Chapter XV: Appendix: Peace Proposals and Programs (3)

2. Since no readjustment of the kind can take place in Europe on national lines, it is necessary to seek the solution, first, by the apportioning of all uncivilized parts of the globe, that is, by a readjustment of colonial possessions, then by the creation of spheres of influence and non-interference with nations who are willing to take and to concede such spheres; further, by an open door and equal opportunity policy all over the globe; and finally, by the neutralization of all the seas and narrows, cables and overseas mails of the world. This readjustment must be sanctioned by a simple and codified international law, safeguarded so that it cannot be broken without putting the infractor outside the pale of international relationships, not only with the party attacked, but also with all the parties remaining neutral. England must give up her rule of the seas, which must be placed definitely in the hands of all the Powers of the world. World trade must be free and all colonies neutralized. The decision whether there is to be a free and neutralized sea or a Chinese wall will also be decisive regarding the fate of Belgium. If the sea remains fortified, there can be no choice for Germany except to have her own sea fortresses as well, and since the only way of getting out into the high sea would be by way of Belgium, there would be no possibility of Germany’s considering the return of Belgium to its former status.

PROF. DR. L. QUIDDE ON REAL GUARANTEES FOR A DURABLE PEACE

[Sidenote: Prof. Dr. L. Quidde.]

I. _The annexation of Belgium would prolong the war indefinitely._

II. _The strength of the German Empire would decrease instead of increase by the annexation of Belgium, in times of peace as well as during the war._

_The annexation of Belgium would destroy every outlook of a better understanding between Germany and her present enemies, after the war. It would make almost the whole rest of the world remain our enemies and would call forth a coalition of all against one. Germany need not foster illusions in this respect, if she only considers the effect of the invasion into Belgium upon public opinion throughout the world, especially in those neutral countries who were originally Germany’s friends._

_He who wishes to annex Belgium must have the courage to face the fact that annexation will make the whole world our enemy for an indefinite space of time and will completely isolate Germany politically, so far as the feelings of the nations are to bring about such isolation._

III. _The annexation of Belgium is bound to bring about a new war._

It is evident that neither England nor France can allow Belgium to be annexed by Germany as long as they do not wish to be annihilated themselves. Especially England would have to prepare retaliation with all the force that she can display, and it would be easy enough for her to find allies to support her. One may differ vastly on the subject of annexation, its advantages and drawbacks, but one cannot deny that durable peace and annexation of Belgium are two things absolutely incompatible.

Finally Prof. Quidde asks how it will be possible to make a durable peace which at the same time guarantees the welfare of Germany. This will be first of all a general removal of the causes that have led to the war, followed by a thorough reorganization of Europe on lines offering a better security for peace.

The first essentials for that reorganization are the “open-door” and the “free sea,” which will have to be guaranteed by international treaties.

One of the best grounded charges against International Law is, that International Law is in many cases so hopelessly rudimentary that the lack of precision forms a temptation to violate it. It is necessary that a strong agitation for the development, perfection and sanction of International Law should result from the experiences, the causes and the course of this war.

ED. BERNSTEIN ON PEACE TERMS

I

[Sidenote: Ed. Bernstein.]

It is the vital interest of the majority of the German nation, that the present war should end by a peace treaty which, as to the rights and the relations of the nations, is in conformity with the principles laid down in the program of the German Social-Democrat Party and in the resolutions adopted by their party-meetings and by the International Social-Democratic Congresses.

Only a peace based on these principles will result in renewing the friendly relations between Germany and the nations she is now at war with, as soon and as thoroughly as possible.

II

The supreme principle, insisted upon in the program and the resolutions of the Social-Democratic Party is the right of peoples to decide their own fate, within the limits of international law.

The German Socialists consider it their duty to defend this principle by all available means against any attack from any side whatsoever. No nation or part of a nation having so far enjoyed national independence, may be deprived of this right or see it impaired; no territory may be annexed, when the annexation would deprive the inhabitants of that right.

The Social-Democratic Party do not admit the right of conquest of one nation over any other.

