Chapter XXI: Part 21

19. Ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent motum neque destrui nec de novo gigni, sed eandem(943) semper motus quantitatem permanere. Aristoteles etiam dubium illud olim proposuit—utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab æterno? _Phys._ lib. viii. Quod vero motus sensibilis pereat, patet sensibus: illi autem eundem impetum, nisum, aut summam virium eandem manere velle videntur. Unde affirmat Borellus, vim in percussione non imminui, sed expandi; impetus etiam contrarios suscipi et retineri in eodem corpore. Item Leibnitius nisum ubique et semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet sensibus, ratione intelligi contendit.—Hæc autem nimis abstracta esse et obscura, ejusdemque fere generis cum formis substantialibus et entelechiis, fatendum.

20. Quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque originem, vel principio hylarchico, vel naturæ indigentia, vel appetitu, aut denique instinctu naturali utuntur, dixisse aliquid potius quam cogitasse censendi sunt. Neque ab hisce multum absunt qui supposuerint(944) _partes terræ esse se moventes, aut etiam spiritus iis implantatos ad instar formæ_, ut assignent causam accelerationis gravium cadentium: aut qui dixerit(945), _in corpore præter solidam extensionem debere etiam poni aliquid unde virium consideratio oriatur_. Siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et determinatum enuntiant; vel, si quid sit, tarn difficile erit illud explicare, quam id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur(946).

21. Frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quæ nec sensibus patent, nec ratione intelligi possunt. Videndum ergo quid sensus, quid experientia, quid demum ratio iis innixa, suadeat. Duo sunt summa rerum genera—_corpus_ et _anima_. Rem extensam, solidam, mobilem, figuratam, aliisque qualitatibus quæ sensibus occurrunt præditam, ope sensuum; rem vero sentientem, percipientem, intelligentem, conscientia quadam interna cognovimus. Porro, res istas plane inter se diversas esse, longeque heterogeneas, cernimus. Loquor autem de rebus cognitis: de incognitis enim disserere nil juvat(947).

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22. Totum id quod novimus, cui nomen _corpus_ indidimus, nihil _in se_ continet quod motus principium seu causa efficiens esse possit. Etenim impenetrabilitas, extensio, figura nullam includunt vel connotant potentiam producendi motum; quinimo e contrario non modo illas, verum etiam alias, quotquot sint, corporis qualitates sigillatim percurrentes, videbimus omnes esse revera passivas, nihilque iis activum inesse, quod ullo modo intelligi possit tanquam fons et principium motus(948). Gravitatem quod attinet, voce illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu sensibili, cujus causa quæritur, diversum significari jam ante ostendimus. Et sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud intelligimus, nisi quod feratur deorsum; de causa hujus effectus sensibilis nihil omnino cogitantes.

23. De corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote de re comperta, quod non sit principium motus. Quod si quisquam, præter solidam extensionem ejusque modificationes, vocem _corpus_ qualitatem etiam _occultam_, virtutem, formam, essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat; licet quidem illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et nominibus nihil distincte exprimentibus abuti. Cæterum sanior philosophandi ratio videtur ab notionibus abstractis et generalibus (si modo notiones dici debent quæ intelligi nequeunt) quantum fieri potest abstinuisse.

24. Quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus; quod vero novimus in corpore, id non esse principium motus constat(949). Qui præterea aliquid incognitum in corpore, cujus ideam nullam habent, comminiscuntur, quod motus principium dicant, ii revera nihil aliud quam _principium motus esse incognitum_ dicunt. Sed hujusmodi subtilitatibus diutius immorari piget.

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25. Præter res corporeas alterum est _genus rerum cogitantium_(950). In iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi, propria experientia didicimus(951); quandoquidem anima nostra pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere membrorum motus, quacunque tandem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe constat, corpora moveri ad nutum animæ; eamque proinde haud inepte dici posse principium motus: particulare quidem et subordinatum, quodque ipsum dependeat a primo et universali Principio(952).

26. Corpora gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu apparente agitata; non tamen existimandum propterea in iis contineri principium motus: cujus rei hanc rationem assignat Aristoteles(953);—_Gravia et levia_ (inquit) _non moventur a seipsis; id enim vitale esset, et se sistere possent_. Gravia omnia una eademque certa et constanti lege centrum telluris petunt, neque in ipsis animadvertitur principium vel facultas ulla motum istum sistendi, minuendi, vel, nisi pro rata proportione, augendi, aut denique ullo modo immutandi: habent adeo se passive. Porro idem, stricte et accurate loquendo, dicendum de corporibus percussivis. Corpora ista quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso percussionis momento, si gerunt passive, perinde scilicet atque cum quiescunt. Corpus iners tam agit quam corpus motum, si res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoscit Newtonus, ubi ait, vim inertiæ esse eandem cum impetu(954). Corpus autem iners et quietum nihil agit, ergo nee motum.

27. Revera corpus æque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel motus vel quietis. Ista vero perseverantia non magis dicenda est actio corporis, quam existentia ejusdem actio diceretur. Perseverantia nihil aliud est quam continuatio in eodem modo existendi, quæ proprie dici actio non potest. Cæterum resistentiam, quam experimur in sistendo corpore moto, ejus actionem esse fingimus vana specie delusi. Revera enim ista resistentia quam sentimus(955), passio est in nobis, neque arguit corpus agere, sed nos pati: constat utique nos idem passuros fuisse, sive corpus illud a se moveatur, sive ab alio principio impellatur.

28. Actio et reactio dicuntur esse in corporibus: nec incommode ad demonstrationes mechanicas(956). Sed cavendum, ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem, quæ motus causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. Etenim voces illæ eodem modo intelligendæ sunt ac vox _attractio_; et quemadmodum hæc est hypothesis solummodo mathematica(957), non autem qualitas physica: idem etiam de illis intelligi debet, et ob eandem rationem. Nam sicut veritas et usus theorematum de mutua corporum attractione in philosophia mechanica stabiles manent, utpote unice fundati in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari supponatur per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium, sive per actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis et moderantis corpora; pari ratione, quæcunque tradita sunt de regulis et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata inde deducta, manent inconcussa, dum modo concedantur effectus sensibiles, et ratiocinia iis innixa; sive supponamus actionem ipsam, aut vim horum effectuum causatricem, esse in corpore, sive in agente incorporeo.

29. Auferantur ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura, remanebit nihil(958). Sed qualitates istæ sunt ad motum indifferentes, nec in se quidquam habent quod motus principium dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris perspicuum est. Si igitur voce _corpus_ significatur id quod concipimus, plane constat inde non peti posse principium motus: pars scilicet nulla aut attributum illius causa efficiens vera est, quæ motum producat. Vocem autem proferre, et nihil concipere, id demum indignum esset philosopho.

