Chapter XVI: Part 4: , Book 20, as follows (1)

“Although the demoniac can manifest itself in everything
material and immaterial, and indeed be singularly apparent in
beasts, it assumes its most extraordinary form when associated
with man, and constitutes a power which if not contrary to is
yet a disturbing element in the moral world order. There are
innumerable names for the phenomena which are brought to light
in this way. For all philosophies and religions have tried both
in prose and in poetry to solve this riddle and to dispose of
the matter once and for all, which they may well continue to do
in the future. But the demoniac assumes its most dreadful form
when it manifests itself preponderantly in any one human being.
During my lifetime I have had occasion to observe several such
persons, either closely or from afar. They are not always the
most distinguished persons, either in intellect or in talent,
and they rarely excel by their goodness of heart; yet a
tremendous force emanates from them, and they exercise an
incredible power over every creature and even over the elements,
and none can tell how far such influence will extend. No
coalition of moral forces can prevail against them; it is in
vain that the better part of humanity attempts to put them in
disrepute as victims of deception, or as impostors. The masses
are attracted to them. They seldom or never find contemporary
equals, and nothing short of the universe itself, against which
they begin the fight, can overcome them; and these observations
may perhaps have inspired that curious but monstrous saying:
_Nemo contra Deum, nisi Deus ipse_.”

I think I have demonstrated that the fact that he served Hitler does not incriminate Schacht and that it can by no means be concluded from this act that at that time he embodied the criminal deeds of Hitler and his regime into his own intentions. He did not even think them possible. Therefore he followed no dolus eventualis either; on the contrary: Insofar as the violent character of the regime disturbed him he believed he would be able, through his appointment to an important post, to contribute to the abolition and prevention of those attendant phenomena of which he also disapproved, and to aid Germany’s recovery within his sphere of activity in a decent and peaceful manner.

That being the case, not the slightest reproach could be made against him for not only serving Hitler after the seizure of power, but also for helping him to gain control. This latter charge is, therefore, completely immaterial as evidence of criminal behavior or of criminal intent. However, there is no need for this argument at all, since as a matter of fact Schacht did not help Hitler to gain power. Hitler was in power when Schacht began to work for him. Hitler’s victory was already assured when the July elections of the Reichstag in 1932 brought him no less than 230 seats. These represented about 40 percent of the total votes. There had been no such election result for any party for decades. But the immediate political future was thereby established under a Government headed by Hitler, thanks to the very rules of the German democratic Constitution and every other democratic constitution. Any other path was beset with the danger of civil war.

It was only natural that Schacht, who at that time honestly believed in Hitler’s political mission, did not wish to take this path. It was likewise natural that he should take an active part whenever he believed that thereby he might be able to prevent harmful radicalism in the economic political domain. A wise French statesman says:

“Every epoch confronts us in some way with the task of creating
benefits or preventing abuses. For this reason, in my opinion, a
patriotic man can and must serve any government which his
country appoints for itself.”

By serving Hitler, Schacht, in his opinion, was serving his country and not Hitler. This opinion may have been the greatest of mistakes, and it has subsequently revealed itself as completely erroneous as far as Hitler was concerned, yet Schacht can never be criminally charged for acting as he did at that time, neither directly nor circumstantially. And indeed we must not forget that the Hitler of 1933 not only seemed to be a different man from the Hitler of 1938 or even of 1941, but actually was different. Schacht has already referred during his interrogation to this transformation, which was caused by the poison of mass worship. Moreover, the transformation of such personalities is a psychological law. History proves this in Nero, Constantine the Great, and many others. In the case of Hitler there exist many irreproachable witnesses for the truth of this fact, irreproachable in the sense that a purpose or an intention to violate the law, to raise terrorism to a principle, and to attack mankind with a war of aggression, can never be imputed to them. I merely wish to quote a few of them. I could multiply the quotations a hundredfold. In 1934 Lord Rothermere wrote an article in the _Daily Mail_, entitled: “Adolf Hitler from Close By.” I quote only a few sentences:

“The most prominent figure in the world today is Adolf Hitler
... Hitler stands in direct line with those great leaders of
mankind who seldom appear more than once in two or three
centuries ... it is delightful to see that Hitler’s speech has
considerably brightened his popularity in England.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I thought the Tribunal had refused to allow the writings of Lord Rothermere to be put in evidence or used.

DR. DIX: I interpreted the decision of the High Tribunal barring quotations from Lord Rothermere from the document book to mean—and this is also the reason given in the Indictment—that this was a matter for argument which should not be submitted in evidence as a fact, and that it would be irrelevant in the hearing of the evidence that Rothermere and others were of this opinion; and from this I drew the conclusion—and I am still of the opinion today that this conclusion is correct—that in the course of my argument, that is, in the course of my appraisal of the evidence, I could cite passages from the literature of the entire world, insofar as it is known, in order to support a line of thought. That Rothermere said that is not a fact which I want to submit to the Tribunal as evidence, but only in support of the assertion forming part of my argument that not only Schacht but also other intelligent and prominent people, even outside of Germany, at first had the same opinion of Hitler’s personality ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, the Tribunal has already indicated its refusal to allow this to be used as evidence, because it does not pay any attention to the opinions expressed by this author. Therefore, we think it would be better if you went on to some other part of your argument.