III

In the case of countries of European civilization, which have lived under foreign rule, no territorial changes shall take place without a referendum being taken of the inhabitants. This referendum should be arranged and supervised by representatives of neutral States, so as to insure perfect freedom in voting. Any inhabitant, who is of age and has lived in the country for at least a year before the outbreak of the war, shall have the right to vote.

In the interests of peace, all peoples of European civilization living under foreign rule in sufficient numbers to form a community in the international Concert, shall obtain political independence.

When a sufficient number out of subject peoples incorporated by force in one State, desire to belong to another, they shall be given the right to decide by vote as to which State they will belong.

IV

Transfer of territory outside of Europe shall only take place under such conditions, as guarantee that the legal and material conditions of such native population shall not be injured.

V

Nations can only be safeguarded against a renewal of war or wars of retaliation by developing and strengthening international law.

In this respect the following means should be emphasized:

_a._ Development of the Hague Conference into a Permanent International Conference for the Codification of International Law and for International Arbitration. Concentration of the various Hague institutions into a permanent international court, suitably divided into branch courts.

_b._ All States to bring those differences they cannot themselves peaceably solve, before the Court of Justice to be instituted by the Hague Conference, where they will be settled either by mutual agreement, conciliation or arbitration.

_c._ All signatory States to refrain from war or warlike measures till the Court of Justice has examined the cause of war and till all attempts to settle the difference in a peaceful manner, have proved useless. Any State or Union resorting to hostilities contrary to these rules to be treated as an enemy by all the others.

_d._ The Parliaments to decide about war and peace. Secret treaties to be abolished.

_e._ Development of International Law relating to the conduct of war and the protection of the civil population. Abolition of the right of capture at sea and of the right to levy war-contributions. No hostages to be taken. Abolition of the system of reprisals against inhabitants of an invaded country for acts of self-defense or defense of other non-combatants. Permanent committees to watch the actions of belligerents in occupied territories and the treatment of prisoners of war and of civil prisoners interned in the enemy’s country.

_f._ Internationalization of transcontinental railways and of all waterways connecting seas or lakes surrounded by different countries, with the ocean.

_g._ Adoption of the principle of the Open Door for all Colonies, Protectorates and for every territory which lies in the sphere of influence of an European State.

_h._ These principles to be inserted into the constitutions of the Powers.

BELGIUM

Whereas, Art. 2 already excludes any forcible annexation of Belgian territory or any attack on the independence of Belgium by another State, Germany has moreover invaded Belgium, overpowered its army and occupied its territory without any provocation from the side of Belgium and as the Chancellor has himself admitted violating the neutrality of Belgium in defiance of the law of nations. Germany having thus made her way into Belgium to satisfy her own designs, beat down the resistance of the army and occupied the country by force, Germany is therefore bound in honor to evacuate Belgium immediately on the conclusion of peace, in accordance with the solemn declaration, made on August 4, 1914, by the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky, to the English Secretary of State, Sir Edward Grey, and to pay a full and ample indemnity to the people of Belgium for the material and moral injury which they have suffered.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS

5. FRANCE

FRENCH GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR

[Sidenote: C. G. T.]

1. Federation of nations.

2. Compulsory arbitration of international disputes.

3. Independence of nationalities. Right of all peoples to dispose of themselves to be safeguarded.

4. Suppression of secret diplomacy.

5. End of competitive armament.

6. Conference of organized labor forces of the world at same time as conference of diplomats.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS

6. SWITZERLAND

RESOLUTIONS OF SWISS PEACE SOCIETY

At Annual Meeting, May 17, 1915.

[Sidenote: Swiss Peace Society.]

1. The avoidance of any annexation or territorial changes which are in opposition to the interests and wishes of a population; a guarantee of religious liberty, free speech and equality before the law, for the minority.

2. The creation of a permanent organization in which all European States shall be equally represented, for the purpose of safeguarding the order, peace and safety of our portion of the earth.

3. The development of an international law organization by continual Hague Conferences.

SWISS COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF A DURABLE TREATY OF PEACE

_President_: Prof. Otto Nippold, Bern.

[Sidenote: Swiss Committee for Study of Peace.]

