Chapter XII: Book V: Argument (1)

In the _fifth_ book he shows how the magistracy is to be constituted, so
as to establish a prosperous state. True philosophy, says he, is its
basis; and this, so far from being superficial and affecting only
the outward bearing and life of the citizens, turns the mind away
from all these fleeting subjects to that which is real, positive,
and consistent with the knowledge of God. Carrying the subject
somewhat back, therefore, he considers in detail the subject-matter
of philosophy, proving that it is the knowledge both of virtue and
of God, both of which are indispensable to a well-ordered state, in
which either philosophers must be rulers or _vice versâ_. As however
he had said in the third book, that a state’s welfare depended on
the community of ideas and of property, he now shows in detail, how
the duties of men and women are common in a state, and how
consequently themselves and their property too should be common,—a
notion which Aristotle rather severely handles in the second book of
the Politics (ch. 3), where he says, that, though the state be one,
but with this restriction, that we must bear in mind that to
different men belong different dispositions, and if εὐταξία is
gently to be maintained, we must specially guard against confusion
and unnecessary interference, the certain means of downfal to a
state.

CHAP. I.—Such a state and government then, and such a man as we have described, I term good and upright: and if this government be an upright one, I reckon the others bad and erroneous, both as to the regulations in states, and the establishment of the moral nature in individuals, inasmuch as there are four species of depravity.[159] Of what kind are these? said he. I was about to mention them in order, as they each appeared to me to rise one out of another; but Polemarchus stretching out his hand—(for he sat a little further off than Adimantus,)—caught him by the robe at his shoulder, and drew him near; and, bending towards him, he spoke something in a whisper, of which we heard nothing but this: Shall we let that pass, then? said he, or what shall we do? By no means, said Adimantus, now speaking aloud. And I replied, What will not you let pass? You, indeed, said he:—for it was to you I alluded. You seem to us to be getting careless and to be stealing through a whole branch of the discourse, and that not the least important, that you may not have the trouble of going through it; and you think you escaped our notice, when you made this speech so simply, viz., that it is clear to every one both as to wives and children, that whatever belongs to friends will be common. Did not I say right, Adimantus? Yes, said he: but this, which was rightly said, like the rest of your discourse, requires explanation;—namely, to show what is the mode of that community; for there must be many:—do not omit saying then which mode you mean; for we have been expecting it for some time past, thinking you would, some time or other, speak of the propagation of children, how they are to be propagated;—and when born, how they should be brought up, and everything relating to this community that you were mentioning both of wives and children; for we suppose it to be of great, nay—paramount importance to the state, whether this be rightly performed or not. Now then, since you are taking in hand another kind of state-government before you have sufficiently discussed this, we have determined, as you just heard, not to let you pass, without going over all these things, as you did the others. And me too you may reckon, said Glaucon, as joining in this vote. Be quite sure, Socrates, said Thrasymachus, that this is the opinion of us all.

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Footnote 159:

The argument here interrupted respecting the four kinds of depravity,
individually or in states, is resumed at the commencement of the
eighth book.

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CHAP. II.—What have you done, said I, in seizing me thus? What a mighty talk is this you are again raising, as you did at the beginning, about your republic, which I was so glad at having completely described, pleased [to think] that any one would let these things pass, and admit what was then said!—And as to what you now challenge me to, you know not what a swarm of disputes you are stirring up: I foresaw them, and let them pass at that time, for fear of making a great disturbance. What then, said Thrasymachus, think you that these are now come hither to melt gold, and not to hear reasonings?[160] Aye, said I, but in moderation. As for moderation, Socrates, said Glaucon, the whole of life serves for hearing such reasonings as these:—but let pass what relates to us; and as to what we are inquiring, do not begrudge explaining what you think about it,—what sort of community of wives and children is to be observed by our guardians, and how the latter ought to be reared while very young, in the period between their birth and their education, which seems to be the most troublesome of all. Try and tell us now, how that is to be accomplished. It is not easy, my good fellow, said I, to describe them; for many of them are very hard to be believed, even more than those we have before described; for even their possibility we might well disbelieve; and even were they possible, one might still doubt, whether they would best be done in this particular way:—on this account, my dear friend, I somewhat hesitate to touch on these topics, lest our reasoning appear to be a mere wish, rather than absolute reality. Do not hesitate now, said he; for your hearers are neither unreasonable, nor incredulous, nor ill-disposed. Now, my very good Glaucon, said I, is it with the desire of reassuring me, that you say this? I do, said he. Then you have produced quite a contrary effect, said I; for could I trust to myself, that I thoroughly know what I am to say, your encouragement would have been quite right; for among intelligent and friendly persons, one who understands the truth, may speak with safety and confidence about the most important matters; but when one speaks, as of course I do, with diffidence and a sort of searching spirit, there is both fear and danger, not only of being exposed to ridicule (for that is but a trifling thing), but lest, mistaking the truth, I not only fall myself, but draw my friends along with me into an error about matters, in which we ought least of all to be mistaken. I conjure Adrasteia,[161] therefore, Glaucon, with respect to what I am going to say:—For I hope it is a smaller offence to be unintentionally a murderer, than an impostor about what is good and excellent, just and lawful: and as for this risk, it were better to risk it among enemies than friends; so that you are not giving me proper encouragement. Then said Glaucon, laughing: Aye, but Socrates, even if we should suffer aught amiss from your discourse, we acquit you as clear of homicide, and as no impostor: so proceed boldly. But the man, said I, who is acquitted in a court of justice is, at any rate, deemed clear of the crime, as the law says; and if it be so in that case, it should be so in this. As respects this then, said he, pray proceed. We must now, said I, once more return to what perhaps in strict order should have been considered before; and thus perhaps it would be correct, after having entirely completed the men’s part, to complete also the women’s; especially since you challenge me to do so.

