Chapter II: Preface

The text of this volume, completed in the spring of 1898 and not since modified, requires a different Preface from that first prepared. The events of another war introduce applications of military principles which have special interest. This is the more significant because modern appliances have been developed with startling rapidity, while general legislation and the organization of troops, both regular and volunteer, have been very similar to those of the times of Washington, and of later American wars.

His letters, his orders, his trials, his experiences; the diversities of judgment between civilians and military men; between military men of natural aptitudes and those of merely professional or accidental training, as well as the diversities of personal and local interest, indicate the value of Washington’s example and the character of his time. Hardly a single experience in his career has not been realized by officers and men in these latter days.

A very decided impression, however, has obtained among educated men, including those of the military profession, that Washington had neither the troops, resources, and knowledge, nor the broad range of field service which have characterized modern warfare, and therefore lacked material elements which develop the typical soldier. But more recent military operations upon an extensive scale, especially those of the Franco-Prussian War, and the American Civil War of 1861–1865, have supplied material for better appreciation of the principles that were involved in the campaigns of the War for American Independence, as compared with those of Napoleon, Wellington, Marlborough, Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar.

With full allowance for changes in army and battle formation, tactical action and armament, as well as greater facilities for the transportation of troops and army supplies, it remains true that the relative effect of all these changes upon success in war upon a grand scale, has not been the modification of those principles of military science which have shaped battle action and the general conduct of war, from the earliest period of authentic military history. The formal “Maxims of Napoleon” were largely derived from his careful study of the campaigns of Frederick, Hannibal, and Cæsar; and these, with the principles involved, had specific and sometimes literal illustration in the eventful operations of the armies of the Hebrew Commonwealth. As a matter of fact, those early Hebrew experiences were nearly as potential in shaping the methods of modern generals, as their civil code became the formative factor in all later civil codes, preëminently those of the English Common Law. The very best civil, police, and criminal regulations of modern enactment hold closely to Hebrew antecedents. And in military lines, the organization of regiments by companies, and the combinations of regiments as brigades, divisions and corps, still rest largely upon the same decimal basis; and neither the Roman legion nor the Grecian phalanx improved upon that basis. Even the Hebrew militia, or reserves, had such well-established comprehension of the contingency of the entire nation being called to the field, or subjected to draft, that as late as the advent of Christ, when he ordered the multitudes to be seated upon the grass for refreshment, “they seated themselves in companies of hundreds and fifties.” The sanitary and police regulations of their camps have never been surpassed, nor their provision for the cleanliness, health, and comfort of the rank and file. From earliest childhood they were instructed in their national history and its glorious achievements, and the whole people rejoiced in the gallant conduct of any.

Changes in arms, and especially in projectiles, only induced modified tactical formation and corresponding movements. The division of armies into a right, centre, and left, with a well-armed and well-trained reserve, was illustrated in their earliest battle record. The latest modern formation, which makes of the regiment, by its three battalion formation, _a miniature brigade_, is chiefly designed to give greater individual value to the soldier, and not subject compact masses to the destructive sweep of modern missiles. It also makes the force more mobile, as well as more comprehensive of territory within its range of fire. All this, however, is matter of detail and not of substance, in the scientific conduct of campaigns during a protracted and widely extended series of operations in the field.

Military science itself is but the art of employing force to vindicate, or execute, authority. To meet an emergency adequately, wisely, and successfully, is the expressive logic of personal, municipal, and military action. The brain power is banded to various shaftings, and the mental processes may differ by virtue of different applications; but the prime activities are the same. In military studies, as in all collegiate or social preparation, the soldier, the lawyer, or the scientist, must be in the man, and not the necessary product of a certificate or a diploma. The simplest possible definition of a few terms in military use will elucidate the narrative as its events develop the War for American Independence, under the direction of Washington as Commander-in-Chief.

Six cardinal principles are thus stated:

I. STRATEGY.—To secure those combinations which will ensure the highest possible advantage in the employment of military force.

