Chapter XXIV: Part 24

782 Collier never came fairly in sight of the philosophical public of
last century. He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his
_Dilucidationes Philosophicæ_ (1746), and also in the _Ada
Eruditorum_, Suppl. VI. 244, &c., and in England by Corry in his
_Reflections on Liberty and Necessity_ (1761), as well as in the
_Remarks_ on the Reflections, and _Answers_ to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8
(1763), where he is described as “a weak reasoner, and a very dull
writer also.” Collier was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in
his _Essays on the Intellectual Powers_, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a
subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at
Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart.
A beautiful reprint of the _Clavis_ (of the original edition of
which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in
Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a
collection of _Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the
Eighteenth Century_, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr.

783 William, fourth Lord Berkeley of Stratton, born about 1663,
succeeded his brother in 1697, and died in 1741 at Bruton in
Somersetshire. The Berkeleys of Stratton were descended from a
younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley of Berkeley Castle, who died
in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous
Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and
in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he held
till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see Burke’s
_Extinct Peerages_). It is said that Bishop Berkeley’s father was
related to him. The Bishop himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in
1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, to whom the _Dialogues_ are
dedicated, as “a cousin of his Lordship.” The title of Berkeley of
Stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord in 1773.

784 This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the
_Dialogues_.

785 The Second Part of the _Principles_ was never published, and only in
part written. See Editor’s Preface to the _Principles_.

_ 786 Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1.

787 Berkeley’s philosophy is professedly a “revolt” from abstract ideas
to an enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues
_Philonous_ personates the revolt, and represents Berkeley. _Hylas_
vindicates the uncritical conception of independent Matter.

788 Berkeley’s zeal against Matter in the abstract, and all abstract
ideas of concrete things, is therefore not necessarily directed
against “universal intellectual notions”—“the principles and
theorems of sciences.”

789 Here “reason” means reasoning or inference. Cf. _Theory of Vision
Vindicated_, sect. 42, including the distinction between
“suggestion” and “inference.”

790 “figure” as well as colour, is here included among the original data
of sight.

791 “without the mind,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind.

792 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14.

793 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 14, 15.

794 “Sensible qualities,” i.e. the significant appearances presented in
sense.

795 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80-86.

796 Descartes and Locke for example.

797 On Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, and their mutual
relations, cf. _Principles_, sect. 9-15. See also Descartes,
_Meditations_, III, _Principia_, I. sect. 69; Malebranche,
_Recherche_, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch.
8.

798 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 80.

799 What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and
second editions.

800 Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of
_all_ the qualities of sensible things.

801 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 122-126; _Principles_, sect. 123,
&c.; _Siris_, sect. 270, &c.

802 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 15.

803 Is “notion” here a synonym for idea?

804 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 16.

805 “Size or figure, or sensible quality”—“size, color &c.,” in the
first and second editions.

806 In Berkeley’s later and more exact terminology, the data or
implicates of pure intellect are called _notions_, in contrast to
his _ideas_, which are concrete or individual sensuous
presentations.

807 They need living percipient mind to make them real.

808 So Reid’s _Inquiry_, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; _Essays on the Intellectual
Powers_, II. ch. 16. Cf. _New Theory of Vision Vindicated_, sect. 8,
&c.

809 i.e. figured or extended visible colour. Cf. _New Theory of Vision_,
sect. 43, &c.

810 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

811 After maintaining, in the preceding part of this Dialogue, the
inevitable dependence of all the qualities of Matter upon percipient
Spirit, the argument now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that
Matter may still be an unmanifested or unqualified _substratum_,
independent of living percipient Spirit.

812 [See the _Essay towards a New Theory of Vision_, and its
_Vindication_.] Note by the _Author_ in the 1734 edition.

813 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 2.

814 Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.

815 “an idea,” i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses.

816 This was Reid’s fundamental question in his criticism of Berkeley.

817 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8.

818 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

819 In other words, the percipient activity of a living spirit is the
necessary condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena
immediately present to our senses.

820 An “explanation” afterwards elaborately developed by Hartley, in his
_Observations on Man_ (1749). Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view.

821 The brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a
part of the material world, and must equally with the rest of the
material world depend for its realisation upon percipient Spirit as
the realising factor.

822 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 23.

823 “in stones and minerals”—in first and second editions.

824 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-33; also sect. 90.—The _permanence_ of a
thing, during intervals in which it may be unperceived and
unimagined by human beings, is here assumed, as a natural
conviction.

825 In other words, men are apt to treat the omniscience of God as an
inference from the dogmatic assumption that God exists, instead of
seeing that our cosmic experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent
and omniscient Intelligence at its root.

