Chapter III: Part 3

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/a@nkara the three first Sûtras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural passages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sûtra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Mâyâ,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sûtra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Mâyâ, yet have a prophetic quality. Sûtras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such participates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by Râmânuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sûtras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sûtras 1 and 2 set forth the pûrvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some /s/âkâs declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sûtra states the siddhânta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Mâyâ, i.e. are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'mâyâ,' Râmânuja remarks, 'mâyâ/s/abdo hy â/sk/aryavâ/k/î janaka/s/ya kule jâtâ devamâyeva nirmitâ ityâdishu tathâ dar/s/anât.' The three remaining Sûtras are exhibited in the /S/rî-bhâshya in a different order, the fourth Sûtra, according to /S/a@nkara, being the sixth according to Râmânuja. Sûtras 4 and 5 (according to Râmânuja's numeration) are explained by Râmânuja very much in the same way as by /S/a@nkara; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sûtras than is possible on /S/a@nkara's interpretation. In Sûtra 6 (sû/k/aka/s/ /k/â hi) Râmânuja sees a deduction from the siddhânta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons entitling us to assume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/a@nkara, taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sûtra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all passages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be destitute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sûtra 12 continues, that in many passages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sûtra 13 adds--in some places the assumption of diversity is specially objected to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sûtra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedânta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform mass of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural passages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural passages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upâdhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun participates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upâdhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the upâdhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Srî-bhâshya differs totally. According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryâmin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapâpman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakâma, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Prajâpativâkya in the Chândogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryâmin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryâmin (in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly assert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dvâ supar/n/â sayujâ sakhâyâ) (13).--Should it be said that, according to the Chândogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence participates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sára; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the principal element (agent; pradhâna) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'âkâ/s/o ha vai nâmarûpayor nirvahitâ') (14).--But does not the passage 'satya/m/ j/ñ/ânam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the passage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to deprive passages as the one quoted from the Taittirîya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the passages in which those qualities are asserted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittirîya passage only asserts so much, viz. the prakâ/s/arûpatâ of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the passage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.--The ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman in the sense assigned above is asserted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the illustration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryâmin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, participate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).--Analogous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sûtras 22-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadâr) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sûtras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upâdhis. The last four Sûtras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fictitious limiting adjuncts.

According to Rámânuja, Sûtras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sûtra 11. How, the question is asked, can the ubhayali@ngatva of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakâra), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmâtra)?--The reply given in Sûtra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prâk/ri/taitâvattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sûtra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sákshâtkkâra) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/râdhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti' is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as prakâ/s/a, luminousness, j/ñ/âna, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/ñk/avsish/t/atâ) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that prakâ/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vâmadeva) in the work of sa/m/râdhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications (li@nga) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanaviseshâ/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e. sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as analogous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29, 30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apûrva, but is allotted by the Lord.

PÂDA III.

With the third pâda of the second adhyâya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what constitutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/âkhâs contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/âkhâ exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circumstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/âkhâ were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/âkhâs also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedânta-sûtras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/âkhâ may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/âkhâs; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pâda.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyâs, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as constituting several vidyâs, or one vidyâ only. /S/a@nkara remarks that the question affects only those vidyâs whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Anticipating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/â/nd/ilyavidyâ which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabráhma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three passages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bhârûpatva), while others are peculiar to each separate passage (prâ/n/a/s/arîratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chândogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brâhma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three passages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedântin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidyâ is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three passages have to be combined into one meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three passages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyâs being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgîthavidyâs of the Chândogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgîtha being in both identified with prâ/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chândogya vidyâ is not the whole udgîtha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadâra/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgîtha as the object of meditation.

