Chapter XLVIII: Appendix: II

Extracts from the Official Report on the Kwantun Fortress Artillery,
by Major-General Biely, lately Commanding the Fortress Artillery in
Port Arthur (submitted after the Capitulation).[50]

When hostilities commenced at Port Arthur, neither the engineer nor artillery preparations for defence were completed, and had hurriedly to be carried out. To make clear how some of the artillery positions came into being needs some explanation.

In 1902 a special Committee sat, by order of the Officer Commanding the District, in order to work out a defence scheme for the district and for Port Arthur itself. After inspections of the ground, carried out in 1902 and 1903, this Committee decided to allot artillery units to the following places:

(_a_) Yinchow: some fortress artillery, in the old Chinese fort at the mouth of the Liao-ho, to protect the entrance.

(_b_) Dalny and Talienwan: some field batteries, to protect the mine fields in Talienwan Bay.

(_c_) Kinchou: twelve batteries, to check the enemy's invasion of the peninsula through the narrow neck between Khinoeze (Hand) and Kinchou Bays.

The advanced positions of Nangalin and Wolf's Hills were noted for field batteries. Plans were made for artillery emplacements immediately in front of the Fortress on Pan-lun-shan ridge, on the height near the temple of Miaosan.

On General Biely's recommendation it was proposed to supplement our own artillery by the following guns, taken by us from the Chinese in 1900: One 28-centimetre,[51] two 24-centimetre, two 21-centimetre, four 120-millimetre, two 150-millimetre, twenty-eight 87-millimetre, more than twenty 75-millimetre, and ten 57-millimetre. We had enough ammunition, spare parts, and gear to render the greater part of these guns useful, and work upon their repair and preparation was started. For the 120-millimetre, 87-millimetre, and 57-millimetre, a supplementary order for shells, fuses, etc., was in 1903 placed in Germany (with Krupp). However, when war broke out some of these guns were not ready owing to deficiency in accessories, etc., and so were not mounted in position, but were placed in reserve; but the 87- and 75-millimetre guns for Talienwan Bay and the Kinchou position were allotted.

General Biely, foreseeing that an enemy, by taking up a position with their ships behind Liao-tieh-shan, would be able to shell the harbour and town with impunity, suggested that one 28-centimetre and two 24-centimetre Chinese guns should be mounted on the top of that hill. This was not agreed to by the Committee, as they considered such an operation by the Japanese fleet to be improbable, and because they were alarmed at the difficulty and cost of the proposal. Similarly, the Committee rejected his recommendation for mounting these guns elsewhere on the shore front--for instance--in the group of batteries on Cross Hill.

Later, after the outbreak of war, the Viceroy gave orders that a 28-centimetre gun should be mounted on the Kinchou position; but this was not done, as it was not ready up to the time we abandoned this position. As will be seen later, this gun, as well as others, were afterwards got up into position on Liao-tieh-shan and Cross Hill.

In 1902 also, as soon as the scale of armament had been settled, General Biely laid great stress upon the early provision of a proper fortress-telephone system, of observation stations, of accurate maps of the neighbouring ground, and of all the apparatus necessary for accurate shooting and fire observation; but, from various causes not under his control, matters hung fire till the end of 1903, when authority was obtained to raise the required sum by selling a quantity of the Chinese artillery. Orders were then at once placed with Krupp, Kunst and Albers, and others, for such articles as could not be procured in Arthur, whilst other material, such as telephones, wire, insulators, etc., were bought locally. By the time war broke out this material had not arrived, which prevented the installation of a new telephone system.

The destruction of our fleet had naturally not been anticipated in the original defence scheme; and the idea of mounting naval guns on shore to supplement the land armament only took shape after the _Cesarevitch_, _Retvisan_, and _Pallada_ were damaged on the night of February 8, 1904, and thus condemned to a prolonged inactivity. The first proposal was to mount four of the _Retvisan's_ 6-inch Canet guns on Liao-tieh-shan, where, since the middle of March, two 6-inch (68 cwt.) fortress guns had been in position. The arming of this hill had been shown to be necessary when the enemy's ships from behind it shelled Tiger's Tail Peninsula, and our ships in the western basin on March 10, 22, 23, and April 15. After these guns had been mounted and high-angle fire from our ships in the western basin had been started, the enemy's fleet ceased this bombardment. The armament of the Fortress was naturally much strengthened by the addition of these guns.

