Chapter XXIII: Part 23

We now proceed to that theory of yours, according to which the variety of ideas can be explained from the variety of mental impressions, without any reference to external things, and remark that on your doctrine the existence of mental impressions is impossible, as you do not admit the perception of external things. For the variety of mental impressions is caused altogether by the variety of the things perceived. How, indeed, could various impressions originate if no external things were perceived? The hypothesis of a beginningless series of mental impressions would lead only to a baseless regressus ad infinitum, sublative of the entire phenomenal world, and would in no way establish your position.--The same argument, i.e. the one founded on the impossibility of mental impressions which are not caused by external things, refutes also the positive and negative judgments, on the ground of which the denier of an external world above attempted to show that ideas are caused by mental impressions, not by external things. We rather have on our side a positive and a negative judgment whereby to establish our doctrine of the existence of external things, viz. 'the perception of external things is admitted to take place also without mental impressions,' and 'mental impressions are not admitted to originate independently of the perception of external things.'--Moreover, an impression is a kind of modification, and modifications cannot, as experience teaches, take place unless there is some substratum which is modified. But, according to your doctrine, such a substratum of impressions does not exist, since you say that it cannot be cognised through any means of knowledge.

31. And on account of the momentariness (of the âlayavij/ñ/âna, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).

If you maintain that the so-called internal cognition (âlayavij/ñ/âna[410]) assumed by you may constitute the abode of the mental impressions, we deny that, because that cognition also being admittedly momentary, and hence non-permanent, cannot be the abode of impressions any more than the quasi-external cognitions (prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/âna). For unless there exists one continuous principle equally connected with the past, the present, and the future[411], or an absolutely unchangeable (Self) which cognises everything, we are unable to account for remembrance, recognition, and so on, which are subject to mental impressions dependent on place, time, and cause. If, on the other hand, you declare your âlayavij/ñ/âna to be something permanent, you thereby abandon your tenet of the âlayavij/ñ/âna as well as everything else being momentary.--Or (to explain the Sûtra in a different way) as the tenet of general momentariness is characteristic of the systems of the idealistic as well as the realistic Bauddhas, we may bring forward against the doctrines of the former all those arguments dependent on the principle of general momentariness which we have above urged against the latter.

We have thus refuted both nihilistic doctrines, viz. the doctrine which maintains the (momentary) reality of the external world, and the doctrine which asserts that ideas only exist. The third variety of Bauddha doctrine, viz. that everything is empty (i.e. that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation. For this apparent world, whose existence is guaranteed by all the means of knowledge, cannot be denied, unless some one should find out some new truth (based on which he could impugn its existence)--for a general principle is proved by the absence of contrary instances.

32. And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

No further special discussion is in fact required. From whatever new points of view the Bauddha system is tested with reference to its probability, it gives way on all sides, like the walls of a well dug in sandy soil. It has, in fact, no foundation whatever to rest upon, and hence the attempts to use it as a guide in the practical concerns of life are mere folly.--Moreover, Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory systems, teaching respectively the reality of the external world, the reality of ideas only, and general nothingness, has himself made it clear either that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions, or else that hatred of all beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused.--So that--and this the Sûtra means to indicate--Buddha's doctrine has to be entirely disregarded by all those who have a regard for their own happiness.

33. On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

Having disposed of the Bauddha doctrine we now turn to the system of the Gymnosophists (Jainas).

The Jainas acknowledge seven categories (tattvas), viz. soul (jîva), non-soul (ajîva), the issuing outward (âsrava), restraint (sa/m/vara), destruction (nirjara), bondage (bandha), and release (moksha)[412]. Shortly it may be said that they acknowledge two categories, viz. soul and non-soul, since the five other categories may be subsumed under these two.--They also set forth a set of categories different from the two mentioned. They teach that there are five so-called astikâyas ('existing bodies,' i.e. categories), viz. the categories of soul (jîva), body (pudgala), merit (dharma), demerit (adharma), and space (âkâ/s/a). All these categories they again subdivide in various fanciful ways[413].--To all things they apply the following method of reasoning, which they call the saptabha@ngînaya: somehow it is; somehow it is not; somehow it is and is not; somehow it is indescribable; somehow it is and is indescribable; somehow it is not and is indescribable; somehow it is and is not and is indescribable.

To this unsettling style of reasoning they submit even such conceptions as that of unity and eternity[414].

This doctrine we meet as follows.--Your reasoning, we say, is inadmissible 'on account of the impossibility in one thing.' That is to say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such or not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is,' 'somehow it is not,' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion; partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the Tîrthakara (Jina) teach with any claim to authority, and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman.--Again, if we apply the Jaina reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact, they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person.--If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are eternal or non-eternal, the absence of all determinate knowledge which is implied in such statements will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And, moreover, it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul, and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained, and which you describe as having existed from all eternity, relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination.--As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non-being cannot belong to any of the categories--being excluding non-being and vice versâ non-being excluding being--the doctrine of the Ârhat must be rejected.--The above remarks dispose likewise of the assertions made by the Jainas as to the impossibility of deciding whether of one thing there is to be predicated oneness or plurality, permanency or non-permanency, separateness or norn-separateness, and so on.--The Jaina doctrine that aggregates are formed from the atoms--by them called pudgalas--we do not undertake to refute separately as its refutation is already comprised in that of the atomistic doctrine given in a previous part of this work.

