Chapter III: Eternal Recurrence (9)

The barbarians showed that the ability o_f keeping within the bounds of moderation_ was not in the scope of their powers: they feared and slandered the passions and instincts of nature--likewise the aspect of the ruling Cæsars and castes. On the other hand, there arose the suspicion that all _restraint_ is a form of weakness or of incipient old age and fatigue (thus La Rochefoucauld suspects that "virtue" is only a euphemism in the mouths of those to whom vice no longer affords any pleasure). The capacity for restraint was represented as a matter of hardness, self-control, asceticism, as a fight with the devil, etc. etc. The natural _delight_ of æsthetic natures, in measure; _the pleasure derived from the beauty of measure,_ was _overlooked_ and _denied,_ because that which was desired was an anti-eudæmonistic morality. The belief in the pleasure which comes of restraint has been lacking hitherto--this pleasure of a rider on a fiery steed! The moderation of weak natures was confounded with the restraint of the strong!

In short, the best things have been blasphemed because weak or immoderate swine have thrown a bad light upon them--the best men have _remained concealed_--and have often _misunderstood_ themselves.

871.

_Vicious_ and _unbridled people_: their depressing influence upon the _value of the pussions._ It was the appalling barbarity of morality which was principally responsible in the Middle Ages for the compulsory recourse to a veritable "league _of_ virtue"--and this was coupled with an equally appalling exaggeration of all that which constitutes the value of man. Militant "civilisation" (taming) is in need of all kinds of irons and tortures in order to maintain itself against terrible and beast-of-prey natures.

In this case, contusion, although it may have the most nefarious influences, is quite natural: that which _men of power and will are able to demand of themselves_ gives them the standard for what they may also allow themselves. Such natures are the very opposite of the _vicious_ and the _unbridled;_ although under certain circumstances they may perpetrate deeds for which an inferior man would be convicted of vice and intemperance.

In this respect the concept, "_all men are equal before God_" does an extraordinary amount of harm; actions and attitudes of mind were forbidden which belonged to the prerogative of the strong alone, just as if they were in themselves unworthy of man. All the tendencies of strong men were brought into disrepute by the fact that the defensive weapons of the most weak (even of those who were weakest towards themselves) were established as a standard of valuation.

The confusion went so far that precisely the great _virtuosos_ of life (whose self-control presents the sharpest contrast to the vicious and the unbridled) were branded with the most opprobrious names. Even to this day people feel themselves compelled to disparage a Cæsar Borgia: it is simply ludicrous. The Church has anathematised German Kaisers owing to their vices: as if a monk or a priest had the right to say a word as to what a Frederick II. should allow himself. Don Juan is sent to hell: this is very _naïf._ Has anybody ever noticed that all interesting men are lacking in heaven? ... This is only a hint to the girls, as to where they may best find salvation. If one think at all logically, and also have a profound insight into that which makes a great man, there, can be no doubt at all that the Church has dispatched all "great men" to Hades--its fight is _against_ all "greatness in man."

872.

The rights which a man arrogates to himself are relative to the duties which he sets himself, and to the tasks which he feels _capable of performing._ The great majority of men have no right to life, and are only a misfortune to their higher fellows.

873.

_The misunderstanding of egoism:_ on the part of _ignoble natures_ who know nothing of the lust of conquest and the insatiability of great love, and who likewise know nothing of the overflowing feelings of power which make a man wish to overcome things, to force them over to himself, and to lay them on his heart, the power which impels an artist to his material. It often happens also that the active spirit looks for a field for its activity. In ordinary "egoism" it is precisely the ... "non-ego," the _profoundly mediocre creature,_ the member of the herd, who wishes to maintain himself--and when this is perceived by the rarer, more subtle, and less mediocre natures, it revolts them. For the judgment of the latter is this: "We are the _noble_! It is much more important to maintain _us_ than _that_ cattle!"

874.

_The degeneration of the ruler and of the ruling classes_ has been the cause of all the great disorders in history! Without the Roman Cæsars and Roman society, Christianity would never have prevailed.

When it occurs to inferior men to doubt whether higher men exist, then the danger is great I It is then that men finally discover that there are virtues even among inferior, suppressed, and poor-spirited men, and that everybody is equal before God: which is the _non plus ultra_ of all confounded nonsense that has ever appeared on earth! For in the end higher men begin to measure themselves according to the standard of virtues upheld by the slaves--and discover that they are "proud," etc., and that all their _higher_ qualities should be condemned.

When Nero and Caracalla stood at the helm, it was then that the paradox arose: "The lowest man is of more value than that one on the throne!" And thus the path was prepared for an _image of God_ which was as remote as possible from the image of the mightiest,--God on the Cross!

875.

_Higher man and gregarious man._--When great men are _wanting,_ the great of the past are converted into demigods or whole gods: the rise of religions proves that mankind no longer has any pleasure in man ("nor in woman neither," as in Hamlet's case). Or a host of men are brought together in a heap, and it is hoped that as a Parliament they will operate just as tyrannically.

Tyrannising is the distinctive quality of great men; they make inferior men stupid.

876.

