Chapter XI: Part IV: , the narrative section, answers the query often raised: For (5)

In the whole of the New Testament only _one_ figure appears which we cannot help respecting. Pilate, the Roman Governor. To take a Jewish quarrel _seriously_ was a thing he could not get himself to do. One Jew more or less--what did it matter?... The noble scorn of a Roman, in whose presence the word "truth" had been shamelessly abused, has enriched the New Testament with the only saying which _is of value,_--and this saying is not only the criticism, but actually the shattering of that Testament: "What is truth!" 195-196

No one is either a philologist or a doctor, who is not also an _Antichrist._ As a philologist, for instance, a man sees _behind_ the "holy books" as a doctor he sees _behind_ the physiological rottenness of the typical Christian. The Doctor says "incurable," the philologist says "forgery." 197

The priest knows only one great danger, and that is science,--the healthy concept of cause and effect. But, on the whole, science flourishes only in happy conditions,--a man must have time, he must also have superfluous mental energy in order to "pursue knowledge." ... _"Consequently_ man must be made unhappy,"--this has been the argument of the priest of all ages.--You have already divined what, in accordance with such a manner of arguing, must first have come into the world:--"sin."... The notion of guilt and punishment, the whole "moral order of the universe," was invented against science. 199

The notion of guilt and punishment, including the doctrine of "grace," of "salvation" and of "forgiveness"--all lies through and through without a shred of psychological reality--were invented in order to destroy man's _sense of causality:_ they are an attack with the fist, with the knife, with honesty in hate and love! But one actuated by the most cowardly, most crafty, and most ignoble instincts! A _priest's_ attack! A _parasite's_ attack! A vampyrism of pale subterranean leeches! 200

"Faith saveth; _therefore_ it is true."--It might be objected here that it is precisely salvation which is not probed but only _promised;_ salvation is bound up with the condition "faith,"--one _shall_ be saved, _because_ one has faith.... But how prove _that_ that which the priest promises to the faithful really will take place, to wit: the "Beyond" which defies all demonstration?--The assumed "proof of power" is at bottom once again only a belief in the fact that the effect which faith promises will not fail to take place. In a formula: "I believe that faith saveth;--_consequently_ it is true."--But with this we are at the end of our tether. 201

Holiness in itself is simply a symptom of an impoverished, enervated and incurably deteriorated body! 203-204

Christianity is built upon the rancour of the sick; its instinct is directed _against_ the sound, against health. Everything well-constituted, proud, high-spirited, and beautiful is offensive to its ears and eyes. 204

"Faith" simply means the refusal to know what is true. 205

The conclusion which all idiots, women and common people come to, that there must be something in a cause for which some one lays down his life (or which, as in the case of primitive Christianity, provokes an epidemic of sacrifices),--this conclusion put a tremendous check upon all investigation, upon the spirit of investigation and of caution. Martyrs have _harmed_ the cause of truth. 208

Convictions are prisons. They never see far enough, they do not look down from a sufficient height: but in order to have any say in questions of value and non-value, a man must see five hundred convictions _beneath_ him--_behind_ him.... A spirit who desires great things, and who also desires the means thereto, is necessarily a sceptic. Freedom from every kind of conviction _belongs_ to strength, to the _ability_ to open one's eyes freely. 209-210

Whom do I hate most among the rabble, the Chandala apostles, who undermine the working man's instinct, his happiness and his feeling of contentedness with his insignificant existence,--who make him envious, and who teach him revenge.... The wrong never lies in unequal rights; it lies in the claim to equal rights. 220

The Christian and the anarchist are both decadents; they are both incapable of acting in any other way than disintegratingly, poisonously and witheringly, like _bloodsuckers;_ they are both actuated by an instinct of _mortal hatred_ of everything that stands erect, that is great, that is lasting, and that is a guarantee of the future. 221-222

Christianity destroyed the harvest we might have reaped from the culture of antiquity, later it also destroyed our harvest of the culture of Islam. The wonderful Moorish world of Spanish culture, which in its essence is more closely related to _us,_ and which appeals more to our sense and taste than Rome and Greece, was _trampled to death_(--I do not say by what kind of feet), why?--because it owed its origin to noble, to manly instincts, because it said yea to life, even that life so full of the race, and refined luxuries of the Moors! 226

