Chapter XXVI: Part I: ; and thirdly, that I rejected a policy of withdrawal from the (4)

ROSENBERG: It certainly referred to this local manpower, and in a conference which I had with Sauckel in 1943 and which is also in evidence as a document here but which was not submitted today, reference was made to it. Sauckel stated that by order of the Führer he would have to raise a large number of new workers in the East and that in this connection, I am thinking of the Armed Forces most of all who had been, as he expressed it, hoarding workers who might instead have been active in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did Sauckel have anything to do with the recruitment of workers, which took place in connection with the germanizing of the East?

ROSENBERG: I cannot quite understand this question. What do you mean in this case by “germanizing”?

DR. SERVATIUS: The SS undertook the resettlement in the East. In connection with this manpower was shifted. Was this manpower allotted to Sauckel upon his request?

ROSENBERG: First of all I do not know exactly which resettlement you are talking about.

DR. SERVATIUS: A report has been presented to me which concerns the Jews who were sent into Polish territory. I assume that they reached your territory, too.

Do you not know about that?

ROSENBERG: Based on my own knowledge, I can say only that this concentration of the Jewish population from Eastern Germany, in certain cities and camps in the East, was carried out under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the German Police, who also had this assignment for the Occupied Eastern Territories. In connection with the resettlement in camps and with the concentrations in ghettos, there probably also developed a shortage of labor or something like that. I merely do not know what that has to do with Germanization.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Before we adjourn, I should like to know what the position is about the Defendant Frank’s documents. Does anybody know anything about that?

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I wish to say that insofar as we are concerned, we have been in consultation with Dr. Seidl for the Defendant Frank as well as the representatives of the Soviet prosecuting staff. We are prepared to be heard at any time that the Tribunal would care to hear us on the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then, Dr. Thoma, how many more witnesses have you got and how long do you think you will be in the Defendant Rosenberg’s case?

DR. THOMA: I have only one witness, Your Honors, the witness Riecke. I believe that as far as I am concerned, he can be examined in one hour at the most; I do not think it will take as long as that. After that, it depends on the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, yes; then you may finish the Defendant Rosenberg’s case tomorrow?

DR. THOMA: It depends upon the cross-examination.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. Then, Dr. Seidl, will you be able to go on at once in Frank’s case? Supposing we finish Rosenberg tomorrow—tomorrow is Wednesday, is it not? Will you be able to go on on Thursday morning in Frank’s case?

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I can start with Frank’s case as soon as Rosenberg’s case is finished. As far as the documents are concerned, there was difficulty regarding only one document and I have foregone the presentation of this one document. But apart from that, these documents have for the greater part already been presented by the other side.

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one document in question, we can hear you upon it now. As I understand you, you have only one document about which there is any difference of opinion.

DR. SEIDL: That has been settled already because I have given up presentation of this document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There is no further difference of opinion?

DR. SEIDL: There is no further difference of opinion.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then you are perfectly ready to go on?

DR. SEIDL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the documents been translated yet?

DR. SEIDL: As far as I know, they already have been all translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, thank you.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH DAY
Wednesday, 17 April 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The Defendant Rosenberg resumed the stand._]

MR. DODD: Just before recess yesterday afternoon the Tribunal inquired as to the status of the Frank Document Book, and when I informed the Tribunal that we were prepared to be heard Dr. Seidl advised that we had a pact to which we had agreed. I was not aware of that at the time. I think we were both a little bit in error. The situation is that last night about 6 o’clock we did reach an agreement so that there is no difficulty at all about the Frank books.

DR. THOMA: I would like to make a brief correction. Yesterday I spoke about the request for a document on the setting up of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg. My client has repeatedly asked me to bring in this document. However, there is a possibility that I confused this document with other documents which I requested, but which were not granted. I just wanted to make that correction.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You do not want to do anything more than just make that verbal correction? Very well.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other defendant’s counsel who wishes to ask any questions?

DR. HAENSEL: Witness, you were the Plenipotentiary of the Führer for the ideological objectives of the NSDAP and its affiliated organizations. Are you of the opinion that what you did as Plenipotentiary of the Führer in carrying out your duties and everything you said and wrote for these aims and for the systematic so-called ideological combating of Jewry may be considered as an official outline of the activity of the Party and its affiliated organizations?

ROSENBERG: If I may answer this long series of questions one by one I would like to say the following: My office, as far as ideological education was concerned, worked with the SS Main Office for Political Training. We were, of course, in constant contact with them. The so-called “guiding pamphlets” of the SS, which appeared as an instruction periodical, were read in my office. I myself had it repeatedly in my hands, and during these years I found that in this Office for Political Training, in these periodicals, a great number of very valuable articles with mostly very decent ideas was contained. This is one of the reasons why, through all these years, I did not enter into any conflict with the SS.