1. Participation of neutral nations in the settlement.

2. Prohibition of secret treaties and agreements between nations.

3. Participation of popular representative bodies in control of foreign policy.

4. No annexation except after plebiscite of populations concerned.

5. Limitation of armaments to point of mere protection.

6. Manufacture of armaments to become State monopoly.

7. The States which participate in the settlement are to mutually guarantee each other’s territories.

8. Since the best guarantee for the preservation of world peace lies in the creation of international law and custom, arbitration must be substituted for war.

9. Disputed regions of the earth should be neutralized.

10. Free trade in all colonies.

PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS

7. HOLLAND

NEDERLANDSCHE ANTI-OORLOG RAAD

The Hague

Founded on the 8th of October, 1914

[Sidenote: Dutch Anti-War Council.]

The Council is of opinion that the following principles are indispensable to attain a lasting peace:

1. Concert of the Powers instead of mutually opposed Alliances;

2. Limitation of armaments by international regulations;

3. Influence of the different Parliaments on the peace-treaty;

4. Avoidance of the dangers engendered by annexation or by transfer of territory against the will of the population;

5. Removal of the obstructions to commerce or at least of difference in treatment of the various nations in colonies and settlements, according to international regulations.

6. New endeavors to promote compulsory arbitration and compulsory inquiry of international differences.

DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY FOR AMERICA

One would prefer to think otherwise, but the truth probably is that the future peace of the world, and the nature of international organization depends a good deal less upon definitely conceived plans like that of the League to Enforce Peace (however admirable and desirable it may be to promote definite projects of that kind) than upon the nature of the foreign policy which each nation individually pursues. Disagreements between nations arise generally in situations in which both sides honestly believe themselves to be in the right. Most nations are honestly in favor of peace in general, and would go to The Hague and assist in drawing up plans to maintain it; yet each may be persisting in a line of conduct which, in its own view entirely defensive and defensible, appears to another unwarrantably aggressive. And when that is the case paper arrangements for avoiding conflict are apt to break down.

So the most practical question for each of us for some time is likely to be this: what will be the effect of our own country’s conduct in its relations with other countries, upon the future peace and international condition of the world? Or, to put the question in another form: What can our country _do_, irrespective of what others may do, to contribute to a more orderly international condition, saner world politics?

America is of course concerned in the present war whether she will or no. She may, by her material resources in supplies, ammunition, credit, be largely influencing its decision. As part of the problem of protecting her own rights, incidentally menaced by the operations of the war, she has taken very solemnly a certain position in international affairs. She has declared, for instance, that she stands irrevocably for the protection of innocent non-combatant life at sea in war time. She would undoubtedly stand as decisively for certain lesser rights of trade and free communication on the seas as well (in the past she has gone to war in their defense) but for the fact that doing so against one belligerent would aid the cause of the other guilty of still greater offenses.

And if we look beneath diplomatically expressed claims into unofficial, but unmistakably expressed public opinion, we find America standing strongly for certain other rules of life between nations—the right of each nation to national existence for instance—like those violated in the invasion of Belgium.

Is America really serious in the stand thus made? Or is she going to avow by her future policy, if not in words, that she will take no real risk nor assume any real obligation in support of the principles she has been maintaining diplomatically and by her clearly expressed public opinion. Is she going to submit lamely, to the indignities and violation of right involved in the massacre of her innocent non-combatant citizens at sea?

I put the question in that form because it is generally a rhetorical prelude to the demand for warlike action. And yet the American who is moved by his country’s dignity and right to have thought this thing out, as well as to have become angry about it, knows that warlike action is perhaps the very last thing—though it may be the last thing—which the situation calls for; and that warlike action alone would be a betrayal of his country’s highest interests in the matter. If America is really serious she must prepare herself—in public opinion, in political education—for action of a different kind: for the abandonment of certain traditions about freedom from entangling alliances, for the assumption of risks and obligations which to most Americans is to ask a great deal more than the mere act of going to war.

Why will war of itself not suffice?