I condemn Christianity and confront it with the most terrible accusation that an accuser has ever had in his mouth. To my mind it is the greatest of all conceivable corruptions, it has had the will to the last imaginable corruption. The Christian Church allowed nothing to escape from its corruption; it converted every value into its opposite, every truth into a lie, and every honest impulse into an ignominy of the soul. Let any one dare to speak to me of its humanitarian blessings! To _abolish_ any sort of distress was opposed to its profoundest interests; its very existence depended on states of distress; it created states of distress in order to make itself immortal.... The cancer germ of sin, for instance: the Church was the first to enrich mankind with this misery!--The "equality of souls before God," this falsehood, this _pretext_ for the _rancunes_ of all the base-minded, this anarchist bomb of a concept, which has ultimately become the revolution, the modern idea, the principle of decay of the whole of social order,--this is _Christian_ dynamite.... The "humanitarian" blessings of Christianity! To breed a self-contradiction, an art of self-profanation, a will to lie at any price, an aversion, a contempt of all good and honest instincts out of _humanitas!_ Is this what you call the blessings of Christianity?--Parasitism as the only method of the Church; sucking all the blood, all the love, all the hope of life out of mankind with anæmic and sacred ideals. A "Beyond" as the will to deny all reality; the cross as the trade-mark of the most subterranean form of conspiracy that has ever existed,--against health, beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, kindliness of soul, _against Life itself...._

This eternal accusation against Christianity I would fain write on all walls, wherever there are walls,--I have letters with which I can make even the blind see.... I call Christianity the one great curse, the one enormous and innermost perversion, the one great instinct of revenge, for which no means are too venomous, too underhand, too underground and too _petty,_--I call it the one immortal blemish of mankind.... 230-231

XI

"The Will to Power"

Volume I

All the evidences of what was to be Nietzsche's final and complete philosophical work in four volumes, are contained in two volumes of desultory and often highly condensed notes which were recently issued under the single caption of "The Will to Power" _("Die Wille zur Macht")._ On this culminating work Nietzsche had laboured from 1883 until his final breakdown. He made two plans for "The Will to Power"--one in 1886 and the other in 1887. As the 1887 plan was the one ultimately adhered to, there seems no reason to hesitate about accepting it as the right one. The titles of the four books which comprised this final work as it stands to-day are "European Nihilism," "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto," "The Principles of a New Valuation" and "Discipline and Breeding." These headings are according to the last plan made at Nice in 1887, and although, as I stated in the preceding chapter, there was some hesitation between the general title of "The Will to Power" and "The Transvaluation of All Values," "The Antichrist," which fell under the latter heading, must not be considered as forming a part of "The Will to Power." However, "The Antichrist" and also "Beyond Good and Evil," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "The Twilight of the Idols," are closely related in thought to "The Will to Power." This fact is borne out not only by internal evidence, by the manner in which the books overlap, and by the constant redistribution of titles which sometimes prove the unity of the last phase of his thought, but also by the testimony of those who had Nietzsche's confidence and could watch him at close quarters.

Nietzsche intended to embody in the four books of "The Will to Power" the entire sweep of his philosophical teachings. This work was to be a summary, not only in statement but also in analysis, of his ethical system. His preceding books had been replete in repetitions, and lacked both organisation and sequence. His health was such that he could work only sporadically and in short shifts, with the result that he was constantly trying to crowd an enormous amount of material into a short space. He was able to deal with but one point at a time, and, as his working period was frequently too short to develop that point as fully as he desired, we find him constantly going back over old ground, altering his syllogisms, making addenda, interpolating analogies, and in numerous other ways changing and clarifying what he had previously written. "The Will to Power" was to be, then, a colossal organisation of all his writings, with every step intact, and every conclusion in its place. And throughout the four volumes emphasis was to be put on his motivating doctrine, the will to power, an oppositional theory to Darwin's theory of struggle for mere existence. But although we have two large volumes of notes, these jottings lack in a large degree the co-ordination which would have characterised them had Nietzsche been able to carry out his plan.

The notes of these two books are the work of many years, and the putting together of them for publication has been done without any attempt to alter their original text. They are just as Nietzsche left them--in some cases completed and closely argued paragraphs, in others mere notations and memoranda, elliptic and unelaborated. It is possible, however, to gain a very adequate idea of what was to be the contents of this final work, due to the copiousness of the material at hand. From the time of finishing "Thus Spake Zarathustra" to 1889, Nietzsche was constantly making notes for his great work, and there is no phase of his thought which is not touched upon in these two remaining volumes. By following their pages closely, in the light of his foregoing works, one gets a very definite impression of the synthesis of his thoughts. Especially true is this of the second volume of "The Will to Power," for it is here that his cardinal doctrine is most strongly and consistently emphasised and its relationship to all human relationships most concisely drawn. Because of this fact I have chosen to consider the two volumes separately. The first volume is full of material more or less familiar to those who have followed Nietzsche in his earlier works. The notes are, in the majority of cases, elaborations and explanations of doctrines contained in those books which followed "Thus Spake Zarathustra." As such they are important.