As far as the Jewish question is concerned, the objective as to this problem was expressed in the program of the NSDAP. That is the only official statement which guided the Party members. Anything which I said about it, and what others wrote about it, were just reasons that were set forth. Certainly much of that was accepted, but as far as the Führer and the State were concerned these proposals were not binding rules.

DR. HAENSEL: Was the objective of your fight against Jewry limited? Did you envisage that the Jews were to be eliminated from economic and State administration, or did you from the first have a vague notion of stronger measures, such as extermination, _et cetera_? What was your objective?

ROSENBERG: In agreement with the Party program, I had the one objective in mind—to change the leadership in the German State as it existed from 1918 to 1933! That was the vital aim. As to elimination, even from economic life, we did not talk about it at that time; and yesterday I already referred to two of my speeches—which are available in print—in which I declared that after the end of this harsh political battle an investigation or examination of the problem would have to take place. There was even earlier talk about the demand for Jewish emigration from Germany, quite rightly. Later, when matters became more critical, I expressed this idea again in conformity with the proposals of very prominent Jewish leaders that German unemployed be deported to Africa, South America, and China.

DR. HAENSEL: Then, following your train of thought of yesterday and today, one could differentiate three kinds of measures against the Jews: First, until 1933—up to the seizure of power—were the propagandistic measures; second, after 1933, those measures which found their expression in the anti-Jewish laws; and then, finally, after the outbreak of the war certain measures which without doubt can be considered as Crimes against Humanity. Do you agree with this tripartite arrangement?

ROSENBERG: Yes, it is approximately right.

DR. HAENSEL: Then I would like to call your attention to Group 2, that is, to those measures which were instituted after the taking over of power, and which were laid down in laws against the Jews. Did you participate in the formulating of the laws?

THE PRESIDENT: You are counsel, are you not, for the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What have those questions got to do with the SS?

DR. HAENSEL: The questions concern the SS in the following way: If the Party as a whole had the objective of a clearly formulated anti-Jewish legislation, which was in the beginning quite orderly, then the SS was bound to this objective and for the time being had none beyond that point. I wanted to establish when the legislation and the measures against Jews turned into criminal acts, and that up to that time the SS in no manner took criminal measures against the Jews.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he said already that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program, and that is all that you want, is it not?

DR. HAENSEL: I wanted only to show that the fact that the Jewish problem was contained in the Party program does not prove that it was in the Party program as a Crime against Humanity. In the Party program there was simply a general sentence which I do not believe can be construed as a Crime against Humanity. In addition to that, there must be...

THE PRESIDENT: That is a matter of construction of the Party program. It is not a matter for him to give evidence about. It is in a written document—the Party program is contained in the written documents.

DR. HAENSEL: But, in addition to the Party program, a great number of decrees and laws were issued later which expanded the Party program, and the question...

THE PRESIDENT: They are also documents which this Tribunal has to construe—not for this witness to construe.

DR. HAENSEL: The question is, insofar as the defendant can tell us, how far the SS participated in the carrying out of these regulations.

THE PRESIDENT: He can tell us the facts. He cannot tell us the laws or the interpretation of documents. If you are asking him about facts, well and good; but if you are asking him to interpret the Party program or to interpret the decrees, that is a matter for the Tribunal.

DR. HAENSEL: Very well.

[_Turning to the defendant._] In your books you advocated the objective that all Germans should be unified in a Greater Germany, and that point is also set down in the Party program?

ROSENBERG: Yes.

DR. HAENSEL: Did you believe that this was possible only through the preparation for a war, or did you believe that it was just as possible through peaceful means?

ROSENBERG: In the beginning of my testimony I referred to a speech of mine made before an International Congress in 1932. Here this proposal was expressly approved by the Führer to the effect that the four great powers should investigate and examine the entire European problem. This proposal said that we would give up all claims to German colonies, to Alsace-Lorraine, to the Southern Tyrol as well as claims to the separated German...

THE PRESIDENT: We have heard all this before from the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop, and we said that we did not want to go into it again. In any event, it has nothing to do with the SS—nothing directly to do with the SS.

DR. HAENSEL: [_To the defendant._] Just one more question. Do you know that the SS, as far as the Jews were concerned, followed secret aims and objectives, others than those that were published officially?

ROSENBERG: That I learned here.

DR. HAENSEL: You do not know that from your own knowledge?

ROSENBERG: No.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, I have one single question to put to you. Under Document 091-PS the Prosecution submitted a letter which you, as the Chief of the Einsatzstab Rosenberg, sent to Dr. Seyss-Inquart in his capacity as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands. In that letter you demanded that the library of the so-called Social Institute at Amsterdam be handed over to you. I do not know whether you recall this library. It was rather voluminous and of Socialist-Marxist content. The Prosecution did not submit the answer given by my client. Therefore, I have to ask you: Do you remember this matter and what answer did Seyss-Inquart give you?