826 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 90. A permanent material world is grounded
on Divine Mind, because it cannot but depend on Mind, while its
reality is only partially and at intervals sustained by finite
minds.

827 “necessarily inferred from”—rather necessarily presupposed in.

828 The present reality of Something implies the eternal existence of
living Mind, if Something _must_ exist eternally, and if real or
concrete existence involves living Mind. Berkeley’s conception of
material nature presupposes a theistic basis.

829 He refers of course to Malebranche and his Divine Vision.

830 But Malebranche uses _idea_ in a higher meaning than Berkeley
does—akin to the Platonic, and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena
which Berkeley calls ideas.

831 The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.

832 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25-33.

833 Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24.

834 I _can_ represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving
things; because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I
_cannot_ represent to myself sensible things existing totally
unperceived and unimagined; because I cannot, without a
contradiction, have an example of this in my own experience.

835 “reason,” i.e. by reasoning.

836 Berkeley’s _material substance_ is a natural or divinely ordered
aggregate of sensible qualities or phenomena.

837 Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, and
it would be an abuse of language to call this Matter.

838 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

839 It is here argued that as _volition_ is the only _originative_ cause
implied in our experience, and which consequently alone puts true
meaning into the term Cause, to apply that term to what is not
volition is to make it meaningless, or at least to misapply it.

840 While thus arguing against the need for independent matter, as an
instrument needed by God, Berkeley fails to explain how dependent
matter can be a medium of intercourse between persons. It must be
more than a subjective dream, however well ordered, if it is
available for this purpose. Unless the visible and audible ideas or
phenomena presented to me are actually seen and heard by other men,
how can they be instrumental in intercommunication?

841 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 68-79.

842 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 20.

843 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 80, 81.

844 i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena.

845 This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley’s
reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of
Berkeley’s philosophy.—“Most of the writings of that very ingenious
author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to
be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not
excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are,
in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this—_that they admit of
no answer, and produce no conviction_. Their only effect is to cause
that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is
the result of scepticism.” (Hume’s _Essays_, vol. II. Note N, p.
554.)

846 Omitted in last edition.

847 “Tell me, Hylas,”—“So Hylas”—in first and second editions.

848 Variously called _noumena_, “things-in-themselves,” absolute
substances, &c.—which Berkeley’s philosophy banishes, on the ground
of their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther
questions concerning them. Questions about existence are thus
confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living
spirits.

849 Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and
excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an
ultimately representative perception of Matter. He also assumes the
reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law.
When we see an orange, the visual sense guarantees only colour. The
other phenomena, which we associate with this colour—the other
“qualities” of the orange—are, when we only _see_ the orange, matter
of faith. We believe them to be realisable.

850 He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense
symbols proceeds—that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational
order, under laws that are independent of, and in that respect
external to, the individual percipient.

851 Mediately as well as immediately.

852 We can hardly be said to have an _immediate_ sense-perception of an
individual “thing”—meaning by “thing” a congeries of sense-ideas or
phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive
some of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See
the last three notes.

853 He probably refers to Descartes, who _argues_ for the
trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of God; thus
apparently arguing in a circle, seeing that the existence of God is
manifested to us only through our suspected faculties. But is not
confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the
heart of the universe, the fundamental _presupposition_ of all human
experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of
experience?

854 As Locke does. See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11.

855 Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, sect. 45-48.

856 And to be thus external to individual minds.

857 It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte
and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given phenomena, and assume the
constancy of their orderly reappearances, _as a matter of fact_,
while they confess total ignorance of the _cause_ of natural order.
(Thus ignorant, why do they assume reason or order in nature?) The
ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power,
Mill expresses by the term “_permanent possibility_ of sensation.”
(See his _Examination of Hamilton_, ch. 11.) Our belief in the
continued existence of a sensible thing _in our absence_ merely
means, with him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should
perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its
appearance.

858 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 25, 26.

859 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.

860 Inasmuch as I am conscious of _myself_, I can gather, through the
sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my
own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of
another person.

861 “reason,” i.e. reasoning or necessary inference—founded here on our
sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense
symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief
in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with
Berkeley, an application of this faith.

862 “Matter,” i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. _Principles_, sect.
135-138.

863 Does this imply that with Berkeley, _self_, as distinguished from
the _phenomena_ of which the material world consists, is not a
necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places—I am
_conscious_ of “my own being,” and that my mind is myself. Cf.
_Principles_, sect, 2.

864 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8.

865 Cf. Ibid., sect. 20

866 This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the
first and second editions of the _Dialogues_. It is, by
anticipation, Berkeley’s answer to Hume’s application of the
objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the
reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as
identical amid the changes of its successive states.

867 See note 4 on preceding page.

868 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 142.