DR. DIX: Then I ask—the Tribunal surely has a translation of my final speech before it—that I be allowed to quote a short passage from Sumner Welles, and then a passage, which seems very important to me, from the book written by the last British Ambassador. I should be very grateful if I could quote both of these two passages for, if one wants to prove that even an intelligent man can hold a certain opinion and is entitled to hold it, then I do not know but what the most obvious and convincing proof for that lies in the fact that other intelligent and completely objective people also held the same view. I shall lose an important point of my argument if I am not permitted to quote the two short passages, and I should like to ask that they be heard briefly; it is only the quotation from Sumner Welles and Henderson.

THE PRESIDENT: I have not said anything about Sumner Welles. It was only because we had expressly excluded the writings on this subject of Lord Rothermere that we thought it was inappropriate that you should quote him. I do not think we excluded these other books to which you here refer in your speech and therefore we thought you might go on to that.

DR. DIX: I quote from Sumner Welles’ book _Time for Decision_, published in New York in 1944:

“Economic circles in each of the western European democracies
and the New World welcomed Hitlerism.”

And it is only right, when Great Britain’s last Ambassador in Berlin, even during the war, states on Page 25 of his book:

“It would be highly unjust not to recognize that a great number
of those who joined Hitler and worked for him and his Nazi
regime were honest idealists.”

Further on he makes this interesting remark:

“It is possible that Hitler was an idealist himself in the
beginning.”

And the Government of the United Kingdom would surely never have concluded a naval treaty with Hitler Germany in April 1935, and therewith have contributed in the interests of justice to a modification of the Versailles Treaty, if they had not had entire confidence in Hitler and his Government. Finally, the same holds true for all the international treaties concluded by Hitler, including the treaty concluded with Russia in August 1939. And it is a striking fact, even today, that so intelligent a man of such high ethical standing as the late British Prime Minister Chamberlain declared in a speech as late as January 1939—at a time when Schacht had already long been treading the dark paths of conspiracy against Hitler, in the face of the events of 1938—that he had gained the definite impression from Hitler’s recent speech that these were not the words of a man who was making preparations to plunge Europe into another war. I do not doubt that these words were not spoken as a matter of tactics, but reflected the speaker’s true opinion. Such examples could be quoted in great number. Is it desired to deny to a German, in 1933 and the following years, the right to come to the same opinion about Hitler in good faith?

The fact that Schacht did not enter office as Minister of Economies until after 30 June 1934 is not inconsistent with this either. Only in retrospect does the full enormity of these events become clear. In June 1934 we were still in the midst of revolutionary turmoil, and history will be able to show similar occurrences in any revolution of this kind. I do not have to give detailed proof of this, nor do I wish to do so. The events of 30 June provided just as little, if not less, motive for Schacht to turn away from Hitler with disgust, as they did for the governments in the world who not only continued diplomatic relations with Hitler in full confidence, but also rendered him great honors and allowed him to score important successes in foreign policy, especially after 1934.

If Schacht, however, cannot be criminally charged with the fact that he placed himself at the disposal of Hitler’s Government, it is surely completely superfluous, indeed it would be beside the point, to attempt to make long statements in excuse of individual acts, such as his petition addressed to the Reich President in 1932, or his letter to Hitler in the same year. Anybody who knows life can find a thoroughly natural explanation for them in the fundamental attitude of Schacht. If this attitude is proved to be unobjectionable from the point of view of criminal law and the rules of evidence, then no such documents can be used in argument against Schacht. It is the principle that matters. The same holds true for Schacht’s participation in the so-called meeting of industrialists. On this subject I should only like to remark by way of correction that Schacht neither presided at this meeting nor administered these funds exclusively for the National Socialist Party.

Now one witness here has passed judgment on Schacht’s attitude toward the seizure and consolidation of power during this period:

“Schacht was an untrustworthy person,” he said. “Schacht
betrayed the cause of democracy at that time. I therefore
refused in 1943 to join a Government proposing to overthrow
Hitler with Schacht’s participation.”