Sûtra 9 constitutes in /S/a@nkara's view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the passage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kâra and the udgîtha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kâra which,' &c.--According to Râmânuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sûtra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called prâ/n/a-vidyâs and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the prâ/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/a@nkara, the Sûtras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidyâ. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to /S/a@nkara, aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the passage constitutes one vidyâ only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/a@nkara, that the Self spoken of in Ait. Âr. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sûtrâtman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 11-17 constitute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikar/n/a. Sûtras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/a@nkara; Sûtra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sûtras 14-17 continue the discussion of the passage about the priya/s/irastva.--If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sûtra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sûtra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (âtmâ ânandamaya) is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in âtma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in âtmâ ânandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sûtra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other passages (âtmaâ vâ idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent passage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the prâ/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in ânandamaya âtman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent passage?--To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayâd iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous passage also, viz. II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the prâ/n/asa/m/vâda.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyâs.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Râ/n/âyanîya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chândogya vidyâ, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidyâ.--Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brâhma/n/a passages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brâhma/n/a about the mahâvrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-âra/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidyâ, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the passages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those passages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pass over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the passages.

Sûtras 27-30 constitute, according to /S/a@nkara, two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaushitaki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the gods (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pass beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

The /S/rî-bhâshya treats the four Sûtras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sûtras are explained as by /S/a@nkara, while Sûtra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the gods) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the gods). To this Sûtra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural passages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the passage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rûpe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti krî/d/an ramamâna/h/ sa svarâ/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kâma/k/âro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyâmâhâtmya.--That the explanation of the /S/rî-bhâshya agrees with the text as well as /S/a@nkara's, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/a@nkara's explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayathâ,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sûtra (31) constitutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the gods is followed not only by those knowing the vidyâs which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyâs of Brahman.--The explanation given in the /S/rî-bhâshya (in which Sûtras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the gods. (The /S/rî-bhâshya reads 'sarveshâm,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvâsâm,' all sagu/n/a-vidyâs.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the /S/rî-bhâshya, where the Sûtra follows immediately on Sûtra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyâs--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Kâ/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, constitute one vidyâ only, because both passages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Râmânuja the Sûtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sûtra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two passages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, constitute one vidyâ only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the passage Ait. Âr. II, 2, 4, 6 constitutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidyâ of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 35-38 constitute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/a@nkara.

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the passages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 22 cannot constitute one vidyâ, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as destitute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya, Sûtras 39-41 form one adhikara/n/a whose first Sûtra reaches essentially the same conclusion as /S/a@nkara under 39. Sûtras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two passages discussed are predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakâmatva, &c.--cannot be considered real (pâramârthika), since other passages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.--To this objection Sûtra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the passage under discussion as well as in other passages) they are stated with emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakâma, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection Sûtra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakâmatva, &c. in his meditations.)

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming constituent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. passage and a similar Ch. Up. passage, Vâyu and Prâ/n/a are not to be identified, but to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not constitute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be substituted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. XXX (53, 54) treats, according to /S/a@nkara, in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be assigned, or not (as the Materialists maintain).--According to the /S/rî-bhâshya the adhikara/n/a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sûtras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/ñ/at/ri/tva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next Sûtra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e. the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).'

Adhik. XXXI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with constituent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that /s/âkhâ in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all /s/âkhâs.--Adhik. XXXII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vânara Agni of Ch. Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.--Adhik. XXXIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidyâ, /S/a/nd/ilyavidyâ, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. XXXIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts assign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being cumulated.--Adhik. XXXV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be cumulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. XXXVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with constituent elements of action, such as the udgîtha.

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrâjins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidyâ only is prescribed, not action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyâs are not mere stutis (arthavâdas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedânta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying--as arthavâdas--the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the ûrdhvaretasa/h/ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidyâ in the mind (Adhik. VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).--The â/s/ramakarmâ/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are anâ/s/rama have claims to vidyâ (Adhik. IX, 36-39).--An ûrdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation of the fall of an ûrdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the fallen ûrdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamâna (Adhik. XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to bâlya and pâ/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By bâlya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sûtras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Râmânuja, the question when the vidyâ, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises. Sûtra 51 treats of that vidyâ whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmântara (in which latter case the vidyâ arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various passages).'--Sûtra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/a@nkara, who treats the two Sûtras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyâs.

Notes:

[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvâdena,' and finally negative them.]

[Footnote 17: Râmânuja has here some strong remarks on the improbability of qualities emphatically attributed to Brahman, in more than one passage, having to be set aside in any meditation: 'Na /k/a mâtâpit/ri/sahasrebhyo-pi vatsalatara/m/ sâstra/m/ pratârakavad apâramârthikau nirasanîyau gu/n/au pramâ/n/ântarâpratipannau âdare/n/opadi/s/ya sa/m/sâra/k/akraparivartanena pûrvam eva bambhramyamânân mumukshûn bhûyo-pi bhramayitum alam.']