30. Datur res cogitans, activa, quam principium motus ... in nobis experimur(959). Hanc _animam_, _mentem_, _spiritum_ ... Datur etiam res extensa, iners, impenetrabilis, ... quæ a priori toto cœlo differt, novumque genus(960) ... Quantum intersit inter res cogitantes et extensas, primus omnium deprehendens Anaxagoras, vir longe sapientissimus, asserebat mentem nihil habere cum corporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro Aristotelis _De Anima_(961). Ex neotericis idem optime animadvertit Cartesius(962). Ab eo alii(963) rem satis claram vocibus obscuris impeditam ac difficilem reddiderunt.

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31. Ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam, actionem, motus principium, in _corporibus_ revera inesse affirmant, sententiam nulla experientia fundatam amplecti, eamque terminis obscuris et generalibus adstruere, nec quid sibi velint satis intelligere. E contrario, qui _mentem_ esse principium motus volunt, sententiam propria experientia munitam proferunt, hominumque omni ævo doctissimorum suffragiis comprobatam.

32. Primus Anaxagoras(964) τὸν νοῦν introduxit, qui motum inerti materiæ imprimeret. Quam quidem sententiam probat etiam Aristoteles(965), pluribusque confirmat, aperto pronuncians primum movens esse immobile, indivisibile, et nullam habens magnitudinem. Dicere autem, omne me vum esse mobile, recte animadvertit idem esse ac s diceret, omne ædificativum esse ædificabile, _Physic_, lib Plato insuper in Timæo(966) tradit machinam hanc corpo seu mundum visibilem, agitari et animari a mente, sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi siani(967) principium motuum naturalium Deum agnoscun. Et Newtonus(968) passim nec obscure innuit, non solummodo motum ab initio a numine profectum esse, verum adhuc systema mundanum ab eodem actu moveri. Hoc sacris literis consonum est: hoc scholasticorum calculo comprobatur. Nam etsi Peripatetici naturam tradant esse principium motus et quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam naturantem esse Deum(969). Intelligunt nimirum corpora omnia systematis hujusce mundani a mente præpotenti juxta certam et constantem rationem(970) moveri.

33. Cæterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt, obscurum aliquid et rebus parum conveniens fingunt. Quid enim aliud est vitali principio præditum esse quam vivere? aut vivere quam se movere, sistere, et statum suum mutare? Philosophi autem hujus sæculi doctissimi pro principio indubitato ponunt, omne corpus perseverare in statu suo, vel quietis vel motus uniformis in directum, nisi quatenus aliunde cogitur statum ilium mutare: e contrario, in anima sentimus esse facultatem tam statum suum quam aliarum rerum mutandi; id quod proprie dicitur vitale, animamque a corporibus longe discriminat.

34. Motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores considerant velut duos status existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus omne sua natura iners permaneret(971), nulla vi externa urgente. Unde colligere licet, eandem esse causam motus et quietis, quæ est existentiæ corporum. Neque enim quærenda videtur alia causa existentiæ corporis successivæ in diversis partibus spatii, quam illa unde derivatur existentia ejusdem corporis successiva in diversis partibus temporis. De Deo autem Optimo Maximo rerum omnium Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et qua ratione res cunctæ a summo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare, quamvis pars sit scientiæ humanæ præcellentissima, spectat tamen potius ad philosophiam primam(972), seu metaphysicam et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quæ hodie fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica. Itaque cognitionem de Deo vel supponit philosophia naturalis, vel mutuatur ab aliqua scientia superiori. Quanquam verissimum sit, naturæ investigationem scientiis altioribus argumenta egregia ad sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam Dei illustrandam et probandam undequaque subministrare.

35. Quod hæc minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur nonnulli immerito repudient physicæ principia mathematica, eo scilicet nomine quod illa causas rerum efficientes non assignant: quum tamen revera ad physicam aut mechanicam spectet regulas(973) solummodo, non causas efficientes, impulsionum attractionumve, et ut verbo dicam, motuum leges tradere; ex iis vero positis phænomenon particularium solutionem, non autem causam efficientem assignare.

36. Multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit principium, et quo sensu intelligenda sit vox illa apud philosophos(974). Causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix rerum omnium jure optimo appellatur fons et principium earundem. Principia vero philosophiæ experimentalis proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta quibus illa innititur, seu fontes unde derivatur, (non dico existentia, sed) cognitio rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex experientia. Similiter, in philosophia mechanica, principia dicenda sunt, in quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina, leges illæ motuum primariæ, quæ experimentis comprobatæ, ratiocinio etiam excultæ sunt et redditæ universales(975). Hæ motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, quoniam ab iis tam theoremata mechanica generalia quam particulares τῶν φαινομένων explicationes derivantur.

37. Tum nimirum dici potest quidpiam explicari mechanice, cum reducitur ad ista principia simplicissima et universalissima, et per accuratum ratiocinium, cum iis consentaneum et connexum esse ostenditur. Nam inventis semel naturæ legibus, deinceps monstrandum est philosopho, ex constanti harum legum observatione, hoc est, ex iis principiis phænomenon quodvis necessario consequi: id quod est phænomena explicare et solvere, causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, assignare.

38. Mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et dilatare. Ad hoc autem notiones et propositiones generales efformandæ sunt, in quibus quodam modo continentur propositiones et cognitiones particulares, quæ turn demum intelligi creduntur cum ex primis illis continuo nexu deducuntur. Hoc geometris notissimum est. In mechanica etiam præmittuntur notiones, hoc est definitiones, et enunciationes de motu primæ et generales, ex quibus postmodum methodo mathematica conclusiones magis remotæ et minus generales colliguntur. Et sicut per applicationem theorematum geometricorum, corporum particularium magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam per applicationem theorematum mechanices universalium, systematis mundani partium quarumvis motus, et phænomena inde pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: ad quem scopum unice collineandum physico.

39. Et quemadmodum geometræ, disciplinæ causa, multa comminiscuntur, quæ nec ipsi describere possunt, nec in rerum natura invenire; simili prorsus ratione mechanicus voces quasdam abstractas et generales adhibet, fingitque in corporibus _vim_, _actionem_, _attractionem_, _solicitationem_, &c. quæ ad theorias et enunciationes, ut et computationes de motu apprime utiles sunt, etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate et corporibus actu existentibus frustra quærerentur, non minus quam quæ a geometris per abstractionem mathematicam finguntur.

40. Revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates sensibiles, et res corporeas omnino passivas, sive in motu sint sive in quiete, percipimus: ratioque et experientia activum nihil præter mentem aut animam esse suadet. Quidquid ultra fingitur, id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis hypothesibus et abstractionibus mathematicis existimandum: quod penitu sanimo infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, facile in obscuram scholasticorum subtilitatem, quæ per tot sæcula, tanquam dira quædam pestis, philosophiam corrupit, relabi possumus.

41. Principia mechanica legesque motuum aut naturæ universales, sæculo ultimo feliciter inventæ, et subsidio geometriæ tractatæ et applicatæ, miram lucem in philosophiam intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica causæque reales efficientes motus et existentiæ corporum attributorumve corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut experimenta pertinent; neque eis lucem dare possunt, nisi quatenus, velut præcognita, inserviant ad limites physicæ præfiniendos, eaque ratione ad tollendas difficultates quæstionesque peregrinas.

42. Qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem corpoream vel incorpoream voce _spiritus_ intelligunt. Si rem corpoream, quantumvis tenuem, tamen redit difficultas: si incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, attamen ad physicam non proprie pertinet. Quod si quis philosophiam naturalem ultra limites experimentorum et mechanicæ extenderit, ita ut rerum etiam incorporearum, et inextensarum cognitionem complectatur, latior quidem illa vocis acceptio tractationem de anima, mente, seu principio vitali admittit. Cæterum commodius erit, juxta usum jam fere receptum, ita distinguere inter scientias, ut singulæ propriis circumscribantur cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus sit in experimentis, legibusque motuum, et principiis mechanicis, indeque depromptis ratiociniis; quidquid autem de aliis rebus protulerit, id superiori alicui scientiæ acceptum referat. Etenim ex cognitis naturæ legibus pulcherrimæ theoriæ, praxes etiam mechanicæ ad vitam utiles consequuntur. Ex cognitione autem ipsius naturæ Auctoris considerationes longe præstantissimæ quidem illæ, sed metaphysicæ, theologicæ, morales oriuntur.

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43. De _principiis_ hactenus: nunc dicendum de _natura_ motus(976). Atque is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur, non tam natura sua, quam doctis philosophorum commentis obscuratus est. Motus nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit sine mole corporea, spatio, et tempore. Sunt tamen qui motum, tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam, atque ab omnibus aliis rebus sejunctam, contemplari student. Verum idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima(977) intellectus aciem eludit: id quod quilibet secum meditando experiri potest. Hinc nascuntur magnæ difficultates de natura motus, et definitiones, ipsa re quam illustrare debent longe obscuriores. Hujusmodi sunt definitiones illæ Aristotelis et Scholasticorum(978), qui motum dicunt esse _actum mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actum entis in potentia quatenus in potentia_. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri(979) inter recentiores celebris, qut asserit _nihil in motu esse reale præter momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente constitui debet_. Porro constat, horum et similium definitionum auctores in animo habuisse abstractam motus naturam, seclusa omni temporis et spatii consideratione, explicare: sed qua ratione abstracta ilia motus quintessentia (ut ita dicam) intelligi possit, non video.

44. Neque hoc contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque ipsius motus a se invicem dividunt et secernunt, quarum ideas distinctas, tanquam entium revera distinctorum, efformare conantur. Etenim sunt qui motionem a motu distinguant, illam velut instantaneum motus elementum spectantes. Velocitatem insuper, conatum, vim, impetum totidem res essentia diversas esse volunt, quarum quæque per propriam atque ab aliis omnibus segregatam et abstractam ideam intellectui objiciatur. Sed in hisce rebus discutiendis, stantibus iis quæ supra disseruimus(980), non est cur diutius immoremur.

45. Multi etiam per _transitum_(981) motum definiunt, obliti, scilicet, transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse, et per motum definiri oportere. Verissimum adeo est definitiones, sicut nonnullis rebus lucem, ita vicissim aliis tenebras afferre. Et profecto, quascumque res sensu percipimus, eas clariores aut notiores definiendo efficere vix quisquam potuerit. Cujus rei vana spe allecti res faciles difficillimas(982) reddiderunt philosophi, mentesque suas difficultatibus, quas ut plurimum ipsi peperissent, implicavere. Ex hocce definiendi, simul ac abstrahendi studio, multæ tam de motu quam de aliis rebus natæ subtilissimæ quæstiones, eædemque nullius utilitatis, hominum ingenia frustra torserunt; adeo ut Aristoteles ultro et sæpius fateatur motum esse _actum quendam cognitu difficilem_(983), et nonnulli ex veteribus usque eo nugis exercitati deveniebant, ut motum omnino esse negarent(984).

46. Sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit fontes solutionum indicasse: ad quos etiam illud adjungere libet: quod ea quæ de infinita divisione temporis et spatii in mathesi traduntur, ob congenitam rerum naturam paradoxa et theorias spinosas (quales sunt illæ omnes in quibus agitur de infinito(985)) in speculationes de motu intulerunt. Quidquid autem hujus generis sit, id omne motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore, vel potius ad ea refert acceptum.

47. Et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio seu divisio rerum vere inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte compositio seu potius confusio rerum diversissimarum motus naturam perplexam reddidit. Usitatum enim est motum cum causa motus efficiente confundere(986). Unde accidit ut motus sit quasi biformis, unam faciem sensibus obviam, alteram caliginosa nocte obvolutam habens. Inde obscuritas et confusio, et varia de motu paradoxa originem trahunt, dum effectui perperam tribuitur id quod revera causæ solummodo competit.

48. Hinc oritur opinio illa, _eandem_ semper motus quantitatem conservari(987). Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et potentia causæ, sive causa ilia dicatur natura, sive νοῦς, vel quodcunque tandem agens sit, falsum esse cuivis facile constabit. Aristoteles(988) quidem l. viii. _Physicorum_, ubi quærit utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab æterno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus omnibus, vitale principium potius, quam effectum externum, sive mutationem loci(989), intellexisse videtur.

49. Hinc etiam est, quod multi suspicantur motum non esse meram passionem in corporibus. Quod si intelligamus id quod in motu corporis sensibus objicitur, quin omnino passivum sit nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid enim in se habet successiva corporis existentia in diversis locis, quod actionem referat, aut aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus?

50. Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum utriusque, moventis et moti(990), non satis discriminant causam ab effectu. Similiter, qui nisum aut conatum in motu fingunt, aut idem corpus simul in contrarias partes ferri putant, eadem idearum confusione, eadem vocum ambiguitate ludificari videntur.

51. Juvat multum, sicut in aliis omnibus, ita in scientia de motu accuratam diligentiam adhibere, tam ad aliorum conceptus intelligendos quam ad suos enunciandos: in qua re nisi peccatum esset, vix credo in disputationem trahi potuisse, utrum corpus indifferens sit ad motum et ad quietem, necne. Quoniam enim experientia constat, esse legem naturæ primariam, ut corpus perinde perseveret in _statu motus ac quietis, quamdiu aliunde nihil accidat ad statum istum mutandum_; et propterea vim inertiæ sub diverso respectu esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum, colligitur: hoc sensu profecto corpus dici potest sua natura indifferens ad motum vel quietem. Nimirum tam difficile est quietem in corpus motum, quam motum in quiescens inducere: cum vero corpus pariter conservet statum utrumvis, quidni dicatur ad utrumvis se habere indifferenter?