This was the former Minister Severing who, according to his own statement, relinquished his ministerial chair and premises on 20 July 1932, when the Berlin Chief of Police and two police officers called on him, demanding his withdrawal with the assertion that they had been authorized to do so by the Reich President. Severing withdrew, as he said himself, to avoid bloodshed. In spite of the great respect which I feel toward Severing’s clean political character, I am forced to my regret to deny him any right to pass competent judgment on statesmen who, unlike him and his Government coalition, did not remain lethargically passive. Severing and his political friends indeed bear a disproportionately greater responsibility than Hjalmar Schacht for Adolf Hitler’s seizure of power because of their indecision and, finally, their lack of political ideas; but they do not have to answer for this to any judge except history. And this responsibility will be all the greater since the witness indeed makes the claim that at that time he had already recognized that Hitler’s accession to power meant war. If one may really believe that he possessed this correct political intuition, then his responsibility, and that of his political friends, will be all the greater in view of their passivity on that and later occasions, and again this responsibility will be disproportionately greater than that of Hjalmar Schacht. Our German workers are certainly no greater cowards than the Dutch. Our hearts rejoiced to hear a witness here describe the manly courage of Dutch workers who dared to strike under the very bayonets of the invading army. The following which Severing and his political friends deservedly had in the German working class might perhaps have induced them not to watch the dissolution of the trade unions with such dull passivity as was the case in 1933, had only their natural leaders such as Severing and his colleagues been a little more daring and willing to expose themselves. In the last resort, the Kapp revolt in 1923 was also overcome by the general strike of the workmen. The Hitler regime was not so strong in 1933 that it did not have to fear the truth of the poet’s words addressed to the workers: “All wheels stand still at your strong arm’s will.” The National Socialist Government at that time was quite well informed about this and was consequently apprehensive. This is also apparent from Göring’s interrogation on 13 October 1945, the transcript of which was quoted and submitted by Professor Kempner on 16 January 1946. Göring said: “You must consider that at that time the activity of the Communists was extraordinarily strong and that our new Government as such was not very secure.” But even this strong arm which I have just mentioned required a guidance which was denied to the working class and for which men like Severing would have been indicated. In all justice they will have to account for their passivity, not before the judge in a criminal court, but before history. I do not presume to pass a final judgment. I confine myself to revealing this problem and to attributing a full and embarrassing measure of self-righteousness to the witness Severing, although I respect him as a man, if he feels himself called upon to accuse others, when studying the question as to who from the view point of history is guilty of the seizure and consolidation of power by Nazism—especially if, in contrast to Schacht, he intuitively foresaw the later evolution of Hitler—instead of submitting himself with humility to the judgment of history, relying on his undoubtedly unimpeachable views and his undoubtedly pure intentions.

Let us always bear in mind, in the interest of historical truth, that especially at the beginning of the Nazi rule there were only two power groups, with the exception of foreign intervention, which could perhaps have liberated Germany, namely, the Army and the working class, provided, of course, that both were under the proper leadership.

I had to go into more detail on this point because such a detrimental remark by such a blameless and distinguished man as Severing brings with it the danger of unjust deductions regarding my client. It would have been agreeable to me if I could have been spared this discussion of Severing’s incriminating testimony. Severing has further brought the charge of political opportunism against Schacht. In politics, to be sure, the boundary between opportunism and statesmanlike conduct dictated by expediency is very fluid. Before appraising Schacht’s conduct in 1932 and 1933 as opportunistic, his past should also have been considered. After 1923 this past lived in the public eye. It has partly been a subject of these proceedings, partly it is already known to the Court. This past speaks rather for the fact that Schacht does what he judges to be right, not only with a great disregard of consequences, but also with great courage. Indeed, he has also proved this courage as a conspirator against Hitler, as is bound to appear from an examination of this activity as conspirator, and as Gisevius expressly described here.

But let us go back with Schacht to the year 1923. At that time he stabilized the mark against all parties interested in inflation; in 1924 he blocked credits against all hoarders of foreign currency; in 1927 he deprived the exchange speculators of the credit basis for their exchange manipulations. From 1925 to 1929 he fought against the debt and expenditure policy of the municipalities and thereby incurred the enmity of all the mayors. In 1929 he signed the Young Plan and thus defied the opposition of the heavy industry circles and continuing this policy, he fought openly since 1934 against the perversions and abuses of the Nazi ideology and never personally carried out a plan or an order which was contrary to his conscience or his sense of justice.

Every statesman must make certain concessions during a time of fanaticism. Certain sticklers for morality—of whom there are many today—who demand a steely hardness for the protection of principles, should not forget that steel has two qualities, not only solidity but also flexibility.

My Lord, I have now finished one particular section; the next one would take longer. I certainly will not finish it until after 1 o’clock. I should be grateful if Your Lordship would call the noon recess now. I am now coming to Appendix Number 1 ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Dix, I think you had better go on until 1 o’clock.

DR. DIX: Your Honors, in the translated copy which you have before you, there are two appendices at the end. I had to employ this device because the matters dealt with in this annex occurred after I had given my speech to be translated. Therefore, I had to work in my comments on this subject somehow, and could only do it by way of an appendix.

And so I now come to the reading of Appendix 1, which is at the back, and to the opinion of the testimony of Gisevius as expressed by my colleague, Dr. Nelte, since I am here concerned with evaluating the testimony of witnesses.

Insofar as my colleague Dr. Nelte criticized the objective reliability of the testimony of Gisevius regarding his statements incriminating the Defendants Keitel, Göring, and so on, I refrain from any statements. The Prosecution may take any standpoint it desires. This is not my task.

But now Dr. Nelte has also attacked the subjective credibility of Gisevius in the personal character of this witness and thus also indirectly the reliability of his testimony concerning Dr. Schacht. This demands a statement of my opinion, and a statement of a very fundamental nature.