ROSENBERG: I remember this library very well, for I was told about it. To my knowledge it represented the establishment of a spiritual center of the Second International in Amsterdam, in which the history of social movements in various countries was to be summarized in a library, so that on the basis of this scientific material now a spiritual political fight, a scientific fight...

DR. STEINBAUER: Very well. We want to be brief, and you know what I am talking about. What answer did you receive? Did Seyss-Inquart permit this library to be transferred to Germany, or did he demand that it remain in Holland?

ROSENBERG: It was at first agreed that this library would remain in Holland, and that the cataloging and classifying of this collection, which was not yet classified, was to take place in Amsterdam. In the course of the next few years this took place in Amsterdam. Only in the year 1944, when either the invasion had already begun or was surely imminent, when bombing attacks also increased in this area, part of this library was taken to Silesia; the other part, to my knowledge, did not get through, but remained in Emden; and the third part, I believe, was not removed.

DR. STEINBAUER: Is it then correct that Seyss-Inquart prevented the taking away of this library from the Dutch working class?

ROSENBERG: Yes, that is correct.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?

MR. DODD: Before we begin our discussion of some matters that we would like to go over, I wonder if you would be good enough to write your name a few times on these pieces of paper, both in pen and in pencil.

[_Paper, pen, and pencil were handed to the defendant._]

Would you write “A. Rosenberg,” please, with pen, and “Alfred Rosenberg” with the pen; and would you handwrite the first initial of your last name with a capital?

Now, would you do the same thing with pencil on another piece of paper, “A. Rosenberg” in pencil, “Alfred Rosenberg,” and the first initial of your last name?

And then would you do one thing more, please. Would you print the first initial of your last name?

[_The signatures were passed to Mr. Dodd._]

Now, yesterday afternoon, while you were on direct examination through your own counsel, you stated before the Tribunal that you did have a discussion with Heinrich Himmler, the Reichsführer SS, about concentration camps, and if I remember correctly, you said that that was some time in 1938; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes. I testified that I discussed the concentration camps with him once, but I cannot say with certainty that it was in 1938, as I did not make a note of it.

MR. DODD: Very good. He offered to have you go through one or the other of these camps, Dachau or some other camp; is that so?

ROSENBERG: Yes, he then told me that I should take a look at the Dachau Camp.

MR. DODD: And you declined the invitation?

ROSENBERG: Right.

MR. DODD: And I understood you—if I recollect correctly, you said because you were quite sure that he would not show you the unfavorable things that were in that camp?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed more or less that in case there really were unfavorable things, I certainly would not see them anyway.

MR. DODD: You mean that you simply assumed that there were unfavorable things; that you did not know there were unfavorable things?

ROSENBERG: I heard this through the foreign press and it is about...

MR. DODD: When did you first hear that through the foreign press?

ROSENBERG: That was already in the first months of 1933.

MR. DODD: And did you continuously read the foreign press about the concentration camps in Germany from 1933 to 1938?

ROSENBERG: I did not read the foreign press at all for unfortunately I do not speak English. I received only some excerpts from it from time to time, and in the German press there were occasional references to it with the strict declaration that these allegations were not true. I can still remember the statement by Minister Göring in which he said that it was beyond his comprehension that something like that could be written.

MR. DODD: But you thought they were true to the extent that there were unfavorable things in that place that Himmler might not show you.

ROSENBERG: Yes, I assumed that in such a revolutionary process surely a number of excesses were taking place, that in some districts also on occasion there might be conflicts, and that the fact that murders of National Socialists in the months subsequent to the seizure of the power continued most probably resulted in sharp countermeasures here and there.

MR. DODD: Did you think that was still going on in 1938, these measures against the National Socialists?

ROSENBERG: No. The chief reports upon the continuance of murders of members of the Hitler Youth, of the Police, and of members of the Party were made especially in 1943 and 1944, but I do not remember that many reports still were published about this in subsequent years...

THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 1943 and 1944 or 1933 and 1934? Which is it?

ROSENBERG: 1933 and 1934, excuse me.

MR. DODD: But, in any event, in 1938 you had some knowledge in your own mind which made you think that it would not be profitable for you to inspect these camps because some things were going on there that would not be shown to you. Now, that is so, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: No; but I said very frankly that under some circumstances excesses might be taking place, and I talked to Himmler about this matter so that he in any case knew that we were informed about such things from abroad and that he should watch his step. Only once did I receive a complaint directly myself.

MR. DODD: Now, turning to another matter, we also understood you to say yesterday that when you wrote your book, _The Myth of the 20th Century_, you expressed your personal opinion and you did not intend it to have any great effect upon state affairs. Is that a fair statement of your testimony of yesterday with respect to your book?