Buckle affords the best example of the extent to which a plebeian agitator of the mob is incapable of arriving at a clear idea of the concept, "higher nature." The opinion which he _combats_ so passionately--that "great men," individuals, princes, statesmen, geniuses, warriors, are the levers and _causes_ of all great movements, is instinctively misunderstood by him, as if it meant that all that was essential and valuable in such a "higher man," was the fact that he was capable of setting masses in motion; in short, that his sole merit was the effect he produced.... But the "higher nature" of the great man resides precisely in being different, in being unable to communicate with others, in the loftiness of his rank--_not_ in any sort of effect he may produce even though this be the shattering of both hemispheres.

877.

The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our civilisation if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is the latter's excuse.

The value of a man (apart, of course, from morality and immorality: because with these concepts a man's _worth_ is not even skimmed) does not lie in his utility; because he would continue to exist even if there were nobody to whom he could be useful. And why could not that man be the very pinnacle of manhood who was the source of the worst possible effects for his race: so high and so superior, that in his presence everything would go to rack and ruin from envy?

878.

To appraise the value of a man according to his _utility_ to mankind, or according to what he costs it, or the _damage_ he is able to inflict upon it, is just as good and just as bad as to appraise the value of a work of art according to its _effects._ But in this way the value of one man compared with another is not even touched upon. The "moral valuation," in so far as it is _social_ measures men altogether according to their effects. But what about the man who has his own taste on his tongue, who is surrounded and concealed by his isolation, uncommunicative and not to be communicated with; a man whom no one has fathomed yet--that is to say, a creature of a higher, and, at any rate, _different_ species, how would ye appraise his worth, seeing that ye cannot know him and can compare him with nothing?

_Moral valuation_ was the cause of the most enormous obtuseness of judgment: the value of a man in himself is _underrated,_ well-nigh _overlooked,_ practically _denied._ This is the remains of simple-minded teleology: the value of man _can only be measured with regard to other men._

879.

_To be obsessed by moral considerations_ presupposes a very low grade of intellect: it shows that the instinct for special rights, for standing apart, the feeling of freedom in creative natures, in "children of God" (or of the devil), is lacking. And irrespective of whether _he_ preaches a ruling morality or _criticises_ the prevailing ethical code from the point of view of his own ideal: by doing these things a man shows that he belongs to the herd--even though he may be what it is most in need of--that is to say, a "shepherd."

880.

We should substitute morality by the will to our own ends, and _consequently_ to the means to them.

881.

_Concerning the order of rank._--What is it that constitutes the _mediocrity_ of the typical man? That he does not understand that things necessarily have _their other side;_ that he combats evil conditions as if they could be dispensed with, that he will not take the one with the other; that he would fain obliterate and erase the _specific character of a thing,_ of a circumstance, of an age, and of a person, by calling only a portion of their qualities good, and suppressing the remainder. The "desirability" of the mediocre is that which we others combat: their _ideal_ is something which shall no longer contain anything harmful, evil, dangerous, questionable, and destructive. We recognise the reverse of this: that with every growth of man his other side must grow as well; that the highest man, if such a concept be allowed, would be that man who would represent _the antagonistic character of existence_ most strikingly, and would be its glory and its only justification.... Ordinary men may only represent a small corner and nook of this natural character; they perish the moment the multifariousness of the elements composing them, and the tension between their antagonistic traits, increases: but this is the prerequisite for greatness in man. That man should become better and at the same time more evil, is my formula for this inevitable fact.

The majority of people are only piecemeal and fragmentary examples of man: only when all these creatures are jumbled together does one whole man arise Whole ages and whole peoples in this sense, have a fragmentary character about them; it may perhaps be part of the economy of human development that man should develop himself only piecemeal. But, for this reason, one should not forget that the only important consideration is the rise of the synthetic man; that inferior men, and by far the great majority of people, are but rehearsals and exercises out of which here and there a whole man may arise; a man who is a human milestone, and who indicates how far mankind has advanced up to a certain point. Mankind does not advance in a straight line,--often a type is attained which is again lost (for instance, with all the efforts of three hundred years, we have not reached the men of the Renaissance again, and in addition to this we must not forget that the man of the Renaissance was already behind his brother of classical antiquity).

882.

The superiority of the Greek and the man of the Renaissance is recognised, but people would like to produce them without the conditions and causes of which they were the result.

883.

_"Purification of taste"_ can only be the result of the _strengthening_ of the type. Our society to-day represents only the cultivating systems, the cultivated man is _lacking._ The great _synthetic man,_ in whom the various forces for attaining a purpose are correctly harnessed together, is altogether wanting. The specimen we possess is the _multifarious_ man, the most interesting form of chaos that has ever existed: but _not_ the chaos _preceding_ the creation of the world, but that following it: _Goethe_ as the most beautiful expression of the type (_completely and utterly un-Olympian_!)[3]

[Footnote 3: The Germans always call Goethe the Olympian.--Tr.]

884.

Handel, Leibniz, Goethe, and Bismarck, are characteristic of the _strong German type._ They lived with equanimity, surrounded by contrasts. They were full of that agile kind of strength which cautiously avoids convictions and doctrines, by using the one as a weapon against the other, and reserving absolute freedom for themselves.

885.

Of this I am convinced, that if the rise of great and rare men had been made dependent upon the voices of the multitude (taking for granted, of course, that the latter knew the qualities which belong to greatness, and also the price that all greatness pays for its self-development), then there would never have been any such thing as a great man!