Your Honors, it is here that minds part company. A gap that cannot be bridged opens up between Schacht’s standpoint and the standpoint of all those who adopt the train of thought with which Dr. Nelte attempts to discredit the character of Gisevius, the deceased Canaris, Oster, Nebe, and others. I most certainly owe it to my client, Dr. Schacht, to state the following fundamental point very clearly and unequivocally:

Patriotism means loyalty to one’s fatherland and people and fight without quarter against anyone who criminally leads one’s fatherland and people into misery and destruction. Such a leader is an enemy of the fatherland; his actions are infinitely more dangerous than those of any enemy in war. Every method is justified against such a criminal State leadership, and the motto must be: _à corsaire, corsaire et demi_.

High treason against such a State leadership is true and genuine patriotism and as such highly moral, even during war. Who could still entertain the slightest doubt after the findings of this Trial, and finally after the testimony of Speer about Hitler’s cynical remarks regarding the destruction of the German people, that Adolf Hitler was the greatest enemy of his people, in short, a criminal toward this people, and that to remove him any means were justified and any, literally any, deed was patriotic. All those on the defendant’s bench who do not recognize this are worlds apart from Schacht.

I had to make this point in order to clear the atmosphere. After this fundamental clarification I can refrain from refuting details in Dr. Nelte’s attacks against Dr. Gisevius. Insofar as Dr. Nelte fails to see any willingness for active service among these resistance groups to which Dr. Schacht belonged, I need only point to the many hundreds who were hanged on 20 July alone; Schacht numbers among the very few survivors, and he too was to be liquidated in Flossenbürg. I point to the dead victims of the political judiciary of the Hitlerian State whose numbers run into thousands. Truly, the waging of a war of conspiracy against Hitler and the necessity for cunning and dissimulation in connection therewith were no less dangerous to life and limb than exposing one’s self at the front.

During the very fair cross-examination conducted by my colleague, Dr. Kubuschok, Gisevius immediately admitted his mistake resulting from the ban on publication, in the affair of Papen’s resignation. I have nothing more to say about this.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. DIX: May it please the Tribunal, I had concluded with the consideration of the probative value of the statements made here by the witnesses Severing and Gisevius.

Now, on concluding the evaluation of Schacht’s conduct up to about 1935 and entering the period from 1935 to 1937, I would emphasize once more that in order to save time I will not repeat the arguments which were presented to the Tribunal in detail during the cross-examination, as for instance the nonparticipation of Schacht in the legislation which led to the total disregard for international law, because this took place before his entry into the Cabinet. The decisive event for the stabilization of Hitler’s power, the merging of the offices of the Reich President and of the Chancellor of the Reich in the person of Hitler, also lay outside his co-operation and responsibility. By this decree the Army took its oath to Hitler. The Chancellor of the Reich not only had police authority as heretofore but also authority over the Army. It is not my task to investigate who bears the political responsibility and thus the historic guilt for this law; in any case, it is not Schacht.

All the basic anti-Jewish laws were also enacted before he entered into office as a minister. He was completely surprised by the subsequent Nuremberg Laws. The decree dealing with the exclusion of the Jews from German economic life dated 12 November 1938 and the ordinance concerning the use of Jewish property and possessions of 3 December 1938 were issued after he had left his post as Minister of Economics and thus without his active collaboration. The same applies to the decree excluding Jews from the Reich Labor Service, which moreover probably hardly inconvenienced them. The law providing for the death penalty for secret reserves of foreign exchange, the so-called Law of Betrayal of the People, was not directed specifically against the Jews but solely against big industry and high finance; also it was not evolved by Schacht but by the Minister of Finance. Schacht did not want to effect a breach of relations on account of such laws because he believed it was his duty to perform a more important task. In any case, this can hardly be regarded as important, for in the Jewish question Schacht, by his public speeches and his reports to Hitler, showed such a favorable attitude toward the Jews that it would be unjust to disqualify him politically and morally for such a reason, much less from the angle of criminal law. As examples I would remind you of the Reichsbank speech after the anti-Jewish pogrom in November 1938, the speech at Königsberg, the memoranda of the year 1935, and so forth. In the Third Reich Schacht was considered the most courageous and active protector of the Jews. I only remind you of the letter of the Frankfurt businessman, Merton, which was submitted to the Court, and of the illuminating statement of the witness Hayler. According to the latter, when Hayler reproached Himmler for the events of November 1938, he replied that after all it had been the fault of the economic administration that matters had reached such a point. Of a man like Herr Schacht one could not expect anything better than that he should exercise a constant restraining influence in the Jewish question and be opposed to the will of the Party.