Their allotment to batteries was decided by circumstances. The 6-inch and 120-millimetre guns, being powerful and having long range, were placed on those points whence they could best attack the enemy's siege guns. The 47-millimetre, 37-millimetre, and other smaller guns, were placed in the first line in the intermediate works and in the trenches between them, principally with a view to repelling assaults. Except the 2-1/2-inch Baranovsky, these guns only had common shell, but their accuracy, rapidity of fire, and the abundance of stores for them, made them suitable for this purpose. The 75-millimetre guns were told off to the first and second lines as auxiliary armament against the enemy's nearest siege and field batteries.

This system of allotment of naval guns was not very strictly adhered to, for it was felt that they were only lent temporarily, and would have to be returned directly the ships' repairs were completed. For this reason, and owing to the anxiety to mount them as quickly as possible on account of the enemy's rapid advance, the 6-inch Canet guns were mounted on separate batteries, newly built for them, and on such of the forts and positions as were completed. It was not sound; and later, when the Japanese began to pound the forts containing these guns, they were at once silenced, and it was very difficult to remove and replace them. It was in some cases impossible owing to the destruction done by the enemy's fire--for instance, when the bridges over the ditches were damaged.

The fortress howitzers were not mounted in accordance with the authorized armament table, though the character of the ground rendered them essential. The 6-inch howitzers were of little use, having only a short range; for this reason General Smirnoff ordered eight 9-inch coast howitzers to be mounted in two batteries on the land side. They were taken from the coast batteries, where they had been quite idle, and were mounted in rear of the first line, from which position they did excellent work against the enemy's siege batteries, approaches, and places of concentration. They were of the greatest use up to the end of the siege.

For the twenty 6-inch (43 cwt.) guns (latest pattern) which arrived in the Fortress in March and the twenty-one carriages (1877 pattern) new batteries were built. The carriages had to be adapted to the guns, but it was a very difficult operation and not successful, and they were continually under repair.

On the land front new batteries were being constructed right up to the end of the siege, to take either fresh guns from the fleet or repaired Chinese guns, and whenever the plan of defence was changed the guns again had to be moved.

Most of the heights round Port Arthur on which the forts and batteries settled on by the Committee (which had drawn out the scheme for the armament of the Fortress) were placed were sloping on the outer side, while on the inner they ran sharply down into deep ravines. It was, therefore, almost impossible to site these batteries to shoot well and yet to keep them concealed. If they were placed near the top, there was very little ground in rear of the guns, and they were visible; if they were placed further back and down the rear slope, all idea of shelling the approaches up the front slope would have to be given up. This was the reason why permanent batteries and fortifications were placed on open ground where they were visible to the enemy, and why guns were mounted in the open on the permanent forts.

The reserve of guns was originally intended to be organized by units of artillery, but in April it had to be broken up to arm new points. Later on another reserve was formed of guns from the unattacked left flank of the western front and from the central wall.

The Chinese wall, which played such an important part in the defence, merits some description. Along the line of old Chinese batteries, from A up to Tumulus Battery, the Chinese had built a continuous mud wall--a dense mass of clay revetted with stone--14 feet thick at bottom, and 2 to 4 feet thick at top. It was 10-1/2 feet high, and had a banquette all along the inner side; the outer had a slope of about 45°. Where the roads from the town passed through it had traversed openings and gun emplacements. There were three such openings on the eastern front--at A Battery, Wolf's Battery, and in the ravine between Fort Erh-lung-shan and Fortification No. 3. Before the war no one dreamed of this wall being of use, and not only was it not kept in repair, but in places stones and earth were taken from it. It eventually proved most valuable; it is doubtful if we could without it have managed to repulse so successfully some of the assaults. When the eastern front was manned, General Smirnoff had the wall repaired and loopholed; splinter proofs and barbettes for the guns were built, and small guns for repulsing attacks were mounted. It was frequently hammered by the enemy's guns, even by their 11-inch howitzers, but little real damage was done to it, and to the end the enemy could not drive us back from it or breach it beyond repair. Only a small portion of it near Fort Erh-lung-shan was abandoned just before the capitulation, and this was done by General Fock's order, but was not really necessary.

The following tables bear witness to the state of the Fortress on the outbreak of hostilities:

Table I.

_Showing the Authorized Armament as laid down by the Committee in
1900, and the Guns actually in the Fortress on January 14, 1904._

-------------------------------+----------------------
| Number.
Nature of Guns. +------------+---------
| Authorized.| Actuals.
-------------------------------+------------+---------
10-inch of 1877 | 10 | 5
9-inch of 1877 | 12 | 12
6-inch quick-firing Canet | 20 | 20
6-inch of 1877 (of 68 cwt.) | 37 | 30
6-inch of 1877 (of 43 cwt.) | 38 | 18
42-line | 28 | 24
Heavy guns of 1877 | 12 | 12
Light field | 233 | 146
57-millimetre coast | 24 | 28
57-millimetre caponier | 84 | 14
11-inch howitzers of 1877 | 10 | 10
9-inch howitzers of 1877 | 32 | 32
6-inch field-howitzers | 26 | 24
3-line machine-guns | 48 | 38
-------------------------------+------------+---------
Total | 614 | 413[52]
-------------------------------+------------+---------

Table II.

