surgeon, E. H. Marsteller; Assistant Surgeon, D. N. Carpenter; Passed Assistant Paymaster, S. E. Heap; Chief Engineer, F. H. Bailey; Passed Assistant Engineer, A. S. Halstead; Assistant Engineer, J. E. Brady; First Lieutenant of Marines, T. C. Treadwell; Acting Gunner, G. D. Johnstone; Acting Carpenter, T. E. Kiley.

_The Concord_.

Commander, A. S. Walker.

Lieutenant-Commander, G. P. Colvocoreses.

Lieutenants: T. B. Howard, P. W. Hourigan.

Ensigns: L. A. Kiser, W. C. Davidson, O. S. Knepper.

Passed Assistant Surgeon, R. G. Broderick; Passed Assistant Paymaster, E. D. Ryan; Chief Engineer, Richard Inch; Passed Assistant Engineer, H. W. Jones; Assistant Engineer, E. H. Dunn.

_The Petrel_.

Commander, E. P. Wood.

Lieutenants: E. M. Hughes, B. A. Fiske, A. N. Wood, C. P. Plunkett.

Ensigns: G. L. Fermier, W. S. Montgomery.

Passed Assistant Surgeon, C. D. Brownell; Assistant Paymaster, G. G. Siebells; Passed Assistant Engineer, R. T. Hall.

The marvel of the naval engagements that disarmed Spain in both the Indies, is that only one American was killed in the Santiago action, and the only man who lost his life on Dewey's fleet was overcome by heat. The Spaniards were deceived as well as surprised at Manila, the deception being their dependence upon the belief that the Americans would take it for granted that the falsified official charts were correct, and stand off. The course of the American fleet, finding with the lead on the first round 32 feet of water where the chart said 15, dismayed the enemy. The Spanish had but one chance to cripple Dewey, and that was by closing with him, but they never seem, except in the case of the flagship, to have contemplated taking the offensive.

In the course of the war crowded with victory, two Spanish fleets were destroyed, two Spanish armies surrendered, thirty-six thousand soldiers and sailors of Spain made prisoners of war, the only heavy losses of Americans were at Santiago, and they happened because in the terrible climate of Cuba in summer, for those unaccustomed to it and forced to be in the rain and sleep on the ground, it was necessary to carry the enemy's lines of defense by assault, because it was certain that delay would be destruction of the troops. The campaign was hurried and short, but such was the effect of the few weeks spent in Cuba that, bloody as were the first days of July, the weeks succeeding witnessed the death from sickness of more soldiers than fell in battle.

Not until November 5,1898, did the State Department make public the complete text of the Protocol between the United States and Spain for the preliminary settlement of the war. A copy was cabled to this country from the French translation, but the department here never gave out the text of the document in official form. The Protocol textually is as follows:

"Protocol of agreement between the United States and Spain, embodying the terms of a basis for the establishment of peace between the two countries, signed at Washington Aug. 12, 1898. Protocol: William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and his Excellency, Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the government of the United States and the government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries--that is to say:

_Article_ I.

"Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

_Article_ II.

"Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.

_Article_ III.

"The United States will occupy and hold the City, Bay, and Harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

_Article_ IV.

"Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and to this end each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under, Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

_Article_ V.

"The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than Oct. 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

_Article_ VI.

"Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

"Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August, 1898.

"William R. Day. Jules Cambon."