Chapter III: Eternal Recurrence (3)

But could not all _quantities_ be merely tokens of _qualities_? Another consciousness and scale of desires must correspond to greater power in fact, another point of view; growth in itself is the expression of a desire _to become more;_ the desire for a greater _quantum_ springs from a certain _quale,_ in a purely quantitative world, everything would be dead, stiff, and motionless.--The reduction of all qualities to quantities is nonsense: it is discovered that they can only stand together, an analogy--

565.

Qualities are our insurmountable barriers; we cannot possibly help feeling mere _differences of quantity_ as something fundamentally different from quantity--that is to say, as _qualities,_ which we can no longer reduce to terms of quantity. But everything in regard to which the word "knowledge" has any sense at all, belongs to the realm of reckoning, weighing, and measuring, to quantity whereas, conversely, all our valuations (that is to say, our sensations) belong precisely to the realm of qualities, _i.e._ to those truths which belong to us alone and to our point of view, and which absolutely cannot be "known." It is obvious that every one of us, different creatures, must feel different qualities, and must therefore live in a different world from the rest. Qualities are an idiosyncrasy proper to human nature; the demand that these our human interpretations and values, should be general and perhaps real values, belongs to the hereditary madnesses of human pride.

566.

The "real world," in whatever form it has been conceived hitherto--was always the world of appearance _over again._

567.

The world of appearance, _i.e._ a world regarded in the light of values; ordered, selected according to values--that is to say, in this case, according to the standpoint of utility in regard to the preservation and the increase of power of a certain species of animals.

It is _the point of view,_ then, which accounts for the character of "appearance." As if a world could remain over, when the point of view is cancelled! By such means _relativity_ would also be cancelled!

Every centre of energy has its _point of view_ of the whole of the _remainder_ of the world--that is to say, its perfectly definite _valuation,_ its mode of action, its mode of resistance. The "world of appearance" is thus reduced to a specific kind of action on the world proceeding from a centre.

But there is no other kind of action: and the "world" is only a word for the collective play of these actions. _Reality_ consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every isolated factor against the whole.

There no longer remains a shadow of a _right_ to speak here of "appearance." ...

The _specific way of reacting_ is the only way of reacting; we do not know how many kinds and what sort of kinds there are.

But there is no "_other,_" no "real," no essential being,--for thus a world _without_ action and reaction would be expressed....

The antithesis: world of appearance and real world, is thus reduced to the antitheses "world" and "nonentity."

568.

A criticism of the concept "_real and apparent_ world."--Of these two the first is a mere fiction, formed out of a host of imaginary things.

Appearance itself belongs to reality: it is a form of its being; _i.e._ in a world where there is no such thing as being, a certain calculable world of _identical_ cases must first be created through _appearance;_ a _tempo_ in which observation and comparison is possible, etc.

"Appearance" is an adjusted and simplified world, in which our _practical_ instincts have worked: for us it is perfectly true: for we _live_ in it, we can live in it: _this is the proof_ of its truth as far as we are concerned....

The world, apart from the fact that we have to live in it--the world, which we have _not_ adjusted to our being, our logic, and our psychological prejudices--does _not_ exist as a world "in-itself"; it is essentially a world of relations: under certain circumstances it has a _different aspect_ from every different point at which it is seen: it presses against every point, and every point resists it--and these collective relations are in every case _incongruent._

The _measure of power_ determines what _being_ possesses the other measure of power: under what form, force, or constraint, it acts or resists.

Our particular case is interesting enough: we have created a conception in order to be able to live in a world, in order to perceive just enough to enable us to _endure_ life in that world....

569.

The nature of our psychological vision is determined by the fact--

(1) That _communication_ is necessary, and that for communication to be possible something must be stable, simplified, and capable of being stated precisely (above all, in the so-called _identical_ case). In order that it may be communicable, it must be felt as something _adjusted,_ as "_recognisable_." The material of the senses, arranged by the understanding, reduced to coarse leading features, made similar to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, _made logical._

(2) The _phenomenal_ world is the adjusted world which _we believe to be real,_ Its "reality" lies in the constant return of similar, familiar, and related things, in their _rationalised character,_ and in the belief that we are here able to reckon and determine.

(3) The opposite of this phenomenal world is not "the real world," but the amorphous and unadjustable world consisting of the chaos of sensations--that is to say, _another kind_ of phenomenal; world, a world which to us is "unknowable."

(4) The question how things-in-themselves are constituted, quite apart from our sense-receptivity and from the activity of our understanding, must be answered by the further question: how were we able to know _that things existed?_ "Thingness" is one of our own inventions. The question is whether there are not a good many more ways of creating such a world of appearance--and whether this creating, rationalising, adjusting, and falsifying be not the best-guaranteed _reality_ itself: in short, whether that which "fixes the meaning of things" is not the only reality: and whether the "effect of environment upon us" be not merely the result of such will-exercising subjects.... The other "creatures" act upon us; our _adjusted_ world of appearance is an arrangement and an _overpowering_ of its activities: a sort of _defensive_ measure. _The subject alone is demonstrable_; the _hypothesis_ might be advanced _that subjects are all that exist,_--that "object" is only a form of action of subject upon subject ... a _modus of the subject._

_(k)_ The Metaphysical Need.

570.

If one resembles all the philosophers that have gone before, one can have no eyes for what has existed and what will exist--one sees only what _is._ But as there is no such thing as Being; all that the philosophers had to deal with was a host of _fancies,_ this was their "world."

571.