_Showing Allotment of Guns on Works on January 14, 1904._

In consequence of the conversions and alterations in progress, the coast batteries alone had their armament. There were eighteen[53] coast batteries--Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, Artillery, Tiger's Tail, Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. Two were being finished and armed--Nos. 6 and 16.

The armament mounted consisted of:

Mounted.

10-inch guns 5
9-inch guns 12
6-inch Canet 15
6-inch (68 cwt.) 12
57-millimetre coast guns 28
Heavy 4
11-inch howitzers 10
9-inch howitzers 24
---
Total ready for action 110

Being
Mounted.

6-inch Canet 5
9-inch howitzers 8
--
Total 13

On the land front only two batteries were armed:

B Battery, 6-inch guns of 68 cwt. 4
G (Sapper) Battery, 6-inch of 68 cwt. 4
--
Total guns ready for action 8

Fort 1 and B (Jagged) Battery and D Battery were under construction.

There were, therefore, only eight guns mounted on the land front.

* * * * *

The remaining guns were distributed in parks, according to sectors or sections, near the batteries for which they were allotted--_i.e._:

_Section 5_: for Fort 1 and the intermediate batteries between Battery 21 and Fort 1. The park near batteries 19 and 20 (four 6-inch of 68 cwt., eighteen light on wheeled carriages, and eight machine-guns).

_Section 6_: for Fortification 1, Ta-ku-shan Hill, A and B Batteries, Fortification 2, Fort Chi-kuan-shan and Big Hill. The park near the Ice House in front of Big Hill (six 6-inch of 43 cwt., six 57-millimetre caponier, twenty-two light guns on wheels, six light guns on pedestals, eight 6-inch field howitzers, four machine-guns).

_Section 7_: for Eagle's Nest, rear caponiers of Redoubts Nos. 1 and 2, Fort Erh-lung-shan, Fortification at head of Water Supply Redoubt, Fortification 3. The park near the barracks of the 7th Company (four 6-inch of 43 cwt., twenty light on wheels, four heavy, two machine-guns).

_Section 8_: for C and G Batteries (Jagged and Sapper), Fort 4 and Fortification 4. The park near G Battery (eight 6-inch of 43 cwt., six 57-millimetre caponier, 24 light on wheels, four machine-guns).

_Section 9_: for Forts 1 and Chi-kuan-shan, D Battery and Salt Battery, Fortification 5, and Redoubts 3, 4, and 5. The park near D Battery (six 6-inch of 68 cwt., two 57-millimetre caponier, six 42-line, six machine-guns).

_In Store and in Reserve_: In the park in the Chinese arsenal, 56 light guns on wheels; sixteen 6-inch field howitzers, eighteen 42-line guns, fourteen machine-guns, four heavy guns.

Thus it was intended to mount another 244 guns and 38 machine-guns on the batteries and intermediate works so soon as these were sufficiently advanced to receive them.

The central magazines, being merely Chinese brick buildings, were in no way shell-proof; but of the numerous section magazines required to store ammunition, spare parts, etc., for the decentralized supply, only four had been built and taken over from the engineers in February, 1904 (two on the sea front, Tiger's Peninsula and Battery 17; two on the land front, Big Hill and C Battery).

Table III.

The following were the shells in the Fortress on January 14, 1904:

Guns. Shells.
10-inch 790
9-inch 2,889
6-inch Canet 4,951
6-inch (68 cwt.) 17,512
6-inch (43 cwt.) 10,459
42-line guns 10,925
Heavy guns 2,409
Light guns 41,227
57-millimetre coast 24,078
57-millimetre caponier 3,210
11-inch howitzer 2,004
9-inch howitzer 7,819
6-inch field howitzer 11,981

Cartridge cases for machine-guns 957,615

Table IV.