NOTE.—The strategical principles which controlled the Revolutionary
campaigns, as defined in Chapter X. had their correspondence in
1861–1865, when the Federal right zone, or belt of war, was beyond the
Mississippi River, and the left zone between the Alleghany Mountains
and the Atlantic Ocean. The Confederate forces, with base at Richmond,
commanded an _interior line_ westward, so that the same troops could
be alternatively used against the Federal right, left, and centre,
while the latter must make a long détour to support its advance
southward from the Ohio River. Federal superiority on sea and river
largely contributed to success. American sea-control in 1898, so
suddenly and completely secured, was practically omnipotent in the war
with Spain. The navy, was a substantially equipped force at the start.
The army, had largely to be created, when instantly needed, to meet
the naval advance. Legislation also favored the navy by giving to the
commander-in-chief the services of eminent retired veterans as an
advisory board, while excluding military men of recent active duty
from similar advisory and administrative service.

II. GRAND TACTICS.—To handle that force in the field.

NOTE.—See Chapter XVII., where the Battle of Brandywine, through the
disorder of Sullivan’s Division, unaccustomed to act as a Division, or
as a part of a consolidated Grand Division or Corps, exactly fulfilled
the conditions which made the first Battle of Bull Run disastrous to
the American Federal Army in 1861. Subsequent _skeleton drills_ below
Arlington Heights, were designed to quicken the proficiency of fresh
troops, in the alignments, wheelings, and turns, so indispensable to
concert in action upon an extensive scale. In 1898 the fresh troops
were largely from militia organizations which had been trained in
regimental movements. School battalions and the military exercises of
many benevolent societies had also been conducive to readiness for
tactical instruction. The large Camps of Instruction were also
indispensably needed. Here again, time was an exacting master of the
situation.

III. LOGISTICS.—The practical art of bringing armies, fully equipped, to the battlefield.

NOTE.—In America where the standing army has been of only nominal
strength, although well officered; and where militia are the main
reliance in time of war; and where varied State systems rival those of
Washington’s painful experience, the principle of Logistics, with its
departments of transportation and infinite varieties of supply, is
vital to wholesome and economic success. The war with Spain which
commenced April 21, 1898, illustrated this principle to an extent
never before realized in the world’s history. Familiarity with
details, on so vast a scale of physical and financial activity, was
impossible, even if every officer of the regular army had been
assigned to executive duty. The education and versatile capacity of
the American citizen had to be utilized. Their experience furnished
object lessons for all future time.

IV. ENGINEERING.—The application of mathematics and mechanics to the maintenance or reduction of fortified places; the interposition or removal of artificial obstructions to the passage of an army; and the erection of suitable works for the defence of territory or troops.

NOTE.—The invention and development of machinery and the marvellous
range of mechanical art, through chemical, electrical, and other
superhuman agencies, afforded the American Government an immediate
opportunity to supplement its Engineer Corps in 1898, with skilled
auxiliaries. In fact, the structure of American society and the trend
of American thought and enterprise, invariably demand the best
results. What is mechanically necessary, will be invented, if not at
hand. That is good engineering.

V. MINOR TACTICS.—The instruction of the soldier, individually and _en masse_, in the details of military drill, the use of his weapon, and the perfection of discipline.

NOTE.—Washington never lost sight of the _set-up_ of the individual
soldier, as the best dependence in the hour of battle. Self-reliance,
obedience to orders, and confidence in success, were enjoined as the
conditions of success. His system of _competitive marksmanship_, of
_rifle ranges_, and _burden tests_, was initiated early in his career,
and was conspicuously enjoined before Brooklyn, and elsewhere, during
the war.

The American soldier of 1898 became invincible, _man for man_, because
of his intelligent response to individual discipline and drill.
Failure in either, whether of officer or soldier, shaped character and
result. As with the ancient Hebrew, citizenship meant knowledge of
organic law and obedience to its behests. Every individual, therefore,
when charged with the central electric force, became a _relay_
battery, to conserve, intensify, and distribute that force.

VI. STATESMANSHIP IN WAR.—This is illustrated by the suggestion of Christ, that “a king going to war with another king would sit down first and count the cost, whether he would be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand.”