To assert the _existence_ as a whole of things concerning which we know nothing, simply because there is an advantage in not being able to know anything of them, was a piece of artlessness on Kant's part, and the result of the recoil-stroke of certain needs--especially in the realm of morals and metaphysics.

572.

An artist cannot endure reality; he turns away or back from it: his earnest opinion is that the worth of a thing consists in that nebulous residue of it which one derives from colour, form, sound, and thought; he believes that the more subtle, attenuated, and volatile, a thing or a man becomes, _the more valuable he becomes: the less real,_ the greater the worth. This is Platonism: but Plato was guilty of yet further audacity in the matter of turning tables--he measured the degree of reality according to the degree of value, and said: The more there is of "idea" the more there is of Being. He twisted the concept "reality" round and said: "What ye regard as real is an error, and the nearer we get to the 'idea' the nearer we are to 'truth.'"--Is this understood? It was the _greatest of all rechristenings:_ and because Christianity adopted it, we are blind to its astounding features. At bottom, Plato, like the artist he was, _placed appearance before_ Being! and therefore lies and fiction before truth! unreality before actuality!--He was, however, so convinced of the value of appearance, that he granted it the attributes of "Being," "causality," "goodness," and "truth," and, in short, all those things which are associated with value.

The concept value itself regarded as a cause: first standpoint.

The ideal granted all attributes, conferring honour: second standpoint.

573.

The idea of the "true world" or of "God" as absolutely spiritual, intellectual, and good, is an _emergency measure_ to the extent to which the _antagonistic_ instincts are all-powerful....

Moderation and existing humanity is reflected exactly in the humanisation of the gods. The Greeks of the strongest period, who entertained no fear whatever of themselves, but on the contrary were pleased with themselves, brought down their gods to all their emotions.

The spiritualisation of the idea of God is thus very far from being a sign of _progress_: one is heartily conscious of this when one reads Goethe--in his works the vaporisation of God into virtue and spirit is felt as being upon a lower plane.

574.

The nonsense of all metaphysics shown to reside in the derivation of the conditioned out of the unconditioned.

It belongs to the nature of thinking that it adds the unconditioned to the conditioned, that it invents it--just as it thought of and invented the "ego" to cover the multifariousness of its processes i it measures the world according to a host of self-devised measurements--according to its fundamental fictions "the unconditioned," "end and means," "things," "substances," and according to logical laws, figures, and forms.

There would be nothing which could be called knowledge, if thought did not first so _re-create_ the world into "things" which are in its own image. It is only _through_ thought that there is _untruth._

The _origin_ of thought, like that of _feelings,_ cannot be traced: but that is _no_ proof of its primordiality or absoluteness! It simply shows that we cannot get _behind it,_ because we have nothing else save thought and feeling.

575.

To know is to _point to past experience:_ in its nature it is a _regressus in infinitum._ That which halts (in the face of a so-called _causa prima_ or the unconditioned, etc.) is _laziness,_ weariness.

576.

_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics_--the influence of fear. That which has been most feared, the cause of the _greatest suffering_ (lust of power, voluptuousness, etc.), has been treated with the greatest amount of hostility by men, and eliminated from the "real" world. Thus the _passions_ have been step by step _struck out,_ God posited as the opposite of evil--that is to say, reality is conceived to be the _negation of the passions and the emotions_ (i.e. _nonentity_).

_Irrationality,_ impulsive action, accidental action, is, moreover, hated by them (as the cause of incalculable suffering). _Consequently_ they denied this element in the absolute, and interpreted it as absolute "rationality" and "conformity of means to ends."

_Change_ and _perishability_ were also feared; and by this fear an oppressed soul is revealed, full of distrust and painful experiences (the case with _Spinoza_: a man differently constituted would have regarded this change as a charm).

A nature overflowing and _playing_ with energy, would call precisely the _passions, irrationality_ and _change, good_ in a eudemonistic sense, together with their consequences: danger, contrast, ruin, etc.

577.

Against the value of that which always remains the same (remember Spinoza's artlessness and Descartes' likewise), the value of the shortest and of the most perishable, the seductive flash of gold on the belly of the serpent _vita_----

578.

_Moral values in epistemology itself:_--

The faith in reason--why not mistrust?

The "real world" is the good world--why?

Appearance, change, contradiction, struggle, regarded as
immoral: the desire for a world which _knows nothing_ of
these things.

The transcendental world discovered, _so that_ a place may
be kept for "moral freedom" (as in Kant).

Dialectics as the road to virtue (in Plato and Socrates:
probably because sophistry was held to be the road to
immorality).

Time and space are ideal: consequently there is unity in
the essence of things; consequently no sin, no evil, no
imperfection, a _justification_ of God.

Epicurus _denied_ the possibility of knowledge, in order to
keep the moral (particularly the hedonistic) values as the
highest.

Augustine does the same, and later Pascal ("corrupted
reason"), in favour of Christian values.

Descartes' contempt for everything variable; likewise
Spinoza's.

579.

_Concerning the psychology of metaphysics._--This world is only apparent: _therefore_ there must be a real world;--this world is conditioned: _consequently_ there must be an unconditioned world;--this world is contradictory: _consequently_ there is a world free from contradiction;--this world is evolving: _consequently_ there is somewhere a static world:--a host of false conclusions (blind faith in reason: if A exists, then its opposite B must also _exist_). Pain _inspires these conclusions_: at bottom they are _withes_ that such a world might exist; the hatred of a world which leads to suffering is likewise revealed by the fact that another and _better_ world is imagined: the _resentment_ of the metaphysician against reality is creative here.