The first volume is divided into two sections--"European Nihilism" and "A Criticism of the Highest Values that Have Prevailed Hitherto." Two subdivisions are found under section one--"Nihilism" and "Concerning the History of European Nihilism." In this first subdivision Nietzsche defines Nihilism and attempts to trace its origin. He states that it is an outcome of the valuations and interpretations of existence which have formerly prevailed, namely: the result of the doctrines of Christianity. For our adherence to Christian morality, Nietzsche says, we must pay dearly: by this adherence we are losing our equilibrium and are on the verge of adopting opposite valuations--those consisting of Nihilistic elements. He defines the Nihilistic movement as an expression of decadence, and declares that this decadence is spreading throughout all our modern institutions. Under his second subdivision, he explains that modern gloominess is a result of the "slow advance and rise of the middle and lower classes," and asserts that this gloominess is accompanied by moral hypocrisy and the decadent virtues of sympathy and pity. In this connection he denies that the nineteenth century shows an improvement over the sixteenth. No better analysis of the effects of Christian morality on modern man is to be found in any of Nietzsche's writings than in this treatise of Nihilism; and a close study of this analysis will greatly help one in grasping the full significance of the doctrine of the will to power. Although the notes in this book are the least satisfactory of all the portions of "The Will to Power," being both tentative and incomplete, I have been able to select enough definite statements from them to give an adequate idea of both Nietzsche's theories and conclusions in regard to Nihilism.

In the second section of Volume I, "A Criticism of the Highest Values That Have Prevailed Hitherto," the notes are fuller and more closely organised. This is due to the fact that the ground covered by them is in the main the same ground covered by "The Antichrist," "The Genealogy of Morals" and "Beyond Good and Evil." In fact, there is in these notes much repetition of passages to be found in the three previous volumes. The first subdivision of this second section is called "Criticism of Religion," and there is little material in it which does not appear in "The Antichrist." Even in the manner of expression there exists so strong a similarity that I am inclined to think Nietzsche used these notes in composing his famous philippic against Christianity. Consequently I have made but few quotations from this division, choosing in each instance only such passages as do not possess a direct parallel in his earlier work. We find here the same inquiry into the origin of religions, the same analysis of Christian ideals, the same history of Christian doctrines, and the same argument against the dissemination of Christian faiths as are contained in "The Antichrist." However, these present notes are sufficiently different from this previous book to interest the thorough student, and there are occasional speculations advanced which are not to be encountered elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings. For the casual reader, however, there is little of new interest in this subdivision.

The same criticism holds true to a large extent when we come to the second subdivision of the second section "A Criticism of Morality." In "The Genealogy of Morals" we have a discussion of practically all the subjects considered in the present notes, such as the origin of moral valuations, the basis of conscience, the influence of the herd, the dominance of virtue, the slander of the so-called evil man, and the significance of such words as "improving" and "elevating." However, there is sufficient new material in these notes to warrant a reading, for although, despite a few exceptions, there are no new issues posed, certain points which were put forth only in a speculative and abridged manner in earlier books, are here enlarged upon. This is especially true in regard to the doctrine of rank. Nietzsche has been accused of advocating only an individualistic morality. But the truth is that he advanced two codes. He preached a morality for the herd, a definite system which suited the needs of the serving classes. For the superior individuals, on the other hand, he taught another code, one which fitted and met the needs of the rulers. The herd morality has always sought to create and maintain a single type of mediocre man. Nietzsche preached the necessity of the superior, as well as the inferior, type of man; and in his present notes he goes into this doctrine more fully than heretofore. Furthermore, he makes clear his stand in regard to the weak. On page 291 he states, "I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals." It has been stated, even in quarters where we have a right to look for more intelligent criticism, that Nietzsche favoured the complete elimination of the weak and incompetent. No such advocacy is to be found in his teachings. To the contrary, as will be seen from the above quotation, he preached only against the _dominance_ of the weak. He resented their supremacy over the intelligent man. Their existence, he maintained, was a most necessary thing. This belief is insisted upon in many places, and one should bear the point in mind when reading the criticisms of socialism to be found throughout the present volume.

Another new point to be found in these notes relates to the immoral methods used by the disseminators of morals. From the passages in which these new points are raised I have taken the quotations which follow at the end of this chapter.

In the third and last subdivision of this second section, "Criticism of Philosophy," we have an extension of Chapter I in "Beyond Good and Evil," "Prejudices of Philosophers," and of the two chapters in "The Twilight of the Idols"--"The Problem of Socrates" and "Reason in Philosophy." The notes (excepting a few pages of general remarks) occupy themselves with a criticism of Greek philosophy and with an analysis of philosophical truths and errors. These notes touch only indirectly on Nietzsche's doctrines, and may be looked upon as explanations of his intellectual methods.

Despite their fragmentariness, the notes in this volume, as I have said, permit one to gain an adequate idea of Nietzsche's purpose. In making my excerpts from this book, I have chosen those passages which will throw new light upon his philosophy rather than those statements of conclusions which have been previously encountered.