The fact that things pursue their course _independently_ of the voice of the many, is the reason why, a few astonishing things have taken place on earth.

886.

_The Order of Rank in Human Values._

_(a)_ A man should not be valued according to isolated acts. _Epidermal actions._ Nothing is more rare than a _personal_ act. Class, rank, race, environment, accident--all these things are much more likely to be expressed in an action or deed than the "personality" of the doer.

_(b)_ We should on no account jump to the conclusion that there are many people who are personalities. Some men are but conglomerations of personalities, whilst the majority are not even _one._ In all cases in which those average qualities preponderate, which ensure the maintenance of the species, to be a personality would involve unnecessary expense, it would be a luxury in fact, it would be foolish to demand of anybody that he should be a personality. In such circumstances everybody is a channel or a transmitting vessel.

_(c)_ A "personality" is a relatively _isolated_ phenomenon; in view of the superior importance of the continuation of the race at an average level, a personality might even be regarded as something _hostile to nature._ For a personality to be possible, timely isolation and the necessity for an existence of offence and defence, are prerequisites; something in the nature of a walled enclosure, a capacity for shutting out the world; but above all, a much _lower degree of sensitiveness_ than the average man has, who is too easily infected with the views of others.

The first _question_ concerning the _order of rank:_ how far is a man disposed to be _solitary_ or _gregarious?_ (in the latter case, his value consists in those qualities which secure the survival of his tribe or his type; in the former case, his qualities are those which distinguish him from others, which isolate and defend him, and make his _solitude possible_).

_Consequence:_ the solitary type should not be valued from the standpoint of the gregarious type, or _vice versâ._

Viewed from above, both types are necessary; as is likewise their antagonism,--and nothing is _more_ thoroughly reprehensible than the "desire" which would develop a _third_ thing out of the two ("virtue" as hermaphroditism). This is as little worthy of desire as the equalisation and reconciliation of the sexes. The _distinguishing qualities must be developed ever more and more,_ the gulf must _be made ever wider...._

The concept of _degeneration_ in both cases: the approximation of the qualities of the herd to those of solitary creatures: and _vice versâ_--in short, when they begin to _resemble_ each other. This concept of degeneration is beyond the sphere of moral judgments.

887.

Where the _strongest natures_ are to be sought. The ruin and degeneration of the _solitary_ species is much greater and more terrible: they have the instincts of the herd, and the tradition of values, against them; their weapons of defence, their instincts of self-preservation, are from the beginning insufficiently strong and reliable--fortune must be peculiarly favourable to them if they are _to prosper_ (they prosper best in the lowest ranks and dregs of society; if ye are seeking _personalities_ it is there that ye will find them with much greater certainty than in the middle classes!)

When the dispute between ranks and classes, which aims at equality of rights, is almost settled, the fight will begin against the _solitary person._ (In a certain sense _the latter can maintain and develop himself most easily in a democratic society:_ there where the coarser means of defence are no longer necessary, and a certain habit of order, honesty, justice, trust, is already a general condition.) The _strongest_ must be most tightly bound, most strictly watched, laid in chains and supervised: this is the instinct of the herd. To them belongs a régime of self-mastery, of ascetic detachment, of "duties" consisting in exhausting work, in which one can no longer call one's soul one's own.

888.

I am attempting an _economic_ justification of virtue. The object is to make man as useful as possible, and to make him approximate as nearly as one can to an infallible machine: to this end he must be equipped with _machine-like virtues_ (he must learn to value those states in which he works in a most mechanically useful way, as the highest of all: to this end it is necessary to make him as disgusted as possible with the other states, and to represent them as very dangerous and despicable).

Here is the first stumbling-block: the tediousness and monotony which all mechanical activity brings with it. To learn to endure _this_--and not only to endure it, but to see tedium enveloped in a ray of exceeding charm: this hitherto has been the task of all higher schools. To learn something which you don't care a fig about, and to find precisely your "duty" in this "objective" activity; to learn to value happiness and duty as things apart; this is the invaluable task and performance of higher schools. It is on this account that the philologist has, hitherto, been the educator _per se:_ because his activity, in itself, affords the best pattern of magnificent monotony in action; under his banner youths learn to "swat": first prerequisite for the thorough fulfilment of mechanical duties in the future (as State officials, husbands, slaves of the desk, newspaper readers, and soldiers). Such an existence may perhaps require a philosophical glorification and justification more than any other: pleasurable feelings must be valued by some sort of infallible tribunal, as altogether of inferior rank; "duty _per se_" perhaps even the pathos of reverence in regard to everything unpleasant,--must be demanded imperatively as that which is above all useful, delightful, and practical things.... A mechanical form of existence regarded as the highest and most respectable form of existence, worshipping itself (type: Kant as the fanatic of the formal concept "Thou shalt").

889.

The economic valuation of all the ideals that have existed hitherto--that is to say, the selection and rearing of definite passions and states at the cost of other passions and states. The lawgiver (or the instinct of the community) selects a number of states and passions the existence of which guarantees the performance of regular actions (mechanical actions would thus be the result of the regular requirements of those passions and states).