In response to my further inquiry Justice Jackson defined this specific charge of the Prosecution as follows: Schacht is not being charged with anti-Semitism, but for activities which have a causal connection with the atrocities committed against the Jews within the framework of the planned war of aggression. Thus it follows that a denial of guilt as to a war of aggression leads with compelling logic to the denial of any guilt as to the atrocities which were committed against the Jews during the war. Justice Jackson made some phases of the legislation in respect to the Jews during Schacht’s term as Minister the subject of his cross-examination. I shall refrain from this part of the cross-examination; going into the questions put to Schacht and answered by him is irrelevant according to the Charter and the previously mentioned authentic interpretation of this part of the Indictment by Justice Jackson. The anti-Semitic legislation of the Third Reich and the personal attitude of an individual defendant toward it are, according to the Charter, relevant in these proceedings only insofar as they are connected with other crimes which are subject to punishment according to the Charter, as for example the conspiracy to wage war, mass extermination, and so forth. According to the Charter they cannot constitute an offense in themselves, not even one against humanity. Only those defendants are punishable for their deeds who can be proved to have participated in the planning of a war of aggression with its resulting inhuman consequences for the Jews. A prerequisite for their conviction on this account, however, is that they recognized and desired this goal and its result. There exists no purely objective liability for the outcome in criminal law. According to the Charter, he who desired the war and thus also the inhuman actions connected with it is punishable; but the incriminating activity must always have occurred in the course of the execution of such a plan. This purely legal consideration in itself excludes the conviction of Schacht on the grounds of atrocities against the Jews.

Another discrepancy between the Prosecution, especially with regard to the statements of Justice Jackson, and myself must likewise be clarified at this point, otherwise we will be talking at cross purposes. During the cross-examination Justice Jackson repeatedly pointed out that the defendant is not being charged with anti-Semitism as such, that he is not being charged with his opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, that he is not being charged with his ideas and statements on the so-called Lebensraum problem as representing the food problem of the central European nations, that he is not being charged with his colonial aspirations; but that he is being charged with all this only to the extent that it served, with his knowledge and desire, for the preparation of a war of aggression. By this objection Justice Jackson meant to preclude certain questions and discussions. This would have been justified and I too could now forego such arguments, were not the Prosecution taking away with one hand what it is giving with the other, because in the course of argumentation all this, namely, Schacht’s alleged anti-Semitism, _et cetera_, is used as indirect proof, that is, as circumstantial evidence that Schacht had prepared and desired this war of aggression. The Prosecution of course does not count all that as a criminal fact in itself, but as indirect proof, as circumstantial evidence. Therefore in evaluating the evidence, I must also treat these problems. I think I have finished dealing with the Jewish question. With regard to the problem of Lebensraum, in order to save time, I can probably refer to what Schacht has stated here during his interrogation in justification of his statements and activities in this respect. The colonial problem was the subject of cross-examination by Justice Jackson insofar as he tried to prove that colonial activity by Germany was impossible without world domination, or at least the military domination of the seas. Further development of this train of thought would result in the Defendant Schacht being charged with the fact that his striving for colonies logically depended on the planning of a war of aggression. That is a false conclusion. I think that Justice Jackson’s conception of colonial policy is too imperialistic. Anyone desiring colonies for his country without attendant domination of the world or the sea bases his colonial activity on a lasting state of peace with the stronger maritime powers. He must necessarily believe in peace with these powers. Germany also possessed colonies from 1884 until the first World War; her merchant marine carried on the necessary traffic with these colonies. Her merchant marine before this war would also have been sufficient. Aviation, in reply to Justice Jackson’s question, would not have been essential. Nothing supports the presumption that in his desire for colonies Schacht would have striven to eliminate foreign naval supremacy by means of war. In view of his general conduct one can hardly credit him with being as foolish as all that. France and Holland likewise possess colonies, the sea routes of which they certainly do not control.

This charge of the Prosecution is therefore inconclusive. Moreover, the Tribunal knows that during the years before the war nearly all the statesmen of the victorious powers were sympathetic to these colonial aspirations of Germany, as is shown in many of their public speeches.

I now come to the subject of rearmament, that is, to the activity of Schacht in his capacity as President of the Reichsbank and Reich Minister of Economics until 1937, in other words, up to the time when he changed from a loyal servant of Adolf Hitler to a traitor against him and took to the dark ways of artifice and dissimulation while making preparations for an attempt on his life.

The Prosecution considers the violation of the Versailles Treaty, the Locarno Pact, and other treaties as indirect proof, that is, as circumstantial evidence, of his criminal intention to wage a war of aggression. This involves first the question of whether any treaty violations took place and, if so, whether these treaty violations must be judged as indications of an intent to wage a war of aggression on the part of members of the Reich Government, Schacht included. It is impossible, and also unnecessary, to discuss exhaustively in this plea the problem of whether actual treaty violations were committed and to what extent. My colleague Dr. Horn has already touched upon this question. A short remark can serve to show at least the problematical nature of this question. This again is important for a proper evaluation. There are no lasting treaties, neither in the domain of civil jurisdiction nor, still less, in the domain of international law. The _clausula rebus sic stantibus_ often plays a much more important role in the domain of international law affecting the political intercourse between nations than in private dealings between individuals. One must be very careful not to apply, offhand, the relatively narrow principles of civil law to the breadth and depth of international law. International law has its own dynamics. The highly political intercourse between nations is subject to other juridical aspects than the commercial and personal relations between individuals. The most striking proof of the correctness of this thesis is the juridical basis of the Indictment, particularly insofar as it deals with the sentence _nulla poena sine lege poenale_ and demands, instead of sanctions, the individual punishment of the leading statesmen of an aggressor nation. Whoever upholds the conception of the Prosecution in this respect, acknowledges the dynamics of international law and the fact that international law develops according to a process of its own.