EXCERPTS FROM "THE WILL TO POWER" volume I

What does Nihilism mean?--_That the highest values are losing their value._ 8

Thorough Nihilism is the conviction that life is absurd, in the light of the highest values already discovered; it also includes the view that we have not the smallest right to assume the existence of transcendental objects or things in themselves, which would be either divine or morality incarnate.

This view is the result of fully developed "truthfulness": therefore a consequence of the belief in morality. 8

_Moral valuations are condemnations, negations; morality is the abdication of the will to live._ 12

All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have therefore _deprived it of all worth_ (once these values have been shown to be inapplicable)--all these values, are, psychologically, the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities: but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's _exaggerated ingenuousness_ to regard himself as the sense and measure of all things. 15

Every purely _moral_ valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic) _terminates in Nihilism:_ Europe must expect the same thing! It is supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. 19

Nihilism is not only a meditating over the "in vain"--not only the belief that everything deserves to perish; but one actually puts one's shoulder to the plough; _one destroys._ 22

The time is coming when we shall have to pay for having been _Christians_ for two thousand years: we are losing the equilibrium which enables us to live--for a long while we shall not know in what direction we are travelling. We are hurling ourselves headlong into the _opposite_ valuations, with that degree of energy which could only have been engendered in man by an _overvaluation_ of himself.

Now, everything is false from the root, words and nothing but words, confused, feeble, or overstrained. 25

Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the _modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such. 29

The "preponderance of _pain over pleasure_" or the reverse (Hedonism); both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....

For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the phenomenon pleasure or pain. 29

"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of tears?"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. 29-30

People have not yet seen what is so terribly obvious--namely, that Pessimism is not a problem but a _symptom,_--that the term ought to be replaced by "Nihilism,"--that the question, "to be or not to be," is itself an illness, a sign of degeneracy, an idiosyncrasy.

The Nihilistic movement is only an expression of physiological decadence. 32

_Decay, decline,_ and _waste,_ are, _per se,_ in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables us to _suppress_ it. On the contrary, reason _would have it retain its rights._

It is disgraceful on the part of socialist-theorists to argue that circumstances and social combinations could be devised which would put an end to all vice, illness, crime, prostitution, and poverty.... But that is tantamount to condemning _Life._ 33

Decadence itself is not a thing _that can be withstood:_ it is absolutely necessary and is proper to all ages and all peoples. That which must be withstood, and by all means in our power, is the spreading of the contagion among the sound parts of the organism. 33-34

All those things which heretofore have been regarded as the _causes of degeneration,_ are really its effects. 34

If Nature have no pity on the degenerate, it is not therefore immoral: the growth of physiological and moral evils in the human race, is rather the _result of morbid and unnatural morality._ 44

The whole of our sociology knows no other instinct than that of the herd, _i.e.,_ of a _multitude of mere ciphers_--of which every cipher has "equal rights," and where it is a virtue to be--naught. 45

Nihilism is a sign that the botched and bungled have no longer any consolation, that they destroy in order to be destroyed, that, having been deprived of morality, they no longer have any reason to "resign themselves," that they take up their stand on the territory of the opposite principle, and _will also exercise power_ themselves, by compelling the powerful to become their hangmen. 52

Our age, with its indiscriminate endeavours to mitigate distress, to honour it, and to wage war in advance with unpleasant possibilities, is an age of the _poor._ 57

Overwork, curiosity and sympathy--our _modern vices._ 64

Christianity, revolution, the abolition of slavery, equal rights, philanthropy, love of peace, justice, truth: all these big words are only valuable in a struggle, as banners: not as realities, but as _showwords,_ for something quite different (yea, even quite opposed to what they mean!). 68

The nineteenth century shows no advance whatever on the sixteenth: and the German spirit of 1888 is an example of a backward movement when compared with that of 1788.... Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist. The aspect of the whole is much more like that of a huge experimenting workshop where some things in all ages succeed, while an incalculable number of things fail; where all order, logic, co-ordination, and responsibility is lacking. How dare we blink the fact that the rise of Christianity is a decadent movement?--that the German Reformation was a recrudescence of Christian barbarism?--that the Revolution destroyed the instinct for an organisation of society on a large scale?... Man is not an example of progress as compared with animals: the tender son of culture is an abortion compared with the Arab or the Corsican; the Chinaman is a more successful type--that is to say, richer in sustaining power than the European. 72-73

I know best why man is the only animal that laughs: he alone suffers so excruciatingly that he was _compelled_ to invent laughter. The unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as might have been expected, the most cheerful. 74