_The second_ series of questions: _wherefore_ suffer? ... and from this a conclusion is derived concerning the relation of the real world to our apparent, changing, suffering, and contradictory world: (1) Suffering as the consequence of error: how is error possible? (2) Suffering as the consequence of guilt: how is guilt possible? (A host of experiences drawn from the sphere of nature or society, universalised and made absolute.) But if the conditioned world be causally determined by the unconditioned, then the _freedom to err, to be sinful,_ must also be derived from the same quarter: and once more the question arises, _to what purpose?_ ... The world of appearance, of Becoming, of contradiction, of suffering, is therefore _willed; to what purpose?_

The error of these conclusions; two contradictory concepts are formed--because one of them corresponds to a reality, the other "_must_" also correspond to a reality. "_Whence_" would one otherwise derive its contradictory concept? _Reason_ is thus a source of revelation concerning the absolute.

But the _origin_ of the above contradictions _need not necessarily_ be a supernatural source of reason: it is sufficient to oppose t_he real genesis_ of the concepts, this springs from practical spheres, from utilitarian spheres, hence the _strong faith_ it commands _(one is threatened with ruin_ if one's conclusions are not in conformity with this reason; but this fact is no "_proof_" of what the latter asserts).

_The preoccupation of metaphysicians with pain,_ is quite artless. "Eternal blessedness": psychological nonsense. Brave and creative men never make pleasure and pain ultimate questions--they are incidental conditions: both of them must be desired when one _will attain to_ something. It is a sign of fatigue and illness in these metaphysicians and religious men, that they should press questions of pleasure and pain into the foreground. Even _morality_ in their eyes derives its great importance _only_ from the fact that it is regarded as an essential condition for abolishing pain.

_The same holds good of the preoccupation with appearance and error_ the cause of pain. A superstition that happiness and truth are related (confusion: happiness in "certainty," in "faith").

580.

To what extent are the various _epistemological positions_ (materialism, sensualism, idealism) consequences of valuations? The source of the highest feelings of pleasure ("feelings of value") may also judge concerning the problem of _reality_!

The measure of _positive knowledge_ is quite a matter of indifference and beside the point; as witness the development of Indici.

The Buddhistic _negation_ of reality in general (appearance pain) is perfectly consistent: undemonstrability, inaccessibility, lack of categories, not only for an "absolute world," but a recognition of the _erroneous procedures_ by means of which the whole concept has been reached. "Absolute reality," "Being in itself," a contradiction. In a world of _Becoming,_ reality is merely a _simplification_ for the purpose of practical ends, or a _deception_ resulting from the coarseness of certain organs, or a variation in the tempo of Becoming.

The logical denial of the world and Nihilism is a consequence of the fact that we must oppose nonentity with Being, and that Becoming is denied. ("_Something_" becomes.)

581.

_Being_ and _Becoming._--"_Reason_" developed upon a sensualistic basis upon the _prejudices of the senses_--that is to say, with the belief in the truth of the judgment of the senses.

"Being," as the generalisation of the concept "_Life_" (breath), "to be animate," "to will," "to act upon," "become."

The opposite is: "to be inanimate," "_not_ to become," "_not_ to will." _Thus_: "Being" is _not_ opposed to "not-Being," to "appearance," nor is it opposed to death (for only that can be dead which can also live).

The "soul," the "ego," posited as _primeval facts;_ and introduced wherever _there is Becoming._

582.

_Being_--we have no other idea of it than that which we derive from "_living._"--How then can everything "be" dead?

583.

_A._

I see with astonishment that science resigns itself to-day to the fate of being reduced to the world of appearance: we certainly have no organ of knowledge for the real world--be it what it may.

At this point we may well ask: With what organ of knowledge is this contradiction established?...

The fact that a world which is accessible to our organs is also understood to be dependent upon these organs, and the fact that we should understand a world as subjectively conditioned, are _no_ proofs of the actual _possibility_ of an objective world. Who urges us to believe that subjectivity _is_ real or essential?

The absolute is even an absurd concept: an "absolute mode of existence" is nonsense, the concept "being," "thing," is always _relative_ to us.

The trouble is that, owing to the old antithesis "apparent" and "real," the correlative valuations "of little value" and "absolutely valuable" have been spread abroad.

The world of appearance does not strike us as a "valuable" world; appearance is on a lower plane than the highest value. Only a "real" world can be absolutely "valuable"....

_Prejudice of prejudices!_ It is perfectly possible in itself that the real nature of things would be so unfriendly, so opposed to the first conditions of life, that appearance is necessary in order to make life possible.... This is certainly the case in a large number of situations--for instance, marriage.

Our empirical world would thus be conditioned, even in its limits to knowledge, by the instinct of self-preservation, we regard that as good, valuable, and true, which favours the preservation of the species....

_(a)_ We have no categories which allow us to distinguish between a real and an apparent world. (At the most, there could exist a world of appearance, but not _our_ world of appearance.)

_(b)_ Taking the _real_ world for granted, it might still be the _less valuable_ to us; for the quantum of illusion might be of the highest order, owing to its value to us as a preservative measure. (Unless _appearance_ in itself were sufficient to condemn anything?)

_(c)_ That there exists a correlation between the _degrees of value_ and the _degrees of reality_ (so that the highest values also possessed the greatest degree of reality), is a metaphysical postulate which starts out with the hypothesis that we _know_ the order of rank among values; and that this order is a _moral_ one. It is only on this hypothesis that _truth_ is necessary as a definition of all that is of a superior value.