History has taught us that treaties based on international law do not usually come to an end by a formal repeal but succumb to the development of events. They inevitably sink into oblivion. In specific instances opinions may differ as to whether this is the case or not; but that does not affect the basic truth of this statement. The militarization of the Rhineland and the introduction of general conscription, the extent of rearmament which Schacht approved of and strived for, the voluntary “Anschluss” of Austria to Germany, which was also basically desired by Schacht, all of these certainly are offenses against the meaning and text of the above-mentioned pacts, particularly the Versailles Treaty. If, however, such violations are only answered by formal protestations, and otherwise very friendly relations continue to exist and honors are even conferred upon the offending nation, and if agreements are concluded which alter the basic stipulations of such a treaty, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, the view is fully justified that because of all this such a treaty is gradually reaching a state of obsolescence and extinction, or at least there is cause for such a subjective point of view.

I beg you to consider that the prerequisite for the conclusion of an armament pact, as for instance the Naval Pact with Great Britain, is the military sovereignty of both nations. The denial of such sovereignty to Germany was, however, one of the main aspects of the Versailles Treaty. I do not wish to speak here about the justice or injustice of this treaty. I know the Court’s wish, or rather prohibition, in regard to this matter, and of course I shall observe it. But I must speak about the legal possibility and therefore the innocence, criminally speaking, of Schacht’s personal opinions on the question of treaty violation. Even if, therefore, one still wished to defend the point of view that the said treaties have not become obsolete, one cannot, at least as far as its inherent honesty is concerned, doubt the justification of an opinion to the contrary. But if this is recognized, these treaty violations no longer provide any proof of the criminal intention of a war of aggression. And that is all that matters. For the violation of treaties in itself is not considered a punishable act by the Charter. Here, too, Schacht can justify his good faith by referring to the same or similar views on the part of leading foreign statesmen, in whom it is therefore logically impossible to assume the existence of a suspicion as to a desire for aggression on the part of Germany. Here again I must limit myself to a few instances, since a complete enumeration would exceed the time limit of this plea.

The first of the violations of the Versailles Treaty is supposedly the reintroduction of general conscription. With regard to this measure, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, with a statesman’s far-sighted objectivity, gave the following reply, which was universally made known in reports by the press and radio and which therefore is valid as legal evidence:

“There is no doubt that an agreed reduction of the armaments of
other big nations was to follow upon the forced disarmament of
Germany.”

This remark contains a confirmation of the juridical point of view I developed a while ago, in spite of the criticism of Hitler’s action that follows. The same applies to the fact that the visit of Sir John Simon and Mr. Anthony Eden to Berlin took place 8 days after this so-called treaty violation, namely, on 24 March 1935. It would not have taken place if this measure of Hitler’s had been considered abroad as militarily aggressive. I will just mention in passing the history of the treatment of this question by the Council of the League of Nations, which is well known. Should Schacht, as a German and a German Minister, judge it in a manner different from that of the foreign Governments?

A second treaty violation by Hitler was the occupation of the Rhineland, also in March 1935. This action did not only violate the Versailles Treaty ...

THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing_] The date of the occupation of the Rhineland was not March 1935, but March 1936.

DR. DIX: I cannot ascertain that at the moment.

The point in question is that this action took place, namely, the occupation of the Rhineland. This action was not only a breach of the Treaty of Versailles but also of the Locarno Pact, that is, of an undoubtedly voluntarily contracted treaty. Two days later Mr. Baldwin stated in the House of Commons, in a speech made public and therefore valid as legal evidence, that, while Germany’s conduct could not be excused, there was no reason to assume that this action contained a threat of hostilities. Was Schacht, a German and a German Minister, to take a different and more skeptical attitude in regard to the aggressive significance of the act than foreign statesmen? And particularly when he was forced to note the fact, which is now history and is universally known, that 10 days after this breach of treaty the Locarno Powers, except Germany, submitted to the Council of the League of Nations a memorandum which proposed the reduction of the number of German troops in the Rhineland to 36,500 men and only endeavored to avoid the strengthening of the SA and SS in the Rhineland and the erection of fortifications and airfields. Should not this memorandum be interpreted as a ratification of an alleged breach of the treaty?

A third breach of the treaty was the fortification of Helgoland, which was hardly observed by the contracting parties, and merely called forth from Mr. Eden, in the now famous public speech before the House of Commons on 29 July 1936, the remark that it was not considered favorable to increase the difficulties of the proceedings by individual questions like the one under discussion. Was the German Minister Schacht to take another and more rigorous attitude?