Socialism--or the _tyranny_ of the meanest and the most brainless,--that is to say, the superficial, the envious, and the mummers, brought to its zenith,--is, as a matter of fact, the logical conclusion of "modern ideas" and their latent anarchy: but in the genial atmosphere of democratic well-being the capacity for forming resolutions or even for coming _to an end_ at all, is paralysed. Men will follow--but no longer their reason. That is why socialism is on the whole a hopelessly bitter affair: and there is nothing more amusing than to observe the discord between the poisonous and desperate faces of present-day socialists--and what wretched and nonsensical feelings does not their style reveal to us!--and the childish lamblike happiness of their hopes and desires. 102

This is the teaching which life itself preaches to all living things: the morality of Development. To have and to wish to have more, in a word, Growth--that is life itself. In the teaching of socialism "a will to the denial of life" is but poorly concealed: botched men and races they must be who have devised a teaching of this sort. 102

_Spiritual enlightenment_ is an unfailing means of making men uncertain, weak of will, and needful of succour and support; in short, of developing the herding instincts in them. 105

When the _feeling of power_ suddenly seizes and overwhelms a man,--and this takes place in the case of all the great passions,--a doubt arises in him concerning his own person: he dare not think himself the cause of this astonishing sensation--and thus he posits a stronger person, a Godhead as its cause, 114-115

Religion has lowered the concept "man"; its ultimate conclusion is that all goodness, greatness, and truth are superhuman, and are only obtainable by the grace of God. 116

_In short:_ what is the price paid for the _improvement_ supposed to be due to morality?--The unhinging of _reason,_ the reduction of all motives to fear and hope (punishment and reward); _dependence_ upon the tutelage of priests, and upon a formulary exactitude which is supposed to express a divine will; the implantation of a "conscience" which establishes a false science in the place of experience and experiment: as though all one had to do or had not to do were predetermined--a kind of contraction of the seeking and striving spirit;--_in short:_ the worst _mutilation_ of man that can be imagined, and it is pretended that "the good man" is the result. 122-123

Paganism is that which says yea to all that is natural, it is innocence in being natural, "naturalness." _Christianity_ is that which says no to all that is natural, it is a certain lack of dignity in being natural; hostility to Nature. 127

_Christianity_ is a degenerative movement, consisting of all kinds of decaying and excremental elements: it is _not_ the expression of the downfall of a race, it is, from the root, an agglomeration of all the morbid elements which are mutually attractive and which gravitate to one another.

It is therefore _not_ a national religion, _not_ determined by race: it appeals to the disinherited everywhere; it consists of a foundation of resentment against all that is successful and dominant: it is in need of a symbol which represents the damnation of everything successful and dominant. It is opposed to every form of _intellectual_ movement, to all philosophy: it takes up the cudgels for idiots, and utters a curse upon all intellect. Resentment against those who are gifted, learned, intellectually independent: in all these it suspects the element of success and domination. 130

All Christian "truth," is idle falsehood and deception, and is precisely the reverse of that which was at the bottom of the first Christian movement. 133

To be really Christian would mean to be absolutely indifferent to dogmas, cults, priests, church, and theology. 133

A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection after death--all these things are the counterfeit coins of real-Christianity, for which that pernicious blockhead Paul must be held responsible. 138

Christianity has, from the first, always transformed the symbolical into crude realities:

(1) The antitheses "true life" and "false life" were misunderstood and changed into "life here" and "life beyond."

(2) The notion "eternal life," as opposed to the personal life which is ephemeral, is translated into "personal immortality";

(3) The process of fraternising by means of sharing the same food and drink, after the Hebrew-Arabian manner, is interpreted as the "miracle of transubstantiation."

(4) "Resurrection" which was intended to mean the entrance to the "true life," in the sense of being intellectually "born again," becomes an historical contingency, supposed to take place at some moment after death;

(5) The teaching of the Son of man as the "Son of God,"--that is to say, the life-relationship between man and God,--becomes the "second person of the Trinity," and thus the filial relationship of every man--even the lowest--to God, is _done away with;_

(6) Salvation through faith (that is to say, that there is no other way to this filial relationship to God save through the _practice of life_ taught by Christ) becomes transformed into the belief that there is a miraculous way of _atoning_ for all _sin;_ though not through our own endeavours, but by means of Christ:

For all these purposes, "Christ on the Cross" had to be interpreted afresh. The _death_ itself would certainly not be the principal feature of the event ... it was only another sign pointing to the way in which one should behave towards the authorities and the laws of the world _--that one was not to defend oneself--this was the exemplary life._ 139-140

The Gospel is the announcement that the road to happiness lies open for the lowly and the poor--that all one has to do is to emancipate one's self from all institutions, traditions, and the tutelage of the higher classes. Thus Christianity is no more than the _typical teaching of Socialists._

Property, acquisitions, mother-country, status and rank, tribunals, the police, the State, the Church, Education, Art, militarism: all these are so many obstacles in the way of happiness, so many mistakes, snares, and devil's artifices, on which the Gospel passes sentence--all this is typical of socialistic doctrines.