Taking all cartridges, fuzes, spare parts, and other accessory stores into consideration, the following were the rounds per gun in the Fortress on the outbreak of war:

Guns. Rounds per Gun. 10-inch guns 158 9-inch guns and howitzers 243 6-inch Canet guns 247 6-inch guns (68 cwt. and 43 cwt.) 583 42-line and heavy guns 370 57-millimetre coast guns 860 57-millimetre caponier 230 Light field guns 282 11-inch howitzers 200 6-inch field howitzers 500

In the artillery magazine there were for the 3-inch quick-firing field artillery guns:

Cartridge cases 6,957 Double action fuzes 8,479

Of small ammunition there were:

Cartridges. 3-line rifle 12,621,176 3-line revolver 14,512 4, 2-line revolver 5,357 4, 2-line Berdan 41,635 Chinese 2,122,050

Since the date of our taking over Port Arthur, particularly during the disorders in China in and after 1900, the diplomatic sky had never been really clear, and at times the political barometer alternated between the 'set fair' and 'storm.' In 1903 it was first very unsettled, and then kept steadily falling, which caused us to think seriously of fortifying Port Arthur, not as heretofore, by talk and correspondence, but by deeds.

General Vernander, head of the Engineer Department, rendered no material assistance. He only greatly delayed matters, which had been practically decided on, by fresh proposals and fiddling with details; but the visit of General Kuropatkin, the War Minister to the place in 1903, gave a great impulse to affairs. After being three weeks in Port Arthur he made himself acquainted with all the details on the spot, inspected all the proposed fortifications, gave great encouragement to us, and ordered certain changes to be made. The most important result of his visit, however, was that he changed the order of building the different works laid down by the original authors of the scheme of defence, in accordance with their actual requirements and importance, and gave orders for us to set to work at once simultaneously on all the most important.

Amongst other things, he thought it advisable to strengthen the summit of Ta-ku-shan by building a block-house for 100 men with two or four quick-firing guns in a caponier for flanking the approaches to the main line of works and to the hill itself. He also thought the height near the temple behind the village of Siu-shuing should be strengthened to cover the approach into the valley of the Lun-ho, and to command the village. A block-house with two guns was to be placed on the near peak west of Fort 4, that the foot and slopes of the hills, on which this fort was built, might be shelled, and a trench was to connect up fort and block-house. He considered the interval between Fortification 5 and Fort Erh-lung-shan too great, and said an intermediate work should be made on the summit of the height in front of Fort Erh-lung-shan. To distribute the defence beyond this Fort by occupying Angle Hill and points D and E (High and Long Hills), he did not conceive to be possible without greatly weakening the garrison. But the sudden outbreak of war compelled us to diverge from much that had been intended.

In an order of the Viceroy's, dated February 9, 1904, the Fortress was declared to be in a state of siege, and three days later the reserve men began arriving. According to the artillery mobilization scheme, three weeks was supposed to be sufficient for this arm to be ready for war. But the Committee of Defence of the Kwantun District, to which this scheme was submitted, expressed the opinion that the mobilization would take two months. It was indeed lucky for us the enemy did not attempt a landing in Pigeon Bay the night of the torpedo attack; but they were cautious and none too certain of themselves at that time, and probably thought us stronger than we were.

At all events, for three months they took no decisive action on land, which enabled us, firstly, to mobilize the garrison, receive reserves, munitions and supplies, to look round and to draw up a scheme for the fortification and defence of the Fortress on land, and partly also from sea; and secondly, to get some knowledge of, and be able to appreciate the worth of the enemy and of ourselves. In the fights at Kinchou and on the advanced positions the enemy did not exhibit any extraordinary bravery or superiority over us. On the contrary, what was shown up was our inability to engage them and drive them back.

Our field force, under General Fock, having made a slight attempt to meet the enemy on the position before Kinchou, quickly withdrew on to the prepared position itself, and then, having lost this in sixteen hours, and lost all its guns of position and batteries at Dalny and Talienwan, retired more than hurriedly towards Arthur, and occupied a strong (in the topographical sense) but long position along the hills--Khelaza, Upilazy, Kuen-san. But the force retired from here also on July 30 to the Fortress works, not defending the position on Wolf's Hills, which had to a certain extent been fortified, and which it had been decided to hold.

All the schemes for the defence of Kwantun in general, and of Port Arthur in particular, which had been made out in peace-time, had to be abandoned or altered at the outbreak of war, and all those who drew up these schemes and were helping to carry them out left the district which was destined to be the arena of a long and bloody struggle. The brilliant ten months' defence was due to the fresh actors who appeared on the scene and the plans made out by them. During part of January and all February the arming of the land works and of two coast batteries (6 and 16) was energetically and incessantly carried on, chiefly by night. The work was often interrupted by the enemy's bombardment and attempts to block the harbour.

The following guns were received in January and February:

6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 20 6-inch field howitzers 2 87-millimetre Chinese guns (selected) 20 From the Fleet: 2-1/2-inch guns 15 3-line Maxims 25

In February the following were sent to the fort at Yinchow:

1 officer, 72 men. 4 6-inch guns (43 cwt.). 8 light field guns.