And what about the terroristic annexation of Austria in March 1938 when, moreover, Schacht was no longer Reich Minister for Economics? If foreign countries had gathered from this action the conviction that Hitler was preparing a war of aggression, they would not have abstained from threatening to use force. Was the German Minister Schacht to hold a different and stricter opinion? He did, in fact, have a different opinion at the time and was already eagerly at work with Witzleben and others to eliminate Adolf Hitler and his regime by means of a Putsch; an effort on the part of these patriotic conspirators which was frustrated, as the unequivocal testimony of the witness Gisevius has shown, because Hitler was able to record one success after another in foreign politics.

I merely remind you of the unequivocal evidence of Gisevius regarding the effects of the Munich Agreement on the influence of the opposition group of which Schacht was a leader; I remind you of the evidence of Gisevius regarding the warnings and hints in this connection sent across the German frontiers to responsible personalities of foreign countries. Is it fair to require from the German Minister Schacht a more critical attitude to those political developments than that adopted by foreign countries whose interests had been injured? As we know from Gisevius, from Vocke, and from all the affidavits submitted, he did have this critical attitude from 1937 on, in which year he took to the dark ways of a conspirator. I remind you of his first contact with the then General Von Kluge. I could give many examples such as those just mentioned. I do not criticize this attitude of foreign countries; that is not for me to do, quite apart from the fact that I have complete understanding for the pacifist attitude it reveals, which is fully aware of its responsibilities. It is, however, my duty to point out that no warlike intention can be imputed to Schacht on account of his opinions and attitude, when the same opinions and the same attitude can be identified as belonging to the foreign countries whose interests had been injured. If foreign countries could entertain the hope of maintaining further friendly relations with Hitler, the same right must be conceded to Schacht as far as he claims it. He does not, however, claim it for himself, at least not after the Fritsch crisis of 1938.

After that time he, in contrast to the foreign countries, had a very clear idea of the danger, which fact, according to the evidence of Gisevius, is undeniable, and he personally risked his life and liberty to maintain peace by attempting to overthrow Hitler. The fact that all these Putsch actions before the war and after the outbreak of war were unsuccessful cannot, according to the evidence submitted, be considered his fault. The responsibility for the failure of this German resistance movement does not lie with the latter but elsewhere, within and without the German frontiers. I shall return to this later.

There remains, therefore, the fact of rearmament as such. Here, too, I can refer essentially to the statements Schacht made in justifying himself during his cross-examination. This was exhaustive, and a repetition would be superfluous. It is therefore also completely superfluous to enter into an academic discussion as to whether Schacht’s views were right; that is to say, whether it is correct that a certain amount of military force sufficient for defensive purposes is necessary for any country and was particularly necessary for Germany, and whether he was correct in his opinion that the nonfulfillment by the parties to the Versailles Treaty of the obligation to disarm justified the rearmament of Germany. The sole point in question is whether these opinions and motives of Schacht’s were honest, or whether he pursued secret aggressive intentions under cover of this defensive armament. But these proceedings have established absolutely nothing to disprove the honesty of these opinions and motives. Of course, one can question the fact whether the quotation “_si vis pacem, para bellum_” has absolute validity; or whether objectively any pronounced rearmament does not carry an inherent danger of war, since good armies with competent officers naturally strive for a chance for real action. Of course, one can defend the thesis that moral strength is stronger than any armed strength. The cohesion of the British Empire and the world-wide influence of the Vatican’s foreign policy could perhaps be cited as proof of this. All these questions carry a certain relativity in themselves; at any rate, one thing is certain: Even today in all large countries of the world the warning is constantly repeated that one must be militarily strong in order to preserve peace. Nations whose individualism and love of liberty rejected general conscription and a strong standing army now act to the contrary and honestly believe that they thereby serve peace. Let us take as an example a nation whose love of peace absolutely no one in the world, even the most mistrustful, can question, namely, Switzerland. Yet this peace-loving nation has always taken pride in maintaining the defense capacity of its people with the very intention of protecting its freedom and independence in a peaceful manner. One may academically call this idea of discouraging foreign aggression by the maintenance of a sufficiently strong defensive army imperialistic. It is, at any rate, honestly entertained by peaceful and liberty-loving nations and perhaps serves the cause of peace more effectively than many so-called antimilitaristic and pacifist doctrines. This sound point of view has really nothing to do with militarism. Whoever today recognizes this viewpoint as justified for great and small nations cannot contest the honesty of this view on the part of Schacht in the years 1935 to 1938. I have no more to say about this.

I also need not give a wearisome enumeration of figures and make specialized technical statements to the effect that this part of rearmament which Schacht first financed with 9,000 million, and then reluctantly with a further 3,000 million Reichsmark, was by no means sufficient for a war of aggression, in fact, not even for an effective defense of the German frontiers. The answers that the witnesses Keitel, Bodenschatz, Milch, General Thomas, Kesselring, et cetera, have given to this in their depositions and affidavits are available and have been submitted to, or officially brought to the attention of, the Tribunal. In this respect they are unanimously agreed that even at the outbreak of war—that is, 18 months later—Germany was not sufficiently armed for an aggressive war; that therefore, when Hitler led this nation into a war of aggression in August 1939, it was not only a crime against humanity but also against his own people, the people with whose leadership he was entrusted.

