Chapter VI: Part 6

This system was devised to countenance and encourage agriculture; it is in her hands, they say, it is at that fountain-head of riches, that riches must be sought for; it is the land that finally pays for all; the impost then must be laid on the net produce of the land.—I shall venture some reflexions on a subject which appears to me the more important, as one of the wisest, and the most profound speeches ever delivered in the House of Lords, seems to hint at the expediency of an aggravation of the burden already laid on agriculture.

Agriculture is the spring of life; it is not the spring of those riches which we call money: money must be had for taxes; money flows from the hands of industry alone: it is then from this spring that money must be drawn.

Besides, how is it known that the money, wrested from agriculture, is not necessary to her support? Or how does it escape observation, that all the money which is not laid out by the cultivator upon agriculture, will necessarily revert to industry, either by the immediate consumption of the cultivator, or by that which he shall have occasioned on the part of the person to whom he shall have lent the value of what he has not consumed himself?

How comes it to be known, that the proprietor of a landed estate that yields him, we shall suppose, 800_l._ _per annum_, and who is charged 200_l._ for taxes, is not indebted in 300_l._ out of the remaining 600_l._? Now, it is true that 300_l._ are sufficient for his support; but were those 200_l._ which are forced from him, laid out annually on his land, they would certainly in very few years raise its produce from 800 to 1000_l._—What is that but to assess unjustly a man who enjoys only 500_l._ as high as another whose income amounts to 800_l._—to tie down agriculture to 800 when it might rise to 1000; to deprive industry of the re-action produced by that benefit; to crush population in the very bud, and consequently to prevent a more considerable consumption; in fine, to deprive government beforehand of the amount of those taxes which that increase of population and consumption would have secured to the State?

It may be said in _France_, it is true, that by a tax laid on private loan-covenants, those inconveniences are partly removed; but this very removal is only an additional obstacle, thrown in the way of agriculture, to impede its progress;—the man who could lend to the cultivator, besides the fear of not receiving back his money when wanted, has before his eyes the certainty of being charged with the twentieth penny laid on the interest of the money thus advanced, and consequently, as often as he conveniently can, lends that money to a merchant, who besides his punctuality in paying at the fixed time, never hesitates to allow the usual interest without any deduction whatever.

It may be said also in _England_, that all over _Great Britain_, the land-tax, (which, like some others, is perhaps no more than a real poll-tax under a name less grating to a _British_ ear) does not exceed the sum of about 2 millions out of 14 or 15, the whole amount of her taxes; but nothing can be deduced therefrom, but that it is subject only to a proportionable share of the inconveniences above stated; inconveniences which are inseparable from it: we may add, that it is indeed free from some further grievances which fall heavy on the _French_ cultivator:—but can the _English_ boast of their tax being founded on an invariable principle, when this very principle is unjust in its consequences, and, as often as necessity requires the tax to be advanced, multiplies the injustice which follows it?—Yet they hint at the expediency of increasing that very tax, in order to alleviate the imaginary burden that weighs down industry!—Some pretend that the land-tax is become a _public property_; they suppose that all such sales and purchases of land as have taken place since the year 1740, have been effected on that principle of renunciation of the capital, the interest of which is paid by that land-tax:—they infer, no doubt, that the intention of those who did not sell, was implicitly included in that of those who have actually sold; for they propose that all the present proprietors shall redeem the tax, in order to refund part of the national debt; as if, on the very next day after the redemption, Government had not a right to renew it, if some fresh exigency should start, which could not be answered by any other means.

In the critical moment of a discredit, which will always be imputable to the Minister, when the King and the People are fully acquainted with their real interest, if administration, not knowing what to do, does not hesitate to apply to the land proprietor, whose ways and means are always visible, and whose purse lies, as it were, ever open against his own inclination, the Minister, no doubt, finds his excuse in the necessity; but after the crisis is over, why should the proprietor be further aggrieved?

But, say they, the amount of the tax cannot be dispensed with;—no objection can be urged against necessity; _all that is wanted, is the least that can possibly be given; just as all that is wanted, is the most that it can be advantageous to take_: but the whole should be paid by each individual, only in proportion to his faculties:—Now the fact is, that the faculties of the land proprietors are not better known than those of the merchants;—_the latter have found means to prove, to persuade, that they ought not to be taxed, but in proportion to their consumption, the only criterion of their riches_, or at least that part of their riches which they do not lay out in increasing commercial wealth.—IS THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE TERRITORIAL WEALTH LESS ESSENTIAL, OR LESS VALUABLE TO THE STATE?

Let us examine, however, in what degree the taxes laid on the different articles of consumption, must enhance the price of goods, in order that agriculture may not suffer more than industry. If it should result from this research, that many previous false steps have raised the greatest obstacles against the execution of those measures which would prove the most equitable, without being more disadvantageous in any point of view; the inconvenience of such obstacles might be deemed trifling, when _compared with the burden supposed to be transmitted to posterity_. And it is not in _England_ that an important truth, generally acknowledged, will long remain without effect; it is not in _England_ that an important truth will long remain without being generally acknowledged.