In the event of these states and passions containing ingredients which were painful, a means would have to be found for overcoming this painfulness by means of a valuation; pain would have to be interpreted as something valuable, as something pleasurable in a higher sense. Conceived in a formula: "_How does something unpleasant become pleasant?_" For instance, when our obedience and our submission to the law become honoured, thanks to the energy, power, and self-control they entail. The same holds good of our public spirit, of our neighbourliness, of our patriotism, our "humanisation," our "altruism," and our "heroism." The _object of all idealism_ should, be to induce people to do unpleasant things cheerfully.

890.

The _belittlement_ of man must be held as the chief aim for a long while: because what is needed in the first place is a broad basis from which a stronger species of man may arise (to what extent hitherto has _every stronger_ species of man arisen from a _substratum of inferior people?_).

891.

The absurd and contemptible form of idealism which would not have mediocrity mediocre, and which instead of feeling triumphant at being exceptional, becomes _indignant_ at cowardice, falseness, pettiness, and wretchedness. _We should not wish things to be any different,_ we should make the gulfs even _wider_!--The higher types among men should be compelled to distinguish themselves by means of the sacrifices which they make to their own existence.

_Principal point of view; distances_ must be established, but _no contrasts must be created._ The _middle classes_ must be dissolved, and their influence decreased: this is the principal means of maintaining distances.

892.

Who would dare to disgust the mediocre of their mediocrity! As you observe, I do precisely the reverse: every step away from mediocrity--thus do I teach--leads to _immorality._

893.

To hate mediocrity is unworthy of a philosopher: it is almost a note of interrogation to his "_right_ to philosophy." It is precisely because he is the exception that he must protect the rule and ingratiate all mediocre people.

894.

What I combat: that an exceptional form should make war upon the rule--instead of understanding that the continued existence of the rule is the first condition of the value of the exception. For instance, there are women who, instead of considering their abnormal thirst for knowledge as a distinction, would fain dislocate the whole status of womanhood.

895.

The _increase of strength_ despite the temporary ruin of the individual:--

A new level must be established;

We must have a method of storing up forces for the maintenance of small performances, in opposition to economic waste;

Destructive nature must for once be reduced to an _instrument_ of this economy of the future;

The weak must be maintained, because there is an enormous mass of _finicking_ work to be done;

The weak and the suffering must be upheld in their belief that existence is still possible;

_Solidarity_ must be implanted as an instinct opposed to the instinct of fear and servility;

War must be made upon accident, even upon the accident of "the great man."

896.

War upon _great_ men justified on economic grounds. Great men are dangerous; they are accidents, exceptions, tempests, which are strong enough to question things which it has taken time to build and establish. Explosive material must not only be discharged harmlessly, but, if possible, its discharge must be _prevented_ altogether, this is the fundamental instinct of all civilised society.

897.

He who thinks over the question of how the type man may be elevated to its highest glory and power, will realise from the start that he must place himself beyond morality; for morality was directed in its essentials at the opposite goal--that is to say, its aim was to arrest and to annihilate that glorious development wherever it was in process of accomplishment. For, as a matter of fact, development of that sort implies that such an enormous number of men must be subservient to it, that a _counter-movement_ is only too natural: the weaker, more delicate, more mediocre existences, find it necessary to take up sides _against_ that glory of life and power; and for that purpose they must get a new valuation of themselves by means of which they are able to condemn, and if possible to destroy, life in this high degree of plenitude. Morality is therefore essentially the expression of hostility to life, in so far as it would overcome vital types.

898.

_The strong of the future._--To what extent necessity on the one hand and accident on the other have attained to conditions from which a _stronger species_ may be reared: this we are now able to understand and to bring about consciously; we can now create those conditions under which such an elevation is possible.

Hitherto education has always aimed at the utility of society: _not_ the greatest possible utility for the future, but the utility of the society actually extant. What people required were "instruments" for this purpose. Provided the _wealth of forces were greater,_ it would be possible to think of a draft being made upon them, the aim of which would not be the utility of society, but some future utility.

The more people grasped to what extent the present form of society was in such a state of transition as sooner or later to be _no longer able to exist for its own sake,_ but only as a means in the hands of a stronger race, the more _this task would have to be brought forward._

The increasing belittlement of man is precisely the impelling power which leads one to think of the cultivation of a _stronger race:_ a race which would have a surplus precisely there where the dwarfed species was weak and growing weaker (will, responsibility, self-reliance, the ability to postulate aims for one's self).

The means would be those which history teaches: _isolation_ by means of preservative interests which would be the reverse of those generally accepted; exercise in transvalued valuations; distance as pathos; a clean conscience in what to-day is most despised and most prohibited.

The _levelling_ of the mankind of Europe is the great process which should not be arrested; it should even be accelerated. The necessity of _cleaving gulfs,_ of _distance,_ of the _order of rank,_ is therefore imperative; but not the necessity of retarding the process above mentioned.

This _levelled-down_ species requires justification as soon as it is attained: its justification is that it exists for the service of a higher and sovereign race which stands upon it and can only be elevated upon its shoulders to the task which it is destined to perform. Not only a ruling race whose task would be consummated in ruling alone: but a race with _vital spheres_ of its own, with an overflow of energy for beauty, bravery, culture, and manners, even for the most abstract thought; a yea-saying race which would be able to allow itself every kind of great luxury--strong enough to be able to dispense with the tyranny of the imperatives of virtue, rich enough to be in no need of economy or pedantry; beyond good and evil; a forcing-house for rare and exceptional plants.