Behind all this there is the outburst, the explosion of a concentrated loathing of the "masters"--the instinct which discerns the happiness of freedom after such long oppression. 173-174

Christianity is a denaturalisation of gregarious morality: under the power of the most complete misapprehensions and self-deceptions. Democracy is a more natural form of it, and less sown with falsehood. It is a fact that the oppressed, the low, and whole mob of slaves and half-castes, _will prevail._

First step: they make themselves free--they detach themselves, at first in fancy only; they recognise each other; they make themselves paramount.

Second step: they enter the lists, they demand acknowledgment, equal rights, "Justice."

Third step: they demand privileges (they draw the representatives of power over to their side).

Fourth step: they _alone_ want all power, and they _have_ it. 177

When and where has any man, _of any note at all,_ resembled the Christian ideal?--at least in the eyes of those who are psychologists and triers of the heart and reins. Look at all Plutarch's heroes! 180

The _higher_ man distinguishes himself from the _lower_ by his fearlessness and his readiness to challenge misfortune: it is a sign of _degeneration_ when eudemonistic values begin to prevail (physiological fatigue and enfeeblement of will-power). Christianity, with its prospect of "blessedness," is the typical attitude of mind of a suffering and impoverished species of man. Abundant strength will be active, will suffer, and will go under. 182

All ideals are dangerous; because they lower and brand realities; they are all poisons. 183

These "conditions of salvation" of which the Christian is conscious are merely variations of the same diseased state--the interpretation of an attack of epilepsy by means of a particular formula which is provided, _not_ by science, but by religious mania. 190

_A pang of conscience_ in a man is a sign that his character is not yet equal to his _deed._ There is such a thing as a pang of conscience after _good deeds:_ in this case it is their unfamiliarity, their incompatibility with an old environment. 192

We immoralists prefer to disbelieve in "faults." We believe that all deeds, of what kind soever, are identically the same at root; just as deeds which turn _against_ us may be useful from an economical point of view, and even _generally desirable._ In certain individual cases, we admit that we might well have been _spared_ a given action; the circumstances alone predisposed us in its favour. Which of us, if _favoured_ by circumstances, would not already have committed every possible crime? ... That is why, one should never say: "Thou shouldst never have done such and such a thing," but only: "How strange it is that I have not done such and such a thing hundreds of times already!"--As a matter of fact, only a very small number of acts are _typical_ acts and real epitomes of a personality, and seeing what a small number of people really are personalities, a single act very rarely characterises a man. Acts are mostly dictated by circumstances; they are superficial or merely reflex movements performed in response to a stimulus, long before the depths of our beings are affected or consulted in the matter. 192-193.

Experience teaches us that, in every case in which a man has elevated himself to any great extent above the average of his fellows, every high degree of _power_ always involves a corresponding degree of _freedom_ from Good and Evil as also from "true" and "false," and cannot take into account what goodness dictates. 200

What is Christian "virtue" and "love of men," if not precisely this mutual assistance with a view to survival, this solidarity of the weak, this thwarting of selection? What is Christian altruism, if it is not the mob-egotism of the weak which divines that, if everybody looks after everybody else, every individual will be preserved for a longer period of time?... He who does not consider this attitude of mind as _immoral,_ as a crime against life, himself belongs to the sickly crowd, and also shares their instincts.... Genuine love of mankind exacts sacrifice for the good of the species--it is hard, full of self-control, because it needs human sacrifices. 203

What deserves the most rigorous condemnation, is the ambiguous and cowardly infirmity of purpose of a religion like _Christianity,_--or rather like the _Church,--_which, instead of recommending death and self-destruction, actually protects all the botched and bungled, and encourages them to propagate their kind. 204

Let us see what the "genuine Christian" does of all the things which his instincts forbid him to do:--he covers beauty, pride, riches, self-reliance, brilliancy, knowledge, and power with suspicion and _mud_--in short, _all culture:_ his object is to deprive the latter of its _clean conscience._ 200

What is it we combat in Christianity? That it aims at destroying the strong, at breaking their spirit, at exploiting their moments of weariness and debility, at converting their proud assurance into anxiety and conscience-trouble; that it knows how to poison the noblest instincts and to infect them with disease, until their strength, their will to power, turns inwards, against themselves--until the strong perish through their excessive self-contempt and self-immolation. 209

All virtues should be looked upon as physiological _conditions._ 213

Formerly it was said of every form of morality, "Ye shall know them by their fruits." I say of every form of morality: "It is a fruit, and from it I learn the _Soil_ out of which it grew." 214

My leading doctrine is this: _there are no moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena. The origin of this interpretation itself lies beyond the pale of morality._ 214