_Effects of an Impost exclusively laid on the Articles of Consumption peculiar to the rich, or in other words, ~on Luxury~._

The immediate effect of a tax, is to raise the price of the object on which it is laid, by at least the whole amount of the tax: _nothing can be more just_; but it is at the same time a consideration which ought to keep pace with the one I have already offered, on the very positive _object_ of all kinds of taxation, namely, _to secure the sum at which the product of the impost is valued, whatever that sum may be_.

Now, in order to estimate justly the system of taxation we are considering, it must be presented in all its glory, that is, such as all Ministers of finance in _Europe_ seem to wish it; such as all the _English_ news-papers recommend it, rather roughly, each of them at least once a week; such as all Oppositions, past, present, and future, have pretended, do pretend, and ever will pretend it to be, so easy and so equitable; such as all preachers of the _Roman_, _English_, _Jansenist_ and _Presbyterian_ persuasion, are wont to deliver it every day among the private societies whom they are pleased to honour with their partly christian, partly political reflexions, and would speak it out from the pulpit, if Ministers of finance had any leisure to hear their sermons, &c. I shall therefore suppose that the tax of 10 millions, mentioned in the three foregoing articles, should be assessed in so able, so _charitable_ a manner, that 5 millions should fall on the landlord, and the other 5 on the richest proprietor of money. I shall begin with the most essential, for the State is certainly founded on the landed property.

What is the revenue of the land-proprietor?⸺Nothing more, all expences defrayed, than the third part of the real produce of his lands; and this third is, in the _hypothesis_, estimated at 20 millions only.—These 20 millions finding in the hands of industry, that portion which usually gave the balance of those 20 millions, raised to 25 millions by means of the tax, it clearly appears that the proprietor alluded to is short by 25 _per cent._ of the sum required to pay that portion.—In this case what is he to do?

Shall he leave industry in possession of one fifth of his former comforts?—Then industry would be debarred from the sale of that fifth part; one fifth of its artificers would be left without any other resource than that which the highway might afford, _and the main object of the taxation would be defeated in the following year_, unless exportation should make up to industry for the want of home-consumption, (_the only one by which a State can prosper_,) and the _deficit_ of the tax laid on the home-consumption, should be compensated by another tax on foreign consumption, that is _on the exports_.

We shall suppose this to be the case, and that industry actually exports that fifth part of the national commodities which the land proprietor is not able any longer to consume, and which, nevertheless, industry is compelled to sell, in order to be reimbursed the tax she has advanced, and be prepared to answer the fresh demand which next year government will have occasion to make.—But if it were to such means that _England_ should stand indebted for part of the increase in her exports, her industry, methinks, would have derived less advantage therefrom, than a home-sale might have procured, even supposing the inconvenience of which I shall speak presently: it appears to me also, that the land proprietors would, in that case, have some reason to complain, and that the rest of the nation would have no cause to boast of the immensity of her exportation.—The draw-backs granted on the very exportation of the taxed commodities, prove that such an expedient never was adopted in _England_.

Will the land proprietor come to a resolution to fly from his native country, in search of another, where good men content themselves with declaiming against luxury, without making any attempt to destroy it? No, he never did, nor ever will take that resolution; he is fast bound to his land by the roots of every plant he has laid on it.—What then is he to do? It behoves the Minister of finance to give him some wholesome advice.

If the Minister be silent, or if he shuffle, because he is closely watched by Opposition, he must equally lose his popularity; for the land proprietor, left to shift for himself, will raise the price of the productions of his land, in proportion as the tax has increased that part of the products of industry that concerns him.—

But his 20 millions revenue, have, as I have said, the same component parts as the 40 millions which he is obliged to give up for the expences of cultivation, and other incumbrances attending property:—he cannot therefore increase them to 25 millions, without raising by one twelfth the total amount of the 60 millions of landed revenue; this will at once carry up the quarter of wheat from 40_s._ to 43_s._ 4_d._: this is therefore an advance of 8⅓ _per cent._ on his commodities:—upon which we must observe, that no increase will take place in the wages of the mechanic, or of the husbandman; for the objects of luxury are the only ones which we suppose to have been taxed: such is the _infernal_ side of this _heavenly_ system.—Yet this is not all.

What is the money-proprietor to do, not having it in his power to raise the price of his money as the landed proprietor can do that of his wheat, but who, on the contrary, is invariably limited to the same nominal revenue, whilst the tax of the other 5 millions, which the _humanity_ of the _taxator_ had levelled at him, has occasioned a rise of 25 _per cent._ in the nominal value of those articles of luxury in which he indulged himself?—He will, he must leave them in the hands of industry, and confine himself to such objects as are not taxed; it is a resource, as it is at the same time a compulsive measure.—_The produce of the tax will then be inadequate to the want_: a second impost must then be thought on, to supply the _deficit_ of the first.—_Fall again upon luxury_, cry the enthusiasts; _this is more necessary than ever, for bread is already 8⅓ per cent. dearer than it was, and the land proprietors have abated nothing of their luxury; they ride still in their chariots, whilst the poor loaded porter constantly trudges on foot_. Enthusiasts will never see further, and those who are not enthusiasts do not yet see far enough; for they only say _that it is expedient for government, that the prices of commodities be kept up, in order to facilitate the payment of the impost_.—Yet, _if it is expedient_ for government, that the prices be _kept up_ to _facilitate_ the payment of the impost, I conclude that it is an _absolute necessity_ for government, that the prices do increase, when there is no other visible means to establish _the possibility_ of paying taxes. I therefore have to answer only to the enthusiasts, and let it be as the enthusiasts will have it:⸺

