Chapter III: Part II

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PLATO’S VIEWS ON ETHICS AND POLITICS.
GENERAL SKETCH OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF
THE REPUBLIC.

The notions entertained by Plato on Political Science will be best understood by viewing them in connexion with his ethical doctrines, from which, indeed, he considered them inseparable. The two leading principles on which his moral system reposes, are—first, that no one is willingly evil (κακὸς μὲν ἑκὼν οὐδεὶς), and, secondly, that _every one is endued with the power of producing moral changes in his own moral character_,—which, indeed, are only the counterpart ethical _changes in his moral character_;—and these are only the corresponding ethical expressions of the theory of _Immutable Being_, on the one hand, and, on the other, of _the world of sensible things_ (τὰ γιγνόμενα),—everything that is born and perishes,—a principle which places in the strongest possible contrast the mutability and false appearances of this world with the true and immutable of the Deity, whom Plato conceived to be not only the measure of all things and the pattern of his own perfections, having the supreme good for the object of all his operations, but likewise as the only real Idea of Good, in comparison with which the best strivings and conceptions of man are but tendencies and approximations. So truly is it said in the Phædo, that “all things desire to be of the same quality as the _summum bonum_, but yet are ever inferior to it.” Philosophy and morals, in fact, perfectly coincide in their object,—the love of truth being the love of good, and the love of good the love of truth;—and morality, viewed _per se_, is the one motive of the love of truth and good predominating over, purifying, and absorbing into itself every desire of human nature,—is, in fact, the purifying of the soul, the perfecting of virtue, the discipline of immortality, the resemblance and participation of the Deity.[3]

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Footnote 3:

“As the rational soul can only involuntarily be subject to ignorance,
_it is only against its will that it can be evil_. Every volition, by
its essential nature, pursues the good; no one is willing to be
subject to evil or to become bad, inasmuch as the end of volition is
not the immediate act, but the object for the sake of which the act is
undertaken; and no man enters on any act or undertaking, except for
the sake of ultimate good. Now a man, when engaging in any act
apparently good, may err, and choose the evil instead of the good; but
in that case he labours under _an involuntary error_, and does not
what he really desires, but what, in spite of his wishes, seems to him
either as an immediate good or a mean to ultimate good.”—Ritter’s
History of Philos. (Morrison’s Tr.) ii. 387.

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Of Plato’s moral doctrines, the most important are the following:—that, independently of other ends, virtue is to be pursued as the true good of the soul,[4] the proper perfection of man’s nature, the power by which the soul fitly accomplishes its existence,[5] whereas vice is a disease of the mind (Republ. iv. 444. c.), arising from delusion or imperfect apprehension of our proper interests;—that the real freedom of a rational being consists in an ability to regulate his conduct by reason, and that every one not guided by his reason, encourages insubordination in the mental faculties, and becomes the slave of caprice or passion; (πολλῆς μὲν δουλείας τε ϗ̀ ἀνελευθερίας γέμει ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ. Republ. ix. 577. d.)—that virtuous conduct, apart from its benefits to society, is advantageous to the individual practising it, inasmuch as it ensures that regularity of the imagination,—that tranquillity and internal harmony, which constitutes the mind’s proper happiness.[6] He, throughout, and with great power, contends for the earnestness of a virtuous mind in the attainment of truth, and inculcates the propriety of pursuing the ordinary pleasures of life,[7] only so far as they are subservient to, or compatible with, man’s higher and nobler duties. In the fourth Book of the Laws, there is a pretty complete summary of the salient features in Plato’s theory of morals,—a condensed view of which will be found in the article “Plato” of the Encyclopædia Metropolitana:—the remarks with which it closes—on the coincidence of the precepts of morality with the conclusions of prudence and enlightened self-love,—are both happily conceived and well expressed.

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Footnote 4:

Gorg. p. 506. e.

Footnote 5:

Republ. i. p. 353. d.

Footnote 6:

Republ. ix. p. 591. d.