The whole of morality of Europe is based upon the values _which are useful to the herd._ 228

The herd regards the _exception,_ whether it be above or beneath its general level, as something which is antagonistic and dangerous to itself. Their trick in dealing with the exceptions above them, the strong, the mighty, the wise, and the fruitful, is to persuade them to become guardians, herdsmen, and watchmen--in fact, to become their _head-servants:_ thus they convert a danger into a thing which is useful. 231

My teaching is this, that the herd seeks to maintain and preserve one type of man, and that it defends itself on two sides--that is to say, against those which are decadents from its ranks (criminals, etc.), and against those who rise superior to its dead level. 236

My philosophy aims at a new _order of rank: not_ at an individualistic morality. The spirit of the herd should rule within the herd--but not beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their actions. 237

Conscience condemns an action because that action has been condemned for a long period of time: all conscience does is to imitate: it does not create values. That which first led to the condemnation of certain actions, was _not_ conscience: but the knowledge of (or the prejudice against) its consequences.... The approbation of conscience, the feeling of well-being, of "inner peace," is of the same order of emotions as the artist's joy over his work--it proves nothing. 242

_By what means does a virtue attain to power?_--With precisely the same means as a political party: slander, suspicion, the undermining of opposing virtues that happen to be already in power, the changing of their names, systematic persecution and scorn; in short, _by means of acts of general "immorality."_ 252

Cruelty has become transformed and elevated into tragic pity, so that we no longer recognise it as such. The same has happened to the love of the sexes which has become amour-passion; the slavish attitude of mind appears as Christian obedience; wretchedness becomes humility; the disease of the _nervus sympathicus,_ for instance, is eulogised as Pessimism, Pascalism, or Carlylism, etc. 253

The qualities which constitute the strength of an _opposing race_ or class are declared to be the most evil and pernicious things it has: for by means of them it may be harmful to us. 255

I recognise virtue in that: (1) it does not insist upon being recognised; (2) it does not presuppose the existence of virtue everywhere, but precisely something else; (3) it does _not suffer_ from the absence of virtue, but regards it rather as a relation of perspective which throws virtue into relief: it does not proclaim itself; (4) it makes no propaganda; (5) it allows no one to pose as judge because it is always a personal virtue; (6) it does precisely what is generally _forbidden:_ virtue as I understand it is the actual _vetitum_ within all gregarious legislation; (7) in short, I recognise virtue in that it is in the Renaissance style--_virtu_--free from all moralic acid. 258

Lust of property, lust of power, laziness, simplicity, fear; all these things are interested in virtue; that is why it stands so securely. 261

Vice is a somewhat arbitrary epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated. 269

It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents; but when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most absurd of all animals. 269

As to the whole socialistic ideal: it is nothing but a blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal. 275

An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours to further its purpose (a) by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin; (b) by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals already existing; (c) by means of the thrill produced by mystery, as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; (d) by the slander of its opponents' ideals; (e) by a lying teaching of the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness, spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty God. 278

My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life are lying beneath the _ban of morality:_ morality is the life-denying instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated. 278

Every one's desire is that there should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means of which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the _weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this process_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become bad bywords. 279

Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "Good taste, good judgment, and virtue are ours." War urges people to this exaggerated self-esteem. 281

Whatever kind of eccentric ideal one may have (whether as a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_ ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature. One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it, and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind. 281

Real heroism consists, _not_ in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission and disinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... "I am thus: I will be thus--and you can go to the devil!" 282

Modest, industrious, benevolent, and temperate: thus you would that men were?--that _good men_ were? But such men I can only conceive as slaves, the slaves of the future. 289

Industry, modesty, benevolence, temperance, are just so many _obstacles_ in the way of _sovereign sentiments,_ of great _ingenuity,_ of an heroic purpose, of noble existence for one's self. 290

I have declared war against the anæmic Christian ideal (together with what is closely related to it), not because I want to annihilate it, but only to put an end to its _tyranny_ and clear the way for other _ideals,_ for _more robust_ ideals. 291

If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and not one's neighbour that one is succouring. 294

"One is continually promoting the interests of one's _'ego'_ at the cost of other people"; "Living consists in living at the cost of others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step towards truth to himself. 294

A morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness, and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers: for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of obedience, of slave-life, of being-ruled, of poverty, of illness, and of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness, the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross." 296

The _hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the Socialists) appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of co-operation and unity.... At bottom, the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological circumstances.