But the first 5 millions of the _charitable_ tax could not be paid, without an advanced price of 8⅓ _per cent._ on all the productions of the earth, without raising the wheat from 40_s._ to 43_s._ 4_d._—it will then be necessary to increase its price by as much again; it must advance from 43_s._ 4_d._ to 46_s._ 8_d._ in order that the tax be paid _without foreign assistance_. Then all will be settled, regulated, balanced, and paid between the _capitalists_ of land and those of industry; _but as no objects will have been taxed but those of luxury_, how long will it be before the people, the labouring man can see justice done to him?—Ten popular insurrections perhaps will be required to extort it. Yet let us suppose that the very first proves sufficient to procure it complete, that is, that their wages be raised 16⅔ _per cent._ as the tax after all the necessary re-actions has increased the price of the produce of their labour:—in this case, instead of the 20 millions allowed before to each of the two classes of working men, cultivators and mechanics, they will then receive 23,333,333_l._ 13_s._ 4_d._—But how will you wrest from the hands of the land proprietor 3,333,333_l._ 13_s._ 4_d._ out of the portion which he was obliged to lay by, _that the tax might be paid by his consumption_, without his advancing again the price of his commodities in such a proportion as will return him the new sum which he is forced to pay?—And were he not to augment again the price of his commodities, would not then a new tax become necessary to supply the _deficit_ which the rise of wages of the labouring men must occasion in the consumption of their employers?—The land proprietor will then add still to the price of his goods;—but will not this addition, _equally necessary as the two first_, be productive of a further necessity of raising in proportion the price of labour, the wages of the labouring man?—No doubt; and another insurrection would procure justice, if the thought did not occur at last of observing, that _the class of labouring men being, before the tax, in possession of one third of the general revenue, forms, in this respect, a third interest equal to one half of the two other_. Now, the tax having enforced an advance in prices of 16⅔, to shelter the two former from its effect, there must also be, in favour of the third interest, a third increase of 8⅓, which rising at last to 25 _per cent._ more, the price of labour, as that of its produce, both in regard to land and industry, will exactly leave to each of the three interests, under the denomination of _twenty-five_, the same comforts as each of them enjoyed under that of _twenty_ before the tax was laid.

In regard therefore to the effects of the tax on the prices of provisions, there is not the least difference between the system of taxing luxury, and that of a land-tax; 50_s._ in the supposition of an impost of ten millions, would prove in either system the _necessary_ price of wheat; for if ever a price can be termed _necessary_, it is when it cannot be lower without effecting the ruin of the land proprietor, and even _without missing the sole and indispensable end of taxation_, unless recourse be had to one of the following resources:

_Either_

To export such commodities, which, as it might be absurdly supposed, the nation is no longer able to consume,

_Or_,

To steal from the people the proportionable increase _due to them_ in the price of their labour, if they should prove so complaisant as tamely to submit, out of gratitude, for _the tax being laid only upon luxury_.

I shall conclude this article with a reflexion which may give birth to many others.

The impost on _luxury_, which, after a very little time, as we have seen, proves no ways injurious to those who were able to pay for the objects upon which the tax was laid, is besides, under another point of view, really advantageous to those very men who seem the only contributors to it; _because_ it sets entirely above the reach of the people, a number of articles in which they would indulge themselves, _to the great benefit of the tax_, and which, though perhaps intended _by the general provider_, as well for the poor as for the rich, are nevertheless, by the _merciful_ system of taxation, exclusively reserved to the rich.—Is this the intention of the _merciful taxator_?—in my opinion it ought not to be that of an _intelligent one_.

_Effects of a merciless Tax upon all the Articles of the most general Consumption._

Instead of laying a tax _on men_, from whom, without rushing with open eyes into the perpetration of a thousand injuries, it is impossible to require any thing more than a _personal service_, when it is necessary and _possible_ withal; instead of taxing _the land_, from which nothing can be expected but food, and the rough materials to which industry can give from one to many hundred degrees of value; instead of taxing that imaginary monster called _luxury_, which procures so substantial a support to some, and such pleasing comforts to others, lay your tax solely, and without predilection, on _all those products of national and foreign industry which are more generally consumed_; then, in my opinion, you will have reason to flatter yourself that riches are taxed to their very source, and without inconvenience to any one, since you tax it in the hands of those who are, _by the strictest justice_, authorised to a benefit for all the advances made by them to the consumer.