Footnote 7:

Democritus, Aristippus, and the Sophists had taught that _good
consists in pleasure_;—and Plato, in his refutation of this vicious
doctrine, does not deny that pleasure belongs to the good things of
life, but only seeks to determine its relative value. Pleasures, too,
are of two kinds,—some simple and pure, dependant on the bodily or
intellectual organisation,—others mixed or impure, as being always
combined with more or less of pain. The latter are only relatively
pleasures, inasmuch as they are incapable of affording pleasure except
by the gratification of some want; whereas true enjoyment consists in
those pure delights which do not arise after pain, but which the soul
experiences, when filled with the contemplation of true being.
(Republ. ix. p. 585. d.)—Ritter’s History of Philos. ii. p. 390.

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Plato conceived that there were two great causes of human corruption, viz., _bad or ill-directed education_, and _the corrupt influence of the body on the soul_. His ethical discussions, therefore, have for their object, the limiting of the desires, and the cure of the diseases produced by them in the soul; while his political discussions have for their immediate object, the laying down of right principles of education, and enforcing them by the constitution of the laws and the power of the State. His two great works, in fact,—the Republic and the Laws,—may be considered as theories and plans of civic education, rather than schemes of legislation and details of laws. The former, it is true, inquires more particularly into the principles on which a right government may be formed, and the latter presents a systematic view of the principles of legislation:—but, comprising, as both works do, so much matter of a purely intellectual and ethical character, we are compelled to conclude that their primary object is, the improvement of human nature by social institutions expressly formed for that purpose. We are not to suppose, moreover, that Plato, in his Republic, had in view the actual foundation of a State, but that he presents rather an example of the most perfect life—public as well as private—free from those impediments which all existing governments and laws throw across the path of the virtuous. Thus, in the Laws (_lib._ vii.), he says—“Our whole government consists in the imitation of a most excellent and virtuous life;” and again, “these excellent things are rather as wishes stated in a fable than actual facts, though it would be best of all if they could exist in all States.” He thought, in fact, that as Philosophy is the guide of private life, elevating it to the knowledge of the true and the good, so it was seated, likewise, on the throne of government, and exhibited the eternal ideas of social good and truth,—modifying society after their pattern;—and hence is it, that (as Aristotle observes in the second Book of his Politics, ch. 2,) Plato overlooks impossibilities in his arrangements, and sacrifices all to the one great object of sketching _the idea of good as a social principle_, apart from the evil influences of society.

We shall now proceed to describe at some length the subject-matter of the Republic; and we shall just remark, that if the work itself had been more studied, there would have been far less difference of opinion respecting the nature and object of this Dialogue. In fact, no exposition or theory can explain Plato, who is, above all others, a writer to be studied in his own works; and his character as a writer and philosopher would have been far higher in general estimation at the present day, if there had been fewer to pronounce sentence on him without having read a single syllable of his writings.

The Republic of Plato is _a development of the analogy between the ideas of the perfect man and the perfect State_,—the two principles being elaborated throughout the Dialogue, in perfect harmony and mutual dependance on each other. He exhibits, indeed, the image of perfect and consummate virtue, such as ought to be seen in the whole life of man, whether in his private capacity simply, as a sentient and moral agent, or in his public position as the member of a State. As man, moreover, has certain special social relations and social functions, he considers him also collectively, as part of a State, and is hence led to inquire into the best or pattern form of a State,—a proceeding quite in unison with the custom of the Greeks, who treated Politics rather as a branch of Ethics than a separate science. This Dialogue, therefore,—one of that splendid group of which the Timæus, the Critias, and the Laws are the other members,—comprises two subjects constantly connected and cohering,—the contemplation of the perfectly good man, composed of body and soul on the one hand, and on the other the perfectly good State, composed of many members in different classes, performing their respective functions. Justice, then,—the principle, cause, and uniting bond of all the other virtues,—one, too, that is essentially of a political character—forms a very suitable discussion by way of introduction to this Dialogue. The refutation of incorrect or inadequate definitions of this virtue, occupies a large portion of the first Book;—and Socrates (the hero of this, as of most other of the Platonic Dialogues), then proceeds, with the view of educing some abstract definition of justice, to explain his notion of a perfect State, as one in which all ranks of its members accurately fulfil their respective functions, dwelling together in harmony.