899.

Our psychologists, whose glance dwells involuntarily upon the symptoms of decadence, lead us to mistrust intellect ever more and more. People persist in seeing only the weakening, pampering, and sickening effects of intellect, but there are now going to appear:--

New Cynics The union of intellectual
barbarians Experimentalists superiority with well-being
Conquerors and an overflow of strength.

900.

I point to something new: certainly for such a democratic community there is a danger of barbarians; but these are sought only down below. There is also _another kind of barbarians_ who come from the heights: a kind of conquering and ruling natures, which are in search of material that they can mould. Prometheus was a barbarian of this stamp.

901.

_Principal standpoint:_ one should not suppose the mission of a higher species to be the _leading_ of inferior men (as Comte does, for instance); but the inferior should be regarded as the _foundation_ upon which a higher species may live their higher life--upon which alone they _can stand._ The conditions under which a _strong, noble_ species maintains itself (in the matter of intellectual discipline) are precisely the reverse of those under which the industrial masses--the tea-grocers _à la_ Spencer--subsist. Those qualities which are within the grasp only of the _strongest_ and most _terrible_ natures, and which make their existence possible leisure, adventure, disbelief, and even dissipation--would necessarily ruin mediocre natures --and does do so--when they possess them. In the case of the latter industry, regularity, moderation, and strong "conviction" are in their proper place--in short, all "gregarious virtues": under their influence these mediocre men become perfect.

902.

_Concerning the ruling types._ The shepherd as opposed to the "lord" (the former is only a means to the maintenance of the herd; the latter, the _purpose_ for which the herd exists).

903.

The temporary preponderance of social valuations is both comprehensible and useful; it is a matter of building a _foundation_ upon which a _stronger_ species will ultimately be made possible. The standard of strength: to be able to live under the transvalued valuations, and to desire them for all eternity. State and society regarded as a sub-structure: economic point of view, education conceived as breeding.

904.

A consideration which "free spirits" _lack_: that the same discipline which makes a strong nature still stronger, and enables it to go in for big undertakings, _breaks up and withers the mediocre_: doubt --_la largeur de cœur_--experiment--independence.

905.

The hammer. How should men who must value in the opposite way be constituted?--Men who possess _all_ the qualities of the modern soul, but are strong enough to convert them into real health? The means to their task.

906.

The strong man, who is mighty in the instincts of a strong and healthy organisation, digests his deeds just as well as he digests his meals; he even gets over the effects of heavy fare: in the main, however, he is led by an inviolable and severe instinct which prevents his doing anything which goes against his grain, just as he never does anything against his taste.

907.

_Can_ we _foresee_ the favourable circumstances under which creatures of the highest value might arise? It is a thousand times too complicated, and the probabilities of failure are _very great:_ on that account we cannot be inspired by the thought of striving after them! Scepticism.--To oppose this we can enhance courage, insight, hardness, independence, and the feeling of responsibility; we can also subtilise and learn to forestall the delicacy of the scales, so that favourable accidents may be enlisted on our side.

908.

Before we can even think of acting, an enormous amount of work requires to be done. In the main, however, _a cautious exploitation_ of the present conditions would be our best and most advisable course of action. The actual _creation_ of conditions such as those which occur by accident, presupposes the existence of _iron_ men such as have not yet lived. Our first task must be to make the personal ideal _prevail_ and _become realised_! He who has understood the nature of man and _the origin of mankind's greatest specimens, shudders before man and takes flight from all action_: this is the result of inherited valuations!!

My consolation is, that the nature of man is _evil,_ and this guarantees his _strength_!

909.

_The typical forms of self-development, or the eight principal questions:_--

1. Do we want to be more multifarious or more simple than we are?

2. Do we want to be happier than we are, or more indifferent to both happiness and unhappiness?

3. Do we want to be more satisfied with ourselves, or more exacting and more inexorable?

4. Do we want to be softer, more yielding, and more human than we are, or more inhuman?

5. Do we want to be more prudent than we are, or more daring?

6. Do we want to attain a goal, or do we want to avoid all goals (like the philosopher, for instance, who scents a boundary, a _cul-de-sac,_ a prison, a piece of foolishness in every goal)?

7. Do we want to become more respected, or more feared, or more _despised_?

8. Do we want to become tyrants, and seducers, or do we want to become shepherds and gregarious animals?

910.

_The type of my disciples._--To such men as _concern vie in any way_ I wish suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities of all kinds. I wish them to be acquainted with profound self-contempt, with the martyrdom of self-distrust, with the misery of the defeated: I have no pity for them; because I wish them to have the only thing which to-day proves whether a man has any value or not, namely, _the capacity of sticking to his guns._

911.

The happiness and self-contentedness of the lazzaroni, or the blessedness of "beautiful souls," or the consumptive love of Puritan pietists, proves nothing in regard to _the order of rank_ among men. As a great educator one ought inexorably to thrash a race of such blissful creatures into unhappiness. The danger of belittlement and of a slackening of powers follows immediately I am _opposed_ to happiness _à la_ Spinoza or _à la_ Epicurus, and to all the relaxation of contemplative states. But when virtue is the means to such happiness, well then, _one must master even virtue._

912.