34. And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

We have hitherto urged against the Jaina doctrine an objection resulting from the syâdvâda, viz. that one thing cannot have contradictory attributes. We now turn to the objection that from their doctrine it would follow that the individual Self is not universal, i.e. not omnipresent.--The Jainas are of opinion that the soul has the same size as the body. From this it would follow that the soul is not of infinite extension, but limited, and hence non-eternal like jars and similar things. Further, as the bodies of different classes of creatures are of different size, it might happen that the soul of a man--which is of the size of the human body--when entering, in consequence of its former deeds, on a new state of existence in the body of an elephant would not be able to fill the whole of it; or else that a human soul being relegated to the body of an ant would not be able to find sufficient room in it. The same difficulty would, moreover, arise with regard to the successive stages of one state of existence, infancy, youth, and old age.--But why, the Jaina may ask, should we not look upon the soul as consisting of an infinite number of parts capable of undergoing compression in a small body and dilatation in a big one?--Do you, we ask in return, admit or not admit that those countless particles of the soul may occupy the same place or not?--If you do not admit it, it follows that the infinite number of particles cannot be contained in a body of limited dimensions.--If you do admit it, it follows that, as then the space occupied by all the particles may be the space of one particle only, the extension of all the particles together will remain inconsiderable, and hence the soul be of minute size (not of the size of the body). You have, moreover, no right to assume that a body of limited size contains an infinite number of soul particles.

Well the, the Jaina may reply, let us assume that by turns whenever the soul enters a big body some particles accede to it while some withdraw from it whenever it enters a small body.--To this hypothesis the next Sûtra furnishes a reply.

35. Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

Nor can the doctrine of the soul having the same size as the body be satisfactorily established by means of the hypothesis of the successive accession and withdrawal of particles. For this hypothesis would involve the soul's undergoing changes and the like. If the soul is continually being repleted and depleted by the successive addition and withdrawal of parts, it of course follows that it undergoes change, and if it is liable to change it follows that it is non-permanent, like the skin and similar substances. From that, again, it follows that the Jaina doctrine of bondage and release is untenable; according to which doctrine 'the soul, which in the state of bondage is encompassed by the ogdoad of works and sunk in the ocean of sa/m/sâra, rises when its bonds are sundered, as the gourd rises to the surface of the water when it is freed from the encumbering clay[415].'--Moreover, those particles which in turns come and depart have the attributes of coming and going, and cannot, on that account, be of the nature of the Self any more than the body is. And if it be said that the Self consists of some permanently remaining parts, we remark that it would be impossible to determine which are the permanent and which the temporary parts.--We have further to ask from whence those particles originate when they accede to the soul, and into what they are merged when they detach themselves from it. They cannot spring from the material elements and re-enter the elements; for the soul is immaterial. Nor have we any means to prove the existence of some other, general or special, reservoir of soul-particles.--Moreover, on the hypothesis under discussion the soul would be of indefinite nature, as the size of the particles acceding and departing is itself indefinite.--On account of all these and similar difficulties it cannot be maintained that certain particles by turns attach themselves to, and detach themselves from, the soul.

The Sûtra may be taken in a different sense also. The preceding Sûtra has proved that the soul if of the same size as the body cannot be permanent, as its entering into bigger and smaller bodies involves its limitation. To this the Gymnosophist may be supposed to rejoin that although the soul's size successively changes it may yet be permanent, just as the stream of water is permanent (although the water continually changes). An analogous instance would be supplied by the permanency of the stream of ideas while the individual ideas, as that of a red cloth and so on, are non-permanent.--To this rejoinder our Sûtra replies that if the stream is not real we are led back to the doctrine of a general void, and that, if it is something real, the difficulties connected with the soul's changing, &c. present themselves and render the Jaina view impossible.

36. And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).

Moreover, the Jainas themselves admit the permanency of the final size of the soul which it has in the state of release. From this it follows also that its initial size and its intervening sizes must be permanent[416], and that hence there is no difference between the three sizes. But this would involve the conclusion that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size, and that the soul cannot enter into bigger and smaller bodies.--Or else (to explain the Sûtra in a somewhat different way) from the fact that the final size of the soul is permanent, it follows that its size in the two previous conditions also is permanent. Hence the soul must be considered as being always of the same size--whether minute or infinite--and not of the varying size of its bodies.--For this reason also the doctrine of the Arhat has to be set aside as not in any way more rational than the doctrine of Buddha.

37. The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).

The Sûtrakâra now applies himself to the refutation of that doctrine, according to which the Lord is the cause of the world only in so far as he is the general ruler.--But how do you know that that is the purport of the Sûtra (which speaks of the Lord 'without any qualification')?--From the circumstance, we reply, that the teacher himself has proved, in the previous sections of the work, that the Lord is the material cause as well as the ruler of the world. Hence, if the present Sûtra were meant to impugn the doctrine of the Lord in general, the earlier and later parts of the work would be mutually contradictory, and the Sûtrakâra would thus be in conflict with himself. We therefore must assume that the purport of the present Sûtra is to make an energetic attack on the doctrine of those who maintain that the Lord is not the material cause, but merely the ruler, i.e. the operative cause of the world; a doctrine entirely opposed to the Vedântic tenet of the unity of Brahman.