So then, though the tax of 10 millions be fixed on certain parts of industry, nothing will prevent the whole from rising proportionably; and for this, _God alone be thanked_. The whole will be then 70 millions instead of 60;—upon which the least reflexion is sufficient to make us feel the necessity of the re-actions mentioned in the foregoing system, _but with this difference_, that the general consumption having been taxed, the two _capitalists_ cannot, even on the very day when the impost takes place, shut their eyes against the justice of increasing the salary of the labouring man in a due proportion.—Now, _the interest_ of the two capitalists could not, as in the preceding system, be preserved undiminished, but by an increase from 60 to 70 millions, that is to say, 16⅔ _per cent._—Now, _the interest_ of the labouring man is, as has been observed before, equal to one half of the other two classes in the general revenue, or, in other words, equal to either;—it will therefore become necessary, in order to restore the former equilibrium, to introduce a fresh increase of 8⅓ _per cent._ upon every thing;—in consequence of which the price of labour, being raised 25 _per cent._ just as its products, both in cultivation and industry, will leave also the two classes of labourers in the same situation they were in previous to the tax; each of them was then in possession of 20 millions out of 60, each will now get 25 out of 75.

I think also that _then_, a Minister of finance, ever so anxious about his operations, ever so zealous for the establishment of none but _productive_ taxes, could not conceive a single article of consumption that might suffer by this arrangement; it would appear too evidently that every one would _then_ have the very same faculty of consuming, manufacturing, or saving, under the denomination of 25, all that he had before consumed, manufactured, or saved under the denomination of 20.

It would also be seen _then_, that the success of those taxes termed _productive_, is not to be ascribed to the abilities of the _taxator_, but to the abilities of the persons _taxed_, who have taken care to right themselves by so much as the _taxator_ ought to have been afraid of being unjust.

_Then_ also would every one be sensible, that the advance in all the prices could not be only of a 12th part, or 8⅓ _per cent._ as in the _glorious_ system of a poll-tax _established by Divine Justice_, but of 25 _per cent._ neither _more nor less_ than in the system of the _land-tax_, neither _more nor less_ than in the system of an exclusive tax _upon luxury_; that consequently _wheat_, as well as produce of any other sort, as well as _labour_ which gives the whole, _would be indebted to the tax for a fifth part of its new nominal value_, and that 50_s._ would be the _medium_ price of wheat;—its _necessary_ price, but not more _necessary_ in that _merciless_ taxation, than in the _merciful_ one laid on the exclusive consumption of the rich:—and this calls for the attention of every individual; nor can it be too often repeated, because _then_ neither hypocrites, nor enthusiasts, nor good men, nor manufacturers, nor farmers, nor proprietors, could any longer deceive themselves or others, on the price of labour; it would be too self-evident that the said price ought to increase with the taxes, and that no one would be injured by that increase.

Then it would also appear, that some people had very good reason to say, that the burden of all taxes, falls one time or another, on the landed property; but who could refuse to admit besides, that I am tolerably founded in insisting, that when taxes have in fine reached every part of the whole, no one part can feel the weight?

_The money proprietor_, it will be said, the _lender alone_ will be aggrieved; he must lose the fifth part of his usual comforts, he must pay 15 for those articles which he could procure formerly for 12.

I shall confine myself to three answers:

First, _Is it not self-evident, that any financiering operation, which reduces from 5 to 4, the interest of a national debt, deprives as well the lender of the fifth part of his comforts, AS IF THE NATION HAD LOADED HERSELF WITH TEN MILLIONS MORE, TO BE PAID ANNUALLY? (such is the present hypothesis.)_ There stands, therefore, between the two cases no other difference, but the _palpable_ justice and necessity of the one, and I believe we may say, the _unsuspected_ inutility and injustice of the other.

Secondly, We have already seen that the loss of the lender, in all cases, flows essentially from the nature of his capital; that it is inseparable from the advance of prices, whether _that advance_ originates from an accession of wealth, or is produced by taxes, or brought on by monopoly; and that besides, by lending to the State, with the certainty that the State could not pay the interest of the loan without the assistance of an import, he has beforehand submitted to the effects of an impost _indispensable_ to his main object.

Thirdly, If we except a poll-tax, which we should suppose _laid by Divine Justice_, and which, in the present hypothesis, should wrest from the lender only a twelfth part of his enjoyments, where is the system, which, _in the supposition of a tax of ten millions, being now necessary in England_, would not deprive him of a fifth part of those enjoyments?—We shall see presently that a _compound-tax_ would perhaps prove still less favourable; but how much has he to dread, in all cases, from the indirect taxation of the _monopoly_, which it is impossible duly to estimate!

_Effects of Compound Taxation._

The system of taxation, which may be called general, is composed of the four different kinds of taxes which I have just mentioned:—First, some kind of _poll-tax_, under that or any other name;—secondly, a _land-tax_;—thirdly, an impost on the consumption of the rich, or _luxury_;—and fourthly, in fine, the freedom taken with _the consumption of the poor_, or general consumption; for the sun of reason forces its way through the darkness of prejudices; these only serve to retard the progress of nature wherever light first began to shine. It would be easier to stifle truth at first, than entirely to escape its effects.