I cannot see how any one can make up for having missed going to _a good school_ at the proper time. Such a person does not know himself; he walks through life without ever having learned to walk. His soft muscles betray themselves at every step. Occasionally life itself is merciful enough to make a man recover this lost and severe schooling: by means of periods of sickness, perhaps, which exact the utmost will-power and self-control; or by means of a sudden state of poverty, which threatens his wife and child, and which may force a man to such activity as will restore energy to his slackened tendons, and a _tough spirit_ to his will to life. The most desirable thing of all, however, is, under all circumstances to have severe discipline _at the right time, i.e._ at that age when it makes us proud that people should expect great things from us. For this is what distinguishes hard schooling, as good schooling, from every other schooling, namely, that a good deal is demanded, that a good deal is severely exacted; that goodness, nay even excellence itself, is required as if it were normal; that praise is scanty, that leniency is non-existent; that blame is sharp, practical, and without reprieve, and has no regard to talent and antecedents. We are in every way in need of such a school: and this holds good of corporeal as well as of spiritual things; it would be fatal to draw distinctions here! The same discipline makes the soldier and the scholar efficient; and, looked at more closely, there is no true scholar who has not the instincts of a true soldier in his veins. To be able to command and to be able to obey in a proud fashion; to keep one's place in rank and file, and yet to be ready at any moment to lead; to prefer danger to comfort; not to weigh what is permitted and what is forbidden in a tradesman's balance; to be more hostile to pettiness, slyness, and parasitism than to wickedness. What is it that one _learns_ in a hard school?--_to obey_ and _to command._

913.

We should _repudiate_ merit--and do only that which stands above all praise and above all understanding.

914.

The new forms of morality:--

Faithful vows concerning that which one wishes to do or to leave undone; complete and definite abstention from many things. Tests as to whether one is _ripe_ for such discipline.

915.

It is my desire to _naturalise asceticism:_ I would substitute the old intention of asceticism, "self-denial," by my own intention, _self-strengthening:_ a gymnastic of the will; a period of abstinence and occasional fasting of every kind, even in things intellectual; a casuistry in deeds, in regard to the opinions which we derive from our powers; we should try our hand at adventure and at deliberate dangers. (_Dîners chez Magny:_ all intellectual gourmets with spoilt stomachs.) _Tests_ ought also to be devised for discovering a man's power in keeping his word.

916.

The things which have become _spoilt_ through having been abused by the Church:--

(1) _Asceticism._--People have scarcely got the courage yet to bring to light the natural utility and necessity of asceticism for the purpose of the _education of the will._ Our ridiculous world of education, before whose eyes the useful State official hovers as an ideal to be striven for, believes that it has completed its duty when it has instructed or trained the brain; it never even suspects that something else is first of all necessary --the education of _will-power;_ tests are devised for everything except for the most important thing of all: whether a man can _will,_ whether he can _promise;_ the young man completes his education without a question or an inquiry having been made concerning the problem of the highest value of his nature.

(2) _Fasting:_--In every sense--even as a means of maintaining the capacity for taking pleasure in all good things (for instance, to give up reading for a while, to hear no music for a while, to cease from being amiable for a while: one ought also to have fast days for one's virtues).

(3) _The monastery._--Temporary isolation with severe seclusion from all letters, for instance; a kind of profound introspection and self-recovery, which does not go out of the way of "temptations," but out of the way of "duties"; a stepping out of the daily round of one's environment; a detachment from the tyranny of stimuli and external influences, which condemns us to expend our power only in reactions, and does not allow it to gather volume until it bursts into spontaneous activity (let anybody examine our scholars closely: they only think reflexively, _i.e._ they must first read before they can think).

(4) _Feasts._--A man must be very coarse in order not to feel the presence of Christians and Christian values as oppressive, so oppressive as to send all festive moods to the devil. By feasts we understand: pride, high-spirits, exuberance; scorn of all kinds of seriousness and Philistinism; a divine saying of Yea to one's self, as the result of physical plenitude and perfection--all states to which the Christian cannot honestly say Yea. _A feast is a pagan thing par excellence._

(5) The _courage of ones own nature: dressing-up in morality,_--To be able to call one's passions good without the help of a moral formula: this is the standard which measures the extent to which a man is able to say Yea to his own nature, namely, how much or how little he has to have recourse to morality.

(6) _Death._--The foolish physiological fact must be converted into a moral necessity. One should live in such a way that _one may have the will to die at the right time_!

917.

_To feel ones self stronger_ or, expressed otherwise: happiness always presupposes a comparison (not necessarily with others, but with one's self, in the midst of a state of growth, and without being conscious that one is comparing).

_Artificial_ accentuation: whether by means of exciting chemicals or exciting errors ("hallucinations.")

Take, for instance, the Christian's feeling of _security_; he feels himself strong in his confidence, in his patience, and his resignation: this artificial accentuation he owes to the fancy that he is protected by a God. Take the feeling of _superiority,_ for instance: as when the Caliph of Morocco sees only globes on which his three united kingdoms cover four-fifths of the space. Take the feeling of _uniqueness,_ for instance: as when the European imagines that culture belongs to Europe alone, and when he regards himself as a sort of abridged cosmic process; or, as when the Christian makes all existence revolve round the "Salvation of man."