Suppose this country goes to war, over, for instance, the submarine issue; and is finally entirely successful, so far as defeating Germany is concerned. How do we then know that America has got what she has been fighting for? Our demands at the end of the war will be that American rights at sea shall be respected; that, most particularly, non-combatants shall not be drowned by attacks on merchantmen. Very good. Germany gives us her promise. She has given it before. How do we know that it will be kept—either by her or any other nation that in a future war may find a ruthless use of the submarine the only weapon left to it against a power commanding the sea? Can we hope that if we show now that we are ready to fight “at the drop of the hat,” in future a hard-pressed belligerent will be overawed by the great American navy? Then why is not the belligerent we now propose to deal with held in check by the combined navies of Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Japan and Portugal? Again, when we have that promise at the end of our victorious war how do we know that it will be kept, that we shall have got what we have been fighting for?

And what of the American case against the Allies? Is America now to surrender rights upon which she has insisted ever since she became an independent State and which she once fought a war and twice very nearly came to war to defend? Is America, in fighting Germany to make the British Order in Council the basis of future sea law, so that when say Japan goes to war with some other nation America will have to submit to Japanese control of her trade and communication with neutral States—even to mail and banking correspondence—as she now submits to British control?

It is quite obvious that American claims have this difference from those of the Allies: they, in so far as they are territorial can at the peace be satisfied on the spot. America’s cannot. Hers depend absolutely upon the establishment, after the war, of a different and better international order; upon agreement as to what shall constitute international law and some method of ensuring its observance.

Now has it not become evident that the present German-American situation contains the elements of a great opportunity for America: not only of putting an end to a situation humiliating for herself but of creating a new state of world affairs out of which might grow—would almost inevitably grow—the restoration of general peace on conditions that civilization could accept?

But that result is certainly conditional on one thing: that American diplomacy is great enough to make precedent, to be dangerously honest to the point of dropping diplomatic make-believe and breaking with diplomatic usage.

Germany says in effect that she will make military sacrifices for the purpose of respecting American neutral right, if America on her side will reciprocally fulfil neutral obligation by insisting on the military sacrifice from _both_ belligerents; so that American rights are not made a means of handicapping one party as against the other; are not invoked in what Germany regards as so one-sided a fashion as to become an arm for the use of one belligerent against the other.

Now it is quite within precedent, right and usage, to reply, as in the past, to such a demand by diplomatic punctilio: “America cannot discuss the behavior of one belligerent with the other,” and so forth and so forth. The American government could make excellent debating points and be diplomatically entirely correct.

But suppose, instead, it were undiplomatically honest and unprecedentedly bold and said bluntly what every one knows to be the truth: that because of the slowly acquired American conviction of the badness of the German cause—the danger to civilization and ourselves which this country has come to believe inherent in that cause—it is impossible for America to enforce the law—or what America holds to be the law—sharply against England, to take any action which would seriously add to the chances of German victory; to be, in other words, really neutral. Suppose America bold and honest enough to avow the quite simple obvious truth that we are not indifferent as to the outcome of the war and that in the long run our conduct won’t be guided as though we were; that so long as we have reason to believe German policy a menace it will encounter in one form or another (not excluding necessarily even the military form) our active or latent opposition.

And then, suppose that on top of that impossibly bold and honest stand this country were further to announce that it can only act effectively for the sea law Germany desires, and otherwise withdraw its opposition, if Germany is prepared to reassure us as to her cause by stating definitely that the terms upon which she is prepared to discuss peace include such things as the evacuation of Belgium and France and indemnification for damage done; the acceptance of the international principles involved in the American claims; recognition of the absolute right to existence of all States great and small; readiness to enter, at least to the extent that others are ready, into European or world arrangements for the guarantee of that right and the mutual discussion and limitation of armaments; together with such minor details as agreement to the appointment of an international commission to enquire into the violation of the laws of war on land and sea and the punishment of the individuals convicted by that commission.

Once convinced that Germany stands for a policy such as peace on those terms would imply, America could on her side (so this impossibly honest diplomacy might make plain) stand effectively for the freedom of the sea as against England if needs be at least to the extent of upholding the Declaration of London; could assure Germany that this country would never be reckoned among her enemies, but on the contrary would co-operate with her in defense of that equality of commercial opportunity in the world of which Germany accuses her enemies of trying to deprive her.