NOTE.—American statesmanship in 1898, exacted other appliances than
those of immediately available physical force. The costly and
insufferable relations of the Spanish West Indies to the United
States, had become pestilential. No self-respecting nation, elsewhere,
would have as long withheld the only remedy. Cuba was dying to be
free. Spain, unwilling, or unable, to grant an honorable and complete
autonomy to her despairing subjects, precipitated war with the United
States. _The momentum of a supreme moral force in behalf of humanity
at large, so energized the entire American people that every ordinary
unpreparedness failed to lessen the effectiveness of the stroke._

It was both statesmanship and strategy, to strike so suddenly that
neither climatic changes, indigenous diseases, nor tropical cyclones,
could gain opportunity to do their mischief. When these supposed
allies of Spain were brushed aside, as powerless to stay the advance
of American arms in behalf of starving thousands, and a fortunate
occasion was snatched, just in time for victory, it proved to be such
an achievement as Washington would have pronounced a direct
manifestation of Divine favor.

But the character of Washington as a soldier is not to be determined by the numerical strength of the armies engaged in single battles, nor by the resources and geographical conditions of later times. The same general principles have ever obtained, and ever will control human judgment. Transportation and intercommunication are relative; and the slow mails and travel of Revolutionary times, alike affected both armies, with no partial benefit or injury to either. The British had better communication by water, but not by land; with the disadvantage of campaigning through an unknown and intricate country, peopled by their enemies, whenever not covered by the guns of their fleet. The American expedition to Cuba in 1898 had not only the support of invincible fleets, but the native population were to be the auxiliaries, as well as the beneficiaries of the mighty movement.

Baron Jomini, in his elaborate history of the campaigns of Napoleon, analyzes that general’s success over his more experienced opponents, upon the basis of his observance or neglect of the military principles already outlined. The dash and vigor of his first Italian campaign were indeed characteristic of a young soldier impatient of the habitually tardy deliberations of the _old-school_ movements. Napoleon discounted time by action. He benumbed his adversary by the suddenness and ferocity of his stroke. But never, even in that wonderful campaign, did Napoleon strike more suddenly and effectively, than did Washington on Christmas night, 1776, at Trenton. And Napoleon’s following up blow was not more emphatic, in its results, than was Washington’s attack upon Princeton, a week later, when the British army already regarded his capture as a simple morning privilege. Such inspirations of military prescience belong to every age; and often they shorten wars by their determining value.

As a sound basis for a right estimate of Washington’s military career, and to avoid tedious episodes respecting the acts and methods of many generals who were associated with him at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, a brief synopsis of the career of each will find early notice. The _dramatis personæ_ of the Revolutionary drama are thus made the group of which he is to be the centre; and his current orders, correspondence, and criticisms of their conduct, will furnish his valuation of the character and services of each. The single fact, that no general officer of the first appointments actively shared in the immediate siege of Yorktown, adds interest to this advance outline of their personal history.

For the same purpose, and as a logical predicate for his early comprehension of the real issues involved in a contest with Great Britain, an outline of events which preceded hostilities is introduced, embracing, however, only those Colonial antecedents which became emotional factors in forming his character and energizing his life as a soldier.

The maps, which illustrate only the immediate campaigns of Washington, or related territory which required his supervision, are reduced from those used in “Battle Maps and Charts of the American Revolution.” The map entitled “Operations near New York,” was the first one drafted, at Tarrytown, New York. In 1847, it was approved by Washington Irving, then completing his Life of Washington, and his judgment determined the plan of the future work. All of the maps, however, before engravure, had the minute examination and approval of Benson J. Lossing. The present volume owes its preparation to the personal request of the late Robert C. Winthrop, of Massachusetts, made shortly before his decease, and is completed, with ever-present appreciation of his aid and his friendship.

HENRY B. CARRINGTON.

HYDE PARK, MASS., Sept. 1, 1898.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I.
PAGE

EARLY APTITUDES FOR SUCCESS 1

CHAPTER II.

THE FERMENT OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 10

CHAPTER III.

THE OUTBREAK OF REPRESSED LIBERTY 20

CHAPTER IV.

