Chapter IX: Appendix: Genealogy of the Ottoman Sultans 382 (8)

In this year also (1684) the Austrians, under Lorraine, issuing from Gran, crossed the Danube and attacked and defeated the Turks at Warzen, and again in another battle before Buda, and then besieged that fortress. But after some weeks they were compelled by the rainy season and disease in the army to raise the siege and retreat. Meanwhile another Austrian army advanced into Croatia and fought and defeated the Turks. As a result of this the province of Croatia, which had been for one hundred and fifty-one years under Turkish rule, was freed from it, and was thenceforward an Austro-Hungarian possession.

In the following year, 1685, the Austrians made further progress. The important stronghold of Neuhausel, which twenty-two years previously had been captured by the Turks, was now recaptured after a desperate resistance. Of its garrison of three thousand men only two hundred survived. The women and children of the Turks were sold to landowners in the Austrian Empire. The capture of this city was the cause of great rejoicing throughout Europe. In 1686 the siege of Buda was renewed. The Imperial army consisted of ninety thousand men—Germans, Hungarians, and Croats. It was under the command of the Prince of Lorraine. The siege was commenced on June 18th. Three attempts to relieve it under Grand Vizier Solyman failed. After six weeks of siege the Austrians assaulted and captured the city. Its brave defender, Abdi Pasha, and its garrison perished, and the city was given up to ruthless sack. The city had been in possession of the Turks for a hundred and forty-five years, and during this time had resisted successfully six sieges. It now passed finally into the hands of the Hungarians.

The campaign of the following year, 1687, was opened on the Drave. The Grand Vizier led an army of fifty thousand men and sixty-six guns. It met the Austrians at Mohacz on the very field where, a hundred and sixty years previously, the Hungarians had been defeated in the battle which gave one-half of their country to the Turks. The Ottomans were now in their turn defeated and routed. Twenty thousand of them were killed, while the loss of the successful army was only a thousand. Slavonia was in the same year cleared of all Turkish forces, and was permanently restored to Austria, while in Transylvania the Voivode Apafy, who owed his position to the Turks, now turned against them.

Meanwhile the Venetians had been equally successful during the past three years. Their army, under Morosini, invaded the Morea in 1686, captured all its strongholds, and drove the Turks from the country. They also successfully invaded Dalmatia. In 1687 they attacked and captured the Piræus and Athens. It was on this occasion that the Parthenon, which, in spite of many centuries of war and dangers of all kinds, still existed in all its original grandeur and beauty, was irreparably ruined. The Turks had made use of it as a powder magazine, thinking probably that it was safe from attack. A bomb from the Venetian batteries exploded there, whether purposely or not, and converted the temple into a ruin as we now see it. The whole of Greece was now practically in the hands of the Venetians. The Greek population had given no aid to the Turks in resisting the new invaders. They had soon to learn that there was little to choose between their old and their new masters. If anything, the Venetians proved to be the more tyrannical and rapacious.

On the conclusion of the campaign of 1687 in Hungary the Turkish army, as a result of its long series of defeats, was seething with discontent, and was almost in a state of mutiny. Its leading officers met and petitioned the Sultan, demanding the dismissal and execution of its general, the Grand Vizier Solyman. They elected Siawousch Pasha as their general. The army then retreated across the Danube to Philippopolis, and thence to Adrianople, from whence it sent a deputation to the Sultan to enforce its views. The Sultan summoned a great Council of State, at which it was decided to accede to the demands of the army. Siawousch Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier in place of Solyman, who was soon after put to death by order of the Sultan. It was hoped by this concession to appease the army, and to prevent its march to Constantinople. The army, however, persisted in its threatening attitude and renewed its march to the capital. It now increased its demands. It insisted on the deposition of the Sultan. There was general concurrence in this among officials at Constantinople. Mustapha Kiuprili, the brother of the late Ahmed Kiuprili, who was Kaimachan, and performed the duties of Grand Vizier in his absence from the capital, called an assembly of ulemas at St. Sophia. He addressed them in these words:—

Since the Padishah thinks only of diverting himself in the chase, and
at the time when the Empire is assaulted from all quarters we have
seen him dismiss all men capable of repairing our misfortunes, can
you doubt any longer that the dethronement of a Padishah who thus
conducts the affairs of the State is legally permitted?

The ulemas unanimously concurred. They decided on the dethronement of Sultan Mahomet and his replacement on the throne, not by his son, but by his legal heir, his next brother, Solyman. They then betook themselves to the abode in the Seraglio where that prince was secluded, called him forth, and announced to him their decision, citing in favour of it a verse from the Koran: “We have named you to be Khaliff of the country.”

There was no opposition to this. Solyman, who had spent his life in seclusion, in constant fear of being murdered by his brother, and who was only saved by the brave efforts of the Sultana Validé, his mother, came out of what was virtually a prison to be invested with the insignia of Sultan. Mahomet, who had reigned as Sultan for thirty-nine years, which he had devoted wholly to the chase, to the neglect of every duty of his great office, retired to the secluded building which his brother had occupied so long. He died there a few years later, regretted by no one.