_B._

It is of cardinal importance that the _real world_ should be suppressed. It is the most formidable inspirer of doubts, and depredator of values, concerning the _world which we are_: it was our most dangerous_ attempt_ heretofore on the life of Life.

_War_ against all the hypotheses upon which a real world has been imagined. The notion that _moral values_ are the _highest_ values, belongs to this hypothesis.

The superiority of the moral valuation would be refuted, if it could be shown to be the result of an _immoral_ valuation--a specific case of real immorality: it would thus reduce itself to an _appearance,_ and as an _appearance_ it would cease from having any right to condemn appearance.

_C._

Then the "Will to Truth" would have to be examined psychologically: it is not a moral power, but a form of the Will to Power. This would have to be proved by the fact that it avails itself of every _immoral_ means there is; above all, of the metaphysicians.

At the present moment we are face to face with the necessity of testing the assumption that moral values are the highest values, _Method in research_ is attained only when all _moral prejudices_ have been overcome: it represents a conquest over morality....

584.

The aberrations of philosophy are the outcome of the fact that, instead of recognising in logic and the categories of reason merely a means to the adjustment of the world for utilitarian ends (that is to say, especially, a useful _falsification_), they were taken to be the criterion of truth--particularly of _reality._ The "criterion of truth" was, as a matter of fact, merely the _biological utility of a systematic falsification of this sort, on principle:_ and, since a species of animals knows nothing more important than its own preservation, it was indeed allowable here to speak of "truth." Where the artlessness came in, however, was in taking this anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the _measure of things,_ as the canon for recognising the "real" and the "unreal": in short, in making a relative thing absolute. And behold, all at once, the world fell into the two halves, "real" and "apparent": and precisely that world which man's reason had arranged for him to live and to settle in, was discredited. Instead of using the forms as mere instruments for making the world manageable and calculable, the mad fancy of philosophers intervened, and saw that in these categories the concept of that world is given which does not correspond to the concept of the world in which man lives.... The means were misunderstood as measures of value, and even used as a condemnation of their original purpose....

The purpose was, to deceive one's self in a useful way: the means thereto was the invention of forms and signs, with the help of which the confusing multifariousness of life could be reduced to a useful and wieldy scheme.

But woe! a _moral category_ was now brought into the game: no creature would deceive itself, no creature may deceive itself--consequently there is only a will to truth. What is "truth"?

The principle of contradiction provided the scheme: the real world to which the way is being sought cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot evolve, has no beginning and no end.

That is the greatest error which has ever been committed, the really fatal error of the world: it was believed that in the forms of reason a criterion of reality had been found--whereas their only purpose was to master reality, by _misunderstanding_ it intelligently....

And behold, the world became false precisely owing to the qualities _which constitute its reality,_ namely, change, evolution, multifariousness, contrast, contradiction, war. And thenceforward the whole fatality was there.

1. How does one get rid of the false and merely apparent world? (it was the real and only one).

2. How does one become one's self as remote as possible from the world of appearance? (the concept of the perfect being as a contrast to the real being; or, more correctly still, as _the contradiction of life_....).

The whole direction of values was towards the _slander of life_; people deliberately confounded ideal dogmatism with knowledge in general: so that the opposing parties also began to reject _science_ with horror.

Thus the road to science was _doubly_ barred: first, by the belief in the real world; and secondly, by the opponents of this belief. Natural science and psychology were (1) condemned in their objects, (2) deprived of their artlessness....

Everything is so absolutely bound and related to everything else in the real world, that to condemn, or to _think away_ anything, means to condemn and think away the whole. The words "this should not be," "this ought not to be," are a farce.... If one imagines the consequences, one would ruin the very source of Life by suppressing everything which is in any sense whatever _dangerous or destructive._ Physiology proves this _much better_!

We see how morality _(a) poisons_ the whole concept of the world, _(b)_ cuts off the way to _science, (c)_ dissipates and undermines all real instincts (by teaching that their root is _immoral_).

We thus perceive a terrible tool of decadence at work, which succeeds in remaining immune, thanks to the holy names and holy attitudes it assumes.

585.

The awful recovery of our _consciousness:_ not of the individual, but of the human species. Let us reflect; let us think backwards; let us follow the narrow and broad highway.

_A._

Man seeks "the truth": a world that does not contradict itself, that does not deceive, that does not change, a _real_ world--a world in which there is no suffering: contradiction, deception, variability---the causes of suffering! He does not doubt that there is such a thing as a world as it ought to be; he would fain find a road to it. (Indian criticism: even the ego is apparent and _not_ real.)

Whence does man derive the concept of _reality_? --Why does he make variability, deception, contradiction, the origin of _suffering;_ why not rather of his happiness? ...

The contempt and hatred of all that perishes, changes, and varies: whence comes this valuation of stability? Obviously, the will to truth is _merely_ the longing for a _stable world._

The senses deceive; reason corrects the errors: _therefore,_ it was concluded, reason is the road to a static state; the most _spiritual_ ideas must be nearest to the "real world."--It is from the senses that the greatest number of misfortunes come they are cheats, deluders, and destroyers.

Happiness can be promised only by Being: change and happiness exclude each other. The loftiest desire is thus to be one with Being. That is the formula for the way to happiness.

_In summa:_ The world as it _ought_ to be exists; this world in which we live is an error--this our world should _not_ exist.