The question is, where does one begin to feel the pressure of constraint: it is thus that different degrees are ascertained. A philosopher for instance, in the midst of the coolest and most transmontane feats of abstraction feels like a fish that enters its element: while colours and tones oppress him; not to speak of those dumb desires--of that which others call "the ideal."

918.

A healthy and vigorous little boy will look up sarcastically if he be asked: "Wilt thou become virtuous?"--but he immediately becomes eager if he be asked: "Wilt thou become stronger than thy comrades?"

***

How does one become stronger?--By deciding slowly; and by holding firmly to the decision once it is made. Everything else follows of itself. Spontaneous and changeable natures: both species of the weak. We must not confound ourselves with them; we must feel distance--betimes!

Beware of good-natured people!. Dealings with them make one torpid. All environment is good which makes one exercise those defensive and; aggressive powers which are instinctive in man. All one's inventiveness should apply itself to putting one's power of will to the test.... _Here_ the determining factor must be recognised as something which is not knowledge, astuteness, or wit.

One must learn to command betimes,--likewise to obey. A man must learn modesty and tact in modesty: he must learn to distinguish and to honour where modesty is displayed; he must likewise distinguish and honour wherever he bestows his confidence.

What does one repent most? One's modesty; the fact that one has not lent an ear to one's most individual needs; the fact that one has mistaken one's self; the fact that one has esteemed one's self low; the fact that one has lost all delicacy of hearing in regard to one's instincts.--This want of reverence in regard to one's self is avenged by all sorts of losses: in health, friendship, well-being, pride, cheerfulness, freedom, determination, courage. A man never forgives himself, later on, for this want of genuine egoism: he regards it as an objection and as a cause of doubt concerning his real ego.

919.

I should like man to begin by _respecting_ himself: everything else follows of itself. Naturally a man ceases from being anything to others in this way: for this is precisely what they are least likely to forgive. "What? a man who respects himself?"[4] This is something quite different from the blind instinct to _love_ one's self. Nothing is more common in the love of the sexes or in that duality which is called ego, than a certain contempt for that which is loved the fatalism of love.

[Footnote 4: Cf. Disraeli in _Tancred:_ "Self-respect, too, is a superstition of past ages.... It is not suited to these times; it is much too arrogant, too self-conceited, too egoistical. No one is important enough to have self-respect nowadays" (book iii. chap. v.).--Tr.]

920.

"I will have this or that"; "I would that this or that were so"; "I know that this or that is so the degrees of power: the man of _will,_ the man of _desire,_ the man of _fate._

921.

_The means by which a strong species maintains itself_:--

It grants itself the right of exceptional actions, as a test of the power of self-control and of freedom.

It abandons itself to states in which a man is not allowed to be anything else than a barbarian.

It tries to acquire strength of will by every kind of asceticism.

It is not expansive, it practises silence; it is cautious in regard to all charms.

It learns to obey in such a way that obedience provides a test of self-maintenance. Casuistry is carried to its highest pitch in regard to points of honour.

It never argues, "What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander,"--but conversely! it regards reward, and the ability to repay, as a privilege, as a distinction.

It does not covet _other_ people's virtues.

922.

The way in which one has to treat raw savages and the impossibility of dispensing with barbarous methods, becomes obvious, in practice, when one is transplanted, with all one's European pampering, to a spot such as the Congo, or anywhere else where it is necessary to maintain one's mastery over barbarians.

923.

_Warlike and peaceful people._--Art thou a man who has the instincts of a warrior in thy blood? If this be so, another question must be put. Do thy instincts impel thee to attack or to defend? The rest of mankind, all those whose instincts are not warlike, desire peace, concord, freedom, "equal rights": these things are but names and steps for one and the same thing. Such men only wish to go where it is not necessary for them to defend themselves,--such men become discontented with themselves when they are obliged to offer resistance: they would fain create circumstances in which war is no longer necessary. If the worst came to the worst, they would resign themselves, obey, and submit: all these things are better than waging war--thus does the Christian's instinct, for instance, whisper to him. In the born warrior's character there is something of armour, likewise in the choice of his circumstances and in the development of every one of his qualities, weapons are best evolved by the latter type, shields are best devised by the former.

What expedients and what virtues do the unarmed and the undefended require in order to survive--and even to conquer?

924.

What will become of a man who no longer has any reasons for either defence or attack? What will remain of his _passions_ when he has lost those which form his defence and his weapons?

925.

A marginal note to a _niaiserie anglaise_: "Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you." This stands for wisdom; this stands for prudence; this stands as the very basis of morality as "a golden maxim." John Stuart Mill believes in it (and what Englishman does not?).... But the maxim does not bear investigation. The argument, Do not as you would not be done by, forbids action which produce harmful results; the thought behind always is that an action is invariably requited. What if some one came forward with the _"Principe"_ in his hands, and said: "We must do those actions alone which enable us to steal a march on others,--and which deprive others of the power of doing the same to us"?--On the other hand, let us remember the Corsican who pledges his honour to vendetta. He too does not desire to have a bullet through him; but the prospect of one, the probability of getting one, does not deter him from vindicating his honour.... And in all really decent actions are we not intentionally indifferent as to what result they will bring? To avoid an action which might have harmful results,--that would be tantamount to forbidding all decent actions in general.