Such a “Declaration of America’s International Position” as that which I am here imagining would, in more precise terms, be about as follows:

1. Though America since the outbreak of the war has done
everything possible to observe the form of neutrality which
international practise had heretofore imposed upon States not
actively participating in a war, the circumstances of the
present conflict have shown that the future protection of her
own particular interests are so identified with the maintenance
of certain general rules of international intercourse that in
all future wars she will differentiate in her treatment of
the combatants. Thus in no case will American resources be
available for the military purposes of a belligerent who had
entered upon a war refusing to submit his case to enquiry and
the necessary delay, and to adhere to certain rules necessary
for the safeguarding of innocent non-combatant life.

The United States could not in consequence feel that her
relations with Germany could be placed upon a really sound
foundation of friendly cooperation until that country had

(a) accepted the international principles (as for instance the
sanctity of non-combatant life) involved in the American claims
and the further principle that their violation is an unfriendly
act towards America whether American life and property are
concerned or not;

(b) undertaken to evacuate Belgium, France and Serbia and
indemnify Belgium for damage done;

(c) agreed to the appointment of an international commission of
inquiry into the violation of the rights of non-combatants on
land and sea, with authority to assess damages, and to payment
of any damages in which Germany may be cast, and to punishment
of individuals convicted of offenses against the laws of war.

On the acceptance of these terms by Germany, America would undertake:

A. Not to furnish military or naval aid to Germany’s enemies in
this war.

B. To become one of the guarantors of the integrity of Belgium.

C. In the event of the creation of new buffer States, to assist
in the maintenance of their inviolability by refusing to allow
American citizens to furnish their invader with supplies of
any nature: by the application, that is, of the principle of
differential neutrality above indicated.

D. To accord to German citizens in protectorates subject
to American control, commercial access on equal terms
with American citizens and to support by the differential
neutrality already indicated the policy of the open door in
all protectorates and non-self-governing territories. That
is to say America would undertake not to furnish military or
naval aid to any power or group of powers that refused to apply
the principle of the open door in their protectorates, and to
prohibit the export of supplies or munitions to such powers in
their military operations.

E. To join, _pari passu_, with other powers in any arrangement
for enforcing the submission of international disputes to
enquiry.

Now whatever followed that announcement America and the world would gain. If Germany refused she would by that prove that she was still unchastened, not ready to surrender or modify her policy of world hegemony. America then knows that her fears are justified. She is definitely warned of a fact which sooner or later she will have to face if it is really a fact. And it is obviously far better that it should become patent to America (and the world) now, than later (after a possibly patched up peace). Indeed, on grounds simply of sheer national security America should attempt by some such means to establish now, when Germany is relatively helpless so far as damaging us is concerned, where she stands, what America faces. It would enable her to make her future policy definite and objective.

But suppose Germany, realizing at last that it is impossible to maintain a national policy which during the next generation or two will have to meet not only the opposition of the Western democracies of Europe and the potential forces of Russia, but all that North America might during the next generation develop into, accepts? What if the German government were pushed by the best elements of the German people to take the opportunity thus so publicly offered for putting themselves right with the world and starting afresh on a more workable basis?

If that happened—which after all is the most probable thing of all—America, without striking a blow, would have secured from Germany the main thing for which the Western democracies are now fighting. Not only would she have laid the foundation for the future protection of her own sea rights in the only way in which finally they can be protected—by an international law that is a reality because rooted in a real international order—but she would have helped win the battle of democracy by bringing about a discussion of terms before the democratic nations have bled themselves white.

Never in history had a nation such an opportunity. But to take it means breaking with routine, employing a new method, a new manner; great governmental boldness, great political honesty. And all that is, perhaps, too much to ask.

But that is no reason why we should not face the fact that on those conditions the opportunity is there. Nor why those most responsible for the direction of American public opinion should not help the nation to realize it.

NORMAN ANGELL.

INDEX

Algeciras, 30.

Alliances, 135 ff, 144, 166;
prohibited, 94, 250, 266.

Alsace-Lorraine, autonomy of, 245, 260.

American School Peace League, program of, 267.

Angell, Norman, 33, 34, 82, 326.

Annexation, 76, 249, 306, 308, 311, 316, 322, 325.