[Footnote 18: The /S/rî-bhâshya as well as several other commentaries reads tadbhâvabhâvitvât for /S/an@kara's tadbhâvâbhâvitvât.]

FOURTH ADHYÂYA. PÂDA I.

Adhikara/n/a I (1, 2).--The meditation on the Âtman enjoined by Scripture is not an act to be accomplished once only, but is to be repeated again and again.

Adhik. II (3).--The devotee engaged in meditation on Brahman is to view it as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. III (4).--To the rule laid down in the preceding adhikara/n/a the so-called pratîkopâsanas, i.e. those meditations in which Brahman is viewed under a symbol or outward manifestation (as, for instance, mano brahmety upâsîta) constitute an exception, i.e. the devotee is not to consider the pratîka as constituting his own Self.

Adhik. IV (5).--In the pratîkopâsanas the pratîka is to be meditatively viewed as being one with Brahman, not Brahman as being one with the pratîka.--Râmânuja takes Sûtra 5 as simply giving a reason for the decision arrived at under Sûtra 4, and therefore as not constituting a new adhikara/n/a.

Adhik. V (6).--In meditations connected with constitutives of sacrificial works (as, for instance, ya evâsau tapati tam udgîtham upâsîta) the idea of the divinity, &c. is to be transferred to the sacrificial item, not vice versa. In the example quoted, for instance, the udgîtha is to be viewed as Âditya, not Âditya as the udgîtha.

Adhik. VI (7-10).--The devotee is to carry on his meditations in a sitting posture.--/S/a@nkara maintains that this rule does not apply to those meditations whose result is sa/m/yagdar/s/ana; but the Sûtra gives no hint to that effect.

Adhik. VII (11).--The meditations may be carried on at any time, and in any place, favourable to concentration of mind.

Adhik. VIII (12).--The meditations are to be continued until death.--/S/a@nkara again maintains that those meditations which lead to sa/m/yagdar/s/ana are excepted.

Adhik. IX (13).--When through those meditations the knowledge of Brahman has been reached, the vidvân is no longer affected by the consequences of either past or future evil deeds.

Adhik. X (14).--Good deeds likewise lose their efficiency.--The literal translation of the Sûtra is, 'There is likewise non-attachment (to the vidvân) of the other (i.e. of the deeds other than the evil ones, i.e. of good deeds), but on the fall (of the body, i.e. when death takes place).' The last words of the Sûtra, 'but on the fall,' are separated by /S/a@nkara from the preceding part of the Sûtra and interpreted to mean, 'when death takes place (there results mukti of the vidvân, who through his knowledge has freed himself from the bonds of works).'--According to Râmânuja the whole Sûtra simply means, 'There is likewise non-attachment of good deeds (not at once when knowledge is reached), but on the death of the vidvân[19].'

Adhik. XI (15).--The non-operation of works stated in the two preceding adhikara/n/as holds good only in the case of anârabdhakârya works, i.e. those works which have not yet begun to produce their effects, while it does not extend to the ârabdhakârya works on which the present existence of the devotee depends.

Adhik. XII (16, 17).--From the rule enunciated in Adhik. X are excepted such sacrificial performances as are enjoined permanently (nitya): so, for instance, the agnihotra, for they promote the origination of knowledge.

Adhik. XIII (18).--The origination of knowledge is promoted also by such sacrificial works as are not accompanied with the knowledge of the upâsanas referring to the different members of those works.

Adhik. XIV (19).--The ârabdhakârya works have to be worked out fully by the fruition of their effects; whereupon the vidvân becomes united with Brahman.--The 'bhoga' of the Sûtra is, according to /S/a@nkara, restricted to the present existence of the devotee, since the complete knowledge obtained by him destroys the nescience which otherwise would lead to future embodiments. According to Râmânuja a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the ârabdhakârya works are exhausted.

PÂDA II.