When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice," "rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses, condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself. But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find relief in slander. 298

I value a man according to the _quantum of power and fulness of his will;_ not according to the enfeeblement and moribund state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been. 304

My ultimate conclusion is, that the real man represents a much higher value than the "desirable" man of any ideal that has ever existed hitherto; that all "desiderata" in regard to mankind have been absurd and dangerous dissipations by means of which a particular kind of man has sought to establish his measures of preservation and of growth as a law for all; that every "desideratum" of this kind which has been made to dominate has _reduced_ man's worth, his strength, and his trust in the future; that the indigence and mediocre intellectuality of man becomes most apparent, even to-day, when he reveals a _desire;_ that man's ability to fix values has hitherto been developed too inadequately to do justice to the actual, not merely to the "desirable," _worth of man;_ that, up to the present, ideals have really been the power which has most slandered man and power, the poisonous fumes which have hung over reality, and which have _seduced men to yearn for nonentity_.... 311

One must be very immoral in order to _make people moral by deeds._ The moralist's means are the most terrible that have ever been used; he who has not the courage to be an immoralist in deeds may be fit for anything else, but not for the duties of a moralist. 314

The priests of all ages have always pretended that they wished to "improve."... But we, of another persuasion, would laugh if a lion-tamer ever wished to speak to us of his "improved" animals. As a rule, the taming of a beast is only achieved by deteriorating it: even the moral man is not a better man; he is rather a weaker member of his species. 319

Up to the present, morality has developed at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts, the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and privileged classes in all respects.

Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are felt to be opposed to the higher instincts).--Degeneration and self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them that the conflict becomes _conscious._321

Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing: let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness, suffering, and sacrifice. Self-contempt on the part of the weak would be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate their kind. And would this be desirable?--should we really like a world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality, the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was lacking? ... 323

Under "Spiritual freedom" I understand something very definite: it is a state in which one is a hundred times superior to philosophers and other disciples of "truth" in one's severity towards one's self, in one's uprightness, in one's courage, and in one's absolute will to say nay even when it is dangerous to say nay. I regard the philosophers that have appeared heretofore as _contemptible libertines_ hiding behind the petticoats of the female "Truth." 384

XII

"The Will to Power"

Volume II

The second volume of "The Will to Power," even in its present fragmentary form, is the most important of Nietzsche's works. It draws together under one cover many of the leading doctrines voiced in his principal constructive books, and in addition states them in terms of his fundamental postulate--the will to power. In Volume I of this work we had the application of this doctrine to morality, religion and philosophy. In the present book it is applied to science, nature, society, breeding and art. The notes are more analytical than in the former volume; and the subject-matter is in itself of greater importance, being more directly concerned with the exposition of Nietzsche's main theory. Volume II is also fuller and more homogeneous, and contains much new material. So compact is its organisation that one is able to gain a very adequate idea of the purpose which animated Nietzsche at the time of making these notes.

The will to power, the principle which Nietzsche held to be the elementary expression of life, must be understood in order for one to comprehend the Nietzschean system of ethics. Throughout all the books which followed "The Joyful Wisdom" we have indirect references to it and conclusions based on its assumption as a hypothesis. And, although it was never definitely and finally defined until the publication of the notes comprising "The Will to Power," it nevertheless was the actuating motive in all Nietzsche's constructive writings. Simply stated, the will to power is the biological instinct to maintenance, persistence and development. Nietzsche holds that Darwin's universal law of the instinct to mere survival is a misinterpretation of the forces at work in life. He points out that existence is a condition--a medium of action--and by no means an end. It is true that only the fittest survive in nature as a result of the tendency to exist; but this theory does not account for the activities which take place after existence has been assured. In order to explain these activities Nietzsche advances the theory of the will to power and tests all actions by it. It will be seen that by this theory the universal law of Darwin is by no means abrogated, but rather is it explained and developed.

In the operation of Darwin's biological law there are many forces at work. That is to say, once the fact of existence is established, numerous forces can be found at work within the limits of existence. We know that the forces of nature--acting within the medium of existence which is an _a priori_ condition--are rarely unified and directed toward the same result. In short, they are not reciprocal. To the contrary, they work more often against each other--they are antagonistic. Immediately a war of forces takes place; and it is this war that constitutes all action in nature. A force in nature directed at another force calls forth a resistance and counter-force; and this instinct to act and to resist is in itself a will to act. Otherwise, inertia would be the condition of life, once mere existence was assured by the fittest. But life is not inert. Even when certain organisms have accomplished the victory for existence, and are no longer moved by a necessity to struggle for mere being, the will to action persists; and this will to action, according to Nietzsche, is the will for power, for in every clash of forces, there is an attempt on the part of each force to overcome and resist the antagonistic one. The greater the action, the greater the antagonism. Hence, this tendency in all forces to _persist_ is at bottom a tendency of self-assertion, of overcoming counter-forces, of augmenting individual power. Wherever this will to persist is found, Nietzsche argues that the will to act is present; and there can be no will to act without a will to power, because the very desire for existence and development is a desire for power.