Arbitration, 249, 251, 254, 262, 271, 306, 324;
compulsory, 262, 322, 325.

Armaments, export of, 266;
limitation of, 99, 124, 246, 248, 249, 250, 256, 262, 265, 266,
267, 271, 276, 277, 297, 300, 301, 306, 310, 322, 323, 325;
national manufacture of, 102 ff, 250, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 271,
277, 299, 300, 301, 324.

Armed Peace, 121.

Australian Peace Alliance, program of, 300.

Autonomy, 249, 254, 262, 275, 306, 318, 322.

Backward peoples, 22.

Balance of Power, 94 ff, 124, 265, 277, 301.

Bauer, Otto, 35.

Belgium, restoration of, 245, 260, 262, 274, 301, 320;
indemnity, 321;
and Germany, 58, 316, 320.

Berlin Conference of 1885, 29.

Bernstein, Ed., 317.

Bosphorus, neutralization of, 245.

Boycott, economic, 155, 174 ff, 186.

Brailsford, H. N., 302.

Bund Neues Vaterland, program of, 306.

Butler, Nicholas Murray, 275.

Buxton, Charles Roden, 301.

Capital, export of, 14, 21, 256.

Causes of war, 3, 5, 109, 265, 268.

Central “human betterment bureau,” 196.

Central Organization for a Durable Peace, program of, 247.

Chamber of Commerce of U. S., program of, 276.

Charte Mondiale, 248.

Citizen Army, 310.

Coercion, international, 130, 133, 134, 155, 160, 174, 184, 251, 255,
264, 270, 276, 293.

Concert of nations, 98, 106, 267, 268, 322, 325.

Commercial privilege as cause of war, 5.

Commission on International Migration, World, 196.

Concessions, 24.

Conference of organized labor, 322.

Conservation Commission, World, 195.

Constantinople, neutralization of, 274.

Consular Service, World, 194.

Council of Investigation and Conciliation, 128, 248, 249, 264, 276,
285, 298.

Council of States, 225, 249.

Court of International Justice, 248, 249, 264, 265, 271, 276, 297,
300, 311, 319.

Dardanelles, neutralization of, 245.

David Starr Jordan, program of, 273.

Democracy, political, 310; industrial, 272, 300.

Democratic Control of foreign policy, 89 ff, 109, 245, 248, 249, 250,
251, 254, 255, 257, 262, 266, 268, 271, 277, 297, 298, 299,
300, 306, 319, 323, 325.

Dernburg, Dr. Bernhard, 314.

Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft, program of, 306.

Dickinson, G. Lowes, 82.

Diplomacy, 22, 67 ff;
secret, 90, 245, 261, 262, 322.

Drago Doctrine, 19.

Dutch Anti-War Council, program of, 325.

Economic Imperialism, 7, 15 ff, 23 ff, 35.

Education, reform of, 249, 257.

Fabian Society, program of, 186, 278.

Far East, commission to study problems of, 269.

Federation of nations, 106, 114, 172, 203, 265, 267, 268, 271, 310,
322, 323, 325.

Ford, Henry, 243.

Foreign policy, democratic control of, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251, 254,
255, 257, 262, 266, 268, 271, 277, 297, 298, 299, 300, 306,
319, 323, 325.

Freedom of nationalities, 50, 249, 254, 262, 275, 306, 318, 322.

Freedom of the seas, 7, 10, 245, 248, 256, 274, 306.

Freedom of trade, 6, 11, 250, 265, 274, 298, 311, 314, 315, 324, 325.

General Confederation of Labor, program of, 322.

German policy, 111 ff.

Great Britain, as example of federalism, 114, 228.

Great Society, the, 222.

Guarantees, 57, 60, 245, 270, 324.

Hague Conference, 150, 248, 256, 270, 323.

Haase, 312.

Imperialism, 7, 15, 23, 35, 110.

Indemnities, 271, 310, 321.

Industrial democracy, 272, 300.

International Congress of Women, program of, 250.

International Bureau of Peace, program of, 249.

International Council, 277, 278, 280.

International Government, 18, 31, 64, 120, 179 ff, 246, 249, 256,
265, 271, 274, 278, 299, 310.