Von Hammer gives a detailed account of one of Sultan Mahomet’s organized expeditions in pursuit of game, which may be worth quoting as an illustration of his pursuits and character. The scene of it was between Adrianople and Tirnova, and it occurred in 1683, the year in which his army was engaged in the invasion of Austria and on the siege of Vienna. Thirty thousand peasants were brought from all parts for the purpose of beating the woods and putting up the game. For their subsistence a levy was made on the district of 150,000 marks. This battue cost the lives of a great number of beaters, who succumbed to the fatigue of the operations. Many rayas were brought from as far as Belgrade for the occasion. The Sultan, on seeing the bodies of those who had perished, said to his followers: “These men would doubtless have rebelled against me. They have received their punishment in anticipation of this.”

Mahomet, it would seem, owed his deposition not so much to his own callous neglect of his duties as Sultan as to the arrogant incapacity of Kara Mustapha in his campaign against Vienna and the imbecility of the two succeeding Grand Viziers, Ibrahim and Solyman.

Solyman, who thus mounted the throne in 1687, at the age of forty-one, showed greater capacity than was to be expected after his long seclusion in ‘the Cage,’ but he was quite unequal to the task of controlling the mutinous Janissaries. They filled Constantinople with riot and slaughter. They pillaged the palaces of the viziers and others. They attacked the harem of the Grand Vizier Siawousch, whom they had so recently elevated to the post. He was killed in bravely defending his harem. His favourite wife and sister were dragged naked through the streets after being cruelly mutilated. The disorder of the capital became so unendurable that the population rose in arms and assisted the authorities in resisting the Janissaries. Their Agha and principal officers were put to death, and order was at last restored.

In the spring of the next year, 1688, a well equipped army was sent to the Hungarian frontier, in the hope of retrieving the defeats of the past five years. The Austrians, however, had made good use of the interval. They had now three armies in the field, under the command of Prince Charles of Lorraine, Prince Louis of Baden, and Prince Eugène of Savoy—all three generals of exceptional ability. They invested the fortress of Erlau and captured it. The road to Belgrade now lay open to them. This supremely important city, the bulwark to the Balkans and the gateway to Hungary, was treacherously surrendered by its garrison in August 1688 after a bombardment of only twenty-one days. Prince Louis of Baden about the same time invaded Bosnia and occupied a great part of it. Dalmatia revolted and threw over Turkish rule. Nisch was later occupied by the Austrians, and Widdin, on the Danube, fell into their hands. By 1689 the only fortresses in Hungary remaining to the Turks were Temesvar and Warardin.

Farther eastward the Turks had been more fortunate. An army of Tartars from the Crimea overran Poland in 1688 and defeated a Polish army on the Sereth. In the following year, when Russia joined in the combination against the Ottomans and sent an army into the Crimea, it met with a severe defeat. These were the only rays of light to the Turks. Elsewhere they met with a succession of disasters. The Balkan provinces, for the first time since the days of Hunyadi, were threatened by the Austrians. Parts of Bosnia and Serbia were in their hands. The whole of Greece and Albania had been conquered by the Venetians, under Morosini, and the Turkish fleets had been swept off the Mediterranean by the combined fleets of Venice, the Pope, the Knights of Malta, and the Duke of Tuscany. On the Ottoman side no single general of any capacity had appeared.

It was under these conditions that a general council of the Empire was summoned at Adrianople at the end of 1689. After a long discussion, it advised the Sultan to appoint as Grand Vizier Zadé Kiuprili, who had been passed over by Sultan Mahomet IV in favour of the corrupt and incompetent Kara Mustapha after the death of Ahmed Kiuprili. After thirteen years of misgovernment and calamity this third member of the Kiuprili family was called to power. He showed at once great vigour and capacity. Addressing the chief dignitaries of the Empire, he described the perilous condition of affairs: “If we go on as we have been in the past, another campaign will see the enemy encamped before Constantinople.” He took immediate steps to restore the financial position.

Zadé Kiuprili repleted the treasury by heavy contributions on the officials, who had enriched themselves at the expense of the public. He filled the ranks of the army by calling out veterans. He revived the Ottoman navy. He fitted out a flotilla of vessels for service on the Danube. He replaced a number of incompetent and corrupt governors by honest men on whom he could rely. He endeavoured to win the support of the Christian rayas throughout the Empire. He issued imperative orders to all governors and pashas that no one should be allowed to oppress the rayas. No taxes were to be levied on them except the capitation tax. He allowed the Christians everywhere to build churches, though he himself was a most strict Mussulman. He freed trade from many unwise and unnecessary restrictions. He was personally austere and simple in his habits, very reserved in his utterances. It was said of him that he never committed a crime and never used a superfluous word. He was commonly called ‘Kiuprili the Virtuous.’ Unfortunately for his country, he held the post of Grand Vizier for less than two years, for it will be seen that he was killed in battle in 1691.

At the time when he assumed the Grand Vizierate the Austrians had crossed the Danube and had advanced far into Macedonia. Kiuprili sent an army against them and defeated them in two engagements. As a result, nearly all the important posts south of the Danube were recovered and the pressure on the Empire in this quarter was removed. Zadé Kiuprili now took command of the army in person, and in August, 1690, advanced through Bulgaria, drove the Austrians from their position between Sofia and Nisch, and besieged and captured the latter place. He then attacked and captured in succession Semendria, Widdin, and Belgrade. Another Ottoman army under Tekeli Pasha invaded Transylvania and drove the Austrians from it. Kiuprili returned to Constantinople covered with glory.