_The belief in Being_ shows itself only as a result: the real primum _mobile_ is the disbelief in Becoming, the mistrust of Becoming, the scorn of all Becoming....

What kind of a man reflects in this way? An unfruitful, _suffering_ kind, a world-weary kind. If we try and fancy what the opposite kind of man would be like, we have a picture of a creature who would not require the belief in Being; he would rather despise it as dead, tedious, and indifferent....

The belief that the world which ought to be, is, really exists, is a belief proper to the unfruitful, _who do not wish to create a world as it should be._ They take it for granted, they seek for means and ways of attaining to it. "The will to truth"--_is the impotence of the will to create._

To recognise that something } Antagonism in is _thus_ or _thus:_ } the degrees of To act so that something will } energy in be _thus_ or _thus:_ } various natures.

The fiction of a world which corresponds to our desires; psychological artifices and interpretations calculated to associate all that we honour and regard as pleasant, with this _real world._

"The will to truth" at this stage is essentially _the art of interpretation:_ to which also belongs that interpretation which still possesses strength.

The same species of men, grown one degree poorer, _no longer possessed of the power_ to interpret and to create fictions, produces the Nihi_lists._ A Nihilist is the man who says of the world as it is, that it ought _not_ to exist, and of the world as it ought to be, that it does not exist. According to this, existence (action, suffering, willing, and feeling) has no sense: the pathos of the "in vain" is the Nihilist's pathos--and as pathos it is moreover an _inconsistency_ on the part of the Nihilist.

He who is not able to introduce his will into things, the man without either will or energy, at least invests them with some meaning, _i.e._ he believes that a will is already in them.

The degree of a man's _will-power_ may be measured from the extent to which he can dispense with the meaning in things, from the extent to which he is able to endure a world without meaning: _because he himself arranges a small portion of it._

The _philosophical objective view of things_ may thus be a sign of poverty both of will and of energy. For energy organises what is closest and next; the "scientists," whose only desire is to _ascertain_ what exists, are such as cannot arrange things _as they ought to be._

The _artists,_ an intermediary species, they at least set up a symbol of what should exist,--they are productive inasmuch as they actually _alter_ and transform; not like the scientists, who leave everything as it is.

_The connection between philosophers and the pessimistic religions;_ the same species of man (_they attribute the highest degree of reality_ to the _things which are valued highest_).

_The connection between philosophers and moral men_ and their evaluations (the _moral_ interpretation of the world as the sense of the world: after the collapse of the religious sense).

_The overcoming of philosophers_ by the annihilation of the world of being: intermediary period of Nihilism; before there is sufficient strength present to transvalue values, and to make the world of becoming, and of appearance, the _only_ world to be deified and called good.

_B._

Nihilism as a normal phenomenon may be a symptom of increasing _strength_ or of increasing _weakness_:--

Partly owing to the fact that the strength _to create_ and _to will_ has grown to such an extent, that it no longer requires this collective interpretation and introduction of a _sense_ ("present duties," state, etc.);

Partly owing to the fact that even the creative power necessary to invent sense, declines, and disappointment becomes the ruling condition. The inability to _believe_ in a sense becomes "unbelief."

What is the meaning of _science_ in regard to both possibilities?

(1) It is a sign of strength and self-control; it shows an _ability_ to dispense with healing, consoling worlds of illusion.

(2) It is also able to undermine, to dissect, to disappoint, and to weaken.

_C._

_The belief in truth,_ the need of holding to something which is believed to be true: psychological reduction apart from the valuations that have existed hitherto. Fear and laziness.

At the same time _unbelief:_ Reduction. In what way does it acquire a _new value,_ if a real world does not exist at all (by this means the capacity of valuing, which hitherto has been _lavished_ upon the world of being, becomes free once more).

586.

The _real_ and the _ "apparent" world._

_A._

The _erroneous concepts_ which proceed from this concept are of three kinds:--

_(a)_ An unknown world:--we are adventurers, we are inquisitive,--that which is known to us makes us weary (the danger of the concept lies in the fact it suggests that "this" world is known to us....);

_(b) Another_ world, where things are different:--something in us draws comparisons, and thereby our calm submission and our silence lose their value--perhaps all will be for the best, we have not hoped in vain.... The world where things are different--who knows?--where we ourselves will be different....

_(c)_ A _real_ world:--that is the most singular blow and attack which we have ever received; so many things have become encrusted in the word "true," that we involuntarily give these to the "real world"; the _real_ world must also be a _truthful_ world, such a one as would not deceive us or make fools of us; to believe in it in this way is to be almost _forced_ to believe (from convention, as is the case among people worthy of confidence).

***

The concept, "the _unknown_ world," suggests that this world is known to us (is tedious);

The concept, "the other world," suggests that this world _might be different,_ it suppresses necessity and fate (it is useless to _submit_ and to _adapt one's self_);

The concept, _the true world,_ suggests that this world is untruthful, deceitful, dishonest, not genuine, and not essential, and _consequently_ not a world calculated to be useful to us (it is unadvisable to become adapted to it; _better_ resist it).

***

Thus we _escape_ from "this" world in three different ways:----

_(a)_ With our _curiosity_--as though the interesting part was somewhere else;

_(b)_ With our _submission_--as though it was not necessary to submit, as though this world was not an ultimate necessity;

_(c)_ With our _sympathy_ and respect--as though this world did not deserve them, as though it was mean and dishonest towards us....

_In summa_: we have become revolutionaries in three different ways; we have made _x_ our criticism of the "known world."