No country in the world can be guarded against the injustice inseparable from the _two first parts_ of the system of a compound-taxation, whatever may be in that respect the wisdom of the legislature, and its tenderness in the manner of collecting the impost; no country can be free from that other kind of injustice which results from the general prejudice in favour of the tax on luxury, which constitutes the _third part_ of the system under examination; but the _ensemble_—the whole together, does not produce every where the same effects on the prices.

In _France_, from the beginning of the present century down to the time when Mons. _Turgot_ was intrusted with the department of the finances, the sum of what I can collect from the _French_ mode of taxation, is, that without any determined system, without any other rule than the immediate want of money, and the facility of procuring that money by means of a loan, at any interest whatever, they had successively taxed whatever came first to hand, or occurred to the imagination of the comptroller general for the time being; nothing was spared, in order that no one should complain; landed estates, employments, money, individuals, the one because he was industrious, the other because he had no industry and _that he might acquire some_; this man, because he had a _title_; that other, because he had none; a third, on account of what he consumed; a fourth, for that consumption to which he was doomed,—(_an expedient which, together with the galleys, was devised by the farmers general, as an admirable stroke upon smuggling_). No sin more venial, than to take some liberties with a compound of such motley pieces; nothing more severe than the reflexions thrown out against it on the other side of the channel; and nothing can more forcibly prove that _France_ was planning some reform on the subject, than the orders given most minutely to enquire into the principles and effects of the various modes of taxation adopted in other parts of _Europe_. I think, in regard to all those parts of _French_ taxation, which I have alluded to, as every intelligent man does in _France_ and _England_: nevertheless, if one cannot positively affirm, that the result of such a chaos of strange regulations, has been, that every one perceiving the burden to be general, nobody ever thought of easing himself at the expence of others who appeared to have been loaded in the same manner, yet it cannot be contradicted, that, notwithstanding the want of true principles on the part of the _taxator_ in _France_, the price of every thing might have continued to this day, without material alteration, had it not been for an event, of which I shall speak in the sequel; and if it were true, as some very deep politicians will have it, that _the more depreciated commodities are in a country, the quicker that nation advances towards opulence, because, in such a case, the national manufacturer has it in his power to favour the foreigner by underselling all other countries in the world_; if this principle were not at least questionable, as I hope to prove it by and by, every one would admit that the _compound-taxation_, EVEN COMPOUNDED, as I have just described it, does not appear totally destitute of some advantages.

Before I venture to express my thoughts on the subject, I wish the reader would form to himself an idea of what might be the effect of such a system in _England_;—in _England_, where every man is a calculator, and adds without ceremony, on the creditor side of his books, the number of figures necessary to balance those which he thinks too many in the calculation of others. They say in _England_, and there they are more bitterly persuaded than any where else, that taxes take annually out of the pockets of those who pay them, the whole amount of the impost; but _there_ as every where, and _there_ much sooner than in any other part of the world, justice and reason never fail to put into the head of each individual, what he is to do, that the tax be not paid for a long while out of his own pocket. I may therefore boldly say, that nothing more is wanted on the part of _England_, to join perfectly in opinion with me, concerning the most important point (that which concerns the national debt), than to observe, that every one has always done as secretly and as expeditiously as he could, for himself alone, what I insist it would be advantageous to do openly, with equal celerity, for the general good[8]. I now resume my subject.

It would be, methinks, a difficult matter not to conclude, from such very reasonable conflict of private calculations, that, were the _French_ system to be adopted in _England_, it would not, in that _land of benediction_, experience the fate of exotic plants; far from degenerating, far from keeping the price of all things at the lowest ebb, it would acquire from the influence of general maxims, and from universal custom, the weight necessary to balance that multitude of private injuries, from which it is impossible to keep it free. Now, this cannot be effected without forcing the price of every thing up to a pitch so much more extravagant, as each man, in such a case, is the natural judge of the indemnity he should allow himself for the tax imposed, and for the advantage that others derive from it; if any one should shrink on the occasion, he finds in his _corporation_ a degree of vigour, of which he shares the benefit. The word of the law is the only bridle in _England_; a tax of 4_s._ on a particular article, increases its known price only by something more; but if government gets 50,000_l._ from a tax, under the appellation of _licence_, or any other name, which leaves the man thus taxed, supreme judge of the rate, and at liberty to choose the means of indemnifying himself, one may rest assured that such a tax costs the people six times as much as it brings in to government. Let every man candidly weigh this (I don’t say undenied, but I say) undeniable assertion, from the circumstances of the moment; let him examine what remains to be done by the land proprietor, that he may not be most shamefully ransomed; let him judge in what predicament that man must stand, whose fixed revenue in money, affords him no resource against the effects produced by such an emulation; let him observe, above all, that the daily labourer will not, _before the matter is brought to the last extremity_, be paid one penny more, _because care has been charitably taken to tax almost none of the articles of his consumption; and let him then_, if he dares to do it, _let him bless the tax on luxury_, and any other kind of impost, _but such as is laid on the objects of most general consumption_.