By March the land works had been armed as follows:

_Fort No. 1._

6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 4 Light guns 4 Machine-guns 4 Rocket troughs 3

_Open Caponier No. 1._

Light guns 4

_Fortification No. 1._ (Danger Hill).

Light guns 4

_A Battery._

6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 6 Light guns 4 Machine-guns 1 Rocket troughs 3

_Fortification No. 2._

6-inch field howitzers 2 Light guns 4

_B Battery._

6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 4 Light guns 2 Rocket troughs 3

_Fort No. 2_ (Chi-kuan-shan).

Light guns 4 Machine-guns 3

_Open Caponier No. 2._

Light guns 4

_Little Eagle's Nest Battery._

42-line guns 3

_Kuropatkin Lunette._

6-inch field howitzers 4 87-millimetre Chinese field guns 4

_Redoubt No. 1._

Light guns 4

_Redoubt No. 2._

6-inch field howitzers 4

_Ravine Trench._

Light guns 2

_Fort No. 3_ (Erh-lung-shan).

6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 4 Light guns 5 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 4

_Bridge Battery._

Light guns 2

_Fortification No. 3._

Light guns 5 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 6

_Tumulus Battery._

42-line guns 2 6-inch field howitzers 4 Light guns 4 Machine-guns 1

_Cemetery Battery._

42-line guns 4 Light guns 2 6-inch howitzers 2 Machine-guns 1

_Lower Jagged Battery._

6-inch field howitzers 2

_C (Jagged) Battery._

6-inch guns (43 cwt.) 4

_G (Sapper) Battery._

6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 4 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 2

_Fort No. 4._

Light guns 6 Machine-guns 2 Rocket platforms 2

_Battery near Fort 4._

6-inch field howitzers 4

_Fortification No. 4._

42-line guns 3 Light guns 5 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 2

_Tea Trench._

Light guns 2

_Rear Redoubt._

Light guns 2

_Rear Battery._

6-inch field howitzers 4 Light guns 2

_Fort No. 5._

Light guns 5 Naval Baranovsky guns 2 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 2

_Pigeon Battery._

Light guns 2 Baranovsky guns 1

_D Battery._

6-inch guns (68 cwt.), all round fire 6

_Lateral Battery._

Light guns 2 Rocket troughs 2

_Flank Battery._

Baranovsky guns 2

_Redoubt No. 3._

Light guns 2

_Fortification No. 5._

42-line guns 4 Light guns 4 Baranovsky guns 4 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 3

_New Battery._

6-inch (43 cwt.) guns 4

_Timber Redoubt._

Light guns 4 Machine-guns 2

_Advanced Battery._

Light guns 2

_Fort No. 6._

42-line guns 4 Light guns 4 Machine-guns 2 Rocket troughs 3

_Salt Battery._

Light guns 4

_White Wolf Battery._

Light guns 4 Rocket troughs 2

_By the Lighthouse on Liao-tieh-shan._

6-inch guns (68 cwt.) 2 Baranovsky guns 2

_Sent to the Bays--Pigeon, Louisa, Ten Ships, Shaopingtao Lunwantun, and Takhe._

Baranovsky guns 4 Machine-guns 3

_On the Redoubts of the Central Wall._

By the slaughter-house 2 light guns No. 1 (Artillery) 2 " No. 2 (Engineer) 2 " No. 3 (Sapper) 2 " No. 4 (Powder) 2 42-line guns Between Batteries 20 and 21 10 light guns

Summary.

Thus, by March 14 there were mounted ready for action on the land front:

6-inch guns (43 cwt. and 68 cwt.) and 42-line guns 60 Light field guns 126 Baranovsky guns 15 87-millimetre Chinese field guns 4 6-inch field howitzers 24 3-line machine-guns 30 --- Total 259

On the sea front, the following guns taken from the ships had been mounted opposite the entrance to the inner roads:

Lighthouse Battery 2 120-millimetre guns Golden Hill Battery 2 120-millimetre guns Electric Cliff 2 37-millimetre guns Battery 16 5 Canet guns -- Total 11

Total on sea front and in Bays:

Guns 37 Machine-guns 3

Grand total in Fortress:

Guns 362 Machine-guns 33

Of ammunition, all batteries on the land front had 200 and on the sea front 200 or 300 rounds per gun ready. There were also 50 rocket troughs on the former.

The whole perimeter of the Fortress with regard to artillery was divided as follows:

(_a_) _Sea Front_.