869 Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not
conscious of ideas—sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is
ever unconscious?

870 That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind.
Berkeley speaks here of a _consciousness_ of matter. Does he mean
consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance?

871 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 54-57.

872 Which he does not doubt.

873 This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his
antagonists.

874 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 29-41.

875 The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.

876 The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus
the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency
of _persons_, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused
causes.

877 That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be
assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent
sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical
data.

878 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 49.

879 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.

880 “without the mind,” i.e. without the mind of each percipient person.

881 This is the gist of the whole question. According to the
Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented,
unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living
Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable,
yet (incoherently) they claim that we _can_ interpret them—in
physical science.

882 A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of
Berkeley in the _Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie_.

883 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 50; _Siris_, sect. 319.

884 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 58.

885 “order”—“series,” in first and second editions.

886 “Matter,” i.e. when the reality of “matter” is supposed to signify
what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless.

887 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the physical coexistences and
sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the
individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences.

888 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things
_subjective_, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to
the senses as _objective_.

889 They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things
themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses
allow them to be realised for us.

890 i.e. abstract Matter.

891 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 49; and _New Theory of Vision
Vindicated_, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.

892 Cf. _New Theory of Vision_, sect. 84-86.

893 “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the order providentially maintained
in nature.

894 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 23-25.

895 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 8-10, 86, 87.

896 This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:—“The ideas in my mind
cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if
the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or
more such minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one
unconfutable consequence of Berkeley’s system, which he seems not to
have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at
all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that,
although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it
seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent
beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a
friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot
possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine,
any more than the pain felt by me can be the _individual pain_ felt
by another. I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the
universe” (Hamilton’s _Reid_, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or
Panegoism is thus charged against Berkeley, unless his conception of
the material world is further guarded.

897 Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally
representative sense-perception.

898 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 6.

899 Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.

900 Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.

901 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 24.

902 “unknown,” i.e. unrealised in percipient life.

903 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-33.

904 See also Collier’s _Clavis Universalis_, p. 6: “Two or more persons
who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be
said to hear the _same_ notes; yet the sound which the one hears is
_not the very same_ with the sound which another hears, _because the
souls or persons are supposed to be different_.”

905 Berkeley seems to hold that in _things_ there is no identity other
than perfect similarity—only in _persons_. And even as to personal
identity he is obscure. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347, &c.

906 But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are
perceived by me _can_ be also perceived by other persons; and if
not, how I can discover that “other persons” exist, or that any
finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if the
sort of _sameness_ that Berkeley advocates is all that can be
predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only _similar_, or
generically the same. Unless the ideas are _numerically_ the same,
can different persons make signs to one another through them?

907 Omitted in author’s last edition.

908 This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is
maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under
a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the
phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my
neighbour is conscious; so that they are _practically_ “the same.”
If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely
trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I
attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed
rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.

909 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley’s critics.

910 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 82-84.

911 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its wholly subjective and
popular meaning.

912 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its objective meaning.

913 “philosophic,” i.e. _pseudo_-philosophic, against which he argues.

914 Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material
world through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning?
May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses
of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet
elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any
beginning in the succession of finite persons?

915 In the first and second editions only.

916 Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution,
unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is
there a distinction between creation or evolution of _things_ and
creation or evolution of _persons_?

917 Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347-349.

918 “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the
word.

919 Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with
God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the
percipient experience of persons.

920 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and
scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the
material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and
applied.

921 “substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and
the second edition.

922 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-42. In _Siris_, sect. 294-297, 300-318,
335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism,
if not to Hegelianism.

923 “Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.

924 These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley’s conception of the
material world. With him, the _immediate_ objects of sense, realise
in _perception_, are independent of the _will_ of the percipient,
and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley’s
“material world” of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two
factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but
not independent of all living Mind.

925 “voces male intellectæ.” Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_,
“Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially
by abstraction.

926 “veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about
motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a
history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the
material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to
Spirit.

927 “hujus ævi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions
raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the
following sections.

928 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality,
exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is
continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed
by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe.

929 “vis.” The assumption that _active power_ is an immediate datum of
sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He
proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is
meaningless.

930 “principio”—the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect.
36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations,
it is argued, when _bodily_ power or force, in any form, e.g.
gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these
“occult causes” is to say nothing that is intelligible. The
perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we
know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors.

931 Cf. sect. 53, where _sense_, _imagination_, and _intelligence_ are
distinguished.

932 Cf. _Principles_, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also _Alciphron_, Dial. VII.
sect. 8, 17.

933 [La Materia altro non è che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale
serve per ricettacolo della forza et de’ momenti dell’ impeto. La
forzae l’impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto
spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che
nell’ intima corpulenza de’ solidi naturali, Vide _Lezioni
Accademiche_.]—AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian
physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented
the barometer.

934 Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and
then of medicine at Florence; see his _De Vi Percussionis_, cap.
XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII.

935 “per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active
force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual
efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency.

936 “vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of
Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible
through the senses, and revealed to _them_ only in its sensible
effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in things, _per se_, is
distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion due to
misleading abstraction. There is no _physical_ power, intermediate
between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes
we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11.

937 “meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_,
sect. 35, 70.

938 “distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the
things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived
sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes
the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in
the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according
to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible
effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249.

_ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III.

_ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I.

941 “utiles.” Such words as “force,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,”
are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the
_phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of
the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical
science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235.

942 Cf. sect. 67.

943 “candem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of force.

944 [Borellus.]—AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII.

945 [Leibnitius.]—AUTHOR.

946 On Berkeley’s reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that
real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover
for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of
personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of
language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail
in sect. 21-35.

947 Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_,
i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_—sentient,
intelligent, active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf.
_Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into
_ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here
the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification,
“bodies” is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the
passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of
the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded.

948 “nihilque,” &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26,
65, 66. where the essential passivity of the _ideas_ presented to
the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal
principle—on the positive ground of our percipient experience of
sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something
sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know
nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.

949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the
measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the
senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must
look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal
consciousness presents to us.

950 “_genus rerum cogitantium._” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.

951 “experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of
internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition
and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith?

952 “a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit,
in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a
way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and
exhaustively in philosophical system.

_ 953 Phys._ θ. 4. 255 a 5-7.

_ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III.

955 “resistentia.” Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be
accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_,
entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea
of power which is formed. See Editor’s Preface.

956 “nec incommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note.

957 “hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also
_Siris_, sect. 250-251.

958 “nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley’s objections to crediting
_matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what
is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas
Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in
recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves
causation among bodies into invariable sequence.

959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the
relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of
our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition,
which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible
activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original
causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally
approved or blamed.

960 “novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley’s antithesis
of mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the
senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas.

_ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.

962 “Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things
pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of
the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible
things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. §§ 63, 64.

963 “alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of
matter thinking?

964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI.
i. 6.

_ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7.

966 Hardly any passage in the _Timæus_ exactly corresponds to this. The
following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν
αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν
μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timæus_ in the same
connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii.

967 “philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium
motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30.

_ 968 Principia Mathematica_—Scholium Generale.

969 “naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as
imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_,
vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27.

970 “juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature
are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The
so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us,
and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality
expresses Perfect Reason.

971 “permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51.

972 “spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the _De Motu_
is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which
the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which
metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach
through consciousness.

973 “regulas.” Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235.

974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and
their immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and
metaphysics—he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to
explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two
meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By
_principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient
supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to
the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active
cause of the order.

975 “ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.” Relations of the data of sense
to universalising reason are here recognised.

976 “natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_—i.e.
perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin
(_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to
metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience,
belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies;
or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that
absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116.

977 “idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to
definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the
inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete
experience.

978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ
κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf.
Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix.

979 Newton.

980 Cf. sect. 3-42.

981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, _De Vi
Percussionis_, p. 1.

982 “res faciles difficillimas.” Cf. _Principles_, “Introduction,” sect.
1.

983 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. _Nat. Ausc._ III.
ii.

984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion,
referred to as a signal example of fallacy.

985 “de infinite, &c.” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the
_Analyst_ passim, for Berkeley’s treatment of infinitesimals.

986 “confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion.

987 The modern conception of the “conservation of force.”

988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and
solves it in cap. iv.

989 “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense;
“vitale principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency.

990 “moventis et moti,” i.e. as concauses.

991 “motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or
empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception
of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute
space and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See
Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which passed
between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81;
97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space “an ideal of some modern
Englishman.”

992 Newton’s _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P.
I. cap. vi. § 1.

993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing
without matter,” _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13.

994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as
distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with αἴσθησις,
φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology.

995 “attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in his
_Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_.

996 “nostrum,” sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we
are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material
world.

997 [Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De
Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine
annis edito.]—AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_.

998 He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent
on Perception and Will.

_ 999 Phys._ α. 5. 188a. 22, 23.

1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the
striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is
the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or
equivalent to, that given forth by the former?

_ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV.

_ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._

_ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX.

1005 Newton’s third law of motion.

1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the
sensible and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in his
_Siris_, more than twenty years later.

1007 “provincia sua.” The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion
perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to
theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.