ROSENBERG: I did not quite follow the last sentence. I must say, I wrote _The Myth of the 20th Century_ during the years 1927 and 1928 approximately, after certain historical and other preliminary studies. It was published in October 1930 with an introduction to the effect that this was a purely personal opinion, and that the political organization of which I was a member was not responsible for it.

MR. DODD: Very good. I will ask that you be shown Document 3553-PS. That is also, if Your Honor pleases, Exhibit Number USA-352. It is already in evidence.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, you wrote a preface or a little introduction for that edition of that book. It is right there before you. You said in it:

“To the 150,000th copy: The _Myth_ has today drawn deep,
ineffaceable furrows into the emotional life of the German
people. Every new edition is a clear indication that a decisive
spiritual and mental revolution is growing into a historical
event. Many things which in my book seemed to be a peculiar idea
have already become a reality of State policy. Many other things
will yet, I hope, materialize as a further result of this new
vigor.”

You wrote that?

ROSENBERG: That is certainly entirely correct. This book of 700 pages does not concern only those points of which I am accused here. This book deals with a large number of problems, the problem of the peasants, of the world states, of the concept of socialism, of the relation between leadership, industry, and labor, a presentation of the judgment...

MR. DODD: Now, just a minute. I don’t think it is necessary for you to give us a list of the table of contents of the book. I simply asked you if you wrote that introduction.

ROSENBERG: Yes, of course.

MR. DODD: Now, with respect to the well-known forced labor program. I think it is perfectly clear to everyone who has been in attendance at these sessions before this Tribunal, and of course to yourself, that there was a forced labor program in effect, or a so-called slave labor program, both in the East and in the Western occupied countries. Isn’t that a fact?

ROSENBERG: Yes, the law of 21 March is concerned therewith with workers from the occupied countries who were to be taken to Germany. In Germany there was also a compulsory labor law.

MR. DODD: Now, there are only two possible offices under the then German State which can, by any stretch of the imagination, be held responsible either in part or altogether for that forced slave labor program. Isn’t that so? Two principal offices, at least.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And they were your own ministry and the office of the Defendant Sauckel. That is pretty simple. Is that true or not?

ROSENBERG: It is correct that Gauleiter Sauckel had been given the authority to pass orders to me and to all the supreme Reich authorities. It was my duty to make known and carry through these orders in the Occupied Eastern Territories according to my powers, my judgment, and my instructions.

MR. DODD: Did you carry out the compulsory labor directives under your ministry, force people to leave their homes and their communities to go to Germany and to work for the German State?

ROSENBERG: I fought for about three-quarters of a year for this recruitment of workers in the East to be put on a voluntary basis. From my record of a discussion with Gauleiter Sauckel still in the year 1943, it is very evident that at all times I made efforts to do this. I also mentioned how many millions of leaflets, of posters, and pamphlets I distributed in these countries so that this principle would be carried through. However, when I heard that if the number of German workers who had to go to the front could not be replaced, the German Army reserves would be at an end, then I could not protest any longer against recruitment of certain age-classes, or use of local authorities and forces of the gendarmerie to assist in this work. Yesterday I already ...

MR. DODD: What you are telling us is you tried to get them voluntarily and you found they would not go, so then you forced them to go. Isn’t that so?

ROSENBERG: That coercion took place here is true and is not disputed. Where an excess took place—and some terrible excesses took place—I did my utmost to prevent it or alleviate it.

MR. DODD: All right. You, of course, had promulgated an order in your own ministry concerning compulsory labor, had you not?

ROSENBERG: Yes. In the beginning, a general compulsory labor service law was promulgated.

MR. DODD: That’s right, on the 19th of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: It may be that it was promulgated about that time.

MR. DODD: Well, you can accept that as being so, I think, that that is the date of your decree concerning compulsory labor, the compulsory labor, significantly—I want to make this very clear to you—in the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: That order was promulgated by you as the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I ask that you be shown Document 1975-PS. It is Exhibit Number USA-820, already in evidence—not in evidence, I’m sorry. I am now offering it.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

I don’t care to stress this document too much except to have you verify the fact that this is the order which you promulgated, and in the first paragraph with the small Figure 1, you stated, “All inhabitants of the Occupied Eastern Territories are subject to the general liability for work according to their capacity.” And I wish to point out the paragraph under that small Number 1, with the Number 3, where you say, “A special ruling is drawn up for Jews.” That is the 19th day of December 1941.

ROSENBERG: The document which has been submitted to me is signed by the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine and is concerned with a skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. I ask that I be shown the skeleton law of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories in order that I may judge correctly the carrying-out provisions issued by the Reich Commissioner.

MR. DODD: Well, we can make that available to you. This is taken from the official gazette of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. You are not disputing, are you, the fact that you promulgated this order and that these two paragraphs I read to you were in it?

ROSENBERG: That I am not disputing.

MR. DODD: All right. If you care to look at all at the other paragraphs and at other parts, I will see that they are made available to you, but for the present purposes I can assure you there is no trick in connection with this.