About this time Sultan Solyman died and was succeeded by his brother, Achmet II, who, like himself, had been brought up in the seclusion of the Seraglio, and was quite incompetent to rule the Empire or to lead its armies. Fortunately he left matters in the hands of his Grand Vizier. Kiuprili again led the army in the field and, advancing from Belgrade in May, 1696, marched northwards on the right bank of the Danube to meet the Austrians under Prince Louis of Baden, who were advancing from Peterwardein. The two armies met at Salankemen. Their flotillas engaged on the Danube and the Turks were there the victors. But on land the battle ended in great disaster to them. Against the advice of the most experienced of his generals, Zadé Kiuprili insisted on fighting, without waiting for reinforcements that were on their way. A most desperate battle took place in which the Turks were completely defeated. The Grand Vizier, in the hope of restoring the fortunes of the day, rushed into the mêlée, sword in hand, and was killed while hewing his way through the Austrian ranks. The Turkish troops were dispirited by the death of their general and gave way. Panic and rout followed. The Turkish camp and a hundred and twenty guns fell into the hands of the Austrians. About the same time Tekeli Pasha was also defeated by the Austrians and was driven out of Transylvania. The Ottoman Empire was again at a very low ebb after these disasters. Sultan Achmet died heartbroken by the burden of shame and grief, and was succeeded by his nephew, Mustapha II, the son of Mahomet IV.

The new Sultan was not wanting in the will to relieve the plight of his country, but it will be seen that he had not the capacity or the persistency required in such an emergency. He fully recognized that the main causes of disaster were the dissolute habits and incapacity of his predecessors. Immediately after his accession to the throne he issued a Hatti-Scheriff in which he announced his intention of restoring ancient usages and leading his armies in person. In the course of this notable document he said:—

Under monarchs who are the slaves of pleasure or who resign
themselves to indolent slumber, never do the servants of God enjoy
peace or repose. Henceforth voluptuousness, idle pastime, and sloth
are banished from this Court. While the Padishahs who have ruled
since the death of our sublime father Mahomet have heeded naught
but their fondness for pleasure and for ease, the unbelievers, the
unclean beings, have invaded with their armies the four frontiers of
Islam. They have subdued our provinces. They have pillaged the goods
of the people of Mahomet. They have dragged away into slavery the
faithful with their wives and little ones. This is known to all, as
it is known to me. I therefore have resolved, with the help of the
Lord, to take a signal revenge upon the unbelievers, that brood of
hell; and I will myself begin the holy war against them.... Do thou,
my Grand Vizier, and ye others, my viziers, my ulemas, my lieutenants
and agas of my armies, do ye all of you assemble round my person
and meditate well on this my imperial Hatti-Scheriff. Take counsel
and inform me if I ought to open hostilities in person against the
Emperor or remain at Adrianople. Of these two measures choose that
which will be most profitable to the Faith to the Empire and to the
servants of God.[28]

In response to this, the Divan met and discussed for three days whether the new Sultan should command in person the army about to be sent against the Austrians. They came to an adverse decision. They thought that it would not only expose the sacred person of the Sultan to too much risk, but would also involve excessive expense. They probably thought also, but scarcely dared to express it, that the Sultan, being quite inexperienced in military matters, would be an encumbrance to the army. They advised the Sultan that he ought not to commit his imperial person to the chances of a campaign, but would do better to leave the conduct of the war to the Grand Vizier. The Sultan replied in the laconic words, “I persist in marching.” In accordance with this decision, Mustapha in person, in spite of his inexperience, led a well appointed army in the summer of 1696 from Belgrade to Temesvar, capturing on the way various minor fortified places. His first encounter with the enemy near Temesvar was successful. The Austrians were defeated with heavy loss and Temesvar was relieved. Mustapha, however, did not pursue his success further. He returned to Constantinople and there received an ovation.

In the following year, 1697, Mustapha again marched with his army from Belgrade into Hungary, without any definite plans as to what he proposed to do. After many councils of war and much irresolution, it was decided to advance northwards to the River Theiss. The Austrian army was now under command of Prince Eugène of Savoy, who, we have seen, made his début at the siege of Vienna. He was the ablest general of his time. The two armies met at Zenta on the River Theiss, about sixty miles above its junction with the Danube. The Turks had erected a bridge over the river at this point. The Sultan and his cavalry, and a great part of the artillery, had already crossed the bridge. The infantry were still on the other side. Prince Eugène with his army, coming suddenly upon them, caught the Turkish army _in flagrante delicto_, divided by the river. Advancing in a wide crescent, he attacked the whole line of the Ottoman infantry who had not crossed the river. There was great confusion in the ranks of the Ottomans and discord among the leading officers and a want of direction. A large body of Janissaries mutinied on the field of battle and began to massacre their officers. There ensued an overwhelming defeat of the Ottomans. Twenty-six thousand Turks were slain on the battlefield and ten thousand were drowned in their attempt to cross the river.