Commencing with the consideration of Virtue, (which consists in the harmonious cultivation of the different intellectual and moral faculties,) he opens the inquiry with a kind of analysis of the human mind, which he divides into three parts,—first, _the rational or reasoning principle_, (τὸ λογιστικὸν),—secondly, _the spirit or will_, (τὸ θυμικὸν or θυμοειδὲς),—and thirdly, _the appetite or passion_ (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν),[8]—which last, however, indicates nothing beyond that vital impulse which leads from one sensation to another. Of these faculties the most excellent is Reason, whose proper province is to direct and controul the other faculties; and of the operations of this faculty Plato forms several divisions (at the close of the sixth Book), according as the ideas are abstract, mixed, or material,—the νόησις constituting the knowledge of pure ideas, the διάνοια that of mixed ideas, πίστις that of actually existing materials and their affections, and εἰκασία the knowledge of the images or shadows of bodies,[9]—these divisions including—first, ἐπιστήμη (true science), and secondly, opinion true or false, (δόξα).[10] So much for Reason (τὸ λογιστικὸν). Now,—intermediate between Reason and Passion (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν) is the Will or Spirit, which should be an assistant to Reason (ἐπίκουρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει) in the pursuit of virtue, and should oppose the indulgence of base desires,—all desires being legitimately under the controul of the Reason and the Will.[11] Furthermore,—from the exercise and combination of these three faculties there are generated four principal or cardinal virtues:—1. Prudence or Wisdom (φρόνησις);—2. Courage or Fortitude (ἀνδρεία), by which Plato means the maintenance of right opinion as to what is and is not to be feared, (περὶ τῶν δεινῶν,) _i. e._ as to good and evil;[12]—3. Temperance or Self-controul (σωφροσύνη);[13]—and 4. Justice (δικαιοσύνη), which, with Plato, does not simply mean the virtue of rendering to all their due, but stands for that harmonious and proportional development of the inner man, by means of which each faculty of his soul performs its own functions without interfering with the others[14] (μὴ ἐάσαντα τἀλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα). Just or virtuous actions, then, says he, consist in the performance of actions agreeable to the nature of the soul,[15] whereas the contrary comprise such as are discordant to a right nature, and productive of mental disturbance and agitation. In the realization of this Justice, in short, consists Virtue itself, which Plato defines to be “a certain health and beauty and good habit of the soul,” exercising the nobler parts of our nature in the contemplation of philosophy and more particularly the _summum bonum_ (τὸ ἀγαθόν), the practical realization of which should be the chief aim of the State constituted in the soul.[16]

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Footnote 8:

Ritter, ii. p. 363.

Footnote 9:

(Query—the science of forms?) Comp. Republ. vi. 509. e.

Footnote 10:

Plato’s system of Ideas (εἴδη) consists, strictly speaking, of what we
now term generalization and abstraction,—the main part of the
definition _real_, and he seems to have constructed his theory as a
mean between the Heraclitean doctrine of a perpetual flux, modified
into the notion of Protagoras, πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος, (which set up
γίγνεσθαι instead of εἶναι,) and the Eleatic doctrine that all is
_one_, without multiplicity, change, augmentation, or decay. He was
convinced of the reality both of the permanent being or genus (οὐσία)
and of the mutable γένεσις of the phenomena:—the science that
contemplates these general terms is called ἡ διαλεκτική—Dialectics.
These ideas are recognized by the νόησις and διάνοια—not by the
senses; and as they belong to οὐσία, they become the objects of true
science or certain knowledge. Everything of this kind is an εἶδος, or
general term, or quiddity. He thought, moreover, that there was a
supreme standard Idea—God—in which were comprised all other
subordinate Ideas, and which contained nothing whatever capable of
being apprehended by the senses. This is not exactly but nearly the
view taken by Ritter, ii. 264—270.