The theories about the Lord which are independent of the Vedânta are of various nature. Some taking their stand on the Sâ@nkhya and Yoga systems assume that the Lord acts as a mere operative cause, as the ruler of the pradhâna and of the souls, and that pradhâna, soul, and Lord are of mutually different nature.--The Máhe/s/varas (/S/aivas) maintain that the five categories, viz. effect, cause, union, ritual, the end of pain, were taught by the Lord Pa/s/upati (/S/iva) to the end of breaking the bonds of the animal (i.e. the soul); Pa/s/upati is, according to them, the Lord, the operative cause.--Similarly, the Vai/s/eshikas and others also teach, according to their various systems, that the Lord is somehow the operative cause of the world.

Against all these opinions the Sûtra remarks 'the Lord, on account of the inappropriateness.' I.e. it is not possible that the Lord as the ruler of the pradhâna and the soul should be the cause of the world, on account of the inappropriateness of that doctrine. For if the Lord is supposed to assign to the various classes of animate creatures low, intermediate, and high positions, according to his liking, it follows that he is animated by hatred, passion, and so on, is hence like one of us, and is no real Lord. Nor can we get over this difficulty by assuming that he makes his dispositions with a view to the merit and demerit of the living beings; for that assumption would lead us to a logical see-saw, the Lord as well as the works of living beings having to be considered in turns both as acting and as acted upon. This difficulty is not removed by the consideration that the works of living beings and the resulting dispositions made by the Lord form a chain which has no beginning; for in past time as well as in the present mutual interdependence of the two took place, so that the beginningless series is like an endless chain of blind men leading other blind men. It is, moreover, a tenet set forth by the Naiyâyikas themselves that 'imperfections have the characteristic of being the causes of action' (Nyâya Sùtra I, 1, 18). Experience shows that all agents, whether they be active for their own purposes or for the purposes of something else, are impelled to action by some imperfection. And even if it is admitted that an agent even when acting for some extrinsic purpose is impelled by an intrinsic motive, your doctrine remains faulty all the same; for the Lord is no longer a Lord, even if he is actuated by intrinsic motives only (such as the desire of removing the painful feeling connected with pity).--Your doctrine is finally inappropriate for that reason also that you maintain the Lord to be a special kind of soul; for from that it follows that he must be devoid of all activity.

38. And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhâna).

Against the doctrine which we are at present discussing there lies the further objection that a Lord distinct from the pradhâna and the souls cannot be the ruler of the latter without being connected with them in a certain way. But of what nature is that connexion to be? It cannot be conjunction (sa/m/yoga), because the Lord, as well as the pradhâna and the souls, is of infinite extent and devoid of parts. Nor can it be inherence, since it would be impossible to define who should be the abode and who the abiding thing. Nor is it possible to assume some other connexion, the special nature of which would have to be inferred from the effect, because the relation of cause and effect is just what is not settled as yet[417].--How, then, it may be asked, do you--the Vedântins--establish the relation of cause and effect (between the Lord and the world)?--There is, we reply, no difficulty in our case, as the connexion we assume is that of identity (tâdâtmya). The adherent of Brahman, moreover, defines the nature of the cause, and so on, on the basis of Scripture, and is therefore not obliged to render his tenets throughout conformable to observation. Our adversary, on the other hand, who defines the nature of the cause and the like according to instances furnished by experience, may be expected to maintain only such doctrines as agree with experience. Nor can he put forward the claim that Scripture, because it is the production of the omniscient Lord, may be used to confirm his doctrine as well as that of the Vedântin; for that would involve him in a logical see-saw, the omniscience of the Lord being established on the doctrine of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture again being established on the omniscience of the Lord.--For all these reasons the Sâ@nkhya-yoga hypothesis about the Lord is devoid of foundation. Other similar hypotheses which likewise are not based on the Veda are to be refuted by corresponding arguments.

39. And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).

The Lord of the argumentative philosophers is an untenable hypothesis, for the following reason also.--Those philosophers are obliged to assume that by his influence the Lord produces action in the pradhâna, &c. just as the potter produces motion in the clay, &c. But this cannot be admitted; for the pradhâna, which is devoid of colour and other qualities, and therefore not an object of perception, is on that account of an altogether different nature from clay and the like, and hence cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action.

40. If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhâna is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

Well, the opponent might reply, let us suppose that the Lord rules the pradhâna in the same way as the soul rules the organ of sight and the other organs which are devoid of colour, and so on, and hence not objects of perception.

This analogy also, we reply, proves nothing. For we infer that the organs are ruled by the soul, from the observed fact that the soul feels pleasure, pain, and the like (which affect the soul through the organs). But we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, &c. caused by the pradhâna. If the analogy between the pradhâna and the bodily organs were a complete one, it would follow that the Lord is affected by pleasure and pain no less than the transmigrating souls are.