Apart from this, the above maxim is valuable because it betrays a certain _type of man_: it is the instinct of the herd which formulates itself through him,--we are equal, we regard each other as equal: as I am to thee so art thou to me.--In this community equivalence of actions is really believed in--an equivalence which never under any circumstances manifests itself in real conditions. It is impossible to requite every action: among real individuals equal actions do not exist, consequently there can be no such thing as "requital." ... When I do anything, I am very far from thinking that any man is able to do anything at all like it: the action belongs to me.... Nobody can pay me back for anything I do; the most that can be done is to make me the victim of another action.

926.

_Against John Stuart Mill._--I abhor the man's vulgarity when he says: "What is right for one man is right for another"; "Do not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you. Such principles would fain establish the whole of human traffic _upon mutual services,_ so that every action would appear to be a cash payment for something done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last degree: it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine; the most personal value Of an action is simply cancelled in this manner (that part of an action which has no equivalent and which cannot be remunerated). "Reciprocity" is a piece of egregious vulgarity; the mere fact that what I do _cannot_ and _may_ not be done by another, that there is _no such thing as equivalence_ (except in those _very select circles_ where one actually has one's equal, _inter pares_), that in a really profound sense a man never requites because he is something _unique_ in himself and can only do _unique_ things,--this fundamental conviction contains the cause of _aristocratic aloofness from the mob_, because the latter believes in equality, and _consequently_ in the feasibility of equivalence and "reciprocity."

927.

The suburban Philistinism of moral valuations and of its concepts "useful" and "harmful" is well founded; it is the necessary point of view of a community which is only able to see and survey _immediate and proximate_ consequences. The _State_ and the _political man_ are already in need of a more _super-moral_ attitude of mind: because they have to calculate concerning a much more complicated tissue of consequences. An economic policy for the whole world should be possible which could look at things in such broad perspective that all its isolated demands would seem for the moment not only unjust, but arbitrary.

928.

"_Should one follow one's feelings?_"--To set one's life at stake on the impulse of the moment, and actuated by a generous feeling, has little worth, and does not even distinguish one. Everybody is alike in being capable of this--and in behaving in this way with determination, the criminal, the bandit, and the Corsican certainly outstrip the honest man.

A higher degree of excellence would be to overcome this impulse, and to refrain from performing an heroic deed at its bidding--and to remain cold, _raisonnable_, free from the tempestuous surging of concomitant sensations of delight.... The same holds good of pity: it must first be _sifted through_ reason; without this it becomes just as dangerous as any other passion.

The _blind yielding_ to a passion, whether it be generosity, pity, or hostility, is the cause of the greatest evil. Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these passions--on the contrary, a man should possess them to a terrible degree: but he should lead them by the bridle.. and even this he should not do out of love of control, but merely because....

929.

"To give up one's life for a cause"--very effective. But there are many things for which one gives up one's life: the passions, one and all, will be gratified. Whether one's life be pledged to pity, to anger, or to revenge--it matters not from the point of view of value. How many have not sacrificed their lives for pretty girls--and even what is worse, their health! When one has temperament, one instinctively chooses the most dangerous things: if one is a philosopher, for instance, one chooses the adventures of speculation; if one is virtuous, one chooses immorality. One kind of man will risk nothing, another kind will risk everything. Are we despisers of life? On the contrary, what we seek is life raised to a higher power, life in danger.... But, let me repeat, we do not, on that account, wish to be more virtuous than others, Pascal, for instance, wished to risk nothing, and remained a Christian. That perhaps was virtuous.----A man always sacrifices something.

930.

How many _advantages_ does not a man sacrifice! To how small an extent does he seek his own profit! All his emotions and passions wish to assert their rights, and how remote a passion is From that cautious utility which consists in personal profit!

A man does _not_ strive after "happiness"; one must be an Englishman to be able to believe that a man is always seeking his own advantage. Our desires long to violate things with passion--their overflowing strength seeks obstacles.

931.

All passions are generally _useful,_ some directly, others indirectly; in regard to utility it is absolutely impossible to fix upon any gradation of values,--however certainly the forces of nature in general may be regarded as good (_i.e._ useful), from an economic point of view, they are still the sources of much that is terrible and much that is fatally irrevocable. The most one might say would be, that the mightiest passions are the most valuable: seeing that no stronger sources of power exist.

932.

All well-meaning, helpful, good-natured attitudes of mind have _not_ come to be honoured on account of their usefulness: but because they are the conditions peculiar to _rich souls_ who are able to bestow and whose value consists in their vital exuberance. Look into the eyes of the benevolent man! In them you will see the exact reverse of self-denial, of hatred of self, of Pascalism.

933.

_In short,_ what we require is to dominate the passions and not to weaken or to extirpate them!--The greater the dominating power of the will, the greater the freedom that may be given to the passions.

The "great man" is so, owing to the free scope which he gives to his desires, and to the still greater power which knows how to enlist these magnificent monsters into its service.