The _real_ necessity of providing for the interest due on the debt contracted during the last war, and the _imaginary_ advantage of the intended reimbursement, have compelled the present Ministry (and according to the maxims and ideas that predominate at this time, would have compelled all possible administrations) to impose many taxes of the very exceptionable kind; to their effects add those of the indirect tax of corporations, premiums, prohibitions, and new obstacles thrown in the smuggler’s way, it will not be wonderful that the million sterling for the _imaginary_ want of a reimbursement, together with the three millions some hundred thousands, for the _real_ want, (the interest of the debt) and which, at the word, ought not to increase the total mass of prices much above 8 _per cent._ actually advance them to 12, whilst in _France_ the expences of the late war will not perhaps occasion, _at first_, a rise of more than 6 _per cent._ It will be seen in the sequel why I say, _at first_.

But, they say in _France_—but, they say in _England_, all the articles of consumption are already so loaded, that it is impossible to think of increasing the weight. The _French_ Farmers General themselves tremble when they propose to increase the duties on any article; _will not consumption suffer by it_?—Such is every where the terrible argument that prevents the establishment of the only unexceptionable system, the only equitable, and the only advantageous one to the people—to the people, on whose account they pretend to be so anxious.—That system, it is true, would lessen by one half, _the nominal value_ of those operations that are held in so important a light, of all those tricks of which the contrivers themselves entertain so high an opinion; but what ease, what leisure would not this very system procure to the Minister! Let us then see whether the formidable argument, on which is grounded the impossibility of doing _the best_, will bear the analysis, so _formidable_ also in so many cases.

_Some Doubts on the supposed Impossibility of laying all Taxes on Consumption._

The universal voice in _England_ is, that so many taxes should be laid, as are necessary to answer the exigences. Ministry, Opposition, Subjects, all agree in this essential point; but if we except some taxes which bear principally on the land proprietor, who never says any thing, and whose silence commands that of every one who shares in his burden, the ablest man in the three kingdoms is not capable of proposing one, on any article, which would not be followed by a petition from those very men who do not even wait till it has received the royal sanction, in order to derive from it an extravagant advantage, if it be within the meaning of _licences_, and perhaps only a profit _rather above_ a reasonable one, if it bears on an object properly specified.

I have perused several of these petitions; and the substance of what has appeared to me most striking in every one of them is nearly this: “Let every thing be taxed in _England_, nothing more equitable; let every thing be taxed, _every thing_, except all the things that concern your humble petitioners: you cannot tax them, without ruining their trade; and not only their trade, but also the whole trade of the nation at large; and not only without ruining the whole trade of the nation at large, but without stifling that principle of liberty, that noble spirit of life, which has so highly distinguished her above all the nations in the world.”

Were any one to infer, from the foregoing extract, that my intention is to stigmatize the use of _petitions_,—notwithstanding the most invincible antipathy I bear to exclamations, which, for the most part, betray either weakness or hypocrisy, I should exclaim, O Divine Liberty, of _humbly shewing_, to the most respectable parts of a nation, all kinds of ideas, whether absurd or reasonable! Divine Liberty, never treated in _England_ but with that regard which is due from one man to whatever comes from another man! Divine Liberty, who givest to the Legislator, the time, knowledge, and often the means, necessary to prevent him from falling into such errors as it is not beyond the power of human nature to avoid, ... be thou ever blessed, and mayest thou be worshipped wherever men are not infallible, and wherever millions of men may suffer from a single mistake!

In _England_, the produce of taxes on the various articles of consumption, amounts, I suppose, to 8,000,000_l._: in order to procure the 5 or 6 other millions required, a part of which is necessary, a part of which is supposed to be so on account of the plan of a reimbursement, the land continues to be taxed for 2 millions, and the other 3 or 4 are taken from perhaps 30 different articles, one of which will bring in 150, another 100, a third 60, a fourth 30 thousand pounds, &c. with a salvo for Government to tax half a score more articles, if it should be robbed rather too unconscionably on the produce of the former; for, in all countries throughout the world, this is all the conjuration in that part of the administration of finances which relates to the collecting of taxes; if you rob Government in one point, be sure Government will ransom you, if required, on ten others; nothing more just, but nothing more easy.

Now, if we lay it down for an indubitable maxim, that the most able Administrator of finances, cannot take from an individual, more than what he possesses, it seems to me then that it remains only to examine, whether that very individual from whom, one way or another, out of the 20 he is possessed of, 5 may be wrested,—will be less aggrieved if the 5 be taken out of his pocket, and he be sent to market with the remaining 15, than he would be, were he permitted to go with the whole 20 to market, where he would find those 15 which he used to purchase for 15, charged with the 5 which might have been taken from him at home?