_B._

_The first step to reason:_ to understand to what extent we have been _seduced,_--for it might be _precisely_ the reverse:

_(a)_ The _unknown_ world could be so constituted as to give us a liking for "this" world--it may be a more stupid and meaner form of existence.

_(b)_ The other world, very far from taking account of our desires which were never realised here, might be part of the mass of things which _this_ world makes possible for us; to learn to know this world would be a means of satisfying us,

_(c)_ The _true_ world: but who actually says that the apparent world must be of less value than the true world? Do not our instincts contradict this judgment? Is not man eternally occupied in creating an imaginative world, because he will have a better world than reality? _In the first place,_ how do we know that _our_ world is _not_ the true world? ... for it might be that the other world is the world of "appearance" (as a matter of fact, the Greeks, for instance, actually imagined a _region of shadows, a life of appearance,_ beside _real_ existence). And finally, what right have we to establish _degrees of reality,_ as it were? That is something different from an unknown world--that is already the _will to know something of the unknown._ The "other," the "unknown" world--good! but to speak of the "true world" is as good as "_knowing_ something about it,"--that is the _contrary_ of the assumption of an _x_-world....

In short, the world _x_ might be in every way a more tedious, a more inhuman, and a less dignified world than this one.

It would be quite another matter if it were assumed that there were several _x_-worlds--that is to say, every possible kind of world besides our own. But this has _never been assumed...._

_C._

Problem: why has the _image of the other world_ always been to the disadvantage of "this" one--that is to say, always stood as a criticism of it; what does this point to?--

A people that are proud of themselves, and who are on the ascending path of Life, always; picture _another_ existence as lower and less valuable than theirs; they regard the strange unknown world as their enemy, as their opposite; they feel no curiosity, but rather repugnance in regard to what is strange to them.... Such a body of men would never admit that another people were the "true people"....

The very fact that such a distinction is possible,--that this world should be called the world of appearance, and that the other should be called the true world,--is symptomatic.

The places of origin of the idea, of "another world":

The philosopher who invents a rational world where _reason_
and logical functions are adequate:--this is the root of
the "true" world.

The religious man who invents a "divine world";--this is the
root of the "denaturalised" and the "anti-natural" world.

The moral man who invents a "free world":--this is the root
of the good, the perfect, the just, and the holy world.

The _common factor_ in the three places of origin: _psychological_ error, physiological confusion.

With what attributes is the "other world," as it actually appears in history, characterised? With the stigmata of philosophical, religious, and moral prejudices.

The "other world" as it appears in the light of these facts, is _synonymous_ with _not-Being,_ with not-living, with the _will_ not to live....

_General aspect:_ it was the instinct of the _fatigue of living,_ and not that of life, which created the "other world."

_Result:_ philosophy, religion, and morality are _symptoms of decadence._

_(l)_ The Biological Value of Knowledge.

587.

It might seem as though I had evaded the question concerning "certainty". The reverse is true: but while raising the question of the criterion of certainty, I wished to discover the weights and measures with which men had weighed heretofore--and to show that the question concerning certainty is already in itself a _dependent_ question, a question of the second rank.

588.

The question of values is more _fundamental_ than the question of certainty: the latter only becomes serious once the question of values has been answered.

Being and appearance, regarded psychologically, yield no "Being in itself," no criterion for reality, but only degrees of appearance, measured according to the strength of the sympathy which we feel for appearance.

There is no struggle for existence between ideas and observations, but only a struggle for supremacy--the vanquished idea is _not annihilated,_ but only _driven to the background_ or _subordinated. There is no such thing as annihilation in intellectual spheres._

589.

"End and means"
"Cause and effect"
"Subject and object"
"Action and suffering"
"Thing-in-itself and
appearance"

As interpretations (_not_ as established facts)--and in what respect were they perhaps necessary interpretations? (as "preservative measures")--all in the sense of a Will to Power.

590.

Our values are _interpreted into the heart_ of things.

Is there, then, any _sense_ in the absolute?

Is not sense necessarily _relative-sense_ and perspective?

All sense is Will to Power (all relative senses may be identified with it).

591.

The desire for "established facts"--Epistemology: how much pessimism there is in it!

592.

The antagonism between the "true world," as pessimism depicts it, and a world in which it were possible to live--for this the rights of _truth_ must be tested. It is necessary to measure all these "ideal forces" according to the standard of life, in order to understand the nature of that antagonism: the struggle of sickly, desperate life, cleaving to a beyond, against healthier, more foolish, more false, richer, and fresher life. Thus it is not "truth" struggling with Life, but _one_ kind of Life with another kind.--But the former would fain be the _higher_ kind!--Here we must prove that some order of rank is necessary,--that the first problem is _the order of rank among kinds of Life._

593.

The belief, "It is _thus_ and _thus,_" must be altered into the will, "Thus and thus _shall it be._"

_(m)_ Science.

594.

Science hitherto has been a means of disposing of the confusion of things by hypotheses which "explain everything"--that is to say, it has been the result of the intellect's repugnance to chaos. This same repugnance takes hold of me when I contemplate _myself;_ I should like to form some kind of representation of my inner world for myself by means of a _scheme,_ and thus overcome intellectual confusion. Morality was a simplification of this sort: it taught man as _recognised,_ as _known,_--Now we have annihilated morality--we have once more grown _completely obscure_ to ourselves! I know that I know nothing _about myself. Physics_ shows itself to be a _boon_ for the mind: science (as the road to _knowledge_) acquires a new charm after morality has been laid aside--and _owing to the fact_ that we find consistency here alone, we must _order_ our lives in accordance with it so that it may help us to _preserve it. _ This results in a sort of _practical meditation_ concerning the _conditions of our existence_ as investigators.