Footnote 11:

Republ. iv. p. 441. a.

Footnote 12:

Ib. iv. 429. b. c.

Footnote 13:

Ib. iii. 389. d. and iv. 430. d. e.

Footnote 14:

Republ. iv. 443. e.

Footnote 15:

Ib. iv. 444. e.

Footnote 16:

Ib. ix. 591. e.

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The man, then, who studies to produce this harmony in the mental faculties, is truly consistent with himself,—truly entitled to the appellation—μουσικὸς and πολιτικὸς,—by which he means far more than is conveyed by the modern terms, musician and politician. So great, indeed, is the power and influence of virtue that, without it, there can be neither true happiness nor mental tranquillity,—all else of the nature of pleasure being mere shadow and inanity (ἐσκιαγραφημένη τίς.)[17] Now, with respect to Pleasure, each mental faculty has its own peculiar species,—the highest as well as purest of all being exclusively enjoyed by the philosopher, through the exercise of wisdom;[18] and those who cultivate wisdom and virtue are to be deemed happy, even in the midst of misfortune, and when it has no probability of proper reward. It is to be cultivated, indeed, on its own intrinsic merits, without any regard for expediency—any hope of reward. At the same time, however, it is quite apparent that good men are praised, loved, and honoured, while the unjust are eventually exposed and punished;—nay, even by the Deity, good and just men are not neglected, for God loves and rewards those who practise virtue and seek to resemble Him. Independently of this, too, Plato derives another motive to virtue from the immortality of the soul,—viz., that, if we be not justly and adequately compensated in this life, we shall meet with perfect and unswerving justice, when arraigned before the judgment-seat of God.

Having thus far explained Plato’s notions respecting Man’s character individually, and respecting the dignity and excellence of Virtue—and of Justice in particular—that union and consummation of all the other virtues,—we now proceed to shew, how he applied these principles to the formation of his ideal and perfect Commonwealth (πολιτεία), which he thought to be analogous to, and a sort of exhibition (παράδειγμα?) of, a good and virtuous man. Some few incidental remarks occur on the formation of society for mutual aid and support; and he then proceeds to classify the members or parts of his ideal Republics.

These he classes under three heads or divisions, corresponding with the faculties of the soul,—viz., 1. the βουλευτικὸν, (counsellors) those who employ reason in the contemplation of what best suits the State,—2. the ἐπικουρικὸν,—those who aid the βουλευταί with a ready will,—3. the χρηματιστικὸν, who are bent on gain and selfish gratification.[19] Reason alone is, according to Plato, entitled to and capacitated for the supreme government (just as reason is the monarch of the properly energising mind), to the total exclusion of the commonalty (χρηματισταί), who are totally unacquainted with wisdom or philosophy. The military class or executive, however, (τὸ ἐπικουρικόν), who are to be the active guardians (φύλακες) of the State, he requires to be properly taught and disciplined, so that, while obeying the counsellors, they may protect the State from both internal and external danger. As these guardians, therefore, are necessarily to be chosen from the better class of the citizens, they should be of a philosophic turn, of an active will, and of a stern determination (φιλόσοφοι καὶ θυμοειδεῖς καὶ ταχεῖς καὶ [*xviii] ἰσχυροὶ τὴν φύσιν).[20]