This and the two remaining pâdas of the fourth adhyâya describe the fate of the vidvân after death. According to /S/a@nkara we have to distinguish the vidvân who possesses the highest knowledge, viz. that he is one with the highest Brahman, and the vidvân who knows only the lower Brahman, and have to refer certain Sûtras to the former and others to the latter. According to Râmânuja the vidvân is one only.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-6).--On the death of the vidvân (i.e. of him who possesses the lower knowledge, according to /S/a@nkara) his senses are merged in the manas, the manas in the chief vital air (prâ/n/a), the vital air in the individual soul (jîva), the soul in the subtle elements.--According to Râmânuja the combination (sampatti) of the senses with the manas, &c. is a mere conjunction (sa/m/yoga), not a merging (laya).

Adhik. IV (7).--The vidvân (i.e. according to /S/a@nkara, he who possesses the lower knowledge) and the avidvân, i.e. he who does not possess any knowledge of Brahman, pass through the same stages (i.e. those described hitherto) up to the entrance of the soul, together with the subtle elements, and so on into the nâ/d/îs.--The vidvân also remains connected with the subtle elements because he has not yet completely destroyed avidyâ, so that the immortality which Scripture ascribes to him (am/ri/tatva/m/ hi vidvân abhya/s/nute) is only a relative one.--Râmânuja quotes the following text regarding the immortality of the vidvân:

'Yadâ sarve pramu/k/yante kâmâ yessya h/ri/di sthitâ/h/ atha
martyosm/ri/to bhavaty atra brahma sama/s/nute,'

and explains that the immortality which is here ascribed to the vidvân as soon as he abandons all desires can only mean the destruction--mentioned in the preceding pâda--of all the effects of good and evil works, while the 'reaching of Brahman' can only refer to the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee.

Adhik. V (8-11) raises; according to /S/a@nkara, the question whether the subtle elements of which Scripture says that they are combined with the highest deity (teja/h/ parasyâ/m/ devatâyâm) are completely merged in the latter or not. The answer is that a complete absorption of the elements takes place only when final emancipation is reached; that, on the other hand, as long as the sa/m/sâra state lasts, the elements, although somehow combined with Brahman, remain distinct so as to be able to form new bodies for the soul.

According to Râmânuja the Sûtras 8-11 do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a, but continue the discussion of the point mooted in 7. The immortality there spoken of does not imply the separation of the soul from the body, 'because Scripture declares sa/m/sâra, i.e. embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman' (tasya tâvad eva /k/ira/m/ yâvan na vimokshye atha sampatsye) (8).--That the soul after having departed from the gross body is not disconnected from the subtle elements, is also proved hereby, that the subtle body accompanies it, as is observed from authority[20] (9).--Hence the immortality referred to in the scriptural passage quoted is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body (10).

Adhik. VI (12-14) is of special importance.--According to /S/a@nkara the Sûtras now turn from the discussion of the departure of him who possesses the lower knowledge only to the consideration of what becomes of him who has reached the higher knowledge. So far it has been taught that in the case of relative immortality (ensuing on the apara vidyâ) the subtle elements, together with the senses and so on, depart from the body of the dying devotee; this implies at the same time that they do not depart from the body of the dying sage who knows himself to be one with Brahman.--Against this latter implied doctrine Sûtra 12 is supposed to formulate an objection. 'If it be said that the departure of the prâ/n/as from the body of the dying sage is denied (viz. in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5, na tasya prâ/n/a utkrâmanti, of him the prâ/n/as do not pass out); we reply that in that passage the genitive "tasya" has the sense of the ablative "tasmât," so that the sense of the passage is, "from him, i.e. from the jîva of the dying sage, the prâ/n/as do not depart, but remain with it."'--This objection /S/a@nkara supposes to be disposed of in Sûtra 13. 'By some there is given a clear denial of the departure of the prâ/n/as in the case of the dying sage,' viz. in the passage B/ri/. Up. III, 2, 11, where Yâj/ñ/avalkya instructs Ârtabhâga that, when this man dies, the prâ/n/as do not depart from it (asmât; the context showing that asmât means 'from it,' viz. from the body, and not 'from him,' viz. the jîva).--The same view is, moreover, confirmed by Sm/ri/ti passages.