The Grand Vizier, four other viziers, and a great number of pashas and thirty aghas of Janissaries were killed; four hundred and twenty standards were captured. The Sultan, who had witnessed the battle from the other side of the river in comparative safety, was able to escape with some of his cavalry to Temesvar, and thence he returned to Belgrade and Constantinople. This experience satisfied his military ardour, and he never again appeared at the head of his army. An immense booty fell into the hands of the Austrians. All the Turkish guns were captured. What remained of the army defeated at Zenta found its way to Belgrade, and thence returned to Adrianople, while Prince Eugène crossed the Danube into Bosnia and made himself master of the greater part of that province. This great victory of the Austrians, after fourteen years of almost uninterrupted success, decided not only the campaign but the war in their favour, and marked irrevocably the decadence of the military power of the Ottoman Empire.

Six days after the battle the Sultan, in his peril, turned once more to the Kiuprili family for help. In place of the Grand Vizier, who had been killed at Zenta, he appointed Hussein Kiuprili, a son of the elder brother of Mahomet Kiuprili, and therefore a cousin of Ahmed. Until the siege of Vienna he had given himself up to a life of pleasure, but after that grave defeat of the Turks he filled with great distinction many high posts in the government. He was the fourth member of his family to hold the position of Grand Vizier, and showed himself fully capable of bearing the burden.

In the course of the following winter of 1697-8, many efforts were made to bring about peace. Lord Paget, the British Ambassador, offered the mediation of Great Britain and Holland on the principle of _Uti possidetis_—that each of the Powers concerned, Austria, Venice, and Poland, were to retain what they had wrested from Turkey. Hussein Kiuprili summoned a great Council of State to consider this. He had personally fought at St. Gotthard and other battles, and fully recognized the superiority of the Austrian army. The Ottomans, since the siege of Vienna, had been defeated by them in nine great battles, and had lost by siege nine fortresses of the first rank. He felt that if the war were prolonged there would be further reverses of the same kind. At his instance, it was decided by the Council to accept the mediation of Great Britain and Holland. The other Powers, with the exception of Russia, were equally willing. The Czar, Peter the Great, alone objected, and warned the other Powers not to trust in Great Britain and Holland, who, he said, were only thinking of their own commercial interests. In spite of his efforts, it was decided to hold a Peace Congress, at which all these Powers, including Russia, eventually were represented. It was held at Carlowitz, not far from Peterwardein, on the Danube, and after seventy-two days’ discussion and negotiation it resulted in peace on the basis suggested by Lord Paget. Austria, it was finally agreed, was to retain possession of Transylvania and Sclavonia and of all Hungary north of the River Marosch and west of the River Theiss. This left to the Ottomans only about one-third of their previous dominions in Hungary. The Emperor also was relieved from payment of tribute in respect of Hungary and Transylvania. The Republic of Venice was to retain the Morea and Albania, but was to give up its conquests north of the Isthmus of Corinth—the only departure from the principle of _Uti possidetis_. The Republic was also relieved from payment of tribute to the Porte in respect of the island of Zante. Poland was to retain Podolia. Russia was to have Azoff and the districts north of the Sea of Azoff which were actually in her occupation. The Czar Peter was dissatisfied with this and refused to enter into a treaty upon these terms. He would only agree to an armistice for two years on this basis. The other three Powers concerned entered into treaties of peace for twenty-five years.

This treaty of Carlowitz was of supreme importance in the international relations of Europe. It recognized for first time that the status of the Ottoman Empire was a matter for the concern of all the Powers of Europe, and not only of those at war with it. It established the principle of equality of the Powers concerned, and rejected finally the pretensions of the Ottoman Empire, founded on its long career of conquest. Thenceforth there was no longer any fear of the invasion of Central Europe by the Turks. The settlement was not so ignominious to them as the later treaties of Passarowitch, Kainardji, Adrianople, and Berlin, but not the less it was a great triumph for the Christian Powers of Europe. In view of the long series of defeats of the Ottoman army and the exhausted state of the Empire, Hussein Kiuprili acted the part of a wise statesman in assenting to the treaty. If his advice and that of other members of his family had been followed, and the Christian subjects of the Empire had been treated with justice, later humiliations might have been avoided, and the Empire might have survived intact to a much later date.

Hussein Kiuprili retained the post of Grand Vizier for three years after the treaty of Carlowitz. During this time he showed that he had most of the qualities of his more distinguished relative, Ahmed Kiuprili. He was a man of high culture and public spirit. He did his best by wise and salutary reforms to stem the growing evils of the State. He aimed at curbing the mutinous power of the Janissaries. He endeavoured in many ways to improve the deplorable condition of the rayas. His reforms met with violent opposition from reactionaries. His health broke down under the stress and he was compelled to resign his post. He died within a few weeks, in 1702. His reforms did not survive him. His successor, Daltaban Pasha, was a man of a totally different type, a savage Serbian, who could neither read nor write, and who had acquired a reputation for gross cruelty which he fully justified in his more exalted position.

Once again, in 1710, another member of the Kiuprili family, Nououman Kiuprili, was appointed Grand Vizier, but though he had many of the virtues of his race he did not prove to be equal to the post. He insisted on attempting to do too much. He interfered with every detail of the State and accumulated the hostility of all his subordinates. The affairs of the government fell into confusion and he was in consequence deposed after a very few months. The names of five other members of the same family appear in the history of the next few years as generals and governors of provinces.

It may be doubted whether in the annals of any country a single family has produced so many distinguished men, owing their position, not to personal favour, but to their own merits and to the exigencies of the State. The case is unique in the history of Turkey, where it would be difficult to find another instance where two members of any family rose to distinction.