I want to move on to another document.

ROSENBERG: I would like to refer to just one point. Under Paragraph 1 it says expressly that people not completely able to work are to be used according to their capability for work. This shows the state of health had been considered.

MR. DODD: Yes, I read that to you.

Now, you had a permanent state secretary by the name of Alfred Meyer, isn’t that so?

ROSENBERG: I do not find anything here regarding the laws about Jews. There was a point mentioned about the directive for Jews, only it is not here.

MR. DODD: You will find it just below the sentence to which you made reference a minute ago, two paragraphs below it. There is a Figure 3 in parentheses and then this statement: “A special ruling is drawn up for Jews.”

Don’t you find that there?

ROSENBERG: I do not find it here—oh, on this page, yes. That refers to another law, yes.

MR. DODD: That’s all right. I just asked you if it was there, and it is. Let’s go on.

I asked you if you had a permanent staff secretary by the name of Meyer, Alfred Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: I want to show you Document 580-PS, which will become Exhibit Number USA-821. Now, this is an order from your Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and it is signed by your permanent staff secretary, Alfred Meyer, and it is addressed to the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, a man by the name of Lohse, L-o-h-s-e, and also to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, a man by the name of Koch about whom we have heard a good deal in this Trial.

I want to have you agree, if you will, that the order calls for 247,000 industrial workers and 380,000 agricultural workers.

Now, I want you to turn specifically to Page 2 of the English translation and to Page 2, as well, of the German text, and Line 14 of the English text and Line 22 of the German text. The paragraph has before it the Figure 6, and it says:

“The workers are to be recruited. Forced enlistment should be
avoided; instead, for political reasons, the enlistment should
be kept on a voluntary basis. In case the enlistment should not
bring the required results and there should be a surplus of
workers still available, use may be made in case of emergency,
and in agreement with the Commissioner General, of the decree
dated 19 December 1941 concerning the introduction of compulsory
labor in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Promises...”

So that this order, signed by Meyer of your staff, directing the Reich commissioners in the Eastern Occupied Territories, was founded on your decree of 19 December 1941 for compulsory labor.

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, you read the introduction, and from that we can see also that my deputy clearly tried in every way to avoid forced enlistment and, as he says, the enlistment was to “be kept on a voluntary basis.” That is proof of what I already said yesterday, that Meyer, my permanent deputy, most emphatically tried to work along these lines, and lastly this does not refer to arbitrary measures but rather to a general compulsory labor law in the Occupied Eastern Territories which would prevent hundreds of thousands who could neither work nor study from wandering about idly in the streets. I would however like to read also the end of the paragraph, and that says:

“Promises which cannot be kept may not be given, neither in
writing nor verbally. Therefore, the announcements, posters, and
appeals in the press and over the radio may therefore not
contain any untrue information in order to avoid disappointment
among the workers employed in the Reich, and thus reactions
against future recruitment in the Occupied Eastern Territories.”

I think a more legal attitude in the midst of war is not at all thinkable.

MR. DODD: Very good. All I am trying to indicate here, and to see if you will not agree with it, is that you, nevertheless, despite these remonstrances and these objections which we do not deny that you made, did authorize your people in the Eastern Occupied Territories actually to conscript and force people to come to work in Germany, and you did it on the basis of your own decree. That is the point I am trying to make with you.

ROSENBERG: A compulsory labor law was issued by me at the end of 1941 for the territory of the Reichskommissariat concerned, that is, for the Ostland and for the Ukraine. The compulsory recruitment of this manpower for the Reich was not taken until much later, and compulsory labor service in the occupied countries was, in my opinion, legally necessary so that on the one hand no wildcat recruitment would take place, and also to prevent chaos resulting from the hundreds of thousands loitering in the streets.

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. You are giving a long paraphrase for the one word “yes,” which is the answer you ought to have made.

ROSENBERG: When compulsory labor service was also instituted for the Reich, I said that I was in favor of voluntary enlistment. I could not persist in this attitude for long and therefore, of course, I agreed that then also compulsory labor laws would have to be instituted. I already admitted that three times yesterday; I have not disputed it.

MR. DODD: Yes, I know you repeated it three times yesterday and again this morning. In your own defense document—Rosenberg-11, I think it is—which is the letter that you wrote to Koch on the 14th of December 1942—I don’t think it will be necessary to show it to you again; I think you saw it yesterday—you specifically mentioned to Koch the matter of picking up people from lines in front of theaters and off the streets, those people who were attending movies and matters of that sort. You knew that was going on under your decree of compulsory labor, didn’t you? You were objecting to it, but you knew it was going on.

ROSENBERG: Excesses are connected with every law, and as soon as I learned of excesses, I did take steps against them.

