Chapter XXVI

1. The first of these quotations is from the Stoic Cleanthes, the second from a lost play of Euripides; in the third Epictetus has joined together two sayings of Socrates, one from the _Crito_ and one from the _Apologia_. Anytus and Meletus were the principal accusers of Socrates in the trial which ended in his sentence to death.

NOTES ON PRINCIPAL PHILOSOPHIC TERMS USED BY EPICTETUS.

[I give under this head only those terms the exact force
of which may not be apparent to the reader in a mere
translation.]

[Greek: Aidemon].--Pious, reverent, modest. The
substantive is [Greek: aidos], the German Ehrfurcht
(_Wilhelm Meister_, _Wanderjahre_, Bk. II. ch. ii.), a
virtue in high regard with Epictetus, who generally
mentions it in connection with that of "faithfulness,"
[Greek: pistis]. In Wordsworth's poem, "My heart leaps
up when I behold a rainbow in the sky," the "natural
piety" which he prays may abide with him in his old age
seems to be just that moral sensitiveness or [Greek:
aidos] which passes into reverence and worship in the
presence of certain things, and into shame and dread in
that of others.

[Greek: Apatheia].--Peace--that is, peace from passion,
[Greek: pathe]. [Greek: Pathos] was any affection of
the mind causing joy or grief. As it appears from Bk. II.
iii. I., [Greek: apatheia] is not, in Epictetus, the
state of absolute freedom from these passions, but that
of being able to master them so that they shall not
overwhelm the inner man.

[Greek: Diarthrotikos].--That which _organizes_,
constitutes organically, forms into a system. From
[Greek: arthron], a joint. The word "analyze," by which
Long translates [Greek: diarthroun], seems to me wanting
in the formative sense expressed by the original.

[Greek: Dogma].--An opinion, that which seems ([Greek:
dokein]) true; generally in the special sense of a
philosophic dogma.

[Greek: Euroein].--To prosper; literally, to flow
freely, [Greek: euroia], prosperity. A common Stoic
phrase for a happy life.

[Greek: Eusebeia].--Religion, piety. [Greek:
sebomai]--"_to feel awe_ or _fear_ before God and man,
especially when about to do something disgraceful"
(_Liddell and Scott_); to worship, respect, reverence.

[Greek: Hegemonikon to].--The Ruling Faculty--that in
a man which chooses, determines, takes cognizance of good
and evil, and sways the inferior faculties ([Greek:
dynameis], powers) to its will. Lotze notes this
_hegemonic_ quality in the human soul as that which
distinguishes it from the bundle of sensations into which
the Association Philosophy would resolve it.

[Greek: thaumazein].--To admire, be dazzled with
admiration by, to worship, to be taken up with a thing so
as to lose the power of cool judgment. A frequent word in
Epictetus, the sense of which is precisely rendered in
Hor. _Sat._ I, 4, 28, "Hunc capit argenti splendor,
_stupet_ Albius aere."

[Greek: Idiotes].--One of the vulgar, an unlettered
person; in Epictetus, one uninstructed in philosophy.
Originally the word meant one who remained in private
life, not filling any public office, or taking part in
State affairs. A man might be an [Greek: idiotes], or
"layman," with respect to any branch of science or art.

[Greek: Kalos kai agathos].--The good and wise
man--literally, beautiful and good. A standing phrase to
denote the perfection of human character. [Greek: kalos]
is a word sometimes difficult to render. Curtius connects
it etymologically with Sanscrit, _kalyas_; Gothic,
_hails_=healthy.

[Greek: Oiesis].--"Conceit"--defined by Cicero as
"Opinatio"--intellectual self-sufficiency, the supposing
one's self to know something when one does not. "The first
business of a philosopher," says Epictetus, "is to cast
away [Greek: oiesis], for it is impossible that one can
begin to learn the things that he thinks he knows"
(_Diss._ II. xvii. 1.) He is not, in short, to be "wise in
his own conceit."

[Greek: orexis, ekklisis, horme, aphorme].--Pursuit,
avoidance, desire, aversion. According to Simplicius
(Comment. _Ench._ i.), [Greek: orexis] and [Greek: ekklisis]
were used by the Stoics to express the counterparts
in outward action of the mental affections, [Greek: horme]
and [Greek: aphorme], and were regarded as consequent upon
the latter.

[Greek: proairesis].--The Will; but as used in
Epictetus, this word implies much more than the mere
faculty of volition. Literally, it means a choosing of
one thing before another; in Epictetus, the power of
deliberately resolving or purposing, the exercise of the
reflective faculty being implied. It is hardly to be
distinguished from [Greek: to hegemonikon], _q. v._

[Greek: prolepseis].--"Natural Conceptions." See
Preface, xxviii., xxix. The "primary truths" of Lord
Herbert of Cherbury.

[Greek: Synkatatithesthai].--To assent to or acquiesce
in anything, to ratify by the judgment the emotions
produced by external things or events, such as the sense
of dread, or pleasure, or reprobation, which they arouse
in us. To be on one's guard against the hasty yielding of
this assent is one of Epictetus's main injunctions to the
aspirant in philosophy.

[Greek: Tarassesthai].--To be troubled; [Greek:
a-taraxia], tranquillity. [Greek: Tarassein] is
primarily to stir up, confuse, throw into disorder.

[Greek: phantasia].--An appearance; with the Stoics, any
mental impression as received by the perceptive faculty
before the Reason has pronounced upon it, a bare
perception.

INDEX OF REFERENCES.

[The references in the right-hand column are to the
books, chapters, and verses of the _Dissertations_, to
the chapters of the _Encheiridion_, and to the
_Fragments_, in Schweighaeuser's edition of Epictetus.]