According to Râmânuja the three Sûtras forming /S/a@nkara's sixth adhikara/n/a do not constitute a new adhikara/n/a at all, and, moreover, have to be combined into two Sûtras. The topic continuing to be discussed is the utkrânti of the vidvân. If, Sûtra 12 says, the utkrânti of the prâ/n/as is not admitted, on the ground of the denial supposed to be contained in B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 5; the reply is that the sense of the tasya there is '/s/ârîrât' (so that the passage means, 'from him, i.e. the jîva, the prâ/n/as do not depart'); for this is clearly shown by the reading of some, viz. the Mâdhyandinas, who, in their text of the passage, do not read 'tasya' but 'tasmât.'--With reference to the instruction given by Yâj/ñ/avalkya to Ârtabhâga, it is to be remarked that nothing there shows the 'ayam purusha' to be the sage who knows Brahman.--And, finally, there are Sm/ri/ti passages declaring that the sage also when dying departs from the body.

Adhik. VII and VIII (15, 16) teach, according to /S/a@nkara, that, on the death of him who possesses the higher knowledge, his prâ/n/as, elements, &c. are merged in Brahman, so as to be no longer distinct from it in any way.

According to Râmânuja the two Sûtras continue the teaching about the prâ/n/as, bhûtas, &c. of the vidvân in general, and declare that they are finally merged in Brahman, not merely in the way of conjunction (sa/m/yoga), but completely.[21]

Adhik. IX (17).--/S/a@nkara here returns to the owner of the aparâ vidyâ, while Râmânuja continues the description of the utkrânti of his vidvân.--The jîva of the dying man passes into the heart, and thence departs out of the body by means of the ná/d/is; the vidvân by means of the nâ/d/i called sushum/n/â, the avidvân by means of some other nâ/d/î.

Adhik. X (18, 19).--The departing soul passes up to the sun by means of a ray of light which exists at night as well as during day.

Adhik. XI (20, 21).--Also that vidvân who dies during the dakshi/n/âyana reaches Brahman.

PÂDA III.

Adhik. I, II, III (1-3) reconcile the different accounts given in the Upanishads as to the stations of the way which leads the vidvân up to Brahman.

Adhik. IV (4-6)--By the 'stations' we have, however, to understand not only the subdivisions of the way but also the divine beings which lead the soul on.

The remaining part of the pâda is by /S/a@nkara divided into two adhikara/n/as. Of these the former one (7-14) teaches that the Brahman to which the departed soul is led by the guardians of the path of the gods is not the highest Brahman, but the effected (kârya) or qualified (/s/agu/n/a) Brahman. This is the opinion propounded in Sûtras 7-11 by Bâdari, and, finally, accepted by /S/a@nkara in his commentary on Sûtra 14. In Sûtras 12-14 Jaimini defends the opposite view, according to which the soul of the vidvân goes to the highest Brahman, not to the kâryam brahma. But Jaimini's view, although set forth in the latter part of the adhikara/n/a, is, according to /S/a@nkara, a mere pûrvapaksha, while Bâdari's opinion represents the siddhânta.--The latter of the two adhikara/n/as (VI of the whole pâda; 15, 16) records the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a on a collateral question, viz. whether, or not, all those who worship the effected Brahman are led to it. The decision is that those only are guided to Brahman who have not worshipped it under a pratîka form.

According to Râmânuja, Sûtras 7-16 form one adhikara/n/a only, in which the views of Bâdari and of Jaimini represent two pûrvapakshas, while Bâdarâya/n/a's opinion is adopted as the siddhânta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. Hira/n/yagarbha, or those who worship the highest Brahman, or those who worship the individual soul as free from Prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self (ye pratyagâtmâna/m/ prak/ri/tiviyukta/m/ brahmâtmakam upâsate).--The first view is maintained by Bâdari in Sûtra 7, 'The guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman, because going is possible towards the latter only;' for no movement can take place towards the highest and as such omnipresent Brahman.--The explanation of Sûtra 9 is similar to that of /S/a@nkara; but more clearly replies to the objection (that, if Hira/n/yagarbha were meant in the passage, 'purusho /s/a mânava/h/ sa etân brahma gamayati,' the text would read 'sa etân brahmâ/n/am gamayati') that Hira/n/yagarbha is called Brahman on account of his nearness to Brahman, i.e. on account of his prathamajatva.--The explanation of 10, 11 is essentially the same as in /S/a@nkara; so also of l2-l4.--The siddhânta view is established in Sûtra 13, 'It is the opinion of Bâdarâya/n/a that it, i.e. the ga/n/a of the guardians, leads to Brahman those who do not take their stand on what is pratîka, i.e. those who worship the highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual Self as dissociated from prak/ri/ti, and having Brahman for its Self, but not those who worship Brahman under pratîkas. For both views--that of Jaimini as well as that of Bâdari--are faulty.' The kârya view contradicts such passages as 'asmâ/k/ charîrât samutthâya para/m/ jyotir upasampadya,' &c.; the para view, such passages as that in the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, which declares that ya ittha/m/ vidu/h/, i.e. those who know the pa/ñk/âgni-vidyâ, are also led up to Brahman.