MR. DODD: Very good. Now, finally, with respect to this forced labor matter, would you say as a matter of fairness and honesty that your ministry was not very largely responsible for this terrible program of forcing people from their homes into Germany, or do you say that you must accept a very considerable responsibility for what happened to these hundreds of thousands of people out of the Eastern occupied areas?

ROSENBERG: I, of course, will take the responsibility for these laws which I issued, and for any framework of directives which were issued by my ministry. The territorial governments were legally responsible for their execution. Where they went beyond these measures—they were 1,500 kilometers away from me—I concerned myself with every case. Many exaggerations were made and excesses also took place. I admit that terrible things did occur. I tried to intervene, to apply punitive measures and because of this quite a number of German officials were taken to court and were sentenced.

MR. DODD: Leaving aside the terrible things that happened to people, assuming that no great violence took place, the very fact of forcing them against their wills to leave is something else that you will accept responsibility for, I assume.

ROSENBERG: Yes, indeed.

MR. DODD: And you also feel that a considerable part of this...

ROSENBERG: [_Interposing._] I accept the responsibility due to a State law which empowered Gauleiter Sauckel to place these claims to me which I applied in legal form to the Eastern territories.

MR. DODD: Briefly, I want to remind you, while we are on this subject, that you acknowledged yesterday that you did consent to the taking of children as young as 10, 12, and 14 years old and removing them to Germany, and I think you told us that at first it did disturb you, but when you found out there were happy recreational circumstances, your mind was eased. Is that a fair statement of your position on forcing those children from the East?

ROSENBERG: No, that is not correct. I do not know just what the translation of the document was, but the opposite was true. I wanted to prevent anything from happening in any action in the operational zone which might, under certain circumstances, be of gravest importance for many children. Then, upon the request of the Army Group Center—which anyway would have done it on its own—I took over the care of these children on condition that I take most scrupulous care of them and care for their own mothers, that they have contact with their parents, and so that they might be returned to their homeland again later on. That is certainly the exact opposite of what the Prosecution has submitted from this document here.

MR. DODD: Well, I don’t want to dwell much longer on it except to remind you that that document which you have seen and which you discussed yesterday states, among other things, that by removing these children out of the East you will be doing more than one thing; you will be destroying the biological potentiality of those people in the East. That is what you approved among other things, isn’t it?

ROSENBERG: Yes. That is contained in the first point of the Prosecution and it was already read. I have made it clear by reading the whole document that my approval did not depend at all on that point, that in the first report I definitely refused that as an argument, and that only after hearing other information did I find a method, for which the women thanked me despite the fact that not I but the Hitler Jugend in Dessau and elsewhere deserve the credit for taking care of them in this way.

MR. DODD: Actually, I understand from all your testimony that, with the possible exception of the little while of which we have been talking, you have been very benign and humane towards these people under your jurisdiction in the Occupied Eastern Territories. You wanted to be very kind to them.

ROSENBERG: I do not want at all to claim for myself any such sentimental phraseology. However, in the midst of this terrible war in the East, which brought with it the continual murder of German employees and German agricultural officials, I only tried to carry on an intelligent policy and to induce the people to heart-felt voluntary co-operation.

MR. DODD: Yes. Now I ask that you be shown Document 1058-PS, which is (Exhibit USA-147.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You now have that before you. It is an extract from a speech which you made with your closest collaborators, and it has been referred to before. It is a speech that you made on the 20th of June 1941, the day before the attack was launched against Soviet Russia. I want to refer to the very first paragraph, and the only one on the paper. It says: “The job of feeding the German people stands in these years without a doubt....”

ROSENBERG: What page is that?

MR. DODD: It is the first page; there is only one page. Oh, you have the whole document. You referred to it yesterday; I think you will be able to find it. It is at Page 8, Line 54. You may recall it; you talked about it yesterday. As a matter of fact, you said it was an impromptu speech. Do you find it on Page 8?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have found it.

MR. DODD: In that paragraph you say, among other things—and I want to call it to your attention for a specific purpose—you say that the job of feeding the German people is at the top of the list, and that the southern regions and the northern Caucasus will have to serve as a balance for the feeding of the German people. And you go on to say that you see no reason why there is any obligation to feed the Russian people with the surplus products of the territory. Then you say, “We know that this is a harsh necessity, bare of any feelings.”

You then go on to say, “A very extensive evacuation will undoubtedly be necessary and the future will hold very hard years in store for the Russians.”

Now, you read us some parts of that speech yesterday that you seemed to think were quite to your credit. Were all parts of the speech impromptu or are you suggesting that only the parts that seem damaging to you now were impromptu?

