Chapter V

THAT GOD TAKES AN INTEREST IN MAN'S WELFARE.

(_A._) THE EVIDENCE IN ITS FAVOUR.

Since God is a _Moral_ as well as a Personal Being, He must
be capable of caring for all His creatures; and we have
abundant evidence that He does so, especially for man.
But there are two great difficulties.

(_B._) THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF MAN.

(1.) Some counter-arguments, showing that even if insignificant,
God might still care for him.
(2.) Man's real importance, due to his mind and spirit.
(3.) The supposed inhabitants of other planets.

(_C._) THE EXISTENCE OF EVIL.

(1.) Physical evil in animals. The objection that it is vast
in amount, wholly unmerited, and perfectly useless,
cannot be maintained.
(2.) Physical evil in man. Several ways of lessening the
difficulty. Its explanation seems to be that God's
designing evil does not mean His desiring it, as it is
essential for forming a man's character.
(3.) Moral evil in man. The possibility of this is essential
to free will; and wicked men are as necessary as any
other form of evil.

(_D._) CONCLUSION.

God's _Goodness_ includes Beneficence and Righteousness.

Having discussed in the last chapter the character of man, we have next to consider, as far as we have any means of doing so, _the Character of God_; more especially whether He seems to take any interest in man's welfare. And we will first examine the evidence in favour of this; then the two arguments on the other side from the insignificance of man, and the existence of evil; and will conclude by considering in what sense the term _Goodness_ can be ascribed to God.

(_A._) THE EVIDENCE IN ITS FAVOUR.

To begin with, God is certainly capable of taking an interest in man's welfare, for He is not only a Personal Being, but also a Moral Being. This follows at once from what may be called the _moral argument_ for the Existence of God, or that depending on man's free will. It is briefly this, that no combination of natural forces, which are uniform and always act the same under the same circumstances, can ever produce a _free_ force, able to act or not as it likes. The idea seems inconceivable. If, then, man possesses such a force, which we have already admitted, it cannot have come from any natural forces, nor can it have made itself, so it must have been derived from some _previous_ free force, and this, again, from a previous one, and so on till we finally arrive at a _Free Force_, which was _not_ derived from any other, but which existed eternally. And this, it will be remembered, was precisely the conclusion we reached in Chapter I., though from quite a different argument. And then it follows that this Free Force, or Free Being, must know that He is free; and must therefore be a _moral_ Being, able to distinguish the quality of acts as right or wrong. Indeed, the mere fact that man possesses this remarkable faculty makes it certain that man's Maker must possess it too.

Now a personal and moral God must clearly be able to take an interest in the welfare of His creatures; and there is abundant evidence that He actually does so. For everywhere in nature, and especially in man, we meet with marks, not only of design, but of _beneficent_ design--that is to say of design tending to the welfare and happiness of the beings in question. Take, for instance, the human eye, which we considered in Chapter II. Everyone will admit that this conduces very greatly to man's happiness; and therefore the conclusion that God, when He designed the eye, did so with the object of benefiting man seems irresistible. Nor is this altered by the fact that the eye has a few defects, in being liable to various kinds of disease. For no one can think that it was made for the sake of these defects. It was evidently made to see, and not to ache. That it does ache now and then is in all probability due to its being such a complicated instrument; and perhaps also to its being often used too much.

But it may be said, beneficial organs like the eye, though they abound throughout nature, are not the only ones we meet with. There are others, like the claws and teeth of wild animals, which are just the opposite, and seem designed to give pain to other creatures. But this is quite untenable. They were plainly designed to enable the animal to secure its food, and are perhaps necessary for that purpose, and they all tend to the welfare of their possessor, and sometimes also to that of their victim, as it hastens death. There is not, in fact, a single organ in nature the _object_ of which is to produce pain. Where pain is produced it is merely a sort of _by-product_. Thus far then, we are quite justified in concluding that God takes an interest in man's welfare. But there are two great difficulties.

(_B._) THE INSIGNIFICANCE OF MAN.

The first is from the apparent _insignificance_ of man. For though he is doubtless by far the most important being on this planet, and endowed with some of the Divine attributes, yet, after all how utterly insignificant he is in comparison with his Maker. This is no new difficulty,[4] but modern science has increased its force by showing that our earth is only one among the planets which go round the sun, while the sun itself is only one among many millions of stars. And, we may ask, is it likely that the God Who rules these millions of stars should take any interest in the beings on a small planet like our earth?

[Footnote 4: Ps. 8. 3, 4.]

This is the difficulty we have to face; but a good deal depends on the way in which it is stated. Would it not be better to argue from the known to the unknown, and ask--Is it likely that the God Who has made this earth, and Who we know (from the marks of design) takes an interest in its inhabitants, should be _also_ the Ruler of the distant stars? And when so stated, the unity of nature compels us to say that it is not only likely, but practically certain. However, we will discuss the subject more in detail, first considering some counter-arguments, which show that even if man were insignificant God might still care for him; then man's real importance; and lastly, the question of other planets being inhabited.

(1.) _Some Counter-arguments._

To begin with, though it seems unlikely that God should take any interest in such insignificant beings as us men, it also seems unlikely that He should ever have designed and created such beings. Yet He has done so. And having created them, there is at most only a slight _additional_ improbability, if any at all, that He should take an interest in their welfare. And this is especially the case when we remember that man is not only the highest and noblest being on this planet, but as far as we know on any planet. Therefore though we may be quite unworthy of God's care, we do not know of any other being who is more worthy of it. And it is most unlikely that a Creator would not take an interest in _any_ of His works.

Next, as to the analogy of nature. Here we find nothing resembling a neglect of small things. On the contrary, everything, down to the minutest insect, seems finished with as much perfection as if it alone existed in the universe. And this is surely what we should expect. For true greatness does not exist in despising that which is small; and it may be a very part of God's infinite greatness that nothing should be too small for Him to care about, just as nothing is too large. And while a Being, Who can govern the universe, and attend to its millions of stars, is no doubt great--inconceivably great; yet He is surely greater still--_inconceivably greater_--if He can _also_ attend to our little planet, and its inhabitants; and can do this so thoroughly, as not only to take an interest in the human race, but in the welfare of each one of its members.

And the whole analogy of nature is in favour of His doing so; for the forces of nature never deal with matter in bulk, but with each particle separately. A stone, for instance, is attracted to the ground, because, and only because, each particle of it is so attracted. In the same way if God takes an interest in the human race (and, as just said, it is hard to imagine His not doing so, since it is His noblest work) it may be because, and only because, He takes an interest in each individual member of it.

Thirdly, the difficulty of thus believing that God takes an interest in the daily life of an individual man, though undoubtedly great, is really no more than that of believing that He knows about it. For if He knows about it, why should He not care about it? Yet, as said in