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52. Peripatetici pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua subire potest, varia motus genera distinguebant. Hodie de motu agentes intelligunt solummodo _motum localem_(991). Motus autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur quid sit _locus_: is vero a neotericis(992) definitur _pars spatii quam corpus occupat_: unde dividitur in relativum et absolutum pro ratione spatii. Distinguunt enim inter spatium absolutum sive verum, ac relativum sive apparens. Volunt scilicet dari spatium undequaque immensum, immobile, insensibile, corpora universa permeans et continens, quod vocant spatium absolutum. Spatium autem a corporibus comprehensum vel definitum, sensibusque adeo subjectum, dicitur spatium relativum, apparens, vulgare.

53. Fingamus itaque corpora cuncta destrui, et in nihilum redigi. Quod reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum, omni relatione quæ a situ et distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. Porro spatium illud est infinitum, immobile, indivisibile, insensibile, sine relatione et sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia ejus attributa sunt privativa vel negativa: videtur igitur esse merum nihil(993). Parit solummmodo difficultatem aliquam quod extensum sit. Extensio autem est qualitas positiva. Verum qualis tandem extensio est illa quæ nec dividi potest, nec mensurari, cujus nullam partem, nec sensu percipere, nec imaginatione depingere possumus? Etenim nihil in imaginationem cadit, quod, ex natura rei, non possibile est ut sensu percipiatur; siquidem _imaginatio_(994) nihil aliud est quam facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium, vel actu existentium, vel saltem possibilium. Fugit insuper _intellectum purum_, quum facultas illa versetur tantum circa res spirituales et inextensas, cujusmodi sunt mentes nostræ, earumque habitus, passiones, virtutes, et similia. Ex spatio igitur absoluto auferamus modo vocabula, et nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, aut intellectu: nihil aliud ergo iis designatur, quam pura privatio aut negatio, hoc est, merum nihil.

54. Confitendum omnino est nos circa hanc rem gravissimis præjudiciis teneri, a quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi vis exercenda. Etenim multi, tantum abest quod spatium absolutum pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse ex omnibus (Deo excepto) unicam existiment, quæ annihilari non possit: statuantque illud suapte natura necessario existere, æternumque esse et increatum, atque adeo attributorum divinorum particeps(995). Verum enimvero quum certissimum sit, res omnes, quas nominibus designamus, per qualitates aut relationes, vel aliqua saltem ex parte cognosci (ineptum enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, nihil notionis, ideæ vel conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus diligenter, utrum formare liceat _ideam_ ullam spatii illius puri, realis, absoluti, quod post omnium corporum annihilationem perseveret existere. Ideam porro talem paulo acrius intuens, reperio ideam esse nihili purissimam, si modo idea appellanda sit. Hoc ipse summa adhibita diligentia expertus sum: hoc alios pari adhibita diligentia experturos reor.

55. Decipere nos nonnunquam solet, quod aliis omnibus corporibus imaginatione sublatis, _nostrum_(996) tamen manere supponimus. Quo supposito, motum membrorum ab omni parte liberrimum imaginamur. Motus autem sine spatio concipi non potest. Nihilominus si rem attento animo recolamus, constabit primo concipi spatium relativum partibus nostri corporis definitum: 2°. movendi membra potestatem liberrimam nullo obstaculo retusam: et præter hæc duo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium aliquod, spatium videlicet immensum, realiter existere, quod liberam potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum: ad hoc enim requiritur absentia solummodo aliorum corporum. Quam absentiam, sive privationem corporum, nihil esse positivum fateamur necesse est(997).

56. Cæterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine perspexerit, verba et voces parum valent. Meditanti vero, et rationes secum reputanti, ni fallor, manifestum erit, quæcunque de spatio puro et absoluto prædicantur, ea omnia de nihilo prædicari posse. Qua ratione mens humana facillime liberatur a magnis difficultatibus simulque ab ea absurditate tribuendi existentiam necessariam(998) ulli rei præterquam soli Deo optimo maximo.

57. In proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis a posteriori (ut loquuntur) ductis confirmare, quæstiones de spatio absoluto proponendo; exempli gratia, utrum sit substantia vel accidens? utrum creatum vel increatum? et absurditates ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando. Sed brevitati consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet, quod sententiam hancce Democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit, uti auctor est Aristoteles 1. i. _Phys._(999) ubi hæc habet: _Democritus solidum et inane ponit principia, quorum aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut quod non est esse dicit._ Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio illa inter spatium absolutum et relativum a magni nominis philosophis usurpetur, eique quasi fundamento inædificentur multa præclara theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum esse, ex iis quæ secutura sunt, apparebit.

58. Ex præmissis patet, non convenire ut definiamus locum verum corporis esse partem spatii absoluti quam occupat corpus, motumque verum seu absolutum esse mutationem loci veri et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus est relativus, ut et omnis motus. Veruntamen ut hoc clarius appareat, animadvertendum est, motum nullum intelligi posse sine determinatione aliqua seu directione, quæ quidem intelligi nequit, nisi praeter corpus motum, nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, simul intelligatur existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrorsum, dextrorsum, omnesque plagæ et regiones in relatione aliqua fundantur, et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et supponunt. Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis, globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur; in illo motus nullus concipi possit: usque adeo necesse est, ut detur aliud corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur. Hujus sententiæ veritas clarissime elucebit, modo corporum omnium tam nostri quam aliorum, præter globum istum unicum, annihilationem recte supposuerimus.

59. Concipiantur porro duo globi, et præterea nil corporeum, existere. Concipiantur deinde vires quomodocunque applicari: quicquid tandem per applicationem virium intelligamus, motus circularis duorum globorum circa commune centrum nequit per imaginationem concipi. Supponamus deinde cœlum fixarum creari: subito ex concepto appulsu globorum ad diversas cœli istius partes motus concipietur. Scilicet cum motus natura sua sit relativus, concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora correlata. Quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine correlatis concipi potest.

60. Ad motum circularem quod attinet, putant multi, crescente motu vero circulari, corpus necessario magis semper magisque ab axe niti. Hoc autem ex eo provenit, quod, cum motus circularis spectari possit tanquam in omni momento a duabus directionibus ortum trahens, una secundum radium, altera secundum tangentem; si in hac ultima tantum directione impetus augeatur, tum a centro recedet corpus motum, orbita vero desinet esse circularis. Quod si æqualiter augeantur vires in utraque directione, manebit motus circularis, sed acceleratus conatu, qui non magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe, quam accedendi ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in situla circumactam ascendere ad latera vasis, propterea quod, applicatis novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quamvis particulam aquæ, eodem instanti non applicentur novæ vires æquales centripetæ. Ex quo experimento nullo modo sequitur, motum absolutum circularem per vires recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci. Porro qua ratione intelligendæ sunt voces istæ, _vires corporum et conatus_, ex præmissis satis superque innotescit.

61. Quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans ex rectis infinitis, etiamsi revera ex illis non constet, sed quod ea hypothesis ad geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo motus circularis spectari potest tanquam a directionibus rectilineis infinitis ortum ducens, quæ suppositio utilis est in philosophia mechanica. Non tamen ideo affirmandum, impossibile esse, ut centrum gravitatis corporis cujusvis successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae circularis, nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectilineæ, sive in tangente sive in radio.