ROSENBERG: I just used a few key words and gave the speech that way. This paragraph has been read by the Prosecution three or four times. Yesterday when we discussed this speech I myself expressly referred to this paragraph. Beyond that, I admitted that I was told by people connected with the Four Year Plan that it was not certain whether the industry of the Moscow industrial region could be fully maintained after its conquest—here the “wagon factories” are mentioned. Restriction might be necessary to some key industries, and through that a difficult problem in the supply of this area would arise. My remarks pointed out that, of necessity, these unemployed would probably have to be evacuated. I expressly referred to this document, namely, the first document of the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories on this question where, under seven most important points for the civilian administration, Point 3 concerns the feeding of the civilian population. Later in the document it says that famines are to be avoided in any event and that in such a case the population was to receive special rations. I believe that in these hard times, in view of the laws and directives, it was impossible for me to do more than that. My entire political and spiritual position is to be concluded from what I said yesterday about the demand for liberty and culture in the Ukraine, about the sovereignty of the Caucasians, and also about the Russian State and its big...

MR. DODD: All right. I don’t want you to go into all that. I understand you thoroughly, and I think everyone else does. I merely wanted to point out to you that on that early date you did say there would be harsh necessities and that there would be very many hard years for the Russians. That is all. And if you don’t want to acknowledge that you were serious in saying that, as you were in saying the other things, then I won’t press you on it.

I want to turn to document...

ROSENBERG: Mr. Prosecutor, I believe that not much more could have been done for this problem than by planning beforehand how to master the difficulties rather than afterwards. Other occupation forces have had the same experience.

MR. DODD: All right.

I ask that you be shown Document 045-PS, Exhibit USA-822.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

ROSENBERG: Perhaps I might say something more about the translation of this passage. It was translated to me that these measures were to be carried through “without any feeling.” In the original it says “beyond feeling,” or “above feeling.”

MR. DODD: All right, I accept your interpretation; we won’t have any trouble about that. Now, will you please look at this document? This is a memorandum found in your files, for your information.

ROSENBERG: Yes.

MR. DODD: You set out there, in the second paragraph, what you call the aim of German politics, notably in the Ukraine, as having been laid down by the Führer. They are, you say, exploitation and mobilization of raw materials, a German settlement in certain regions, no artificial education of the population towards intellectualism, but the preservation of their labor strength; apart from that, an extensive unconcern with the interior affairs.

Then, moving down a little bit—because I don’t think it is necessary to read all of it, much of it has been referred to in another document—we come down to the 12th line from the bottom of that paragraph. Beginning at the 14th line:

“After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the
Occupied Eastern Territories, I am convinced that German
politics may have their own, possibly contemptuous opinion of
the qualities of the conquered peoples, but that it is not the
mission of German political representatives to proclaim measures
and opinions which could eventually reduce the conquered peoples
to dull despair instead of promoting the desired utilization of
manpower to capacity.”

Then, in the next paragraph, you say:

“If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most
openly and aggressively, in contrast to the others, the
political leaders in the East must remain silent where German
policy calls for necessary harshness. They must remain silent as
to any derogatory opinions which they may form about the
conquered peoples. Yes, a clever German policy may in certain
circumstances do more in the German interest through
alleviations which do not affect policy and certain humane
concessions, than through open, inconsiderate brutality.”

Were you honestly expressing your views when you wrote that memorandum on the 16th of March 1942?

ROSENBERG: This document is correct. It was also submitted to me in the preliminary interrogation. It shows that, although I knew that the Führer had not accepted my more far-reaching proposals, I continued to fight for these more far-reaching proposals. And it shows, further, that I saw the Führer personally, so that a few crazy middle-class people in the East would not make derogatory remarks about other nations whose standard of living may to all appearances have been poor at the time. From the many thousands who came in there, I could not expect either sympathy or antipathy, but I could demand one thing of them if their attitude was contemptuous, and that was to keep it to themselves and to act decently.

In conclusion I would like to add something which is extraordinarily decisive, namely, it says here in the last paragraph, “I ask that the Führer rule on this record and the draft decree.” This instruction is unfortunately not attached to the document; I believe that much would have been proved from it.

MR. DODD: All right. Now let’s turn to Document R-36, Exhibit USA-699.

[_The document was submitted to the defendant._]

You have seen this document before, haven’t you?

ROSENBERG: Yes, I have seen it.

MR. DODD: Now, this is a memorandum submitted to you by one of your subordinates, Dr. Markull, and directly submitted to you by Leibbrandt, also one of your subordinates, one of your top men, on the 19th of August 1942. I want you to follow along with me while I read you certain passages from it.

The first few lines are dated the 5th of September 1942, and it says, “To the Reich Minister; on the premises.” It states that there is enclosed a memorandum containing the opinion of Dr. Markull on the matter of the Bormann letter of the 23rd July.

Before we go into this just for a minute—if you will just pay attention to this—you told us yesterday that you were in disagreement with Bormann about some matters. Is that so?

ROSENBERG: I said...

MR. DODD: Just answer the question. Did you tell us that yesterday?