The question more to the point is yet more singular; for it goes to this enquiry:

First, Whether the land proprietor, who is obliged to give at a fixed period three millions in taxes for his land, windows, domestics, and other objects more recently taxed, would think himself more injured if those three millions were divided and laid upon some objects of his consumption, while he should observe that by this new order of things he would gain the convenience, not only of paying these three millions by different and remote installments, but also of making use of the money previous to such payment,—without injury to the trader, to whom the interest would be one way or other repaid,—while on the other hand, a part of the money, laid out upon his land, would furnish new resources for augmenting the produce of the taxes, by increasing his faculties of consumption:

Secondly, Whether those unfortunate licensed persons, and others (who so bitterly complain of all the various taxes that produce to them three or four times the sum which they advance to Government) would not be _justly_, as they ought to be, relieved from the _oppression_ (that is the word) if such taxes were taken off, and laid on articles of which they would themselves be the consumers:

Thirdly, Whether all those extraordinary, usurious, and unjust benefits, arising from those _oppressive_ taxes which I have been mentioning, reduced to their proper point, by taxes that would not increase the price of any article beyond a known degree, would not naturally reduce the _value_ of every thing to that _necessary_ price I have spoken of,—to that price which every thing ought to maintain, that the imaginary _oppressed_ might not actually _oppress_ the imaginary _oppressors_,—that all things may be preserved in a just balance, without any person experiencing a change in his condition;—and consequently, without the consumption of any article being diminished, unless fancy or fashion should transfer it to another article that will indemnify for the deficiency.[9]

From _England_ let us pass over to _France_, and always taking for granted that a Minister of finance is not a conjurer, and that he can take from the pockets of the people no more money than they possess; I wish it could be examined:

Whether the 41 millions of _livres Tournois_, produced by the poll-tax, and which should be paid no longer, when that tax should be transferred to, and divided between all the articles _of the most general consumption, and of course the most productive_, would diminish the general faculties, by increasing the value of those objects, to the whole of that sum which the contributors would gain by paying no longer the poll-tax.

I would have it also enquired into, whether the clergy, finding the objects of that general consumption loaded with 11 millions more, could be aggrieved by the sole disappointment of giving no longer _gratuitously_ to his Majesty, those 11 millions which they are now _compelled_ to pay; and whether they would not be left in possession of all the faculties necessary to satisfy the first article, as soon as they should be freed from the other.

I should also wish the _French_ to examine whether the 76 millions _Tournois_, paid in that country for the _three twentieths_, instead of being very often called for, _at a time when the Subject has them not_, transferred to those objects which cannot be consumed but by means of the money remaining after those 76 millions are discharged, would impair the means of the contributors, although after having eased them of that truly terrible tax, the Minister should, in a manner, juggle them out of the whole amount of it, by another impost on consumption. Supposing even they had some suspicion of the trick, I wish it were examined whether they would think themselves injured by paying in the new way that amount, by installments at their own time, and till then laying out a part of it upon their lands, the revenues of which would of course increase in proportion.

But above all, I wish it should be examined, whether 91 millions of another kind of subsidy, called _la taille_, added to 7 millions and a half more, laid out in expences for warrants and distresses, necessary to enforce the law of the subsidy, transferred upon the consumption of those from whose hands the _subsidy_ is directly wrested, against whom the _warrants_ are issued, upon whose goods or body the distresses are executed, would diminish the faculty of that poor people’s consumption, if, by means of that consumption, by the suppression of the old _subsidy_, of _warrants_, and _distresses_ attending the same, they should acquire the faculty of consuming cheerfully, what they often consume in bitterness and sorrow; and whether the department of the finances could lose by it any thing more than the pleasure or trouble, or rather the necessity of assessing a dreadful subsidy, issuing out warrants, and distressing the body—when there are no goods to be distrained.

_But in this scheme the expence is more considerable._

This is the grand objection: _The expence is more considerable!_ Reduce the unfortunate to a bed of straw, or cast him into prison, to spare the purse ... of whom?—For after all, supposing even that a few additional charges ought to be compared with millions of inconveniences, injuries, and acts of barbarity, which are inseparable from the other methods, let it be examined whether the extra charges can produce any other effect, than that of advancing by a few _deniers pour livrè_ the general price of merchandise; let it be examined whether that advance is not a matter of perfect indifference, provided that the price of the provisions sold by the land proprietor, _who is stiled rich_, and that of the wages of the labouring man, who _is called poor_, rise in the same proportion as the goods of the _capitalist_ of industry, who stands equally and as essentially in need of the ease of the _poor_, as of the opulence of the _rich_.

In fine, Let it be examined whether there is any thing great, courageous, just, and fair, that may not be expected from the _French_ nation, when she shall be admitted to the honour of being heard,—or when they will be kind enough to convince her.—A King of _France_, with the trifling help of his provincial administrations, may do, and play with every thing: a King of _France_ is truly a despot; not from that absurd right of giving his _will_ for _reason_, but from that principle which is congenial to the _French_, that the People and the King are but one, have but one interest, and have nothing to fear but the ignorance of a Minister, conscious of his inability, without the least thought of the resources he has at hand in such a case, without principles to guard him against committing those injuries which seem to him unavoidable, in order to conceal the errors which he has been, or fears to be, guilty of; a Minister, in fine, whose insignificant little self, wrests from the King and People, the fruit of that _identity_ which forms the acknowledged essence of the _French_ constitution.