595.

Our first principles: no God: no purpose: limited energy. We will take good care to _avoid_ thinking out and prescribing the necessary lines of thought for the lower orders.

596.

No "_moral_ education" of humanity: but the _disciplinary school of scientific errors_ is necessary, because truth disgusts and creates a dislike of life, provided a man is not already irrevocably launched upon his _way,_ and bears the consequences of his honest standpoint with tragic pride.

597.

The first principle of _scientific work:_ faith in the union and continuance of scientific work, so that the individual may undertake to work at any point, however small, and feel sure that his efforts _will not be in vain._

There is a great paralysing force: to work _in vain,_ to struggle _in vain._

***

The periods of _hoarding,_ when energy and power are stored, to be utilised later by subsequent periods: _Science_ as a _half-way house,_ at which the mediocre, more multifarious, and more complicated beings find their most natural gratification and means of expression: all those who do well to avoid _action._

598.

A. philosopher recuperates his strength in a way quite his own, and with other means: he does it, for instance, with Nihilism. The belief _that there is no such thing as truth,_ the Nihilistic belief, is a tremendous relaxation for one who, as a warrior of knowledge, is unremittingly struggling with a host of hateful truths. For truth is ugly.

599.

The "purposelessness of all phenomena": the belief in this is the result of the view that all interpretations hitherto have been false, it is a generalisation on the part of discouragement and weakness--it is not a necessary belief.

The arrogance of man: when he sees no purpose, he _denies_ that there can be one!

600.

The unlimited ways of interpreting the world: every interpretation is a symptom of growth or decline.

Unity (monism) is a need of inertia; Plurality in interpretation is a sign of strength. One should not _desire to deprive_ the world of its disquieting and enigmatical nature.

601.

Against the desire for reconciliation and peaceableness. To this also belongs every attempt on the part of monism.

602.

This relative world, this world for the eye, the touch, and the ear, is very false, even when adjusted to a much more sensitive sensual apparatus. But its comprehensibility, its clearness, its practicability, its beauty, will begin to _near their end_ if we _refine_ our senses, just as beauty ceases to exist when the processes of its history are reflected upon: the arrangement of the _end_ is in itself an illusion. Let it suffice, that the more coarsely and more superficially it is understood, the _more valuable,_ the more definite, the more beautiful and important the world then seems. The more deeply one looks into it, the further our valuation retreats from our view,-_senselessness approaches!_ We have created the world that has any value! Knowing this, we also perceive that the veneration of truth is already the _result of illusion_--and that it is much more necessary to esteem the formative, simplifying, moulding, and romancing power.

"All is false--everything is allowed!"

Only as the result of a certain bluntness of vision and the desire for simplicity does the beautiful and the "valuable" make its appearance: in itself it is purely fanciful.

603.

We know that the destruction of an illusion does not necessarily produce a truth, but only one more piece of _ignorance;_ it is the extension of our "empty space," an increase in our "waste."

604.

Of what alone can _knowledge_ consist?--"Interpretation," the introduction of a sense into things, _not_ "explanation" (in the majority of cases a new interpretation of an old interpretation which has grown incomprehensible and little more than a mere sign). There is no such thing as an established fact, everything fluctuates, everything, is intangible, yielding; after all, the most lasting of all things are our opinions.

605.

The ascertaining of "truth" and "untruth," the ascertaining of facts in general, is fundamentally different from the creative _placing,_ forming, moulding, subduing, and _willing_ which lies at the root of _philosophy. To give a sense to things_--this duty always remains _over,_ provided _no sense already lies in them._ The same holds good of sounds, and also of the fate of nations they are susceptible of the most varied interpretations and turns, _for different purposes._

A higher duty is to _fix a goal_ and to mould facts according to it: _that is,_ the _interpretation of action,_ and not merely a _transvaluation_ of concepts.

606.

Man ultimately finds nothing more in things than he himself has laid in them--this process of finding again is science, the actual process of laying a meaning in things, is art, religion, love, pride. In both, even if they are child's play, one should show good courage and one should plough ahead; on the one hand, to find again, on the other,--we are the other,--to lay a sense in things.

607.

_Science_: its two sides:--

In regard to the individual;

In regard to the complex of culture ("levels of culture")

--antagonistic valuation in regard to this and that side.

608.

The development of science tends ever more to transform the known into the unknown: its aim, however, is to do the _reverse,_ and it starts out with the instinct of tracing the unknown to the known.

In short, science is laying the road to _sovereign ignorance,_ to a feeling that "knowledge" does not exist at all, that it was merely a form of haughtiness to dream of such a thing; further, that we have not preserved the smallest notion which would allow us to class knowledge even as a _possibility_ that "knowledge" is a contradictory idea. We _transfer_ a primeval myth and piece of human vanity into the land of hard facts: we can _allow_ a thing-in-itself as a concept, just as little as we can _allow_ "knowledge-in-itself." The _misleading_ influence of "numbers and logic," the misleading influence of "laws."

_Wisdom_ is an attempt to _overcome_ the perspective valuations (_i.e._ the "will to power"): it is a principle which is both unfriendly to Life, and also decadent; a symptom in the case of the Indians, etc.; _weakness_ of the power of appropriation.

609.