XIV

TO THE TREATY OF PASSAROWITCH

1702-18

MUSTAPHA did not long survive as Sultan the death of his great Vizier, Hussein, the fourth of the Kiuprilis. He had not fulfilled the early expectation of his reign, when, against the advice of the Divan, he took command of his army in the field. Disappointed and discouraged by his failure, he fell back on a life of indolence and debauchery. After the death of Hussein Kiuprili there was widespread discontent throughout the Empire, and in most parts imminent danger of rebellion. Mustapha had not the courage to cope with it. He abdicated the throne and retired voluntarily to the Cage. He was succeeded by his brother, Achmet III, at the age of thirty, who reigned for twenty-seven years till he was deposed at the instigation of the Janissaries.

Achmet had not been subjected by his uncle to the customary seclusion. He came to the throne, therefore, with greater knowledge of the world. He was not a warrior. He did not attempt to lead his armies in the field. But he did not allow the affairs of State to fall into the hands of women of his harem. Neither did he permit ambitious Viziers to monopolize power. He changed them so often that this was impossible. During the first fifteen years of his reign there were twelve Grand Viziers. It was imputed to him that these frequent changes were due to his want of money and the extravagances of his harem. It was the custom for Grand Viziers, on their appointment, to make very large presents in money to the Sultan, and Achmet looked on this as a source of income. But during their short tenures of office he interfered very little with them. He was, however, personally in favour of a policy of peace, and supported his Viziers in its maintenance. The first six years and the last twelve years of his reign were periods of almost unbroken peace to the Empire. In the other nine years there were many important events bearing on the extension or reduction of his Empire. Territory formerly in the possession of the Ottomans was reconquered, and provinces long held by them were lost. The city of Azoff and its adjoining territory—important for the protection of the Crimea—were recovered from Russia. The Morea and Albania were reconquered from the Republic of Venice. By agreement with Russia a partition was made of important provinces belonging to Persia, some of which had formerly been in the possession of the Porte. On the other hand, as the result of war with Austria, the remaining part of Hungary, not included in the cession made by the treaty of Carlowitz, and considerable parts of Serbia and Wallachia were lost to the Empire. The gains in territory exceeded in area the losses. But there can be little doubt that the loss of prestige by the Ottomans from the defeats of their armies by the Austrians under Prince Eugène was not compensated for by victories over the Venetians and Persians, or over the very inferior army of Peter the Great.

The first of the wars thus referred to was that with Russia, then under the rule of Peter the Great. He was ambitious of extending his Empire by the acquisition of the Crimea, and of thus getting access to the Black Sea. It was only after the defeat of Charles XII, the King of Sweden, at the battle of Pultowa in 1709, and the consequent conquest of Livonia, that his hands were free for aggression elsewhere. Russia was already in possession of the important fortress of Azoff, on the north-east shore of the sea of that name. The Czar had also fortified Taganrog and other places threatening the Crimea. The Porte was alarmed by these manifest preparations for war. The relations of the two Governments were also embittered by the fact that the Swedish King, Charles XII, after his defeat at Pultowa, sought refuge in Turkey, and that the Sultan accorded a generous hospitality to him, and with great magnanimity refused the demand of Peter for his extradition. It followed that, in 1711, the Porte anticipated the undoubted hostile intention of the Czar, and declared war against Russia. An army was sent by the Sultan across the River Pruth into Moldavia, under command of Grand Vizier Baltadji. This pasha had risen to his post from the humble position of woodcutter at the palace, through the intrigues of his wife, who had been a slave in the Sultan’s harem. The Czar, on his part, had collected his forces in the south of Poland and marched into Moldavia. The two armies met on the River Pruth. The Russian army, already greatly reduced in number by want of food and disease, numbered no more than twenty-four thousand men. The Ottomans, who had been reinforced by a large body of Tartars, under the Khan of the Crimea, were at least five times more numerous. The Czar Peter, unaware that the Ottomans had crossed the Danube, advanced rashly on the right bank of the Pruth, and was posted between that river and an extensive marsh not far from Zurawna. The position was dominated by hills, which the Grand Vizier occupied in force, and his numerous and powerful guns swept the position of the Russians, cut off their access to the river, and completely hemmed them in. Their plight is best described in a letter which the Czar wrote to the Russian Senate at Moscow from his camp at this point:—

I announce to you that, deceived by false intelligence and without
blame on my part, I find myself shut up in my camp by a Turkish army.
Our supplies are cut off, and we momentarily expect to be destroyed
or taken prisoners, unless Heaven should come to our aid in some
unexpected manner. Should it happen to me to be taken prisoner by the
Turks you will no longer consider me as your Czar and Sovereign, nor
will you pay any attention to any orders that may be brought to you
from me, not even if you recognize my handwriting; but you will wait
for my coming in person. If I am to perish here, and you receive well
confirmed intelligence of my death, you will then proceed to choose
as my successor him who is most worthy among you.