International High Court, 186, 278, 288.

Independent Labor Party, program of, 33, 296.

International law, 221 ff, 264, 265, 268, 276, 306, 314, 319, 320,
323.

International Parliament, 161, 249.

International Peace Commission, 298.

International organization, 29, 194, 276, 306.

International police force, 152, 181, 249, 264, 265, 268, 271, 310.

International Secretariat, 278, 287.

Justiciable issues, 290.

Kautsky, Karl, 40.

Language, guarantee of, 248.

League of Peace, 78, 79, 85, 120, 131, 135 ff, 143 ff, 165, 169, 270.

League to Enforce Peace, 148, 160, 264.

Like-mindedness, 193.

Loans for war, prohibition of, 186, 267.

Mediation, continuous, 243, 254.

Militarism, 123.

Military service, 109, 152, 266, 301.

Minorities, rights of, 61, 249, 275.

Monetary System, World, 197.

“Most favored nation,” 311.

Nationality, 47, 192, 217;
freedom of, 249, 254, 262, 275, 306, 318, 322;
respect for, 254, 267.

National Peace Convention, program of, 264.

National Peace Council, program of, 298.

Naturalization, 269.

Neutral Conference for Continuous Mediation, program of, 243.

Neutralization of straits and canals, 10, 265, 271, 310, 311, 314,
315, 320;
of disputed regions, 324;
of Constantinople, 274;
of colonies, 315.

Neutral States in peace negotiations, 249, 268, 269, 323.

Non-intercourse, 265.

“Open Door,” the, 4, 250, 306, 320 (see Freedom of trade).

Patriotism, 217 ff.

Pacifism, 164.

Peaceful penetration, 23.

Permanent Credit Bureau, 20.

Persia, guarantees for, 60.

Philadelphia Conference of League to Enforce Peace, 170.

Plebiscite in transferred territory, 76, 87, 244, 247, 249, 251, 254,
266, 267, 271, 277, 297, 298, 299, 300, 310, 318, 323.

Preparedness, 269.

Poland, autonomy of, 245, 260.

Press, reform of, 74, 249.

“Principle of the Commonwealth,” 227.

Private property at sea, 265.

Publicity organization, World, 197.

Quidde, Dr. L., 316.

Reform Club of New York, memorandum, 4, 10.

Religious liberty, 248.

Rights-of-way, economic, 60.

Scandinavia, guarantees for, 60.

Serbia, autonomy of, 245.

Slovene Unit, guarantees for, 60.

Small States, security of, 77, 143, 274, 275.

Socialism, 35, 272.

Socialists, allied nations, program, 259;
German and Austro-Hungarian, program, 306;
South-German, program, 310;
German party, program, 310, 311;
neutral nations, program, 261;
American party, program, 271;
and imperialism, 33, 38.

Social organization, forms of, 189.

“Spheres of influence,” 15, 83.

State, theory of the, 70.

Status quo ante, 310.

Straits, neutralization of, 245, 265.

Suffrage, universal adult, 266;
woman, 249, 251, 254, 255, 257, 268, 271, 298.

Swiss Committee for Study of a Durable Peace, program, 323.

Swiss Peace Society, program, 323.

Switzerland, example of federalism, 114.

Tariff restrictions, 6, 82.

Trade as cause of war, 9.

Trades unions, organized against war, 300.

Transfer of territory, 76, 87, 244, 247, 249, 251, 254, 266, 267,
271, 275, 277, 297, 298, 299, 300.

Treaties, secret, 245, 248, 249, 250, 257, 306, 323.

Union of Democratic Control, program, 33, 86 ff, 277.

Union of International Associations, program of, 248.

United States, example of federalism, 114, 228.

Vorwaerts, 36.

Walling, Wm. English, 39.

West African Conference, 29.

Women, as delegates to peace conference, 251, 258, 259;
Committee for Constructive Peace, program, 259;
International Congress of, 250;
suffrage, 249, 251, 254, 255, 257, 268, 271, 298.

Women’s Peace Party, program of, 33, 268.

World Congress, 246, 298.

World Peace Foundation, program of, 266.