62. Haud omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut aquæ in situla circumacta, dici non posse motum vere circularem, juxta mentem eorum qui per partes spatii absoluti definiunt loca vera corporum; cum sit mire compositus ex motibus non solum situlæ vel fundæ, sed etiam telluris diurno circa proprium axem, menstruo circa commune centrum gravitatis terræ et lunæ, et annuo circa solem: et propterea particula quævis lapidis vel aquæ describat lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem. Neque revera est, qui creditur, conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum aliquem axem ratione spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur tale spatium: proinde non video quomodo appellari possit conatus unicus, cui motus vere circularis tanquam proprio et adaequato effectui respondet.

63. Motus nullus dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per res sensibiles. Cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo in sensus incurrat, necesse est ut inutile prorsus sit ad distinctionem motuum. Præterea determinatio sive directio motui essentialis est, ilia vero in relatione consistit. Ergo impossibile est ut motus absolutus concipiatur.

64. Porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit motus ejusdem corporis, quinimo uno respectu moveri, altero quiescere dici quidpiam possit(1000); ad determinandum motum verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet tollatur ambiguitas, et consulatur mechanicæ philosophorum, qui systema rerum latius contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium relativum fixarum cœlo, tanquam quiescente spectato, conclusum adhibere, loco spatii absoluti. Motus autem et quies tali spatio relativo definiti, commode adhiberi possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo symptomate discerni possunt. Etenim imprimantur utcunque vires, sint quicunque conatus, concedamus motum distingui per actiones in corpora exercitas; nunquam tamen inde sequetur, dari spatium illud et locum absolutum, ejusque mutationem esse locum verum.

65. Leges motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem proportiones et calculos continentia, pro diversis viarum figuris, accelerationibus itidem et directionibus diversis, mediisque plus minusve resistentibus, hæc omnia constant sine calculatione motus absoluti. Uti vel ex eo patet quod, quum secundum illorum principia qui motum absolutum inducunt, nullo symptomate scire liceat, utrum integra rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur uniformiter in directum, perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis cognosci posse.

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66. Ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam summopere juvaturum, 1°. Distinguere inter hypotheses mathematicas et naturas rerum: 2°. Cavere ab abstractionibus: 3°. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid sensibile, vel saltem imaginabile; mensurisque relativis esse contentos. Quæ si fecerimus, simul clarissima quæque philosophiæ mechanicæ theoremata, quibus reserantur naturæ recessus, mundique systema calculis humanis subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et motus contemplatio a mille minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque abstractis libera evadet. Atque hæc de natura motus dicta sufficiant.

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67. Restat, ut disseramus de causa communicationis motuum(1001). Esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile causam motus in eo, plerique existimant. Veruntamen illos non assignare causam motus cognitam, et a corpore motuque distinctam, ex præmissis constat. Patet insuper vim non esse rem certam et determinatam, ex eo quod viri summi de ilia multum diversa, immo contraria, proferant, salva tamen in consequentiis veritate. Siquidem Newtonus(1002) ait vim impressam consistere in actione sola, esseque actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus mutandum, nee post actionem manere. Torricellius(1003) cumulum quendam sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem in corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere atque impetum constituere contendit. Idem fere Borellus(1004) aliique prædicant. At vero, tametsi inter se pugnare videantur Newtonus et Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi consentanea proferunt, res satis commode ab utrisque explicatur. Quippe vires omnes corporibus attributæ tam sunt hypotheses mathematicæ quam vires attractivæ in planetis et sole. Cæterum entia mathematica in rerum natura stabilem essentiam non habent: pendent autem a notione definientis; unde eadem res diversimode explicari potest.

68. Statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso conservari, sive per vim insitam, qua corpus quodlibet perseverat in statu suo vel motus vel quietis uniformis in directum; sive per vim impressam, durante percussione in corpus percussum receptam ibidemque permanentem; idem erit quoad rem, differentia existente in nominibus tantum. Similiter, ubi mobile percutiens perdit, et percussum acquirit motum, parum refert disputare, utrum motus acquisitus sit idem numero cum motu perdito, ducit enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de identitate. Itaque sive dicamus motum transire a percutiente in percussum, sive in percusso motum de novo generari, destrui autem in percutiente, res eodem recidit. Utrobique intelligitur unum corpus motum perdere, alterum acquirere, et præterea nihil.

69. Mentem, quæ agitat et continet universam hancce molem corpoream, estque causa vera efficiens motus, eandem esse, proprie et stricte loquendo, causam communicationis ejusdem haud negaverim. In philosophia tamen physica, causas et solutiones phænomenon a principiis mechanicis petere oportet. Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando ejus causam vere agentem et incorpoream, sed demonstrando ejus connexionem cum principiis mechanicis: cujusmodi est illud, _actionem et reactionem esse semper contrarias et æquales_(1005), a quo, tanquam fonte et principio primario, eruuntur regulæ de motuum communicatione, quæ a neotericis, magno scientiarum bono, jam ante repertæ sunt et demonstratæ.

70. Nobis satis fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio modo declarari potuisse. Nam si vera rerum natura potius quam abstracta mathesis spectetur, videbitur rectius dici, in attractione vel percussione passionem corporum, quam actionem, esse utrobique æqualem. Exempli gratia, lapis fune equo alligatus tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum equus versus lapidem: corpus etiam motum in aliud quiescens impactum, patitur eandem mutationem cum corpore quiescente. Et quoad effectum realem, percutiens est item percussum, percussumque percutiens. Mutatio autem illa est utrobique, tam in corpore equi quam in lapide, tam in moto quam in quiescente, passio mera. Esse autem vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream talium effectuum vere et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus motum in quiescens impingitur; loquimur tamen active, dicentes illud hoc impellere: nec absurde in mechanicis, ubi ideæ mathematicæ potius quam veræ rerum naturæ spectantur.

71. In physica, sensus et experientia, quæ ad effectus apparentes solummodo pertingunt, locum habent; in mechanica, notiones abstractæ mathematicorum admittuntur. In philosophia prima, seu metaphysica, agitur de rebus incorporeis, de causis, veritate, et existentia rerum. Physicus series sive successiones rerum sensibilium contemplatur, quibus legibus connectuntur, et quo ordine, quid præcedit tanquam causa, quid sequitur tanquam effectus, animadvertens.(1006) Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus motum esse causam motus in altero, vel ei motum imprimere, trahere etiam, aut impellere. Quo sensu causæ secundæ corporeæ intelligi debent, nulla ratione habita veræ sedis virium, vel potentiarum actricum, aut causæ realis cui insunt. Porro dici possunt causæ vel principia mechanica, ultra corpus, figuram, motum, etiam axiomata scientiæ mechanicæ primaria, tanquam causæ consequentium spectata.