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Footnote 160:

The verb χρυσοχοεῖν is used proverbially to indicate the entertaining
of great hopes that are afterwards unfulfilled.

Footnote 161:

Adrasteia or Nemesis was a daughter of Zeus, and regarded as the
punisher of murderers and homicides,—even those involuntarily so. See
Blomfield’s note to Æschyl. Prom. v. 972.

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CHAP. III.—Men who have been born and educated as we have described, cannot, in my opinion, otherwise rightly acquire and employ their wives and children than by following the same track, in which we have proceeded from the beginning: for we surely undertook, in our argument, to represent men as the guardians of a flock. Yes. Let us proceed then, to give the children a corresponding birth and education; and let us consider, whether it be proper for us or not. How? replied he. Thus: Are we to reckon it proper for the females among our guardian dogs to watch and hunt, and do everything else in common with the males; or rather to manage domestic affairs within doors, as being disabled from other exercises on account of bearing and nursing the whelps, while the males are to labour and take the entire charge of the flocks? All in common, said he; except that we employ the females as the weaker, and the males as the stronger. Is it possible then, said I, to employ an animal for the same purposes [with another,] without giving it the same nurture and education? It is not possible. If therefore, we are to employ the women for the same purposes as the men, must we not give them also the same kind of instruction? Yes. Were both music and gymnastics bestowed on the males? Yes. To the women too, then, we must impart these two arts, and those likewise that refer to war; and we must employ them in the same manner. It is probable from what you say, said he. Perhaps, however, said I, many things, concerning what we are now speaking, may appear ridiculous, because contrary to custom,—if they shall be practised in the way now mentioned. Quite so, replied he. But which of them, said I, do you conceive to be the most ridiculous? Would it not clearly be to behold the women naked in the palæstra wrestling with the men, and not only the young women, but even those more advanced in years, just like the old men in the wrestling-schools, who are still fond of the exercises, though wrinkled, and not at all comely to the eye? Aye, by Zeus, said he; it would appear truly ridiculous, as present fashions go. Ought we not then, said I, since we have entered on this discourse, to fear the raillery of wits, which they would probably bestow pretty abundantly on such innovations [as respects exercising the women] in gymnastics, music, and more especially in the use of arms, and the management of horses? You say right, he replied. But since we have entered on this discourse, let us go to the rigour of the law, and beg these men not to be the slaves of prejudice, but to think seriously, and remember, that not long since the sight of naked men appeared base and disgusting to the Greeks, just as now indeed it does to most of the barbarians: and when first the Cretans, and afterwards the Lacedæmonians, began their exercises, the wits of that day might have made a jest of all this: do not you think so? I do. But methinks, when those experienced in the art thought it better to strip themselves, than to cover up such parts, the merely apparent ridiculousness of the thing is set aside by the advantage stated in our reasoning; and this, too, manifestly shows that the man is a fool who deems anything ridiculous except what is bad, and tries to run down as ridiculous any other idea but that of the foolish and the vicious, or employs himself seriously with any other end in view but that of the good. Assuredly, said he.