Therefore I also consider it superfluous to go into long discussions as to whether Blomberg’s statement that Schacht was aware of the progress of rearmament is correct, or the statement of Schacht and Vocke that this was not so. I accept without further discussion the sincerity of Blomberg’s statement. But since he had more to do with the technical side of rearmament than the Reichsbank had, general experience would seem to indicate that the memory of Schacht and Vocke is more reliable on this point than Blomberg’s, to whom this report to the Reichsbank was a matter of secondary importance for his department. For the Reichsbank the desire to be informed about the technical progress of the armament as well as about the financial expenditure was a very important matter. One remembers such facts better than unimportant secondary matters. In any case it is established that until the budget year 1937-38 only 21,000 millions were spent on armament, of which 12,000 millions were financed by credits of the Reichsbank, and that, according to Generaloberst Jodl’s statement of 5 June, on 1 April 1938 only 27 or 28 divisions were ready, whereas in 1939 there were already 73 or 75 divisions.

It needs no expert to show that this volume of expenditure and armament on 1 April 1938 was entirely insufficient for a war of aggression. Indeed Hitler was of the same opinion when in his memorandum of August 1936, which has been submitted to the Court, and which was handed to Speer in 1944, he pointed out, along with many derogatory remarks about Schacht’s conduct of economic affairs, that 4 precious years had gone by, that we had had time enough in these 4 years to determine what we could not do, and that he hereby gave orders that the German Army must be ready for action in 4 years, that is, in the course of the year 1940.

I should like to remind the Court that after Schacht’s withdrawal as President of the Reichsbank, 31,500 millions were spent on armament during the two budget years 1938-39 and 1939-40. The issuing and expenditure of money on armament therefore continued without Schacht, and indeed to a considerably greater extent. Schacht had once written to Blomberg that he was not a money-making machine.

He exercised constant pressure on Blomberg along this line. I refer only to his letter to Blomberg on 21 December 1935, which has been submitted to the Tribunal. He exercised a restraining influence by means of explanatory lectures to officers of the War Ministry and of the Armed Forces Academy. He refused the railway loan of 1936 requested by the Minister of Communications, which was indirectly in the interest of armament; and he stopped the credits of the Reichsbank as early as the beginning of 1937, concluding them by compromising on a final grant of 3,000 millions. He refused the credit which the Reich Minister of Finance requested from him in December 1938.

He created an automatic brake for armament expenditure through the mefo bills, which from the technical and financial point of view was a somewhat bold measure, although legally tenable. These served at first to finance the armament expenditure but restricted further armament expenditure after their expiration on 1 April 1939 because the Reich was obligated to redeem them. Schacht’s foresight proved true. The increase in employment brought such a rise in the state revenues that it would not have been difficult to liquidate the mefo bills at their expiration 5 years later. Keitel’s statement has proved that during the budget year beginning 1 April 1938, 5,000 million marks more were spent for armament than during the preceding year, although as from 1 April 1938 the Reichsbank credits had completely ceased. Half of the 5,000 millions would have sufficed to redeem the mefo bills which matured during the budget year beginning 1 April 1939. The use of this money for further rearmament would have been avoided; but this was exactly what Schacht intended. From the beginning he had limited the validity of the mefo bills to 5 years; he stopped the credit assistance of the Reichsbank on 1 April 1939 in order to limit armament. It was impossible for Schacht to foresee that Hitler would simply break a strict credit obligation and not redeem the bills. These facts in themselves show that his attempts to resign could have had no other reason than opposition to any further armament, and the refusal to accept responsibility for it. In this sense the assertion of the Prosecution that he wanted to evade responsibility is completely correct.

Nothing indicates that any other motives than those which are obvious from the facts just mentioned caused him to make this attempt to relinquish his duties. If the Prosecution maintains that the reason was his antagonism to Göring, this is also correct insofar as Schacht was an opponent of the Four Year Plan, of which Göring was the chief. That the reason was rivalry of power is a pure supposition, an interpretation of actual events which justifies the quotation: “Interpret to your heart’s content; should you fail to explain, you will at least insinuate.”

The Reichsbank memorandum of November 1938, which led to the dismissal of Schacht and most of his collaborators including Vocke, is also unequivocally and forcibly opposed to armament. It naturally had to contain reasons for this which were derived from the departmental jurisdiction of the Reichsbank. Its aim was obvious. Hence Hitler’s remark, “This is mutiny.” The memorandum ends with the demand for control of the capital and loan market as well as the management of taxation by the Reichsbank. Compliance with this demand would have deprived Hitler of every possibility of raising money for further armament, and therefore this demand was unacceptable to him. Schacht and his colleagues knew this. Accordingly, they deliberately sought a break by this step. Schacht now bore no further responsibility. From now on he could devote himself exclusively to the plans for a _coup d’état_ by the conspiracy group to which he belonged. He became a traitor to Hitler. By remaining Minister without Portfolio, he hoped to learn more about what went on than if he resigned altogether; this was vital for the aims of his conspiracy group. I shall return to this point later.