Or else the two preceding Sûtras may be explained in a different way. Ordinary experience teaches us that kings, who are the rulers of countries, are never without some material abode, i.e. a body; hence, if we wish to infer the existence of a general Lord from the analogy of earthly rulers, we must ascribe to him also some kind of body to serve as the substratum of his organs. But such a body cannot be ascribed to the Lord, since all bodies exist only subsequently to the creation, not previously to it. The Lord, therefore, is not able to act because devoid of a material substratum; for experience teaches us that action requires a material substrate.--Let us then arbitrarily assume that the Lord possesses some kind of body serving as a substratum for his organs (even previously to creation).--This assumption also will not do; for if the Lord has a body he is subject to the sensations of ordinary transmigratory souls, and thus no longer is the Lord.

41. And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).

The hypothesis of the argumentative philosophers is invalid, for the following reason also.--They teach that the Lord is omniscient and of infinite duration, and likewise that the pradhâna, as well as the individual souls, is of infinite duration. Now, the omniscient Lord either defines the measure of the pradhâna, the souls, and himself, or does not define it. Both alternatives subvert the doctrine under discussion. For, on the former alternative, the pradhâna, the souls, and the Lord, being all of them of definite measure, must necessarily be of finite duration; since ordinary experience teaches that all things of definite extent, such as jars and the like, at some time cease to exist. The numerical measure of pradhâna, souls, and Lord is defined by their constituting a triad, and the individual measure of each of them must likewise be considered as defined by the Lord (because he is omniscient). The number of the souls is a high one[418]. From among this limited number of souls some obtain release from the sa/m/sâra, that means their sa/m/sâra comes to an end, and their subjection to the samsâra comes to an end. Gradually all souls obtain release, and so there will finally be an end of the entire sa/m/sâra and the sa/m/sâra state of all souls. But the pradhâna which is ruled by the Lord and which modifies itself for the purposes of the soul is what is meant by sa/m/sâra. Hence, when the latter no longer exists, nothing is left for the Lord to rule, and his omniscience and ruling power have no longer any objects. But if the pradhâna, the souls, and the Lord, all have an end, it follows that they also have a beginning, and if they have a beginning as well as an end, we are driven to the doctrine of a general void.--Let us then, in order to avoid these untoward conclusions, maintain the second alternative, i.e. that the measure of the Lord himself, the pradhâna, and the souls, is not defined by the Lord.--But that also is impossible, because it would compel us to abandon a tenet granted at the outset, viz. that the Lord is omniscient.

For all these reasons the doctrine of the argumentative philosophers, according to which the Lord is the operative cause of the world, appears unacceptable.

42. On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhâgavatas cannot be accepted).

We have, in what precedes, refuted the opinion of those who think that the Lord is not the material cause but only the ruler, the operative cause of the world. We are now going to refute the doctrine of those according to whom he is the material as well as the operative cause.--But, it may be objected, in the previous portions of the present work a Lord of exactly the same nature, i.e. a Lord who is the material, as well as the operative, cause of the world, has been ascertained on the basis of Scripture, and it is a recognised principle that Sm/ri/ti, in so far as it agrees with Scripture, is authoritative; why then should we aim at controverting the doctrine stated?--It is true, we reply, that a part of the system which we are going to discuss agrees with the Vedânta system, and hence affords no matter for controversy; another part of the system, however, is open to objection, and that part we intend to attack.

The so-called Bhâgavatas are of opinion that the one holy (bhagavat) Vâsudeva, whose nature is pure knowledge, is what really exists, and that he, dividing himself fourfold, appears in four forms (vyûha), as Vâsudeva, Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Pradyumna, and Aniruddha. Vâsudeva denotes the highest Self, Sa@nkarsha/n/a the individual soul, Pradyumna the mind (manas), Aniruddha the principle of egoity (aha@nkâra). Of these four Vâsudeva constitutes the ultimate causal essence, of which the three others are the effects.--The believer after having worshipped Vâsudeva for a hundred years by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things to be offered (upâdâna), oblation (îjyâ), recitation of prayers, &c. (svâdhyâya), and devout meditation (yoga), passes beyond all affliction and reaches the highest Being.

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Nârâya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as 'He is onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhâgavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that Sa@nkarsha/n/a springs from Vâsudeva, Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vâsudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate Sa@nkarsha/n/a, i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhâgavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The Bhâgavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman. But the Bhâgavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed Sa@nkarsha/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the aha@nkâra termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural passage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vâsudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sûtra 42).

Let us then--the Bhâgavatas may say--understand by Sa@nkarsha/n/a, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e. powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory. All these are Vâsudevas free from faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhâna), without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sûtra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vâsudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not constitute one and the same Self?--If so, you commit the fault of uselessly assuming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vâsudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sûtra 42 remains valid. For Sa@nkarsha/n/a cannot be produced from Vâsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sa@nkarsha/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pâ/ñk/arâtra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vâsudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vâsudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vâsudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of grass, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhâgavata system, with reference to the assumption of qualities and their bearers. Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy Vâsudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with passages contradictory of the Veda. The following passage, for instance, blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas /S/â/nd/ilya studied this /s/âstra.'--For this reason also the Bhâgavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

Notes:

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, the three constituent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhâna. Sâ. Kâ. 12, 13.]

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sâ. Kâ. 3.]

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sâ. Kâ. 15: Sâ. Sûtras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been asserted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three constituents of the pradhâna.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.]

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the Sâ@nkhya hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bhâ.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/sargapûrvakatvaprasa@nga iti gu/n/ânâ/m/ sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/ânekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sâ. Kâ. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.--Pratyakshatvâbhâve katham âtmasiddhir ity âsa@nkya anumânâd ity âha, prav/ri/ttîti. Anumânasiddhasya /k/etanasya na pravr/i/ttyâ/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakâra/h/. Katham anumânam ity apekshâyâ/m/ tatprakâra/m/; sû/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/ prâ/n/âdimattvam. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.--Sâdhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sâdhyavati pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyâpy upalaksha/n/am, anpanyâso na vyabhi/k/ârabhûmin ity artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of grass into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bhâ.]

[Footnote 327: Anâdheyâti/s/ayasya sukhadukhaprâptiparihârarûpâti/s/aya/s/ûnyasyety artha/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhâna aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items constituting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tîyes'pi katipaya/s/abdâdyupalabdhir vâ samastatadupalabdhir vâ bhoga iti vikalpyâdye sarveshâm ekadaiva mukti/h/ syâd iti manvâno dvitîya/m/ pratyâha ubhayârthateti. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of Ânanda Giri omit sa/m/sârânu/kkh/edât; the Bhâmatî's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edât.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhâna's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhâna acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadâdikâryotpâdâyoga/h/. Ân. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, aha@nkâra, and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedântin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pass away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedântin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavahârika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the Sâ@nkhya dogma of the soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: Âtmanas tapte sattve pratibîmitatvâd yuktâ taptir iti /s/a@nkate sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fictitious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The Sâ@nkhya Pûrvapakshin had objected to the Vedânta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.--The Vedântin in his turn endeavours to show that on the Sâ@nkhya doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fictitious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which--according to the Sâ@nkhya also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhâna may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.]

[Footnote 352: When the time for a new creation has come.]

[Footnote 353: The &c. implies the activity of the Lord.]

[Footnote 354: The inherent (material) cause of an atomic compound are the constituent atoms, the non-inheient cause the conjunction of those atoms, the operative causes the ad/ri/sh/ta/ and the Lord's activity which make them enter into conjunction.]

[Footnote 355: I.e. in all cases the special form of extension of the effect depends not on the special extension of the cause, but on the number of atoms composing the cause (and thereby the effect).]

[Footnote 356: In order to escape the conclusion that the non-acceptance of the doctrine of Brahman involves the abandonment of a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 357: I.e. forms of extension different from sphericity, &c.]

[Footnote 358: The first of the three Sûtras quoted comprises, in the present text of the Vai/s/eshika-sûtras, only the following words, 'Kâra/n/abahutvâ/k/ /k/a;' the /k/a of the Sûtra implying, according to the commentators, mahattva and pra/k/aya.--According to the Vai/s/eshikas the form of extension called a/n/u, minute, has for its cause the dvitva inherent in the material causes, i.e. the two atoms from which the minute binary atomic compound originates.--The form of extension called mahat, big, has different causes, among them bahutva, i.e. the plurality residing in the material causes of the resulting 'big' thing; the cause of the mahattva of a ternary atomic compound, for instance, is the tritva inherent in the three constituent atoms. In other cases mahattva is due to antecedent mahattva, in others to pra/k/aya, i.e. accumulation. See the Upaskâra on Vai/s/. Sût. VII, 1, 9; 10.]

[Footnote 359: I.e. if the Vai/s/eshikas have to admit that it is the nature of sphericity, &c. not to produce like effects, the Vedântin also may maintain that Brahman produces an unlike effect, viz. the non-intelligent world.]

[Footnote 360: Like other things, let us say a piece of cloth, which consists of parts.]

[Footnote 361: Or, more particularly, to the conjunction of the atoms with the souls to which merit and demerit belong.--Ad/ri/sh/t/âpeksham ad/ri/sh/t/avatkshetraj/ñ/asa/my/ogâpeksham iti yâvat. Ãn. Gi.]

[Footnote 362: According to the Vai/s/eshikas intelligence is not essential to the soul, but a mere adventitious quality arising only when the soul is joined to an internal organ.]

[Footnote 363: The soul being all-pervading.]

[Footnote 364: Which is inadmissible on Vai/s/eshika principles, because sa/m/yoga as being a quality is connected with the things it joins by samavâya.]

[Footnote 365: Viz. from those things which are united by conjunction. The argument is that conjunction as an independent third entity requires another connexion to connect it with the two things related to each other in the way of conjunction.]

[Footnote 366: Viz. the absolute difference of samavâya and sa/m/yoga from the terms which they connect.]

[Footnote 367: Action (karman), &c. also standing in the samavâya relation to their substrates.]

[Footnote 368: Our Vai/s/eshika-sûtras read 'pratishedhabhâva/h/;' but as all MSS. of Sa@nkara have 'pratishedhâbhâva/h/' I have kept the latter reading and translated according to Ânandagiri's explanation: Kâryam anityam iti kârye vireshato nityatvanishedho na syâd yadi kâra/n/eszpy anityatvam atozs/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/ânâ/m/ nityateti sûtrârtha/h/.]

[Footnote 369: Because they also are not perceptible; the ternary aggregates, the so-called trasare/n/us, constituting the minima perceptibilia.]

[Footnote 370: As they have no cause which could either be disintegrated or destroyed.]

[Footnote 371: This according to the Vedânta view. If atoms existed they might have originated from avidyâ by a mere pari/n/âma and might again be dissolved into avidyâ, without either disintegration or destruction of their cause taking place.]

[Footnote 372: The Sâ@nkhyas looking on everything (except the soul) as being the pradhâna in various forms.--There is no need of assuming with Govindânanda that by the Sâ@nkhya of the text we have to understand the Vedânta.]

[Footnote 373: Yayor dvayor madhya ekam avina/s/yad aparâ/s/ritam evâvatish/th/ate tâv ayutasiddhau yathâvayavâvayavinau.]

[Footnote 374: The connexion of cause and effect is of course samavâya.]

[Footnote 375: If the effect can exist before having entered into connexion with the cause, the subsequent connexion of the two is no longer samavâya but sa/m/yoga; and that contradicts a fundamental Vai/s/eshika principle.]

[Footnote 376: This clause replies to the objection that only those connexions which have been produced by previous motion are to be considered conjunctions.]

[Footnote 377: A clause meant to preclude the assumption that the permanent existence of the things connected involves the permanent existence of the connexion.]

[Footnote 378: It having been shown above that atoms cannot enter into sa/m/yoga with each other, it is shown now that sa/m/yoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter, and that sa/m/yoga of soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognition.]

[Footnote 379: Ekasambandhyâkarsha/n/e yatra sambandhyantarâkarsha/n/a/m/ tatra sa/m/slesha/h/, sa tu sâvayavânâ/m/ jatukâsh/th/âdînâ/m/ d/ri/sh/t/o na tu niravayavai/h/ sâvayâvânâm, ato dvya/n/ukasya sâvayavasya niravayavena paramâ/n/unâ sa nopapadyate. Brahmavidyâbh.]

[Footnote 380: In answer to the question how, in that case, the practically recognised relation of abode, &c. existing between the cause and the effect is accounted for.]

[Footnote 381: For they must in that case have a northern end, an eastern end, &c.]

[Footnote 382: And that on that account the atoms which he considers as the ultimate simple constituents of matter cannot be decomposed.]

[Footnote 383: Because according to their opinion difference of size constitutes difference of substance, so that the continuous change of size in animal bodies, for instance, involves the continual perishing of old and the continual origination of new substances.]

[Footnote 384: The following notes on Bauddha doctrines are taken exclusively from the commentaries on the /S/a@nkarabhâshya, and no attempt has been made to contrast or reconcile the Brahminical accounts of Bauddha psychology with the teaching of genuine Bauddha books. Cp. on the chief sects of the Buddhistic philosophers the Bauddha chapter of the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.--The Nihilists are the Mádhyamikas; the Idealists are the Yogâ/k/âras; the Sautrântikas and the Vaibháshikas together constitute the class of the Realists.--I subjoin the account given of those sects in the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.--Buddhasya hi mâdhyamika-yogá/k/âra-sautrântika-vaibhâshikasamj/ñ/akâs /k/atvâra/h/ /s/ishyâ/h/. Tatra buddhena prathama/m/ yân prati sarva/m/ /s/ûnyam ity upadish/t/a/m/ te màdhyamikâs te hi guru/n/â yathokta/m/ tathaiva /s/raddhayâ g/ri/hîtavanta iti k/ri/tvâ nâpak/ri/sh/t/â/h/ puna/s/ /k/a taduktasyârthasya buddhyanusâre/n/âkshepasyâk/ri/tatvân notk/ri/sh/t/abuddhaya iti mâdhyamikâ/h/. Anyais tu /s/ishyair guru/n/â sarva/s/ûnyatva upadish/t/e j/ñ/ânâtiriktasya sarvasya /s/ûnyatvam astu nâmeti gurûktir yoga iti bauddai/h/ paribhâshitopetâ/h/ tad upari /k/a j/ñ/ânasya tu /s/ûnyatva/m/ na sa/m/bhavati tathâtve jagadândhyaprasa@ngât sûnyasiddher apy asa/m/bhavâ/k/ /k/eti buddhamate â/k/âratvena paribhâshita âkshepos'pi k/ri/ta iti yogâ/k/ârâ/h/ vij/ñ/ânamâtrâstitvavâdina/h/. Tadanataram anyai/h/ /s/ishyai/h/ pratîtisiddhasya katha/m/ /s/ûnyatva/m/ vaktu/m/ /s/akyam ato j/ñ/ânavad vâhyârthos'pi satya ity ukte tarhi tathaiva sos'stu, para/m/ tu so s'numeyo na tu pratyaksha ity ukte tathâ@ngîk/ri/tyaiva/m/ /s/ishyamatim anus/ri/tya kiyatparyanta/m/ sûtra/m/ bhavishyatîti tai/h/ p/ri/sh/t/am atas te sautrântikâ/h/. Anye punar yady aya/m/ gha/t/a iti pratîtibalâd vâhyos'rtha upeyate tarhi tasyâ eva pratîter aparokshatvât sa katha/m/ parokshos'to vâhyos'rtho na pratyaksha iti bhâshâ viruddhety âkshipann atas te vaibhâshikâ/h/.]

[Footnote 385: The rûpaskandha comprises the senses and their objects, colour, &c.; the sense-organs were above called bhautika, they here re-appear as /k/aittika on account of their connexion with thought. Their objects likewise are classed as /k/aittika in so far as they are perceived by the senses.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha comprises the series of self-cognitions (ahamaham ity âlayavj/ñ/ânapravâha/h/), according to all commentators; and in addition, according to the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a, the knowledge, determinate and indeterminate, of external things (savikalpaka/m/ nirvikalpaka/m/ /k/a prav/ri/ttivij/ñ/ânasamj/ñ/itam).-- The vedanâskandha comprises pleasure, pain, &c.--The samj/ñ/âskandha comprises the cognition of things by their names (gaur a/s/va ityâdi/s/abdasamjalpitapratyaya/h/, Ân. Gi.; gaur a/s/va ityeva/m/ nâmavi/s/ish/t/asavikalpaka/h/ pratyaya/h/, Go. Ân.; sa/m/j/ñ/â yaj/ñ/adattâdipadatadullekhî savikalpapratyayo vâ, dvitîyapakshe vij/ñ/ânapadena savikalpapratyayo na grâhy/h/, Brahmavidyâbh.). The sa/m/skâraskandha comprises passion, aversion, &c., dharma and adharma.--Compare also the Bhâmatî.--The vij/ñ/ânaskandha is /k/itta, the other skandhas /k/aitta.]

[Footnote 386: It has to be kept in view that the sarvâstitvavâdins as well as the other Bauddha sects teach the momentariness (ksha/n/ikatva), the eternal flux of everything that exists, and are on that ground controverted by the upholders of the permanent Brahman.]

[Footnote 387: Mind, on the Bauddha doctrine, presupposes the existence of an aggregate of atoms, viz. the body.]

[Footnote 388: In consequence of which no release could take place.]

[Footnote 389: The Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a explains the last clause--from ksha/n/ikatvâ/k/ /k/a--somewhat differently: Api /k/a paramâ/n/ûnâm api ksha/n/ikatvâbhyupagamân melana/m/ na sambhavati, paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ melana/m/ paramâ/n/ukriyâdhînam, tathâ /k/a svakriyâ/m/ prati paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ kâra/n/atvât kriyâpûraksha/n/e paramâ/n/ubhir bhâvyam kriyâ /s/rayatayâ kriyâksha/n/eszpi teshâm avasthânam apekshitam eva/m/ melanakshaneszpi, nahi melanâ/s/rayasyâbhâve melanarûpâ prav/ri/ttir upapadyate, tathâ /k/a sthiraparamâ/n/usâdhyâ melanarûpâ prav/ri/tti/h/ katha/m/ teshâm ksha/n/ikatve bhavet.--Ânanda Giri also divides and translates differently from the translation in the text.]

[Footnote 390: The kâra/n/atvât of /S/a@nkara explains the pratyayatvât of the Sûtra; kârya/m/ praty ayate janakatvena ga/kkh/ati.]

[Footnote 391: The commentators agree on the whole in their explanations of the terms of this series.--The following is the substance of the comment of the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Nescience is the error of considering that which is momentary, impure, &c. to be permanent, pure, &c.--Impression (affection, sa/m/skâra) comprises desire, aversion, &c., and the activity caused by them.--Knowledge (vij/ñ/âna) is the self-consciousness (aham ity âlayavij/ñ/ânasya v/ri/ttilâbha/h/) springing up in the embryo.--Name and form is the rudimentary flake--or bubble-like condition of the embryo.--The abode of the six (sha/d/âyatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses.--Touch (spar/s/a) is the sensations of cold, warmth, &c. on the embryo's part.--Feeling (vedaná) the sensations of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom.--Desire (t/ri/sh/n/â) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones.--Activity (upâdâna) is the effort resulting from desire,--Birth is the passing out from the uterus.--Species (jâti) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs.--Decay (jarâ).--Death (mara/n/am) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (mumûrshâ).--Grief (/s/oka) the frustration of wishes connected therewith.--Lament (paridevanam) the lamentations on that account.--Pain (du/h/kha) is such pain as caused by the five senses.--Durmanas is mental affliction.--The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.]

[Footnote 392: Ânanda Giri and Go. Ânanda explain: Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv iti bhokt/ri/vi/s/esha/n/am ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayeshv ity artha/h/.--The Brahrma-vidyâbhara/n/a says: Nityeshv â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv a/n/ushv abhyupagamyamâneshu bhokt/ri/shu /k/a satsv ity anvaya/h/. Â/s/râya/s/rayibhûteshv ity asyopakâryopakârakabhâvaprâpteshv ity artha/h/.--And with regard to the subsequent â/s/rayâ/s/rayi/s/ûnyeshu: â/s/rayâ/s/rayitva/s/ûnyeshu, aya/m/ bhâva/h/, sthireshu paramâ/n/ushu yadanvaye paramâ/n/ûnâ/m/ sa/m/ghâtâpatti/h/ yadvyatireke /k/a na tad upakârakam upakâryâ/h/ paramâ/n/ava/h/ yena tatk/ri/to bhoga/h/ prârthyate sa tatra karteti grahîtu/m/ /s/akyate, ksha/n/ikeshu tu param/n/ushu anvayavyatirekagrahasyânekaksha/n/asâdhyasyâsa/m/bhavân nopakâryopakârakabhâvo nirdhârayitu/m/ /s/akya/h/.--Ananda Giri remarks on the latter: Ad/ri/sh/t/â/s/rayakârt/ri/râhityam âhâ/s/rayeti. Another reading appears to be â/s/ayâ/s/raya/s/ûnyeshu.]

[Footnote 393: Bauddhânâ/m/ ksha/n/apadena gha/t/âdir eva padârtho vyavahriyate na tu tadatinkta/h/ ka/sk/it ksha/n/o nâma hâlosti. Brahmâvidyâbh.]

[Footnote 394: And whereupon then could be established the difference of mere efficient causes such as the potter's staff, &c., and material causes such as clay, &c.?]

[Footnote 395: These four causes are the so-called defining cause (adhipati-pratyaya), the auxiliary cause (sahakâripratyaya), the immediate cause (samanantarapratyaya), and the substantial cause (âlambanapratyaya).--I extract the explanation from the Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a: Adhipatir indriya/m/ tad dhi /k/akshurádirûpam utpannasya j/ñ/ânasya rûpâdivishayatâ/m/ niya/kkh/ati niyâmaka/s/ /k/a lokedhipatir ity u/k/yate. Sahakârî âloka/h/. Samanantarapratyaya/h/pûrvaj/ñ/ânam, bauddhamate hi ksha/n/ikaj/ñ/anasa/m/tatau pûrvaj/ñ/ânam uttaraj/ñ/âsya kârana/m/ tad eva /k/a mana ity u/k/yate. Âlambana/m/ gha/t/âdi/h/. Etân hetûn pratîya prâpya /k/akshurâdijanyam ity âdi.]

[Footnote 396: Sa/m/skâra iti, tanmate pûrvaksha/n/a eva hetubhûta/h/ sa/m/skâro vâsaneti /k/a vyavahriyate kârya/m/ tu tadvishayatayâ karmavyutpattyâ sa/m/skâra/h/, tathâ /k/a kâryakâra/n/âtmaka/m/ sarva/m/ bhâvarûpa/m/ ksha/n/ikam iti pratij/ñ/ârtha/h/. Brahmavidyâbhara/n/a.]

[Footnote 397: As when a man smashes a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so.]

[Footnote 398: I.e. the insensible continual decay of things.--Viparîta iti pratiksha/n/a/m/ gha/t/âdînâ/m/ yuktyâ sâdhyamânoku/s/alair avagantum a/s/akya/h/ sûkshmo vinâ/s/opratisa/m/khyânirodha/h/. Brahmâv.]

[Footnote 399: A series of momentary existences constituting a chain of causes and effects can never be entirely stopped; for the last momentary existence must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. In the former case the series is continued; the latter alternative would imply that the last link does not really exist, since the Bauddhas define the sattâ of a thing as its causal efficiency (cp. Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha). And the non-existence of the last link would retrogressively lead to the non-existence of the whole series.]

[Footnote 400: Thus clay is recognised as such whether it appears in the form of a jar, or of the potsherds into which the jar is broken, or of the powder into which the potsherds are ground.--Analogously we infer that even things which seem to vanish altogether, such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continue to exist in some form.]

[Footnote 401: The knowledge that everything is transitory, pain, &c.]

[Footnote 402: What does enable us to declare that there is âvara/n/âbhâva in one place and not in another? Space; which therefore is something real.]

[Footnote 403: If the cause were able, without having undergone any change, to produce effects, it would at the same moment produce all the effects of which it is capable.--Cp. on this point the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha.]

[Footnote 404: This is added to obviate the remark that it is not a general rule that effects are of the same nature as their causes, and that therefore, after all, existent things may spring from non-existence.]

[Footnote 405: According to the vij/ñ/ânavâdin the cognition specialised by its various contents, such as, for instance, the idea of blue colour is the object of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is consciousness (avabhâsa) is the result of knowledge; the cognition in so far as it is power is mâna, knowledge; in so far as it is the abode of that power it is pramât/ri/, knowing subject.]

[Footnote 406: If they are said to be different from the atoms they can no longer be considered as composed of atoms; if they are non-different from atoms they cannot be the cause of the mental representations of gross non-atomic bodies.]

[Footnote 407: Avayavâvayavirûpo vâhyosrtho nâsti /k/en mâ bhûd jâtivyaktyâdirûpas tu syâd ity â/s/rankyâha evam iti. Jâtyâdînâ/m/ vyaktyâdînâm /k/âtyantabhinnatve svâtantryaprasa@ngâd atyantâbhinnatve tadvadevâtadbhâvâd bhinnâbhinnatvasya viruddhatvâd avayavâvayavibhedavaj gâtivyaktyâdibhedosxpi nâstîty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 408: Vâsanâ, above translated by mental impression, strictly means any member of the infinite series of ideas which precedes the present actual idea.]