CHAP. IV.—Must we not then, first of all, agree on this,—whether these things be possible or not;—and set forth a question, whether any one, either in jest or earnest, can doubt, if the human nature in the female can in all cases share with the male, or in no case share at all; or in some cases, but not in others; and this too with reference to what concerns war? Would not the man who thus sets out so also probably conclude? Certainly, said he. Do you wish then, said I, that we should argue against ourselves about these things, in order that the opposite side may not, if attacked, be destitute of defence? Nothing hinders, said he. Let us then say this for them: There is no need, Socrates and Glaucon, for others to dispute with you about this matter; for yourselves, in first establishing your state, agreed that each individual ought to practise one business, according to his particular talent. We did so agree, I think; for how could we do otherwise? Does not then the nature of a woman differ widely from that of a man? Of course it differs. And is it not right to allot to each a different work, according to the nature of each? Of course. Are not you in the wrong then, and do you not contradict yourselves, in saying that men and women ought to do the same things, with natures so widely different? Have you any answer to make against this, my clever Glaucon? To do so on the moment is no such easy matter, said he; but I will entreat you, and I do so now, to unravel the arguments on our side, whatever they may be. These, Glaucon, replied I, and many other such things, are what I long ago foresaw; and I was both afraid and unwilling to touch on the law concerning the possession of wives and the education of children. No, by Zeus, replied he, it seems no easy matter. Certainly not, said I. The case, however, is thus: If a man fall into a small fish-pond, or quite into the ocean itself, still he has to swim no less. Certainly. Let us too, then, swim, and try to escape from this argument, expecting that either some dolphin[162] will rescue us, or that we shall have some other remarkable deliverance? It seems we ought, replied he. Come then, said I;—let us see, if we can anywhere find an outlet; for we acknowledged that different natures ought to study different things, and that the natures of a woman and a man are different; yet now we say, that different natures ought to study the same things:—do you accuse us of this? Just so. How admirable, Glaucon, said I, is the power of the art of disputing! How? Because, replied I, many seem to fall into it unwillingly, supposing that they are not cavilling, but reasoning truly, owing to their inability to divide a subject rightly and investigate it according to its species; but following the literal sense, they pursue what is quite contradictory to their subject, making use of cavilling instead of argument. This is indeed the case with many, said he; but does that extend likewise to us in the present instance? Quite so, said I; for I think, that without meaning it, we have fallen into a contradiction. How? Because we have very boldly and disputatiously asserted, that unless persons’ natures are the same, they ought not to have the same employments; though we have not at all inquired the sort of difference and identity of the nature [here referred to,] and with reference to which we defined them, when we ascribed different pursuits to different natures, and to the same natures the same pursuits. No certainly, said he, we did not consider that. It would seem then, replied I, that we may still ask ourselves the question, whether the nature of the bald and those who wear hair be the same and not different;—and if we agree that it be different, whether, if the bald made shoes, we should let those who wear hair make them;—or if again, those who wear hair [made them, whether we should allow] the others [to do so likewise]? That were ridiculous, replied he. Is it then ridiculous, said I, for any other reason than that we did not then in general define the sameness and diversity of natures, but observed only that species of diversity and sameness, which respects their peculiar functions, just as we say that a physician, and a man who has a genius for being a physician, have one and the same nature? Do not you think so? I do. But have the physician and the carpenter a different [nature]? Most assuredly.

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Footnote 162:

Allusion is here made to the fable of Arion,—or if not to that, to the
vulgar notion that the dolphin was particularly friendly to man. See
Plin. Hist. Nat. ix. 8.

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CHAP. V.—In that case, said I, as regards the natures of men and women, if they appear different, with respect to any art, or other employment, we are supposed to assign to each separately his proper employment:—but if it appear to differ only in this,—namely, that the female bears children, and the male begets them,—we must not say that it has at all as yet been proved that a man differs from a woman in the sense of which we are speaking, and we must still think, that both our guardians and their wives may pursue the same employments. And with reason, said he. After this, then, should we not require any one who says the contrary, to inform us on this point,—what is that art or function in the arrangements of a state, where the nature of a man and woman is not the same, but different? A reasonable demand, too. Perhaps then some one may reply, as you said some time since, that it is not easy all at once to explain this sufficiently, but yet no hard matter for one who has considered it? Yes,—one might well say so. Do you wish then, that we should request such an opponent to follow us, while we try to show him, that there is no function peculiar to a woman in the management of a state? By all means. Come then (we will say to him), answer us:—did you not mean that one man has a natural talent for anything, and another not, in this respect,—namely, that one learns a thing easily, and another with difficulty; and one with a little instruction discovers much in what he learns, while another, after much instruction and care, does not retain even what he has learned; and that with the one, the body is duly subservient to the mind; while in the other it is opposed to it?—Well, and what other marks are there besides these, by which you would distinguish a man that has particular talents from him that has none at all? One cannot mention any other, said he. Know you then of any function performed by mankind, in which the males have not all these characteristics in a superior degree to the females;—and would it not be tedious to specify particularly the weaving art, and the making of pastry and spice-meats, for which female talents seem to have some repute, and cannot be surpassed without the greatest disgrace? You are right, said he, in saying that in all things universally the talent of the one is superior to that of the other;—yet many women are superior in many respects to many men; though, on the whole, it is as you say. There is no function, my friend, then, among the entire members of our state that is peculiar to woman, considered as such, nor to man, considered as such; but natural talents are indiscriminately diffused through both, and the woman naturally shares in all offices, the same as the man, though in all cases the woman is weaker than the man. Certainly. Are we then to commit all [state concerns] to the men, and none to the women? How should we? It is true then, I think (as we say), that one woman too is fitted for being a physician, and another not so,—one is musical, another by nature unmusical. How otherwise? And is one fitted for gymnastics and warlike,—another not fitted either for war or gymnastics? That is my opinion too. And what;—is not one a lover of philosophy, and another averse to it; and one high-spirited, and another timid? This is true, too. And is not one woman naturally suited for being a guardian, and another not so;—and have we not made choice of such a talent as this for our guardian men? Yes—just of such as this. The nature then of the woman and of the man, as respects the guardianship of the state, is the same,—only that the one is weaker, the other stronger. So it seems.

CHAP. VI.—Women such as these then are to be chosen to dwell with such men, and to be their fellow-guardians,—inasmuch as they are naturally suited for them, and of kindred talents. Certainly. And must not the same employments be assigned to the same natures? The same. We have now got round then, to our former point; and, we allow that it is not contrary to nature, to allot to the wives of our guardians the study both of music and gymnastics? Assuredly. We did not establish then what is impossible, or to be only vainly wished for, when we established the law according to nature:—and it would seem rather, that what is at present contrary to these things is contrary to nature? It seems so. Was not then our inquiry, whether our establishment was possible and best? It was. And we have agreed, that it is possible? Yes. And we must next be convinced, that it is best? Clearly so. In order, therefore, that a woman may become a suitable guardian, there will not be one mode of education for making men [guardians,] and another for women, especially as the latter have received the same natural genius? No,—it will not be different. What think you then of such an opinion as this? Of what? That of imagining in your own mind, that one man is better and another worse;—or do you deem them to be all alike? By no means. In the state then which we were just establishing,—which of the two do you think to make the better men,—the guardians provided with this education we have described, or shoemakers that are taught shoemaking? That question, replied he, is ridiculous. I understand you, said I:—but, tell me; of all the other citizens, are not they the best? By far. But what;—will not these women too be the best of women? They will, replied he, by far. Is there anything better in a state, than that both women and men be rendered the very best? There is not. And this is to be effected by music and gymnastics being imparted to them, as we have described? Of course. We have been establishing then a law, which is not only possible, but best also for the state? Just so. We must unclothe, then, the wives of our guardians, since they are to put on virtue for clothes;[163] and they must bear a part in war, and all other guardianship of the state, and do nothing else:—but of these special services the lightest part is to be allotted to the women rather than the men, on account of the weakness of their sex:—and the man who laughs at naked women while going through their exercises with a view to the best object, reaps the unripe fruit of a ridiculous wisdom, and seems not rightly to know at what he laughs, or why he does it:[164]—for that ever was and will be deemed a noble saying, that the profitable is beautiful, and the hurtful base. Assuredly.

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Footnote 163:

The expression of Herodotus, Clio, ch. 8, is not dissimilar:—ἅμα δὲ
χιτῶνι ἐκδυομένῳ συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδω γυνή.

Footnote 164:

The cited words—ἀτελῆ σοφίας δρέπων καρπόν are from Pindar. See.
Stobæus, Serm. ccxi. p. 711, and Boeck’s Pindar, vol. ii. part 2, p.
669.

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CHAP. VII.—We may say then, that we have escaped one wave, as it were, by thus settling the law with respect to women, and have not been quite overwhelmed, through determining that our male and female guardians are to manage all things in common:[165] and besides that, our reasoning has been consistent with itself, as respects both what is possible and advantageous also. Truly, it is no small wave you have escaped, said he. You will not call it a great one, replied I, when you see what follows. Tell me, said he; and let me see. After this enactment, replied I, and the others formerly mentioned, the following, I think, comes naturally. Which is that? That these women be all common to all these men, and that no one woman dwell with any man privately, and that their children likewise be common;—so that neither shall the parents know their own children, nor the children their parents.[166] This, in comparison with the other, is far more difficult to persuade, both as to its possibility and utility. I do not think, replied I, as to its utility at least, that any one would doubt about it being a very great good to have the women and children in common, if it were but possible:—but the greatest question, methinks, will be, whether it be possible or not? One might very well, said he, raise a discussion on both points. You are mentioning, replied I, a combination of discussions; but I thought, at least, that I should escape from one of them, if its utility had been agreed on, and that in that case it would only have remained to consider its possibility. But you have not slunk off, said he, quite unobserved; and so, give us an account of both. I must submit to a trial, said I:—indulge me thus far, however: let me feast myself, as the slow in intellect are wont to feast themselves, when they walk alone:—for men of this sort, I imagine, ere finding out how to attain what they desire, waive that inquiry, in order that they may not tire themselves in deliberating about its possibility or impossibility, supposing they have obtained what they desire, and then they go through what remains,—rejoicing, also, to recount what they will do, when it has happened, and rendering their soul, otherwise indolent, more indolent still. Now I too am become languid, and would, therefore, defer such debates, and inquire afterwards into the possibility of these [arrangements]. At present, however, supposing them possible, I will, if you please, consider how our rulers are to regulate matters thence arising, in order that the doing of these things may be most advantageous both to the state and the guardians:—this, first, I will try to examine with your assistance, and the other question afterwards, if you allow me. Oh, I will give you leave, said he;—so pray proceed with your inquiry.

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Footnote 165:

The figure here used bears some resemblance to that used in ch. iv. of
this book, p. 453 d:—ἄντε τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ, ἄντε εἰς
τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, &c.

Footnote 166:

This peculiar notion on the community of wives and children is
severely handled by Aristotle, Polit. ii. ch. 2, and Hist. Anim. ix.
1. It seems probable, however, that Plato did not intend here entirely
to destroy all domestic ties whatever, but to inculcate a general
community of goods as far as possible,—as most conducive to civil
concord and national prosperity. Compare, however, the opening of the
ninth chapter of this book. The fact is, that the question is here
viewed simply in its physical, not in its moral relations.

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I imagine then, said I, if our rulers will be worthy of that name, and those also who are their auxiliaries, that the latter will cheerfully do whatever they are bidden, while the former will take the command, giving their directions in some matters conformably to the laws, and imitating their spirit in whatever matters we leave to their sole guidance. Very likely, said he. Do you then, their lawgiver, said I, as you have chosen out the men, so choose out also the women, making them, as far as possible, of similar dispositions:—and these, as they dwell and eat together in common, and none possesses anything whatever in private, will be always together;—and as they mingle in the gymnastic yards and in all their other training exercises, they will, I think, be led by innate necessity, to mutual intimacies:—do not you think I am speaking of what must necessarily happen? Not, replied he, by any geometrical necessity, but by one founded on love, which seems to be more cogent than the other, in persuading and winning over the bulk of mankind.

CHAP. VIII.—Quite so, said I; but in the next place, Glaucon, to form irregular intimacies, or to do anything else of the same character, is not at all right in a city of happy persons, nor ought the rulers to allow it. No, it were not just, said he. It is evident, by right, in the next place, to make marriages as far as possible sacred; and those most advantageous would be sacred. Altogether so. How then are they to be most advantageous? Tell me this, Glaucon;—for in your house I see both sporting dogs, and a great number of well-bred birds; have you, by Zeus, ever attended to their pairing, and bringing forth young? How? said he. First of all, among these, though all be well-bred, are not some of them far better than all the rest? They are. Do you breed then from all alike; or are you anxious to do so, as far as possible, from the best breeds? From the best. But how; from the youngest or the oldest, or those quite in their prime? From those in their prime. And if they are not thus bred, you consider that the breed both of birds and dogs greatly degenerates? I do, replied he. And what think you as to horses, said I, and other animals;—is the case otherwise with respect to these? It were absurd [to think so,] said he. How strange, my dear fellow, said I; what extremely perfect governors must we have,—if the same applies to the human race! Nevertheless, it is so, replied he; but what then? Because, said I, they must necessarily use many medicines; but as for a physician, where the body does not want medicines, but men willingly subject themselves to a regimen of diet, we think that an inferior and less skilful one may suffice; but when there is need for taking medicines, we know that we want a more able physician. True; but with reference to what do you say this? With reference to this, replied I: it seems likely that our rulers must use an abundance of lying and deceit for the advantage of the governed; and we said somewhere, that all these things were useful in the way of a remedy. Rightly too, said he. This apparent right now seems by no means inconsiderable in marriages and the propagation of children. How so? It necessarily follows, said I, from what has been acknowledged, that the best men should as often as possible form alliances with the best women, and the most depraved men, on the contrary, with the most depraved women; and the offspring of the former is to be educated, but not of the latter, if the flock is to be of the most perfect kind:—and this must be so done, as to escape the notice of all but the governors themselves, if at any rate the whole band of the guardians is to be as free as possible from sedition. Quite right, said he. Are there not to be festivals legally established, in which we shall draw together the brides and bridegrooms;—and must not there be sacrifices, and hymns composed by our poets suitable to the marriages in course of celebration?—But as to the number of the marriages, this we will leave to the rulers, that they may as much as possible keep up the same number of men, having a regard both to wars and diseases, and all other such matters, so that as far as possible our state may be neither great nor small. Right, said he. And chances too, I conceive, should be so well managed, that the depraved man may, on every turn of them, accuse his fortune, and not the governors. Of course, said he.

CHAP. IX.—As for those youths, who distinguish themselves, either in war or other pursuits, they ought to have rewards and prizes given them, and the most ample liberty of lying with women, that so, under this pretext, the greatest number of children may spring from such parentage. Right. And as for the offspring born from time to time, are the authorities presiding over these matters to receive them, whether they be men or women, or both?—for somehow these offices belong in common both to men and women. Yes, they do. As respects, then, the children of worthy persons, I think, they should carry them to some retirement, to certain nurses dwelling apart in a certain quarter of the city; but as for the children of the more depraved, and such of the rest as may be maimed or lame, they will hide them, as is right, in some secret and obscure place. Yes, indeed, said he, if the race of guardians is to be pure. Will they not then take care also of their children’s nurture, bringing to the nursery mothers with full breasts, taking every precaution that no woman should recognise her own child, and, where the mothers cannot suckle them, providing others who would be able to do so? And they will be careful also of this most particularly, that the nurses suckle only during a proper time, and they will enjoin, both on the nurses and keepers, their watching duties, and every other necessary toil. You speak, said he, of a time of great ease to the wives of our guardians, in the breeding of children. Yes, for it should be so, replied I. But let us next discuss what we were so anxious to do, when we said that the procreation of children should take place among persons in the prime of life. True. Do you agree with me then, that this prime season is at twenty in a woman, and at thirty in a man? How do you reckon this time for each sex? said he.[167] The woman, replied I, is to bear children to the state from the age of twenty to that of forty; and the man, after having passed the most excitable period of his course, is from that period to beget children to the state up to the age of fifty-five. This indeed, is the prime, replied he, in both sexes, both as respects body and mind. If then any one, either older or younger than these, should employ himself in begetting children for the commonwealth, we should say that the trespass is neither right nor just, since he is begetting to the state a child, which (if concealed) is born and grows up, ushered in neither by sacrifices nor prayers—(which, on every marriage, the priestesses and priests, and the whole state offer, that the descendants of the good may be still better, and that from useful descendants others still more useful may arise),—but is born in darkness, and the result of dreadful incontinence. Right, said he. And the law, said I, must be the same, if any of those men, who are yet of the age for procreation, have intercourse with women of a proper age, without the magistrate’s leave; for we may consider him as having raised to the state a bastard, born in adultery and unhonoured by religious auspices. Most right, said he. And I presume, whenever either the women or the men are past the age of procreation, we are to let the men cohabit with any woman they like, except their daughter and mother, and the children of their daughters, or those upwards from their mother; and so likewise the women are to embrace any, except a son, a father, and the children of these, in either direction: all this liberty we are to grant them, after we have enjoined them to be careful, first, if a child be conceived, not to bring it to the light, but if, by accident, it should be brought forth, so to expose it as if there were no provision for it. All these things, said he, are reasonably said:—but how are the fathers and daughters, and the other relations you just mentioned, to be known to one another? They are not to be known at all, said I; but from the day on which any one is married, whatever children are born between the seventh or tenth month after it, all these he is to call, the males his sons, and the females his daughters, and they are to call him father; and in the same way again, he is to call the children of these—grandchildren; and they in turn are to call them grandfathers and grandmothers; and those who were born during the period in which their fathers and mothers were begetting children, they shall call sisters and brothers, as I just observed,—so that they may have no sexual intercourse.—But as for brothers and sisters, the law will allow them to live together,—if their lot so fall, and the Pythian oracle give consent. Quite right, said he.

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Footnote 167:

The Greek (τὰ ποῖα αὐτῶν) is very elliptical; but we agree with Cousin
in considering this to be its real meaning.

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CHAP. X.—This, and such as this, Glaucon, is the community of women and children, among the guardians of the state: and that this is consistent both with the rest of our polity, and is by far the best, we must next establish from reason;—or how shall we do? By Zeus, just so, said he. Is not this, then, the beginning of our agreement, to ask ourselves what we can allege to be the greatest good for the establishment of a state, with a view to which the lawgiver is to enact the laws, and what the greatest evil,—and next to examine, whether what we have hitherto described tends to or conforms with the track of the good, and is opposed to that of the evil? Most certainly, said he. Is there, then, any greater evil for a state than that which tears it in pieces, and makes it many instead of one;—or, any greater good than that which binds it together, and makes it one? There is not. Does not then the communion both of pleasure and pain bind men together, when the whole of the citizens as much as possible rejoice and mourn in fellowship, for the same matters, whether gainful or the contrary?[168] Assuredly, he replied. And again, any mere private perception of such things dissolves [that union,] when some grieve exceedingly, and others rejoice exceedingly at the same events, either in the state or those composing it? Of course. Does not this then arise from the following circumstance,—when such words as these are not pronounced at the same time in a state, as _mine_, and _not mine_; and with regard to what concerns another, in the same way? Aye, surely. And the state, in which the greatest number unite in saying of the same things, that _this concerns me_, and _that does not concern me_,—that is best regulated? By far. And it is that also, which most closely resembles the individual man;—just as, when a person’s finger is wounded, the entire fellowship of feeling, extending through the body towards the soul, and producing that harmony which is the work of the governing principle within it, [viz. the soul,][169] experiences a sensation, and at the same time wholly sympathizes with the ailing part; and thus we say that the man has a finger-ache:—and so also, with respect to any part whatever of the human frame, the same reasoning applies either with respect to grief, when a part is in pain, or with respect to pleasure, when it is at ease. Aye, the very same, said he: and as to what you are asking, the state that nearest approaches this is the best governed. When, therefore, any individual citizen receives good or ill, such a state, methinks, will most especially maintain that she herself is the party affected, and will unite as a whole in joy or mourning. That must be the case, said he, in a state, governed, at least, by good laws.

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Footnote 168:

Gr. τῶν αὐτῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων, &c.

Footnote 169:

Gr. ὅταν που ἡμῶν δάκτυλός που πληγῇ, πᾶσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα
πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος ἐν αὐτῇ,
&c.

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CHAP. XI.—It will be time perhaps for us to return to our state, and consider as to the points on which we have agreed in our discussion, whether they belong more particularly to our state than any other. Yes,—we must, he replied. What then? there are surely in other states, both governors and people?—and so also in this? There are. And will not all these address one another as citizens? Of course. But besides calling them citizens, what do the people call their governors under the other forms of government? In most states, masters, but in democracies, this very name governors. But what as to the people in our state? besides citizens, what do they say their governors are? Saviours, said he, and helpers. And what do they call the people? Paymasters, replied he, and supporters. And in the other states, what do the governors call their people? Slaves, he replied. And what do the governors call one another? Fellow-governors, said he. And ours, what? Fellow-guardians. Can you then tell about the governors in other states, whether any one of them can address one of his fellow-governors as an intimate, and another as a stranger? Aye, very many can. Does he not then esteem and speak of his intimate as his own, and the stranger as not his own? Just so. But how is it with your guardians? Is there any one of them, who can esteem or address any of his fellow-guardians as a stranger? By no means, he replied;—for with whomever a person falls in, he will conceive that he falls in with a brother or sister, or a father or mother, or a son or daughter, or their descendants or ancestry. You speak exceedingly well, replied I:—and further, tell me this also, whether you will give them only a legal right to these familiar names,—or rather bid them perform all their actions in accordance with these names, especially as respects parents, whatever the law enjoins as the parents’ due,—such as reverence, and care, and obedience,—it being otherwise not for his advantage, either in the sight of God or of men, inasmuch as he would do what is neither holy nor just, if he acted otherwise than thus?—Will these, or other maxims coming from the whole body of our citizens, echo close round the ears of our children, both about their parents, when pointed out to them, and about other relations likewise? These [maxims must so,] replied he; for it were ridiculous, if, without actions, their proper names were uttered by the mouth alone. Of all states then, in this especially, when any one individual fares either well or ill, the citizens will mostly agree in exclaiming, according to our late expression,—namely, “Mine fares well, or mine ill?” Quite true, said he. Did we not say too, that agreeably to this opinion and expression, their common pleasures and pains should agree? Aye,—and we said rightly. Will not then our citizens most especially hold in common that same thing, which they call “_my own_,”—and, holding this in common, thus have a special fellowship in pleasure and pain? Very much so. And the cause of all this, independently of other regulations of the state,—is it not the community of women and children among the guardians? Most especially so, he replied.

CHAP. XII.—We had agreed, moreover, as to the greatest good of a state, by comparing a well-managed state to a body, which feels pleasure or pain affecting any part of it. Aye, we were right, said he, in agreeing about this. The cause then of all this high degree of good to our state was found to be the community of women and children among our defenders? Surely, replied he. And in that case, we agree at least with what was before alleged; for we said, I believe, that they ought to have neither houses of their own, nor land, nor any possession, but to receive their subsistence from others, as a reward for their guardianship, and all to consume it in common, if they mean really to be guardians? Right, said he. Do not then, as I say, the circumstances formerly mentioned, and still more those now mentioned, cause them to be true guardians, and prevent those divisions in the state [which arise] from not calling one and the same thing their own,—but one one thing, and another another;—one drawing to his own dwelling whatever he can acquire separately from the rest, and another, to his likewise that which is separate; and also different wives and children, occasioning both pleasures and pains, individually private, though holding one and the same opinion concerning what is domestic,—all, as far as possible, pointing towards the same thing,—namely, a community of feeling respecting pleasure and pain? Of course, we grant that, replied he. But what?—will not lawsuits and criminal charges in the courts be banished from among them (so to speak), from the fact of their possessing nothing in private but their body, but all the rest in common,—owing to which, they will be kept free from all the dissensions which men raise about money, or children and relatives? It is quite clear, they will be thus relieved. And, moreover, in these there could not fairly be any suits, as regards personal violence or improper treatment:—for conceiving personal preservation to be an absolute necessity, we will own it to be handsome and just for compeers in age to help their compeers. Right, said he. And this privilege, said I, at any rate this law possesses:—if a man be in a passion with any one, he will in such a case be less apt to venture on still greater seditions. Certainly. The elder, moreover, will be ordered both to govern and chastise all the younger. Clearly so. And moreover, as to the younger, with regard to the elder, unless the magistrates order it, he will never attempt to beat the elder, or otherwise offer him violence,—nor, methinks, will he by any other means dishonour him:—for there are two sufficient guardians to hinder it, fear and respect,—respect on the one hand restraining him from laying hands on a parent, and fear on the other, that others might come to the defence of the sufferer;—some as sons, others as brothers, and others as fathers. Yes,—such is the case, said he. In every respect then, in consequence of the laws, these men, [_i. e._ the warriors,] will enjoy peace with one another? Yes, much. And so long as these do not quarrel among themselves, there is no danger of the rest of the state rising or mutually splitting into factions. No, of course not. As for the least important evils, I am unwilling for propriety’s sake even to mention from how many they will have been relieved,—the poor, [for instance,] as regards the work of flattering the rich,—and the difficulties and anxieties, which people have in bringing up their children and procuring money for the support of servants,—sometimes borrowing, sometimes denying debts, and at other times using all manner of shifts in procuring [money,] and then giving it to the management of their wives and domestics;—about these matters, friend, how many slavish and ignoble troubles they suffer are not even worthy to be mentioned. Yes, they are manifest, said he, even to one blind.

CHAP. XIII.—From all these troubles, therefore, they will be relieved, and will live more blessedly than that most blessed life which those live who gain the Olympic prizes. How? On one small account only are those esteemed happy, compared with what these enjoy;—for the victory of these is more noble, and their maintenance at the public expense more complete: inasmuch as the victory that they gain brings safety to the entire state,—and by way of crown and reward, both they and their children receive their maintenance and all other necessaries of life, thus winning honours from their own state while living, and at their death an honourable funeral. Noble rewards! indeed, said he. Do you remember, then, said I, that in a former part of our discussion, some one,—I know not who,—objected to us, that we were not making our guardians happy, by decreeing that those who had the whole wealth of the citizens at their command should nevertheless have nothing at all?—and we said, I believe, that we would consider this afterwards, if it fell in our way; but that at present we were making our guardians real guardians, and the state itself as happy as possible, without exclusively regarding any single class in it, with a view to make it happy? I remember, said he. What think you now of the life of our auxiliaries, which appears far more noble and happy than that of those of the Olympic prizemen;—do you think it can be compared to the life of the leather-cutter, or any other kind of craftsman, or even the farmer? I do not think so, said he. Still even, what I said before, it is proper that I mention here also,—if the guardian should try to become happy in such a way as to lose his character as a guardian, and not be content with a life thus moderate and steady, and as we say, of the best quality, but on the other hand be impelled by a silly boyish notion about happiness, to appropriate to himself all the property in the state, because he has the power, he will know that Hesiod was really wise, in saying that “the half is considerably more than the whole.”[170] If he take me for his counsellor, said he, he will remain in such a life. You agree then, said I, as to the fellowship of the women with the men, which we have explained, in matters referring to education and children, and the guardianship of the other citizens;—that whether they remain in the state, or go forth to war, they ought to keep guard with them, and hunt with them like hounds, and in every case take a share in all things, as far as they can; and that doing these things they will do what is best, and not contrary to the nature of the female, as regards the male,—by which nature, indeed, they act jointly with one another? I agree, said he.

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Footnote 170:

Comp. Hes. Op. et Di. v. 40—νήπιοι οὐδ’ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντός.

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