72. Causæ vere activæ meditatione tantum et ratiocinio e tenebris erui quibus involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus cognosci. Spectat autem ad philosophiam primam, seu metaphysicam, de iis agere. Quodsi cuique scientiæ provincia sua(1007) tribuatur, limites assignentur, principia et objecta accurate distinguantur, quæ ad singulas pertinent, tractare licuerit majore, cum facilitate, tum perspicuitate.

FOOTNOTES

_ 1 Philosophy of Theism_: The Gifford Lectures delivered before the
University of Edinburgh in 1894-96. (Second Edition, 1899.)

_ 2 Essay on Vision_, sect. 147, 148.

_ 3 Principles_, sect. 6.

4 Preface to the _Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous_.

5 By Anthony Collins.

6 See vol. III, Appendix B.

7 Murdoch Martin, a native of Skye, author of a _Voyage to St. Kilda_
(1698), and a _Description of the Western Islands of Scotland_
(1703).

8 See Stewart’s _Works_ (ed. Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There is a
version of this story by DeQuincey, in his quaint essay on _Murder
considered as one of the Fine Arts._

9 Sir John became Lord Percival in that year.

10 A place more than once visited by Berkeley.

11 Bakewell’s _Memoirs of the Court of Augustus_, vol. II. p. 177.

12 A letter in Berkeley’s _Life and Letters_, p. 93, which led me to a
different opinion, I have now reason to believe was not written by
him, nor was it written in 1721. The research of Dr. Lorenz,
confirmed by internal evidence, shews that it was written in
October, 1684, before Berkeley the philosopher was born, and when
the Duke of Ormond was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The writer was
probably the Hon. and Rev. George Berkeley, a Prebendary of
Westminster in 1687, who died in 1694. The wife of the “pious Robert
Nelson” was a daughter of Earl Berkeley, and this “George” was her
younger brother.

13 Percival MSS.

14 For the letter, see Editor’s Preface to the _Proposal for a College
in Bermuda_, vol. IV. pp. 343-44.

15 Afterwards Sir John James.

16 Smibert the artist, who made a picture of Berkeley in 1725, and
afterwards in America of the family party then at Gravesend.

_ 17 Historical Register_, vol. XIII, p. 289 (1728).

_ 18 New England Weekly Courier_, Feb. 3, 1729.

19 For valuable information about Rhode Island, reproduced in
_Berkeley’s Life and Correspondence_ and here, I am indebted to
Colonel Higginson, to whom I desire to make this tardy but grateful
acknowledgement.

20 James, Dalton, and Smibert.

21 Whitehall, having fallen into decay, has been lately restored by the
pious efforts of Mrs. Livingston Mason, in concert with the Rev. Dr.
E. E. Hale, and others. This good work was completed in the summer
of 1900; and the house is now as nearly as possible in the state in
which Berkeley left it.

22 See vol. III, Appendix C.

_ 23 Three Men of Letters_, by Moses Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). He
records some of the American academical and other institutions that
are directly or indirectly, due to Berkeley.

24 The thought implied in this paragraph is pursued in my _Philosophy
of Theism_, in which the ethical perfection of the Universal Mind is
taken as the fundamental postulate in all human experience. If the
Universal Mind is not ethically perfect, the universe (including our
spiritual constitution) is radically untrustworthy.

_ 25 Life and Letters of Berkeley_, p. 222.

26 The third Earl of Shaftesbury, the pupil of Locke, and author of the
_Characteristics_. In addition to the well-known biography by Dr.
Fowler, the present eminent Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftesbury
has been interpreted in two other lately published works—a _Life_ by
Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. (1900), and an edition of the
_Characteristics_, with an Introduction and Notes, by John M.
Robertson (1900).

27 The title of this book is—_Things Divine and Supernatural conceived
by Analogy with Things Natural and Human_, by the Author of _The
Procedure, Extent and Limits of the Human Understanding_. The
_Divine Analogy_ appeared in 1733, and the _Procedure_ in 1728.

28 Spinoza argues that what is _called_ “understanding” and “will” in
God, has no more in common with human understanding and will than
the dog-star in the heavens has with the animal we call a dog. See
Spinoza’s _Ethica_, I. 17, _Scholium_.

29 The question of the knowableness of God, or Omnipotent Moral
Perfection in the concrete, enters into recent philosophical and
theological discussion in Britain. Calderwood, in his _Philosophy of
the Infinite_ (1854), was one of the earliest, and not the least
acute, of Hamilton’s critics in this matter. The subject is lucidly
treated by Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) in his _Lectures
on Theism_ (1897) and in a supplement to Calderwood’s _Life_ (1900).
So also Huxley’s _David Hume_ and Professor Iverach’s _Is God
Knowable?_

30 Stewart’s _Works_. vol. I. pp. 350-1.

31 Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon Rose.

32 Pope’s poetic tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period—

“Even in a bishop I can spy desert;
Secker is decent; Rundle has a heart:
Manners with candour are to Benson given,
To Berkeley—every virtue under heaven.”

_Epilogue to the Satires._

Also his satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley—

“Truth’s sacred fort th’ exploded laugh shall win;
And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.”

_Essay on Satire, _Part II.

33 Berkeley’s _Life and Letters_, p. 210.

34 Bacon’s _Novuin Organum_. Distributio Operis.

35 Section 141.

36 See “Editor’s Preface to Alciphron.”

37 Compare Essay II in the _Guardian_ with this.

38 Taylor, in later life, conformed to the Anglican Church.

39 See Berkeley’s _Life and Letters_, chap. viii.

40 The Primacy.

41 This seems to have been his eldest son, Henry.

42 His son George was already settled at Christ Church. Henry, the
eldest son, born in Rhode Island, was then “abroad in the south of
France for his health,” as one of his brother George’s letters tells
us, found among the Johnson MSS.

43 See Appendix D. Reid, like Berkeley, held that “matter cannot be the
cause of anything,” but this not as a consequence of the new
conception of the world presented to the senses, through which alone
Berkeley opens _his_ way to its powerlessness; although Reid
supposes that in his youth he followed Berkeley in this too. See
_Thomas Reid_ (1898), in “Famous Scots Series,” where I have
enlarged on this.

44 Johnson MSS.

45 That Berkeley was buried in Oxford is mentioned in his son’s letter
to Johnson, in which he says : “His remains are interred in the
Cathedral of Christ Church, and next week a monument to his memory
will be erected with an inscription by Dr. Markham, a Student of
this College.” As the son was present at, and superintended the
arrangements for his father’s funeral, it can be no stretch of
credulity to believe that he knew where his father was buried. It
may be added that Berkeley himself had provided in his Will “that my
body be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which I die.” The
Will, dated July 31, 1752, is given _in extenso_ in my _Life and
Letters_ of Berkeley, p. 345. We have also the record of burial in
the Register of Christ Church Cathedral, which shews that “on
January ye 20th 1753, ye Right Reverend John (_sic_) Berkley, Ld
Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed” there. This disposes of the statement
on p. 17 of Diprose’s _Account of the Parish of Saint Clement Danes_
(1868), that Berkeley was buried in that church.

I may add that a beautiful memorial of Berkeley has lately been
placed in the Cathedral of Cloyne, by subscriptions in this country
and largely in America.

M1 I.

46 “General ideas,” i.e. _abstract_ general ideas, distinguished, in
Berkeley’s nominalism, from _concrete_ general ideas, or from
general names, which are signs of any one of an indefinite number of
individual objects. Cf. _Principles,_ Introduction, sect. 16.

47 Introduction to the _Principles of Human Knowledge_.

M2 N.

48 “co-existing ideas,” i.e. phenomena presented in uniform order to
the senses.

M3 M. P.
M4 M. P.
M5 M.

49 Newton postulates a world of matter and motion, governed
mechanically by laws within itself: Berkeley finds himself charged
with New Principles, demanded by reason, with which Newton’s
postulate is inconsistent.

M6 E.

50 He attempts this in many parts of the _Principles_ and _Dialogues_.
He recognises the difficulty of reconciling his New Principles with
the _identity_ and _permanence_ of sensible things.

M7 M.
M8 E.

51 He contemplated thus early applications of his New Principles to
Mathematics, afterwards made in his book of _Principles_, sect.
118-32.

52 What Berkeley calls _ideas_ are either perceptible by the senses or
imagined: either way they are concrete: _abstract ideas_ are empty
words.

M9 S.
M10 M. P.

53 i.e. the existence of bodies and qualities independently of—in
abstraction from—all percipient mind. While the spiritual theism of
Descartes is acceptable, he rejects his mechanical conception of the
material world.

M11 M.

54 But a “house” or a “church” includes more than _visible_ ideas, so
that we cannot, strictly speaking, be said to see it. We see
immediately only visible signs of its invisible qualities.

M12 E.

55 This is added in the margin.

M13 N.
M14 N.
M15 N.

56 The total impotence of Matter, and the omnipotence of Mind or Spirit
in Nature, is thus early becoming the dominant thought with
Berkeley.

M16 N.
M17 N.

57 This refers to an objection to the New Principles that is apparently
reinforced by recent discoveries in geology. But if these contradict
the Principles, so does the existence of a table while I am only
seeing it.

M18 E.

58 Existence, in short, can be realised only in the form of living
percipient mind.

59 Berkeley hardly distinguishes uncontingent mathematical _relations_,
to which the sensible ideas or phenomena in which the relations are
concretely manifested must conform.

60 M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. = matter visible; M. . = matter
sensible. The distinctions n question were made prominent in the
_Essay on Vision_. See sect. 1, 121-45.

M19 P.

61 Which the common supposition regarding primary qualities seems to
contradict.

62 [That need not have been blotted out—’tis good sense, if we do but
determine wt we mean by _thing_ and _idea_.]—AUTHOR, on blank page
of the MS.

M20 P.
M21 N.

63 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises
attempts to define motion, as involving a _petitio_.

M22 P.
M23 N.
M24 N.

64 George Cheyne, the physician (known afterwards as author of the
_English Malady_), published in 1705 a work on Fluxions, which
procured him admission to the Royal Society. He was born in 1670.

65 This reminds us of Hume, and inclines towards the empirical notion
of Causation, as merely constancy in sequence—not even continuous
metamorphosis.

66 This is Berkeley’s objection to abstract, i.e. unperceived,
quantities and infinitesimals—important in the sequel.

67 The “lines and figures” of pure mathematics, that is to say; which
he rejects as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable abstractions.

M25 I.
M26 I.
M27 M. E.
M28 E.

68 Things really exist, that is to say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser
degree, when they are imagined than when they are actually perceived
by our senses; but, in this wide meaning of existence, they may in
both cases be said to exist.

M29 E.

69 Added on blank page of the MS.

70 In Berkeley’s limitation of the term _idea_ to what is presented
objectively in sense, or represented concretely in imagination.
Accordingly “an infinite idea” would be an idea which transcends
ideation—an express contradiction.

M30 M.
M31 M.
M32 M.
M33 S.

71 Does the _human_ spirit depend on _sensible_ ideas as much as they
depend on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient
of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in those few senses
to which man is confined, although self-conscious activity
abstracted from _all_ sorts of presented phenomena seems impossible.
But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily dependent on _our_
material world or _our_ sense experience.

M34 S.
M35 S.

72 [This I do not altogether approve of.]—AUTHOR, on margin.

M36 M.
M37 S.

73 He afterwards guarded the difference, by contrasting _notion_ and
_idea_, confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to
our senses, or represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the
former to intellectual apprehension of “operations of the mind,” and
of “relations” among ideas.

M38 E.

74 See _Principles_, sect. 89.

75 Is thought, then, independent of language? Can we realise thought
worthy of the name without use of words? This is Berkeley’s
excessive juvenile reaction against verbal abstractions.

76 Every general notion is _ideally realisable_ in one or other of its
possible concrete or individual applications.

M39 N.
M40 S.

77 This is the germ of Berkeley’s notion of the objectivity of the
material world to individual percipients and so of the rise of
individual self-consciousness.

M41 S.

78 Added by Berkeley on blank page of the MS.

79 Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop Sprat’s _History of the Royal Society_
appeared in 1667.

80 Much need; for what he means by _idea_ has not been attended to by
his critics.

M42 I. Mo.

81 What “Second Book” is this? Does he refer to the “Second Part” of
the _Principles_, which never appeared? God is the culmination of
his philosophy, in _Siris_.

M43 M.

82 This is Berkeley’s material substance. Individual material
substances are for him, steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena,
having the efficient and final cause of their aggregation in
eternally active Mind—active mind, human and Divine, being essential
to their realisation for man.

M44 I.

83 Cf. Introduction to the _Principles_, especially sect. 18-25.

M45 M.

84 Stillingfleet charges Locke with “discarding substance out of the
reasonable part of the world.”

M46 M.

85 The philosophers supposed the real things to exist behind our ideas,
in concealment: Berkeley was now beginning to think that the
objective ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, the existence
of which needs no proof, were _themselves_ the significant and
interpretable realities of physical science.

M47 I.
M48 M.
M49 S.
M50 I.
M51 N.
M52 P.
M53 M.
M54 N.
M55 M.

86 If the material world can be _real_ only in and through a percipient
intelligence, as the realising factor.

M56 S.
M57 Mo.
M58 Mo.
M59 Mo.
M60 I.

87 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 119-122, which deny the possibility of
an idea or mental picture corresponding to abstract number.

M61 M. P.

88 “Præcedaneous,” i.e. precedent.

M62 S.

89 Who refunds human as well as natural causation into Divine agency.

M63 Mo.

90 In which Locke treats “Of the Reality of Knowledge,” including
questions apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in
reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind.

M64 M.
M65 M.
M66 E.
M67 M.
M68 Mo.
M69 I.
M70 I.
M71 I.

91 Locke’s “abstract idea” is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley
in his impetuosity.

M72 M.