ROSENBERG: On decisive points I did not agree with Bormann. I testified that in the course of years I was assailed in such a way that, on occasion, I had to give him an appeasing answer. My whole policy was to...

MR. DODD: All right. Let’s look at this document, which is, as I say, a memorandum about a Bormann letter to you, dated the 23rd of July, I assume 1942:

“On 23 July 1942, Reichsleiter Bormann sent the Minister a
letter which enumerates in eight paragraphs the principles which
the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Eastern
Territories.”

It goes on to say that you, in a message to the Führer dated the 11th of August 1942, explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.

The next paragraph says:

“Any person reading this correspondence is struck, first of all,
by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister”—that is
you—“apparently was particularly concerned about two points.
The first relates to the protection of German rule against the
pressure of the Slav race; the second to the absolute necessity
of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive
problems, of which more will have to be said.”

Then there is this statement:

“For the rest, the Minister”—referring to you—“not only raises
no objections against Bormann’s principles or even his
phraseology; on the contrary, he uses them as a basis for his
reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into
practice. When, however, Bormann’s letter was read out by
Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the department chiefs,
grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the
phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our Eastern
policy.”

Then it goes on to say:

“In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is
best to start from a supposition which clearly shows the
prevailing situation.”

Then, under the Number 1, Markull writes:

“Let us suppose Bormann’s letter were issued to the Reich
commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no
means unrealistic since the Minister”—and that again refers to
you—“appears to hold identical views. Since the Ostland
presents a special case, and moreover the Ukraine is, or will
become probably the most important region politically, the
following discussion will mainly be based on that region.”

Then, going on:

“The consequences of a decree of this kind will best be judged
by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into
practice.”

Moving down a little bit, he says:

“Imagine the formulas of Bormann’s letter translated into the
language of a member of the German civilian administration, and
you will get, roughly, the following views:

“The Slavs are to work for us. Insofar as we do not need them,
they may die. Therefore, compulsory vaccination and German
health service are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is
undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion,
the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if
they can count up to 100. At best an education which produces
useful coolies for us is admissible. Every educated person is a
future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion.
As for food, they will not get any more than is necessary. We
are the masters; we come first.”

Then it goes on to say:

“These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary
they are covered, word by word, by the spirit and the text of
Bormann’s letter. Already at this point the question arises
whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the
Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become
known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail already
today.”

Moving on, the next paragraph, with the Number 2, says:

“But there is no real need to assume a fictitious decree as was
done in Paragraph 1. The above-mentioned concept of our role in
the East already exists in practice. The Reich Commissioner for
the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainian people
governed by him in three successive speeches at the
inauguration....”—_et cetera._

And he goes on to quote those speeches, which have been referred to before this Tribunal.

Then, in the next paragraph, he says that every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm this from his own observations, and they show particularly clearly how well the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter. Then he goes on to quote statements that have been made by saying, “To be exact, we are here among negroes; the population is just dirty and lazy,” and so on.

And then, passing on, he says:

“I may add that Kreisleiter Knuth, whom the Gauleiter still
retains in spite of the gravest accusations against his
professional integrity, declared, in conversations on the Kiev
question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics.
Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the
population starved to death.”

Moving on further we come to the third paragraph down. It says:

“Finally among the district commissioners 80 percent oppose the
views described above. In many conferences with the general
commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be
treated decently and with understanding.”

And, that statements opposing such policies as referred to above will result in a catastrophe. That is what the next paragraph says.

And then Markull goes on to say:

“For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the
‘master race’ is to relax the discipline of our officials.”

I will not take the time to read all of it. I am sure you are reading it. Then we move on and we come to this very significant paragraph, with a Number 5:

“However, it must be examined whether there is not in fact an
agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann
letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other
instructions of the ministry are to be understood merely as
tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of
opinion. The Minister’s reply”—I remind you each time the
Minister refers to you—“of 11 August might be considered to
point in this direction.”

Then he goes on to say:

“In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister
knows very well that it is not possible to reorganize a
continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics
and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a
statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political
conditions.”—And so on.

And finally he says:

“Another reason why...”

I want to be fair about this document with you. He indicates that perhaps it should not be interpreted merely as a tactical maneuver, because of the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word “liberation” ought never to have been mentioned and no theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university should be allowed to function.

And finally I would like to read you—not finally—but I would like to read you this significant paragraph. It states—and I think you will allow me to summarize it—that this letter of Bormann’s, which originated from the field headquarters, simply cannot be issued as a ministerial decree, since it would disavow the entire policy hitherto announced by the Minister—yourself.

And in this connection, a few sentences down, says Markull:

“It is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity
between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions
given in the Bormann letter.”

Then, about halfway down the paragraph, it says only you can decide upon this question and he suggests certain considerations which might be useful, recounting some difficulties.

And finally you come, under Number II to the second paragraph: