Chapter XI: Part II: A League of Peace (3)

There is another method of bringing financial pressure upon a law-breaking State which deserves consideration. It is put forward in the following terms by Mr. F. N. Keen in his able little book, “The World in Alliance”: “The States comprised in the international scheme might be required to keep deposited with, or under the control of, the International Council sums of money, proportioned in some way to their relative populations or financial resources, which might be made available to answer international obligations, and an international bank might be organized, which would facilitate the giving of security by States to the International Council for the performance of their obligations and the enforcement of payments between one State and another (as well as probably assisting in the creation of an international currency and discharging other useful international functions).”

The organized concentration of international finance by the formation of an international bank is a line of action which might immensely strengthen that body of pacific forces the rising importance of which Mr. Norman Angell has so effectively expounded. It might consolidate to an almost incalculable degree the effective unity of the International League by placing under it the solid foundation of world-peace, while the power which such an institution would wield, either for purposes of fiscal or financial boycott, would be enormous.

[Sidenote: The international police force.]

But however highly we estimate the potentialities of the boycott as a valuable adjunct to the pressure of public opinion in compelling obedience to treaty obligations, it is idle to pretend that the confidence required to induce the chief nations to rely upon the due performance of these obligations by all their co-signatories will be possible without placing at their disposal, for use in the last resort, an adequate armed force to break the resistance of an armed law-breaking State. Somewhere behind international law there must be placed a power of international compulsion by arms. If that force were really adequate, it is probable that it would never be necessary to employ it for any purpose save that of repelling invasions or dangerous disorders on the part of outsiders. Its existence and the knowledge of its presence might suffice to restrain the aggressive or lawless tendencies which will survive in members of the League. But in the beginnings of the organization of international society it is at least possible, perhaps likely, that some dangerous outbreak of the old spirit of state-absolutism should occur, and that some arrogant or greedy Power, within the circle of the League, might endeavor to defy the public law.

For the States entering such a League will be of various grades of political development: some may enter with reluctance and rather because they fear to be left out than because they believe in or desire the success of the League. It is idle to imagine that a society starting with so little inner unity of status and of purpose can dispense entirely with the backing of physical force with which the most highly evolved of national societies has been unable to dispense.

[Sidenote: How constituted.]

What form, then, should the required international force take, and who should exercise it?

The proposal to endow some executive international body with the power of levying and maintaining a new land and sea force, superior to that of any Power or combination it may be called upon to meet, scarcely merits consideration. Apart from the hopelessness of getting the Powers to consent to set up a Super-State upon this basis, the mere suggestion of curing militarism by creating a large additional army and navy would be intolerable. Nor is it any more reasonable to expect the Powers to abandon their separate national forces, simply contributing their quota towards an international force under the permanent control of an International Executive. No such abandonment of sovereign power, no such complete confidence in the new internationalism, could for a long time to come be even contemplated. Each nation would insist upon retaining within its own territory and at its own disposal the forces necessary to preserve internal order and to meet at the outset any sudden attack made from outside. It is evident, in other words, that the forces required by the International League in the last resort, for the maintenance of public law and the repression of breaches of the treaty, must be composed of contingents drawn upon some agreed plan from the national forces and placed for the work in hand at the disposal of an international command. Such armed cooperation is, of course, not unknown. Several times within recent years concerted action has been taken by several European Powers, and though the Pekin expedition in 1900 cannot be regarded as a very favorable example, it illustrates the willingness of Powers to act together for some common end which seems to them of sufficient importance. Is it too much to expect that the nations entering the Confederation will realize with sufficient clearness the importance of preserving the integrity of their international agreement to be willing to entrust a permanent executive with the duty of commandeering the forces necessary to achieve this purpose when they may be required?

[Sidenote: Armies and navies must be held in trust for the world-community. Each nation would get more security at less cost.]

It will doubtless be objected that there is a world of difference between the occasional willingness of a group of Powers to take concerted action upon a particular occasion, for which each reserves full liberty of determination as to whether and to what extent it will cooperate, and the proposal before us. It is absurd, we shall be told, to expect that States bred in the sense of sovereignty and military pride will seriously entertain a proposal which may bring them into war in a quarrel not specifically theirs and compel them to furnish troops to serve under an international staff. But many events that have seemed as absurd are brought to pass. A few decades ago nothing would have seemed more absurd than to suppose that our nation would be willing to equip an Expeditionary Force of several million men to operate upon the Continent under the supreme control of a French general. Whether, in fact, such cooperation as we here desiderate is feasible at any early period will depend upon two factors: first, the realization on the part of Governments and peoples of the civilized world of the supreme importance of the issue at stake in this endeavor to lay a strong foundation for the society of nations; secondly, the diminution in the influence of militarism and navalism as factors in national life that is likely to occur if sufficient belief in the permanence and efficacy of the new arrangement is once secured. If nations can be brought to believe that national armies and navies are too dangerous toys to be entrusted to the indiscretion of the national statesmen and generals, and are only safe if they are held in trust for the wider world community, this conviction will modify the surviving sentiments of national pride and national pugnacity and make it easier to accept the new international status. Moreover, if, as the first-fruits of the new order, a sensible reduction of national armaments can be achieved, this lessening of the part which armed force plays within each national economy will be attended by a corresponding increase in the willingness to place the reduced forces at the international disposal. For the root motive of the international policy is the desire of each nation to get a larger amount of security at a smaller cost than under the old order. Those, therefore, who confidently assert that States will not consent on any terms to entrust their national forces to an international command for the maintenance of the treaty obligations under the proposed scheme in effect simply assert the permanency of the reign of unreason in the relations between States.

For though the general agreement of States to submit their disagreements to processes of arbitration and conciliation with pledges to abide by the results would be a considerable advance towards better international relations, even if no sanction beyond the force of public opinion existed to enforce the fulfilment of the obligations, it would not suffice to establish such confidence in future peace as to secure any sensible and simultaneous reduction of armed preparations. No Government would consent to any weakening of its national forces so long as there was danger that some Power might repudiate its treaty obligations. This being the case, the burdens and the perilous influences of militarism and navalism would remain entrenched as strongly as before in the European system, advertising, by their very presence, the lack of faith in the efficacy of the new pacific arrangements. So long as these national armaments remained unchecked the old conception of State absolutism would still survive. There would still be danger of militarist Governments intriguing for aggression or defense in new groupings, and new efforts to tip the balance of armed power in their favor.

It is ultimately to the dread and despair of this alternative that I look for the motive-power to induce nations to make the abatements of national separatism necessary to establish an international society. Whether the end of this war will leave these motives sufficiently powerful to achieve this object will probably depend upon the degree of enlightenment among mankind at large upon the old ideas of States and statecraft.

_J. A. Hobson, “Toward International Government,” pp. 90-100._

ECONOMIC COERCION

[Sidenote: There must be effective penalties for aggression.]

I want to suggest here that the forces of Europe will not be readily deterrent of aggression until the following conditions at least are fulfilled: (a) The forces placed behind a policy the first object of which shall be to deter aggression; (b) aggression so defined as to have no reference to the merits of a dispute between two nations or groups, but to consist simply in taking any belligerent action to enforce a State’s claim against another without first having submitted that claim to international enquiry; (c) the economic pressure which is an essential part of military operations rendered effective by the cooperation of States which do not necessarily give military aid at all; (d) economic pressure so organized as to be capable of prolongation beyond the period of military operations; and (e) the penalties attaching to aggression made so plain as to be realized beforehand by any people whose government tends to drift towards aggression.

If the new Congress of Vienna is effective, these conditions will be fulfilled.

[Sidenote: Offending nation could be outlawed.]

Any arrangement which includes them would partake of the nature of a league of mutual guarantee of integrity, and would be one in which there would be fair hope of economic pressure gradually replacing military force as the compelling sanction. Economic pressure might be that first felt if the outstanding feature of the arrangement were that any constituent State resorting to hostilities as the result of a difference with another, not previously submitted to an international court of enquiry, by that fact caused boycott or non-intercourse to be proclaimed and maintained against it by the whole group. This would not prevent certain members of the group from carrying on military operations, as well, against it. Some of the group would go to war in the military sense—all in the economic sense; the respective rôles would be so distributed as to secure the most effective action. From the moment of the offending nation’s defiance of the international agreement to which it had been a party, its ships could enter no civilized ports outside its own, nor leave them. Payment of debts to it would be withheld; the commercial paper of its citizens would not be discounted; its citizens could not travel in any civilized country in the world, their passports being no longer recognized.

Thus, the outlaw nation could neither receive from nor send to the outside world material or communication of any kind—neither food nor raw material of manufacture, nor letters, nor cables. Money due to him throughout the world would be sequestrated for disposal finally as the international court’s judgment should direct; and that rule would apply to royalties on patents and publications, and would, of course, involve precautionary seizure or sequestration of all property—ships, goods, bank balances, business—held by that nation’s citizens abroad.

It is doubtful whether at the present stage of international understanding this arrangement could be carried beyond the point of using it as a means to secure delay for enquiry in international disputes. Its use as a sanction for the judgments of international tribunals will probably require a wider agreement as to the foundations of international law than at present exists. But a union of Christendom on the basis of common action against aggression would be a very great step to the more ambitious plans.

[Sidenote: Terms of outlawry: the Fabian plan.]

It has, however, been suggested (by the Fabian Society) to use this method as a sanction for the judgment of an international court in the following terms:

In the event of non-compliance with any decision or decree or injunction of the International High Court, or of non-payment of the damages, compensation, or fine within the time specified for such payment, the Court may decree execution and may call upon the Constituent States or upon some or any of them, to put in operation, after duly published notice, for such period and under such conditions as may be arranged, the following sanctions:

(a) To prohibit all postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and wireless communication with the recalcitrant State;

(b) To prohibit all passenger traffic (other than the exit of foreigners), whether by ship, railway, canal, or road, to or from the recalcitrant State;

(c) To prohibit the entrance into any port of the Constituent States of any of the ships registered as belonging to the recalcitrant State, except so far as may be necessary for any of them to seek safety, in which case such ship or ships shall be interned;

(d) To prohibit the payment of any debts due to the citizens, companies, or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national Government; and, if thought fit, to direct that payment of such debts shall be made only to one or other of the Constituent Governments, which shall give a good and legally valid discharge for the same, and shall account for the net proceeds thereof to the International High Court;

(e) To lay an embargo on any or all ships within the jurisdiction of such Constituent State or States registered as belonging to the recalcitrant State;

(f) To prohibit any lending of capital or other moneys to the citizens, companies, or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or to its national Government;

(g) To prohibit the issue or dealing in or quotation on the Stock Exchange or in the press of any new loans, debentures, shares, notes, or securities of any kind by any of the citizens, companies or subordinate administrations of the recalcitrant State, or of its national Government;

(h) To prohibit all imports, or certain specified imports, coming from the recalcitrant State, or originating within it;

(i) To prohibit all exports, or certain specified exports consigned directly to the recalcitrant State, or destined for it.

[Sidenote: Co-operation must be organized as part of international law.]

It should be noted that if the future European coalition means business at all in giving permanent effect to its settlement provisions, the chief Powers would be committed, during any period of war, by virtue of their military obligations, to everything contained in the plan just outlined. All that the project under discussion involves in addition is that (1) certain States interested in the observance of public right, but which, by their circumstances, are not suited to military cooperation, should give economic aid by taking part in the embargo arrangements. They should not be neutral, but should refuse intercourse with the recalcitrant State while according it to the others. (2) That such cooperation should be duly organized beforehand by public arrangement and be recognized as part of the normal measures of international public safety and, being duly recognized in this way, should become part of international law—an amended law in so far as the rules of neutrality are concerned. (3) That the arrangements should include provisions for prolonging embargo or discrimination against an offending State after the period of military operations had ceased.

[Sidenote: Boycott would threaten offending nation after the war.]

The first point that occurs to one, of course, in considering such a plan is that it has proven ineffective in the present war since this condition of non-intercourse is exactly that in which Germany now finds herself, and it is not at all effective.

To which I reply:

1. That Germany, as already pointed out, is not yet subject to a condition of complete non-intercourse, since from the beginning of the war she has been receiving her mail and cables and maintaining communication with the outside world, morally an immensely important factor. Nor is it entirely moral. Large supplies have, despite the naval blockade, come to her through Scandinavia and Holland.

2. That, though of slow operation, it is the economic factor which in the end will be the decisive one in the operations against Germany; as the ring tightens and a necessary raw material like cotton is absolutely excluded, the time will come when this fact will tell most heavily. If the non-intercourse had been world-organized the effect would have operated from the first. Incidentally, of course, America and England, between them, control the cotton of the world.

3. The effect of the suggested embargo, boycott or economic pressure would be most decisive as a deterrent to aggression, not so much by what it might be able to accomplish during a war as by what its prolongation would mean to the aggressor afterwards.

_Norman Angell, “The World’s Highway,” pp. 318-324._

WORLD-ORGANIZATION AND PEACE

[Sidenote: Types of social organization.]

The end of armed conflict is conceivable as the result of either of two achievements. Permanent peace may come either upon the establishment of successful means for the settlement of disputes or upon the elimination of the causes which produce disputes. This paper is limited to discussion of the second of these alternatives....

In large-scale organizations purposefully created because of their utility, history discloses few in which that utility, in its broader aspect, has been appreciated by all of the cooperating members. Only in organizations approaching a pure democracy has an approximation to such conditions been attained. In other forms of organization, force or reward has been employed to gain the cooperation of persons outside a limited number of organizers, who alone have appreciated the full utility of organization. Even in democracies, however, when population is too large for all to participate in government, it is possible only for the majority of the members of the organization to exercise control over general policies; executive functions are of necessity delegated. Thus three sub-forms of the utility type of organization are to be distinguished. They may be termed respectively the organizer-force, the organizer-reward, and the democratic-control-expert-executive forms.

Brief analysis and appeal to history will serve to indicate the relative stability of these forms, both with respect to each other and to the sympathy type of organization.

[Sidenote: Peace cannot come from the organizer-force system.]

Of the organizer-force form the slavery system and the militaristic empire are examples. Neither of these systems, however, has inherent stability. Both run the danger of revolt. The militaristic empire breaks down sooner or later because unlikeness of peripheral regions causes local patriotism to assert itself whenever there is possibility of success. Slavery does not survive the growth of intelligence. Governments of the organizer-force form, moreover, have to face the constant threat of revolution. If Germany be cited as a possible exception, the reply is, that special conditions have stimulated the loyalty of the Germans to their sovereign. Germany was unified but recently and then only by war. Her people have not yet wholly overcome the distrust of one another engendered by long-standing local differences. Germany has thus required a strong hand to create and to preserve her unity. In addition, the Germans, not altogether without reason, have believed themselves surrounded by hostile nations. These conditions sufficiently account for the exception. It must not be overlooked, however, that even in Germany there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the form of organization of her government. Thus the briefest examination of the organizer-force form of organization discloses the futility of expecting permanent international peace to result from an extension of this form throughout the world. Even in its local manifestations this form exhibits inherent instability and lack of harmony.

[Sidenote: The organizer-reward and democratic systems.]

The organizer-reward form of organization also appears to have its own peculiar tendency towards instability. This was true of the feudal systems of the past, and is true of the great business corporations of to-day, both of which are examples of the organizer-reward form. In the feudal system the reward offered by the organizers in return for service was protection; in modern industry the reward is a money wage. In both cases, however, when subordinate members of the organization have been ignorant, there has been some tendency towards the exploitation as well as the utilization of such members. To the extent, however, that intelligence has developed, there has been less and less voluntary continuance of organizations whose utility has been thought by the subordinate members to be limited to one class in the organization. Force has been met by force. Since intelligence is increasing, it is not fortuitous that the great internal problem of advanced nations is the control of such exploitive industry as exists, while the great political problem of less advanced nations is the struggle for democracy. In both cases the struggle is to prevent the organizer-reward form from becoming the organizer-force form and to replace the instability and the lack of harmony of these forms by the greater stability and greater harmony of the democratic-control-expert-executive form. Far more than is the case in the other utility forms, the democratic form directs its policies with a view to the welfare of all its members. Minorities are represented on the executive staff. All members of the organization participate in control. The danger of dissatisfaction on the part of non-executive members is reduced to a minimum.

[Sidenote: National homogeneity means strength.]

The most striking fact, however, with respect to the question of the relative stability and harmony of the various forms of organization is that the largest and the most permanent relatively harmonious organizations that have appeared among men are those great modern nations whose inhabitants live in a unified area of characterization and are essentially alike in language, race, customs, traditions and religion. Homogeneity in all these respects, it is true, does not as yet exist even on a national scale and there is certainly no prospect of such homogeneity on a world scale in the near future. These considerations must not blind us to the fact, however, that England, France, Spain, Germany, Russia, Italy, the Scandinavian nations, the United States, Japan and China—the largest and internally the most harmonious organizations yet known to man—are each composed of individuals the vast majority of whom are relatively alike in language, customs and traditions, and for the most part in race and religion. Nations that are markedly heterogeneous in the characteristics mentioned, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Balkan States and European Turkey, are notoriously unstable. Furthermore, the stability possessed by the various utility-form organizations that exist within or among the stable nations of the world is, in large part, the result of the stability and permanence of the nations themselves. The stability of all three of the utility forms thus rests upon the inherent stability of the sympathy type of organization.

If the foregoing analysis be correct, certain propositions of great importance for the problem of international peace may now be stated. First, nationality on the basis of sympathy is likely to persist for an indefinite period. Second, because of the ignorance of the inhabitants of a number of important nations, the organizer-force and the organizer-reward forms of government and of business organization are also likely to persist, for a considerable period, in various parts of the globe. Third, where the organizer-force or organizer-reward form of organization is superimposed on nationality, readiness to maintain harmony with other national groups can exist only when such international harmony is to the interest of the organizer class in each of such nations. Where the democratic-control-expert-executive form prevails, readiness to maintain harmony with other national groups can exist only when such international harmony is to the interest of each nation so organized, taken as a whole.

[Sidenote: Peace will follow increasing like-mindedness among the nations.]

These propositions mean that, under present conditions, permanent world peace can be produced only if in the organizer-force and in the organizer-reward nations the organizer is less interested in personal fame than in the welfare of the whole organization, if the organizing class does not seek aggrandizement or if the organizing class is willing to permit a peaceful transition within the nation to the democratic-control-expert-executive form of organization rather than to seek perpetuation of its own control through foreign war. They mean also that such peace can be maintained only if democratic nations can be kept free from that trooping of emotion which sometimes suddenly sweeps vast bodies of men into unreasoning demand for aggressive action, and if the interests of such nations lead them to desire international peace....

_Let there be produced sufficient likeness among the peoples of the world, and harmonious organization based on sympathy will follow of itself._ If there be created a sufficient likeness among all peoples in ideals of progress, in the desire for the betterment of the entire human race, and in other equally important mental and moral respects, then world harmony, based on sympathy, will ultimately develop in the same way that the present harmony within homogeneous nations has resulted, in large part, from a sympathy spontaneously created by resemblance in race, language, religion and customs.

That final permanent international peace can come, however, only on the basis of world-wide like-mindedness is the chief contention of this essay. If this contention is correct, advocates of international peace must not only adopt policies calculated to produce like-mindedness, but must not shrink from the endeavor to produce the central executive organization—the natural result of like-mindedness, and in itself, if established, a creator of like-mindedness.

From the standpoint of producing like-mindedness it is of comparatively small moment what one of a number of possible projects is used for the initial attempt. It is of supreme importance only that the project chosen should be the one most likely to succeed in evolving common response and cooperation.

[Sidenote: Action be taken towards securing this like-mindedness.]

The practical suggestions which follow, therefore, are based on these two notions: first, the desirability of creating like-mindedness among the peoples of the world on a plane above race, religion, language and customs; and second, the desirability of creating a central executive organization, so far as possible responsible to the peoples behind each national government, rather than responsible to constituent governments. They suggest action on the basis of combining the two most stable forms of harmonious organization, namely, the sympathy form growing out of like-mindedness, and the democratic-control-expert-executive form of the utility type.

The first suggestion under the principles thus outlined is that there be established a world consular staff, to assume some at least of the functions of the present national consular services. The first duty undertaken by a world consular service would be to systematize, for the benefit of business the world over, such investigations as are now carried on in a somewhat haphazard way by each national consular service. By centralization, much duplication of effort would be eliminated and a much more comprehensive plan of investigation carried out. The results, as now, would be available for all business men of all nationalities. From the beginning, so far as possible, the chief executives of such a consular staff should be elected by the people of each nation, rather than appointed by governments—the purpose of this being to create in each voter the world over, some sense of participation in a world-undertaking, and to some extent a sympathy with other voters the world over. The cost both of the consular service and of the election of the executive officers of the service should be met, not by appropriations from national governments, but by a fixed percentage of the revenues of each nation. The usefulness of the service itself to all the people of the world would be, eventually, the guarantee that the contribution of this percentage would be maintained. Proposed changes in the percentage would ultimately have to be submitted to the voters of all peoples.

[Sidenote: A world consular service.]

The suggestion as thus outlined is an ideal not likely to be soon realized, but it is possible that some beginning toward a world consular service could be provided for by the peace treaty to be signed at the close of the present war. Such a beginning might well be a provisional world-chamber of commerce, organized on the basis of constituent national chambers, the character and organization of which should be provided for in the treaty. The subject will hardly receive notice during the peace negotiations, however, unless, as the result of previous publicity and discussion, the possibilities of world organization latent in the proposition are fully realized.

[Sidenote: World-bureaus for conservation and human betterment.]

The second suggestion for the production of world-wide like-mindedness is that there be undertaken a world investigation into the natural resources of the earth, and that a central world-conservation investigation commission be created. At the present time the conservation movement is organized on national rather than on world-wide lines, and the natural result is to strengthen local rather than international sympathy. The principle of scientific management would become much more effective if adopted from a world standpoint. Moreover, there is no reason why the results of a world-wide conservation investigation should not produce recommendations that, through appeals to the peoples back of the national governments, the governments themselves would be forced to heed. The machinery for the conservation investigation might develop out of the world consular service or become a part of the work of that service.

The third suggestion for the production of world-wide like-mindedness is that there be established a central bureau of advice and information on all “human betterment” projects. Thus far we have not advanced beyond the point of developing national bureaus of commerce and labor, hygiene, child welfare and other similar interests, and of holding “international congresses.” A permanent world bureau would be far more systematic in the dissemination of knowledge of successful experiments. It would also tend to create world sympathy. With increasing prestige the bureau would naturally extend its functions to those of recommendation and advice to national and local governments.

The fourth suggestion is that there be established a permanent world commission on international migration. At the present time problems of migration, such, for example, as those of the Japanese and Chinese to the United States, are settled by the nations primarily interested, without recognition of the fact that migration is essentially a world problem in which all humanity has an interest. The local problems of migration that arise from time to time are but a part of an age-long movement of population which is gradually producing an equilibrium between density of population and natural resources in every part of the world. Movements between two nations, however, will never be settled on reasons other than local. A world commission would at least work toward a world-policy in this possibly the most important of world-problems.

[Sidenote: World-publicity, and world monetary-systems.]

The fifth suggestion is that these and all other projects for the creation of the world-mind and centralized organization be furthered by utilizing all the modern methods of the commercial “accelerator of public opinion,” the publicity agent and the advertiser versed in psychologically efficient methods. There should be an adequate world-publicity service, the task of which should be to develop like responses to the proposed projects in the populations back of governments, and by publicity methods to develop that like-mindedness which is essential for world-wide organization on the sympathy basis.

The development of many other projects similar to those outlined above, it is apparent, would inevitably tend toward the production of centralized organization with many departments. Separate world organizations for different purposes could not long exist without integration. The central organization would inevitably assume the duties of the international postal union; it would create a world monetary system; and it would assume the functions of an international court. With increasing prestige, such an organization would gain greater and greater moral power. Resting on like-mindedness in the populations back of national governments, it would ultimately develop a world-loyalty and find its recommendations enforced by the moral sense of the world. Force, except for local police purposes, would not be needed.

[Sidenote: Peace proposals should inaugurate like-mindedness.]

The final suggestion based on the preceding analysis is that the principle underlying these projects be adopted as at least one of the fundamental propositions for the guidance of peace negotiators at the close of the present war. Peace should be established not upon the basis of the interests of victorious nations alone, nor even upon the combined interests of victors and vanquished, but upon the basis of the future welfare of all peoples. The inauguration of policies for the production of like-mindedness might well be provided for in the peace treaty itself. National boundaries should not be set on a basis which will intensify national self-sufficiency and aloofness, but on a basis which will encourage inter-communication and the development of like-mindedness throughout the world. Moreover, the choice of national representatives for the peace negotiations should include men capable of taking the world-view rather than the exclusively nationalistic view. Representatives of the neutral nations should be admitted to the proceedings. A popular demand that these representatives be of the world-mind type should be created immediately by publicity methods. So far as possible, practical projects for the creation of the world-mind and world-organization should be provided for in the treaty of peace, and as a guarantee of good faith no indemnity other than a pro-rata contribution for the maintenance of these projects should be exacted. Provision should be made also for permanently meeting the cost of such projects, by agreement that a definite percentage of national taxes be set aside for the use of the world organizations created by the treaty. In short, an authoritative and intelligent beginning toward world-organization should be made at the close of the present war.

_A. A. Tenney, “Theories of Social Organization,
and the Problems of International Peace,”
Political Science Quarterly, March, 1915._