92 This and other passages refer to the scepticism, that is founded on
the impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with
unperceived real things; so that we can never escape from the circle
of subjectivity. Berkeley intended to refute this scepticism.

M73 I.
M74 I.
M75 I.
M76 Mo.

93 Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards edited the _Querist_.

M77 M.

94 This “First Book” seems to be “Part I” of the projected
_Principles_—the only Part ever published. Here he inclines to
“perception or thought in general,” in the language of Descartes;
but in the end he approximates to Locke’s “sensation and
reflection.” See _Principles_, sect. 1, and notes.

M78 I.
M79 E.
M80 S.
M81 S.

95 Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, that ideas or phenomena
constitute the ego, so that I am only the transitory conscious state
of each moment?

M82 S.

96 “Consciousness”—a term rarely used by Berkeley or his
contemporaries.

97 This too, if strictly interpreted, looks like an anticipation of
Hume’s reduction of the ego into successive “impressions”—“nothing
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed
one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux
and movement.” See Hume’s _Treatise_, Part IV. sect. 6.

M83 S.
M84 M.

98 What “Third Book” is here projected? Was a “Third Part” of the
_Principles_ then in embryo?

M85 S.

99 This is scarcely done in the “Introduction” to the _Principles_.

M86 S.
M87 E.

100 Berkeley, as we find in the _Commonplace Book_, is fond of
conjecturing how a man all alone in the world, freed from the
abstractions of language, would apprehend the realities of
existence, which he must then face directly, without the use or
abuse of verbal symbols.

M88 E.
M89 T.
M90 I.
M91 I.
M92 E.
M93 I.
M94 I.

101 This “N. B.” is expanded in the Introduction to the _Principles_.

M95 M.
M96 S.
M97 I.
M98 M.
M99 I.
M100 M.

102 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 4.

M101 E. M102 M.

103 What is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be
presumed or trusted in as real, if we have any hold of reality, or
the moral right to postulate that our universe is fundamentally
trustworthy.

M103 I. M104 S.

104 But he distinguishes, in the _Principles_ and elsewhere, between an
idea of sense and a percipient ego.

M105 S. M106 S. M107 S. M108 S. M109 S. M110 S. M111 N.

105 They reappear in _Siris_.

M112 M.

106 In one of Berkeley’s letters to Johnson, a quarter of a century
after the _Commonplace Book_, when he was in America, he observes
that “the mechanical philosophers pretend to demonstrate that matter
is proportional to gravity. But their argument concludes nothing,
and is a mere circle”—as he proceeds to show.

107 In the _Principles_, sect. 1-33, he seeks to fulfil the expository
part of this intention; in sect. 33-84, also in the _Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous_, he is “particular in answering
objections.”

M113 S. M114 M.

108 If Matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence.

M115 S. M116 S. M117 S. M118 S. M119 S. M120 S.

109 On freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent, cf. _Siris_,
sect. 257 and note.

M121 N.

110 Is not this one way of expressing the Universal Providence and
constant uniting agency of God in the material world?

111 Here _idea_ seems to be used in its wider signification, including
_notion_.

M122 G.

112 “infinitely greater”—Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees?

M123 G.

113 ’embrangled’—perplexed—involved in disputes.

114 See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 24.

M124 S.

115 “homonymy,” i.e. equivocation.

116 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense,
nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses “thing” in
the wide meaning which comprehends persons.

M125 S.

117 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense,
nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses “thing” in
the wide meaning which comprehends persons.

M126 S. M127 E. M128 T. M129 S.

118 Is this consistent with other entries?

M130 S.

_ 119 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.

M131 S.

120 This is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions
of conscious or percipient activity.

M132 S. M133 S.

121 This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously
self-originated.

M134 S. M135 N. M136 T. M137 S.

122 “perception.” He does not include the percipient.

123 “without,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient.

M138 M.

124 This would make _idea_ the term only for what is imagined, as
distinguished from what is perceived in sense.

M139 S. M140 S.

125 In a strict use of words, only _persons_ exercise will—not _things_.

M141 S. M142 S.

126 As we must do in imagination, which (unlike sense) is
representative; for the mental images represent original data of
sense-perception.

M143 S. M144 S. M145 S. M146 I. M147 S. M148 Mo. M149 Mo.

127 Does he not allow that we have _meaning_, if not _ideas_, when we
use the terms virtue and vice and moral action?

128 As Locke says we are.

M150 E.

129 “_Existence_ and _unity_ are ideas that are suggested to the
understanding by every object without and every idea within. When
ideas are in our minds, we consider that _they_ exist.” Locke’s
_Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.

M151 E.

130 i.e. of Existence in the abstract—unperceived and
unperceiving—realised neither in percipient life nor in moral
action.

M152 S. M153 S. M154 S. M155 S. E. M156 G.

131 This suggests that God knows sensible things without being sentient
of any.

M157 N. Mo. M158 Mo. M159 I. M160 I.

132 Cf. _Principles_, Introd., sect. 1-5.

M161 I.

133 Cf. Preface to _Principles_; also to _Dialogues_.

M162 S. M163 I. M164 Mo.

134 i.e. that ethics was a science of phenomena or ideas.

M165 S. M166 I.

135 i.e. of the _independent_ existence of Matter.

M167 M.

136 ’bodies’—i.e. sensible things—not unrealised Matter.

M168 I. &c.

137 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 13.

M169 I.

138 Locke died in October, 1704.

M170 S.

139 “without the mind,” i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life.

M171 Mo. M172 Mo. M173 P. S.

140 e.g. secondary qualities of sensible things, in which pleasure and
pain are prominent.

141 e.g. primary qualities, in which pleasure and pain are latent.

M174 I. M175 Mo. M176 M.

142 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV.
ch. 3. § 6; also his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding
the possibility of Matter thinking. With Berkeley real space is a
finite creature, dependent for realisation on living percipient
Spirit.

M177 I. M178 Mo. M179 Mo. M180 S.

143 But what of the origination of the volition itself?

M181 M. S.

_ 144 Essay_, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See also Locke’s _Letters_ to
Stillingfleet.

M182 M. S.

145 It is, according to Berkeley, the steady union or co-existence of a
group of sense-phenomena.

M183 I. M184 I. M185 S.

_ 146 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10—where he argues for interruptions of
consciousness. “Men think not always.”

M186 Mo. M187 S. M188 S. M189 S. M190 S. M191 S. M192 S. M193 S.

147 In other words, the material world is wholly impotent: all activity
in the universe is spiritual.

M194 I.

148 On the order of its four books and the structure of Locke’s _Essay_,
see the Prolegomena in my edition of the _Essay_, pp. liv-lviii.

M195 M.

149 i.e. independent imperceptible Matter.

M196 I. M197 M.

150 What of the earliest geological periods, asks Ueberweg? But is there
greater difficulty in such instances than in explaining the
existence of a table or a house, while one is merely seeing, without
touching?

M198 M.