As respects the training of the military class, that must be effected by a thorough discipline,—first, in _Gymnastics_, which includes every exercise and training of the body, whether patience under hardships, or endurance of hunger and thirst—cold or heat; and likewise dancing, all being practised not only to invigorate the body, but to strengthen the spirit and maintain the entire man—the passions, in particular—in subjection to reason;—and secondly, in Music,[21] which Plato held to comprise all imaginative art, the ordinary instruction in grammar, and also science itself, all of which contribute to elevate and enlarge the mind, protecting it, at the same time, from all that militates against virtue. More particularly, the φύλακες must be kept free from all ambition and avarice, which are unquestionable obstacles to the proper performance of their civic functions. From these φύλακες the chief rulers and counsellors of the State (βουλευταί) are to be chosen; to be chosen, too, for their general fitness and estimation:—and those only should be placed in charge, who are endowed with high talent, and have all along maintained a life of virtue, superior to that of the other citizens. Furthermore, in the same way as human life can only attain to its highest happiness, under the guidance of reason conducting it to the highest good,—so also, a State can only attain to consummate virtue and prosperity, when its rulers apply themselves to the investigation of eternal truth and the contemplation of the highest good. Hence it is, that Plato says (v. 473. c.), the rulers must be philosophers,—not, indeed, necessarily occupied in subtle disputations on general subjects of investigation, but rather engaged in contemplating the eternal ideas of things—truth itself; and they must not only admire the beauty of virtue, but earnestly seek the individual cultivation of it, and teach it to others also[22] by the exhibition of its development in their own persons.

Virtue, again, whether exercised by individuals or in communities, is one and the same,[23] comprising, however, four parts:—first, _Wisdom_, the essential qualification of rulers;—secondly, _Courage_, the property of the military class who defend the State;—thirdly, _Temperance_, the distinctive quality of a well-ordered and obedient commonalty; and, fourthly, _Justice_, by virtue of which each particular class or individual energises in his own sphere, without encroaching on that of his neighbours. The pure exercise of virtue, however, is exceedingly rare, either in States or individuals; while, on the other hand, errors and defects are constantly observable and ever likely to interfere with correct action. Hence, applying this remark to Politics, our pattern State (ἀριστοκρατία) will insensibly become vitiated; sinking first into τιμαρχία, and thence into ὀλιγαρχία, δημοκρατία, and lastly downright τυραννίς, the worst possible mode of social union. No wonder, for if we compare them with the state of the human soul when reason is on her throne, and also when she is dethroned by the passions, we discover between them a close analogy. From the dominance of the will over reason we realise the idea of _Ambition_; and this seems nearly allied to the τιμαρχία of the Cretans and Spartans (which Plato greatly preferred to the democracy of Athens);—again, when rein is given to the appetite, still other and greater evils arise, and among others, _Avarice_, which bears a close analogy to ὀλιγαρχία;—thirdly, when the passions are freely indulged, and in a base manner, without regard to order or decency, we have before us δημοκρατία or mob-rule;—and lastly, when any one passion or violent emotion exercises sway to the exclusion of all the more generous feelings of our nature, we have an exact picture of τυραννίς, which is the worst species of government, and furthest of all removed from political perfection.

To return to our pattern State: it must have the principle of permanence in healthy operation; and this is best effected by harmony, or, as it were, unity of action in all the members, just as individual virtue results from the harmonious exercise of the collective mental faculties. The various establishments in a State, therefore, must so cohere and harmonise, as mutually to aid each other; and the most anxious pains must be taken to protect the State from all influences likely to deteriorate good morals and impair the authority of the government. To this end, then, care must be observed, that no innovations (τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν, Republ. iv. 424. c.) be introduced in the training of youth in Gymnastics and Music;—for such innovations, says this ancient Conservative, have an insidious and destructive tendency. The affairs of domestic life, also, must be so regulated, that no base desires shall invade and disturb the State; and to promote this object, as well as to show that the defenders of the State should consider not so much their own individual existence, or their own gratifications, as their inseparable connection and membership with the whole State, to the welfare of which the individual man is ever subordinate;—on this principle must be explained those strange views of the community of wives and children, that have always excited the astonishment of those not fully acquainted with the moral ends of the Republic. Individuals are, according to this philosopher, members of, and to be merged in, the State;—and hence he suggests also, that even the women should undergo the same kind of training with the young men, as they have their respective aptitudes. Thus is a State to be maintained in permanent health, free from the incursions of civil discord. With whatever ability, however, a State may be formed, it cannot be permanently prosperous without the constant and active exercise of virtue;—and just in proportion as sin entails misery and virtue happiness, so, likewise, Tyranny produces disorder and wretchedness; while Aristocracy, _i. e._, Plato’s best form of government, will not fail to exalt the State and its several members to the pinnacle of civil happiness and prosperity.