There can be no doubt that the Russian army was completely at the mercy of the Ottomans, and might have been entirely destroyed or captured. It was saved from either fate by the Czar’s wife, Catherine. She was the daughter of a peasant, married in the first instance to a dragoon in the Russian army, and later the mistress of Prince Menschikoff. Peter, smitten by her beauty and wit had recently married her, and she was with him on this campaign. This lady, with great presence of mind, collected what money she could, to the value of a few thousand roubles, and sent it and her jewellery with a letter to the Kiaya of the Grand Vizier, suggesting a suspension of hostilities with a view to terms of agreement. In this way relations were established between the two generals, and a treaty of peace was agreed to. Its terms were very humiliating to Russia. Azoff and its surrounding district were to be surrendered to the Porte. Taganrog and some other fortresses were to be dismantled. The Russian army was to withdraw from Poland. The King of Sweden was to be allowed safe conduct through Russia to his own country. There was to be no Russian ambassador in the future at Constantinople. In return for these great concessions the Russian army was to be permitted to retreat without molestation.

The preamble to the treaty contained the following remarkable admission of the predicament in which the Czar and his army were placed:—

By the grace of God, the victorious Mussulman army has closely hemmed
the Czar of Muscovy with all his troops in the neighbourhood of the
River Pruth, and the Czar has asked for peace, and it is at his
request that the following articles are drawn up and granted.

It was also declared in the treaty by the Grand Vizier “that he made the peace by virtue of full powers vested in him, and that he entreated the Sultan to ratify the treaty, and overlook the previous evil conduct of the Czar.”

The signing of the treaty of the Pruth was vehemently opposed by the King of Sweden, who was in the Ottoman camp, and by the Khan of the Crimea. They doubtless had good reasons of their own for wishing the war with Russia to be prolonged. It was due to their intrigues at Constantinople that violent opposition was roused to the ratification of the treaty. Baltadji found on his return that, instead of being received with acclamation for having recovered Azoff and other territory, of which the Porte had been deprived a few years previously, he was dismissed from his office with disgrace. The Kiaya Osman and the Reis Effendi Omer, who were believed to be largely responsible for the treaty, were put to death by order of the Sultan.

The Porte refused to ratify the treaty, and preparations were made for a renewal of the war with Russia. But wiser counsels ultimately prevailed, largely through the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir R. Sutton; and two years later, after long negotiation, another treaty was concluded with the Czar, which embodied all the terms of that effected by Baltadji which had been so much objected to.

Many historians have found fault with Baltadji for having neglected the opportunity of destroying or capturing the Russian army and the Czar Peter himself, and for having allowed them to escape by concluding the treaty. It has been suggested that he was bribed by the Empress Catherine. It is, however, inconceivable that one in the high position of Grand Vizier, where there were such immense opportunities for enrichment, could have sold himself and his country for so small a price. It is more probable that the presents of the Empress were made to the subordinate of the Grand Vizier for the purpose of opening negotiations with him. It is also more reasonable to conclude that Baltadji was convinced that no better terms could be obtained by a prolongation of the war. The destruction of the Russian army or its capture, together with the Czar, would have roused the Russian people to a great effort to avenge such a disaster. It is significant that the Sultan, while putting to death the Kiaya and Reis Effendi, spared the life of Baltadji, who was mainly responsible, and simply dismissed him from the office of Grand Vizier. This seems to indicate that the Sultan had given authority in advance to Baltadji, as stated in the treaty, to agree to terms such as were actually obtained. It seems to be unlikely that Sultan Achmet desired to extend his Empire beyond the territory of Azoff into the heart of Russia. What better terms, then, could have been obtained by prolonging the war?

It has also been contended by some historians that it was unwise policy to impose such a humiliation on the Czar as that embodied in the treaty; that it was certain to lead to a renewal of the war for the purpose of avenging it. But the Czar himself did not apparently take this view of the case. After the escape of his army from disaster he showed no inclination to renew the war. He was willing, two years later, to re-enact the treaty, in spite of its humiliating terms. He did not break peace with the Turks in the remaining ten years of his reign. He did not bear a grudge against them and after a few years he entered into an arrangement with the Sultan for the partition of a large part of Persia.

On a review of the whole transaction, we must conclude that the Grand Vizier Baltadji was fully justified in effecting the treaty of the Pruth, and that it was no small achievement, by the skilful manœuvring of his army and without the loss of a single life, to impose terms on the Czar, under which the Ottoman Empire recovered Azoff and its district, the key to the Crimea, and obtained the other valuable concessions embodied in the treaty.

In 1715 the Porte embarked on another war, this time against the Republic of Venice, with the object of recovering the Morea, which sixteen years previously had been conquered by the Republic, when in alliance with Austria, and the possession of which had been confirmed to the Republic by the treaty of Carlowitz. Morosini, the Venetian general by whom this conquest had been achieved, was now dead. It was thought that Austria would not intervene. A pretext for the war was found in the assistance which the Republic rendered to the Montenegrins in an insurrection against the Porte. The army, which had been equipped for war with Russia, was now available for other purposes. The Grand Vizier Damad, who was also otherwise known as Coumourgi, son-in-law of the Sultan, took command of an army of a hundred thousand men. A fleet of one hundred sail co-operated by sea. The Sultan himself accompanied the army as far as Larissa, in Thessaly, but no farther. He left the direction of it wholly in the hands of Damad, who showed great ability in the conduct of the war. It commenced with the siege of Corinth, which, after a brave defence of three weeks, capitulated on July 7, 1715, on favourable terms. But a powder magazine blew up during the evacuation of the fortress, killing six or seven hundred of the Turkish soldiers. This afforded an excuse for breaking the agreement, and for a general massacre of Venetians and Greeks, whether of the garrison or inhabitants—much to the disapproval of Damad. This siege of Corinth formed the subject of Lord Byron’s well-known poem, in which Damad is referred to under the name of Coumourgi:—

Coumourgi—can his glory cease,
That latest conqueror of Greece,
Till Christian hands to Greece restore
The freedom Venice gave of yore?
A hundred years have rolled away
Since he refixed the Moslem sway.