PÂDA IV.

Adhik. I (1-3) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the owner of the parâ vidyâ, and teaches that, when on his death his soul obtains final release, it does not acquire any new characteristics, but merely manifests itself in its true nature.--The explanation given by Râmânuja is essentially the same, but of course refers to that vidvân whose going to Brahman had been described in the preceding pâda.

Adhik. II (4) determines that the relation in which the released soul stands to Brahman is that of avibhâga, non-separation. This, on /S/a@nkara's view, means absolute non-separation, identity.--According to Râmânuja the question to be considered is whether the released soul views itself as separate (p/ri/thagbhûta) from Brahman, or as non-separate because being a mode of Brahman. The former view is favoured by those /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti passages which speak of the soul as being with, or equal to, Brahman; the latter by, such passages as tat tvam asi and the like.[22]

Adhik. III (5-7) discusses the characteristics of the released soul (i.e. of the truly released soul, according to /S/a@nkara). According to Jaimini the released soul, when manifesting itself in its true nature, possesses all those qualities which in Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1 and other places are ascribed to Brahman, such as apahatapâpmatva, satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c., ai/s/varya.--According to Au/d/ulomi the only characteristic of the released soul is /k/aitanya.--According to Bâdarâyana the two views can be combined (/S/a@nkara remarking that satyasa/m/kalpatva, &c. are ascribed to the released soul vyavahârâpekshayâ).

Adhik. IV (8-9) returns, according to /S/a@nkara, to the aparâ vidyâ, and discusses the question whether the soul of the pious effects its desires by its mere determination, or uses some other means. The former alternative is accepted--According to Râmânuja the adhikara/n/a simply continues the consideration of the state of the released, begun in the preceding adhikara/n/a. Of the released soul it is said in Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 3 that after it has manifested itself in its true nature it moves about playing and rejoicing with women, carriages, and so on. The question then arises whether it effects all this by its mere sa/m/kalpa (it having been shown in the preceding adhikara/n/a that the released soul is, like the Lord, satyasa/m/kalpa), or not. The answer is in favour of the former alternative, on account of the explicit declaration made in Ch. Up. VIII, 2, 'By his mere will the fathers come to receive him.'

Adhik. V (10-14) decides that the released are embodied or disembodied according to their wish and will.

Adhik. VI (11, 12) explains how the soul of the released can animate several bodies at the same time.--Sûtra 12 gives, according to /S/a@nkara, the additional explanation that those passages which declare the absence of all specific cognition on the part of the released soul do not refer to the partly released soul of the devotee, but either to the soul in the state of deep sleep (svâpyaya = sushupti), or to the fully released soul of the sage (sampatti = kaivalya).--Râmânuja explains that the passages speaking of absence of consciousness refer either to the state of deep sleep, or to the time of dying (sampatti = mata/n/am according to 'vân manasi sampadyate,' &c.).

Adhik. VII (17-21).--The released jîvas participate in all the perfections and powers of the Lord, with the exception of the power of creating and sustaining the world. They do not return to new forms of embodied existence.

After having, in this way, rendered ourselves acquainted with the contents of the Brahma-sûtras according to the views of /S/a@nkara as well as Râmânuja, we have now to consider the question which of the two modes of interpretation represents--or at any rate more closely approximates to the true meaning of the Sûtras. That few of the Sûtras are intelligible if taken by themselves, we have already remarked above; but this does not exclude the possibility of our deciding with a fair degree of certainty which of the two interpretations proposed agrees better with the text, at least in a certain number of cases.