We have thus briefly sketched the general and ethical system of Plato’s Philosophy, as well as given a general survey of the subject-matter of the Republic; and it is presumed that the student will now be enabled to take up the writings of Plato with improved facilities, and a far greater probability of getting thoroughly acquainted with the notions of that great philosopher.

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Footnote 17:

Republ. ix. 583. b.

Footnote 18:

The relation which, according to Plato, subsists between knowledge and
pure pleasure, seems to be in general of the following nature.—in the
gradual growth of the human consciousness, pleasure is necessarily
combined with cognition,—so however, as that, at one time pleasure, at
another cognition, is the dominant and determining element. In the
former case, the pleasure is impure and immoderate while in the latter
a pure pleasure arises, measured by the truth of Ideas. To avoid the
former and pursue the latter, ought, therefore, to be the object of a
truly intellectual life.—_Ritter_, ii. p. 396.

Footnote 19:

In other words,—“There should be one part to correspond with the
reason, to whom the sovereignty is to be entrusted,—a second,
answering to spirit, is to assist the sovereign,—and lastly, a third
part is made parallel to the appetite, and intended to supply the
bodily wants of the community. These are the three social classes—the
ruler, the warrior, and the craftsman. Each contributes a peculiar
virtue to the general body: by its ruling class it becomes sagacious,
bold by its warriors, and temperate by the obedience of the artizan to
the orders of his ruler. From the due combination of these virtues in
the whole community, results civil justice.” This explanation, so
happily expressed by Ritter, is fully authorised by the passages, lib.
ii. 427. c.; 433. d.

Footnote 20:

Republ. ii. 376. c.

Footnote 21:

These accomplishments, however, he wished to restrain within due
bounds, lest their simplicity should become luxurious, and lest they
should become incentives to passion and vice. Poetry, in particular,
he desires to restrain, dreading its evil influence on the moral
habits;—and he almost wishes the expulsion of poets from his ideal
State. He looks upon poetry, indeed, as a mere art of imitation,
little better than mere illusion and childishness (x. 602. b.
c.);—useful, perhaps, for education, but to be placed, for fear of
abuse, under the strictest surveillance.

Footnote 22:

Virtue, according to Plato, in the Meno and Protagoras, may be learnt,
so far as it rests on science, in the same sense as science itself is
teachable,—_i. e._, originally and naturally it dwells potentially in
the soul; and for the right attainment of virtue, nothing more is
requisite than a fitting direction of the mind, leading man to
contemplate the good through the medium of reflection and memory.

Footnote 23:

The question, whether virtue is one or many (often raised without
receiving any decisive solution), is connected with the more general
one, whether _the one_ (τὸ ἕν) can be manifold or the manifold _one_.
From the Dialectic, it must be clear, that on this point Plato came to
the conclusion that virtue must both be regarded as one, and in
another respect also as many. In a moral point of view, however, this
question of the unity of virtue must be taken in quite another sense;
for as all good is considered as a due measure and proportion, no
single virtue, by itself and apart from the rest, can be truly
virtuous. Hence Plato often describes some single virtue as comprising
in itself the sum of all virtues. Thus, Justice is often used for
virtue in general, because no action, which is not also just, can be
virtuous;—and similarly with wisdom, temperance, and valour. In the
Protagoras, too, Plato adds a fifth virtue— ὁσιὸτης, or piety, and in
the Republic (iii. 402, b.) he mentions liberality and magnanimity.

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THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO.

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