With poetic licence Byron attributes to the Venetian governor of Corinth the setting fire to the powder magazine and the fearful destruction of life which it caused:—

When old Minotti’s hand
Touched with the torch the train—
’Tis fired.

There seems to have been no more justification in fact for this than for the statement that the Venetians gave liberty to the Greeks. Nothing is more certain than that the Greeks hated the rule of Venice as more oppressive than that of the Turks.

After the capture of Corinth the Ottoman army, in two divisions, invaded the Morea, and had no difficulty in capturing all the Venetian fortresses there, such as Modon, Coron, and Navarino. The Greek inhabitants gave no assistance to their Venetian masters. They welcomed the Turks as their deliverers from an odious tyranny.

The reconquest of the Morea occupied Damad and his army for only a hundred and one days. There was no pitched battle with the Venetians. The campaign consisted of a succession of sieges of fortresses. It was the intention of the Ottomans to complete the expulsion of the Venetians by the capture of Corfu and the other Ionian islands, but at this stage the Emperor of Austria, Charles VI, intervened, and entered into a defensive alliance with the Republic of Venice. It was too late, however, to save the Morea. There was much difference of opinion at the Court of the Sultan whether the action of Austria should be treated as a _casus belli_. The Grand Vizier Damad vehemently contended that it was a breach of the treaty of Carlowitz. He was a man of great force of character and very eloquent. But there was strong opposition to him. The debates in the Divan, in presence of the Sultan, have been recorded and are interesting reading. The Mufti, when consulted on the subject, gave his judgment in favour of Damad. This decided the Council. War was declared against Austria, and in 1716 an army of a hundred and fifty thousand was sent, under command of Damad, to attack the Austrians. It reached Belgrade in September. A council of war was then held to decide whether to advance towards Temesvar or Peterwardein. There was again difference on the subject. Damad ultimately gave his decision in favour of the latter project.

The Turks crossed the River Saave by a bridge of boats, and then marched along the bank of the Danube towards Peterwardein. Their van came in contact with that of the Austrians at the village of Carlowitz, where, sixteen years before, the last treaty had been signed. From Carlowitz to Peterwardein the distance is only two leagues. The Austrian army, greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Turks, was posted in front of the great fortress, behind entrenchments which had been made by Siawousch Pasha in the last war. It was again commanded by Prince Eugène of Savoy, who, in the interval, had gathered fresh laurels in many hard-fought battles for Austria, and who was second to no living general, save only the Duke of Marlborough, by whose side he fought so many battles. The two armies came to issue on August 10, 1716. At first the battle went in favour of the Ottomans. Their redoubtable Janissaries broke the line of the Austrian infantry opposed to them. Prince Eugène then brought up his reserve of cavalry. They charged the Janissaries with irresistible force, and retrieved the fortunes of the day. Damad Pasha, when he saw that the tide of battle was turning against him, put himself at the head of a band of officers and galloped into the thick of the battle, in the hope of infusing fresh courage in his army. He was struck down and was carried from the field to Carlowitz, where he died.

As so often happened to the Turks, the loss of their leader caused a panic in their ranks and completed their discomfiture. Their left wing retreated in the direction of Belgrade, and was followed by the débris of the rest of the army. One hundred and forty of their guns were captured. Their camp and an immense booty fell into the hands of the enemy. The battle, however, was not very costly in men to either side. The Austrians lost three thousand men and the Turks about double the number. Eugène followed up his success by the siege of Temesvar, the last great stronghold of the Ottomans in Hungary. He appeared before it twenty days after the battle of Peterwardein. Its garrison of eighteen thousand men capitulated, after a siege of five weeks, on November 25th. This completed the campaign of 1716. The Turks had not been more successful in other directions. They were compelled to raise the siege of Corfu. Their fleet often met that of the Venetians and had rather the worst of it, though there was no decisive battle.

In the year following, 1717, another large army was sent from Constantinople to the Danube, under Grand Vizier Khalil, who had succeeded Damad after the battle of Peterwardein. It consisted of a hundred and fifty thousand men, of whom eighty thousand were Janissaries and Spahis. It was no more fortunate than that under Damad in the previous year. Prince Eugène, still in command of the Austrians, had opened the campaign by marching to Belgrade with a force of not more than seventy thousand men. He besieged the city and fortress, which was garrisoned by thirty thousand Ottomans. When, after three weeks of siege, the Ottoman army came in sight, so vastly superior in numbers, the position of Eugène was most critical. The garrison of Belgrade was in front of him and Khalil’s army, double in number of his own, threatened his rear.