ARMED AMERICA NEEDS A SOLDIER 31

CHAPTER V.

WASHINGTON IN COMMAND 41

CHAPTER VI.

BRITISH CANADA ENTERS THE FIELD OF ACTION 50

CHAPTER VII.

HOWE SUCCEEDS GATES.—CLOSING SCENES OF 1775 58

CHAPTER VIII.

AMERICA AGAINST BRITAIN.—BOSTON TAKEN 68

CHAPTER IX.

SYSTEMATIC WAR WITH BRITAIN BEGUN 82

CHAPTER X.

BRITAIN AGAINST AMERICA.—HOWE INVADES NEW YORK 93

CHAPTER XI.

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND 101

CHAPTER XII.

WASHINGTON IN NEW YORK 114

CHAPTER XIII.

WASHINGTON TENDERS, AND HOWE DECLINES, BATTLE.—HARLEM HEIGHTS AND
WHITE PLAINS 125

CHAPTER XIV.

THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN.—TRENTON 134

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIRST NEW JERSEY CAMPAIGN DEVELOPED.—PRINCETON 150

CHAPTER XVI.

THE AMERICAN BASE OF OPERATIONS ESTABLISHED.—THE SECOND NEW JERSEY
CAMPAIGN 160

CHAPTER XVII.

BRITISH INVASION FROM CANADA.—OPERATIONS ALONG THE HUDSON 171

CHAPTER XVIII.

PENNSYLVANIA INVADED.—BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE 181

CHAPTER XIX.

WASHINGTON RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE.—BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN 192

CHAPTER XX.

JEALOUSY AND GREED DEFEATED.—VALLEY FORGE 198

CHAPTER XXI.

PHILADELPHIA AND VALLEY FORGE IN WINTER, 1778 210

CHAPTER XXII.

FROM VALLEY FORGE TO WHITE PLAINS AGAIN.—BATTLE OF MONMOUTH 221

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE TAKES EFFECT.—SIEGE OF NEWPORT 238

CHAPTER XXIV.

MINOR EVENTS AND GRAVE CONDITIONS, 1779 246

CHAPTER XXV.

MINOR OPERATIONS OF 1779 CONTINUED.—STONY POINT TAKEN.—NEW ENGLAND
RELIEVED 255

CHAPTER XXVI.

SHIFTING SCENES.—TEMPER OF THE PEOPLE.—SAVANNAH 263

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE EVENTFUL YEAR 1780.—NEW JERSEY ONCE MORE INVADED 269

CHAPTER XXVIII.

BATTLE OF SPRINGFIELD.—ROCHAMBEAU.—ARNOLD.—GATES 282

CHAPTER XXIX.

A BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE THEATRE OF WAR 294

CHAPTER XXX.

THE SOLDIER TRIED.—AMERICAN MUTINY.—FOREIGN JUDGMENT.—ARNOLD’S
DEPREDATIONS 304

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN, 1781, OUTLINED.—COWPENS.—GUILFORD
COURT-HOUSE.—EUTAW SPRINGS 312

CHAPTER XXXII.

LAFAYETTE IN PURSUIT OF ARNOLD.—THE END IN SIGHT.—ARNOLD IN THE
BRITISH ARMY 323

CHAPTER XXXIII.

NEW YORK AND YORKTOWN THREATENED.—CORNWALLIS INCLOSED BY LAFAYETTE 333

CHAPTER XXXIV.

BRITISH CAPTAINS OUTGENERALED.—WASHINGTON JOINS LAFAYETTE 344

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE VINDICATED.—WASHINGTON’S MAGNANIMITY.—HIS
BENEDICTION 352

CHAPTER XXXVI.

WASHINGTON’S PREDICTION REALIZED.—THE ATTITUDE OF AMERICA
PRONOUNCED 366

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APPENDIX A.—American Army, by States 377

APPENDIX B.—American Navy and its Career 378

APPENDIX C.—Comparisons with Later Wars 380

APPENDIX D.—British Army, at Various Dates 383

APPENDIX E.—Organization of Burgoyne’s Army 387

APPENDIX F.—Organization of Cornwallis’s Army 388