What seems to be in _France_ no more than a fortunate prejudice, is every where an irrefragable truth: in every country the strength, power, and riches of the Prince, are but the sum of the force, power, riches, energy, honour and _susceptibility_, which actually exist in the mass of his subjects.—But if the Sovereign be the most powerful man in his kingdom, only because all its strength centers in him; if in this age, the most complaisant, the meanest Minister should not dare even to insinuate a contrary idea before the Prince the most jealous of his authority; how can he presume to think, or to hope, that it will be in his power to persuade the Prince, that he, the Minister, is the best informed man in the Empire, before he has collected all the information that can be got on every object that does not call for an immediate execution?—And how can he pretend to have collected every such information, when in addition to his own ideas, he goes only by those of the few dependents who surround him, dependents as much on their guard before him, as he himself is circumspect before the Sovereign, when the Sovereign, before he asks his advice, has the misfortune to let a single word escape that betrays even the appearance of an opinion on the object under deliberation?

_Recapitulation of the foregoing Thoughts on Taxes and their Effects._

The fate of the various kinds of taxes, is similar to that of political operations, which pretty regularly bring about the very contrary of what had been expected from them: thus if you tax the consumption of the rich, presently the poor alone will pay the impost, and will continue to pay it till an insurrection will make you sensible that he is brought too low; now this insurrection is commonly the consequence of a trifling scarcity, which, it seems, Providence sends to the unfortunate in order to encourage his asking for justice, in the only manner that is likely to prove successful: on the contrary, let the tax be laid on the general consumption, without sparing that of the poor, the man who possesses, shall be, no doubt, necessitated to pay for the man who has nothing, if the former wishes to enjoy the labour of the latter; and on the very same day, when the tax is laid on the consumption of the labouring man, he will not hesitate to demand an increase of wages to the full amount.... How is he to be deceived?—If it be well to deceive the poor as long as possible, then tax nothing but the consumption of the rich. But whatever be the manner in which the impost is laid, as soon as its effect shall be general, the burden will prove _null_ (SAVE THE INJURIES INSEPARABLE FROM ALL OTHER TAXES, BUT THOSE THAT BEAR UPON CONSUMPTION): this effect is no more than a general advance in all the prices: an advance, it is true, already acknowledged necessary with regard to the taxed articles, but dreaded hitherto in regard to all the rest, _where it ought to have been wished for_; universally felt, but never justly estimated; the _nullity_ of the burden of the debt would have been determined by the estimation.

The poll-tax, _supposed to be established by Divine Justice_, would enhance the price of labour, and of its products, but by a fraction equal to that which the amount of the tax should be, in the mass of both revenues, land and industry. Ten millions of a poll-tax on a revenue of 120, would increase the prices of every thing by one twelfth; and every man thus taxed, would evidently after the advance of prices, in consequence of such a poll-tax, find himself in the very same state he stood in before the tax; yet one twelfth more must be given for every thing, but then one twelfth more would be received for every thing.

All other kinds of taxes, as well as the poll-tax, seem to affect only the article on which they are laid; but this article comprehends the three interests, and trebles the action of the tax when the interest of the labouring man, that is, the price of his day’s work, constitutes, as it does in _England_, nearly one third of the revenue.⸺How could it be supposed that the taxing of industry in its products, was granting to its _capitalist_ the _right_ of increasing his price by the whole amount of the tax, without making it _necessary_ for the land proprietor to enhance the price of his commodities at the same rate? And how could it be supposed that the products of agriculture and industry, happening to be, by a very just re-action, (whether it originates with the one or the other), increased in price in the same proportion, agriculture and industry should not be compelled to increase of course the price of labour which procured those products? If therefore you advance by 10 millions, the prices either of all the productions of the earth, by taxing agriculture, or of all the productions of the arts, by taxing industry, you equally compel the untaxed part to advance its prices to the whole amount of the 10 millions laid on the corresponding part, _otherwise goods to the amount of 10 millions would evidently remain unsold_. Now the influence of those new prices will enforce by degrees an increase on the price of labour, and this increase will soon be followed by a fresh one on the value of its products; whence it appears at last, that after all the necessary re-actions, the same tax of 10 millions, which by a general _equitable_ poll-tax, supposed _as equitable as it is IMPOSSIBLE to make it so_, would only raise the prices by one twelfth, or 8⅓ _per cent._; if laid, either on the land, or luxury, or general consumption, would necessarily advance the prices, sooner or later, to 25 _per cent._; the very precise period whereat every one would find himself in the exact state in which he was previous to the tax, paying, it is true, every thing 25 _per cent._ dearer, but being himself paid 25 _per cent._ dearer too.

Alter the proportion of the usual price of labour, by supposing a country so far barren as to make it necessary to appropriate one half of the revenue to the labouring people; in such case a tax of 10 millions laid on a revenue of 60 would increase by 30 _per cent._ the price of labour, and of its products; 30 _per cent._ would raise the revenue from 60 to 78 millions: now 39 being the half of 78, as 30 is that of 60, the burden of the tax would then prove equally _null_, after every article should have been raised 30 _per cent._