It is highly probable that if the Ottoman general had attacked the Austrians without delay he would have been successful. He hesitated and delayed. He ended by an effort to besiege the besiegers. He entrenched his army in the rear of that of Eugène. The two armies then fired their heavy guns on one another without much result. The Turks were greatly superior in this respect. They were provided with a hundred and forty guns and thirty-five mortars. Failure of food would have compelled the Turks to an issue. But Prince Eugène anticipated this by making an attack himself on the Ottoman lines. Never was a bolder course attempted by a general, and never was there a more brilliant success. With greatly inferior force, the Austrians stormed the Turkish lines on August 16, 1717, little more than a year from the day on which the battle of Peterwardein had been fought. The Ottomans gave way along their whole line. Twenty thousand of them were killed or wounded, while the loss of the Austrians in killed was no more than two thousand. Prince Eugène himself was wounded for the thirteenth time in his great career. The Turks retreated in disorder. They lost a hundred and thirty-one guns and thirty-five mortars and a vast supply of munitions. On the following day Belgrade and its garrison of thirty thousand men surrendered.

After the battle before Belgrade and the capture of that fortress, the Austrians advanced and occupied a great part of Serbia and Western Wallachia. They appealed to the Serbian people to rise against their Ottoman masters, but not more than twelve hundred answered the appeal and joined the Austrian army. There was no desire on the part of the Serbians to exchange Turkish for Austrian rule. The occupation by the Austrians of territory south of the Danube proved to be temporary. Twenty-two years later the Ottomans recaptured Belgrade and drove the Austrians from Serbia.

Meanwhile the Grand Vizier Khalil was dismissed from office by the Sultan for the incapacity which he had shown in the campaign and in the battle of Belgrade. After a time he was succeeded by Damad Ibrahim, a son-in-law and lifelong favourite of the Sultan, who held the post for twelve years, till the deposition of Achmet in 1730. He proved himself in every way worthy of his high office. There was a desire in many quarters to embark on another campaign for the recovery of Hungary. But in the winter of 1717-18 the British Ambassador again proposed mediation, on behalf of England and Holland, on the principle of _Uti possidetis_. This was accepted by both Austria and the Porte. The Emperor was willing to content himself with what he had already achieved, the more so as there was danger of war in other directions. There was more difficulty on the part of the Ottomans. But the Sultan and the Grand Vizier ultimately gave their decision in favour of peace.

The precedent of the Congress of Carlowitz was closely followed. A congress was held at Passarowitch, a small town in Serbia. England and Holland again acted as mediators. After long discussion, agreement was arrived at, and was embodied in a treaty known as that of Passarowitch, on July 21, 1718. By its terms the whole of what remained of Hungary to the Ottoman Empire after the treaty of Carlowitz, a large part of Wallachia, bounded by the River Aluta, and the greater part of Serbia, and a portion of Bosnia bounded by the Rivers Morava, Drina, and Unna, together with the fortresses of Belgrade and Semendria, were ceded to the Emperor.

The Republic of Venice, on whose behalf Austria had embarked on the war, fared badly by the treaty. It had to give up to Ottoman rule the whole of the Morea which had been reconquered by Damad, but received some concessions in Dalmatia. It was, however, arranged by the Congress that the Porte should have an access to the Adriatic, so as to protect the Republic of Ragusa from Venice. There remained to Venice of its possessions in this quarter only the island of Corfu, the other Ionian islands, and a few ports on the Albanian and Dalmatian coasts. The Porte engaged by the treaty to put a stop to the piracy of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Ragusa, and to prohibit the residence of the Hungarian rebels in the vicinity of the new Austrian frontier.

The treaty of Passarowitch, following on the great defeats of the Ottomans at the battles of Peterwardein and Belgrade, was almost as important as that of Carlowitz. It determined finally the release of the whole of Hungary from the Ottomans. Their rule there had never been more than a military occupation. There was no real incorporation of the country in the Ottoman Empire. There had been no attempt to settle Turks there, or to impose the Moslem religion on its population. After the expulsion of the garrisons from the various fortresses, all vestiges of the Ottomans disappeared, and no trace of them remained as evidence that they had ever been masters there.[29] It was a great achievement of the Austrians, for which Prince Eugène was mainly responsible. It should be added, however, that there does not appear to have been any popular rising of the people of Hungary, whether Magyars or Sclavs, either in these last two years of war or in the previous war of 1698-9, against their Ottoman rulers. It has been shown that the earlier war had its commencement in an insurrection against the Austrians in that part of Hungary subject to their rule. The Turks hoped to take advantage of this. They appear to have been in close relation with these insurgents throughout these two wars. The Austrians defeated the Turks and drove them out of the country, but their bigoted tyranny was not more acceptable to the inhabitants than that of the Turks. Many years were to elapse before the Magyars of Hungary secured for themselves the benefits of self-government.

The war with Austria, which resulted in the treaty of Passarowitch, did something more than free Hungary from Ottoman rule. It completed the destruction of the prestige of the Turkish armies which had so long weighed on the mind of Europe. The great battles of Peterwardein and Belgrade, in which the Turks were defeated by Austrian armies of very inferior numbers, following as they did a long succession of similar defeats from the battle of St. Gotthard downwards, showed conclusively that the Ottoman armies were no match for the well-disciplined forces of Austria when led by competent generals. The Ottomans seem to have been completely cowed by the succession of defeats. Thenceforth they were always on the defensive in Europe, and never willingly acted the part of aggressors. It became the settled conviction of Europe not only that there was no longer any reason to fear invasion from the Turks, but that it was only a question of time when they would be driven back into Asia.

XV

TO THE TREATY OF BELGRADE

1718-39