It does not suffice for you to see in what ignorance man and beast now live; you must also have and learn the _desire_ for _ignorance._ It is necessary that you should know that without this form of ignorance life itself would be impossible, that it is merely a vital condition under which, alone, a living organism can preserve itself and prosper: a great solid belt of ignorance must stand about you.

610.

Science--the transformation of Nature into concepts for the purpose of governing Nature--that is part of the rubric _means._

But the _purpose_ and _will_ of mankind must grow in the same way, the intention in regard to the whole.

611.

_Thought_ is the strongest and most persistently exercised function in all stages of life--and also in every act of perception or apparent experience! Obviously it soon becomes the _mightiest_ and _most exacting_ of all functions, and in time tyrannises over other powers. Ultimately it becomes "passion in itself."

612.

The right to great passion must be reclaimed for the investigator, after self-effacement and the cult of "objectivity" have created a false order of rank in this sphere. Error reached its zenith when Schopenhauer taught: _in the release from passion and_ in will alone lay the road to "truth," to knowledge; the intellect freed from will _could not help_ seeing the true and actual essence of things. The same error in art: as if everything became _beautiful_ the moment it was regarded without will.

613.

The contest for supremacy among the passions, and the dominion of one of the passions over the intellect.

614.

To "humanise" the world means to feel ourselves ever more and more masters upon earth.

615.

Knowledge, among a higher class of beings, will also take new forms which are not yet necessary.

616.

That the _worth of the world_ lies in our interpretations (that perhaps yet other interpretations are possible somewhere, besides mankind's); that the interpretations made hitherto were perspective valuations, by means of which we were able to survive in life, _i.e._ in the Will to Power and in the growth of power; that every _elevation of man_ involves the overcoming of narrower interpretations; that every higher degree of strength or power attained, brings new views in its train, and teaches a belief in new horizons--these doctrines lie scattered through all my works. The world that _concerns us at all_ is false--that is to say, is not a fact; but a romance, a piece of human sculpture, made from a meagre sum of observation; it is "in flux"; it is something that evolves, a great revolving lie continually moving onwards and never getting any nearer to truth--for there is no such thing as "truth."

617.

_Recapitulation_:--

To _stamp_ Becoming with the character of Being--this is the highest _Will to Power._

_The twofold falsification,_ by the senses on the one hand, by the intellect on the other, with the view of maintaining a world of being, of rest, of equivalent cases, etc.

That _everything recurs,_ is the very nearest _approach of a world of Becoming to a world of Being, the height of contemplation._

It is out of the values which have been attributed to Being, that the condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, Becoming, have sprung: once such a world of Being had been invented.

The metamorphoses of Being (body, God, ideas, natural laws, formulæ, etc.).

"Being" as appearance the twisting round of values: appearance was that which _conferred the values._

Knowledge in itself in a world of Becoming is impossible; how can knowledge be possible at all, then? Only as a mistaking of one's self, as will to power, as will to deception.

Becoming is inventing, willing, self-denying, self-overcoming; no subject but an action, it places things, it is creative, no "causes and effects."

Art is the will to overcome Becoming, it is a process of eternalising, but short-sighted, always according to the perspective, repeating, as it were in a small way, the tendency of the whole.

That which _all life_ shows, is to be regarded as a reduced formula for the collective tendency: hence the new definition of the concept "Life" as "will to power."

Instead of "cause and effect," the struggle of evolving factors with one another, frequently with the result that the opponent is absorbed; no constant number for Becoming.

The uselessness of old ideals for the interpretation of all that takes place, once their bestial origin and utility have been recognised, they are, moreover, all hostile to life.

The uselessness of the mechanical theory--it gives the impression that there _can be no purpose._

All the _idealism_ of mankind, hitherto, is on the point of turning into _Nihilism_--may be shown to be a belief in absolute _worth_lessness, _i.e. purpose_lessness.

The annihilation of ideals, the new desert waste the new arts which will help us to endure it--_amphibia_ that we are!

_First principles,_ bravery, patience, no "stepping-back," not too much ardour to get to the fore. (_N.B._--Zarathustra constantly maintaining an attitude of parody towards all former values, as the result of his overflowing energy.)

II.

THE WILL TO POWER IN NATURE.

1. The Mechanical Interpretation of the World.

618.

Of all the interpretations of the world attempted heretofore, the _mechanical_ one seems to-day to stand most prominently in the front. Apparently it has a clean conscience on its side; for no science believes inwardly in progress and success unless it be with the help of mechanical procedures. Every one knows these procedures: "reason" and "purpose" are allowed to remain out of consideration as far as possible; it is shown that, provided a sufficient amount of time be allowed to elapse, everything can evolve out of everything else, and no one attempts to suppress his malicious satisfaction, when the "apparent design in the fate" of a plant or of the yolk of an egg, may be traced to stress and thrust in short, people are heartily glad to pay respect to this principle of profoundest stupidity, if I may be allowed to pass a playful remark concerning these serious matters. Meanwhile, among the most select intellects to be found in this movement, some presentiment of evil, some anxiety is noticeable, as if the theory had a rent in it, which sooner or later might be its last: I mean the sort of rent which denotes the end of all balloons inflated with such theories.

Stress and thrust themselves cannot be "explained," one cannot get rid of the _actio in distans._ The belief even in the ability to explain is now lost, and people peevishly admit that one can only describe, not explain that the dynamic interpretation of the world, with its denial of "empty space" and its little agglomerations of atoms, will soon get the better of physicists: although in this way _Dynamis_ is certainly granted an inner quality.

619.