Chapter I: Preface

The chief point of interest in the South African war, apart from its political aspect, will always be that it was the first great struggle fought out under the new conditions which smokeless powder has introduced. No invention has made a greater change in the art of war than this; the revolution is so profound that it can only be compared with that brought about by the general adoption of firearms four hundred years or more ago. So late as the Spanish-American war of 1898 a large part of the United States army was equipped with the Springfield rifle, firing smoke-producing powder, so that in that war, in spite of the fact that the Spanish Army was supplied with the Mauser, the full consequences of the revolution could not be observed and ascertained. The British Army, when it took the field in October, 1899, was face to face with factors the precise effect of which could only be conjectured. Magazine, or, to give them their older name, "repeating," rifles had been employed as far back as the American Civil War of 1861-5, though they were in every way vastly inferior to our modern Mausers and Lee-Metfords. But smokeless powder was a distinctly novel element.

It is easy to ascribe our defeats in the early part of the war, as some have ascribed them, to the "stupidity" of the British officers and generals. At bottom, however, it would seem that much of this unsuccess was due to the new conditions of war, coupled with the Boer's inherited capacity for taking cover and his absolute knowledge of the country. Again and again our men came suddenly and almost without notice under a deluge of bullets from perfectly invisible rifles. When once engaged in this manner it was difficult for them to go forward and dangerous to retreat. There was no means of guessing the strength of the foe. No dense clouds of smoke revealed at once his location and the exact volume of his fire. It was uncertain whether we had to deal with 500 men using magazine fire, or with 5,000 firing in a leisurely manner. There may have been a neglect of reconnaissance, yet against troops thus concealed personal reconnaissance repeatedly failed. On their side the Boers had no such difficulty to face in fighting us. All through our earlier battles we disdained the use of cover and often advanced to the attack in comparatively close formations--a splendid target.

The same invisibility which marked the Boer riflemen marked also their artillery, which was not massed, but scattered gun by gun, wide apart and artfully concealed. As one result of this disposition, we seldom succeeded in silencing the Boer weapons; but, on the other hand, except at Spion Kop, they inflicted trivial loss upon us. The enemy's most effective gun was the "Pom-Pom," which, though it caused infinitesimal loss of life, was especially dreaded by our soldiers for the great rapidity of its discharge. The frequent flashes from its muzzle, however, rendered it comparatively easy to locate and to put out of action.

It has been often debated whether as science progresses war grows more bloody. A learned Russian, M. Bloch, had argued, before this struggle began, that the deadliness of modern weapons rendered mutual annihilation of the two combatants probable. It need scarcely be said that this forecast has been disproved by events. There has been nothing in the present war in the least comparable with the hideous butchery of Borodino, when, in 1812, with the old flint-lock smooth-bore musket and smooth-bore cannon, over 30,000 French were killed or wounded out of 125,000, and over 40,000 Russians out of 110,000.

Excluding prisoners, in no case did the British losses in battle reach one tenth of the force engaged, and in the Spion Kop fighting, where the heaviest casualties were incurred, they were spread over a week. Another striking feature is the low proportion of killed. Usually in the past the killed have numbered one-third to one fourth of the total wounded. In this war they have generally been from one fifth to one tenth, and sometimes an even lower fraction, as a result of the use of the small-bore bullet. Not only so, but an enormous number of the wounded have recovered. Thus, taking the Casualty Return of July 11, we find that of over 12,000 wounded only 695 have died. In Napoleon's day the proportion would have been more like 5,000, and in the era of the Franco-Prussian war 3,000. Clearly, then, the risk to life in war is not increasing. Disease is as deadly as ever, but it may safely be said that much of our loss would have been preventable with a better hospital organisation.

We have been asked by several correspondents to set forth in a short table the losses in the battles recorded in the present volume, and we take the opportunity of doing so, adding a rough estimate of the Boer force opposed. The Boer losses, unhappily, cannot be ascertained with the slightest accuracy, and even the estimates of their armies are largely conjectural. It should be noted that only combatants--cavalry, artillery, and infantry--are included in our figures, and that deductions are made for details absent at the base, for the sick, and for men not present for duty. The numbers in one or two instances differ slightly from those of the text of the work, the latest official returns necessarily differing in some cases from the figures obtained on the battlefield.

-------------+------+----------+-----------+----------+-------+------+------
| | | |Prisoners | | |
| | | | and | |Brit- |
| | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | | ish | Boer
| +----------+-----------+----------| Total |Force |Force
| |Offi-| |Offi-| |Offi-| |Casual-| En- | En-
Battle of |Date. |cers.|Men.|cers.| Men.|cers.|Men.| ties. |gaged.|gaged.
-------------+------+-----+----+-----+-----+-----+----+-------+------+------
Dundee |Oct. | 8 | 40 | 11 | 84 | 25 | 306| 474 | 3,400| 7,000
|20. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Elandslaagte |Oct. | 5 | 50 | 30 | 169 | 0 | 4| 258 | 3,500| 2,000
|21. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Rietfontein |Oct. | 1 | 11 | 6 | 98 | 0 | 2| 118 | 5,100|7,000?
|24. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Farquhar's |Oct. | 6 | 57 | 9 | 244 | 43 | 925| 1,284 |10,000|20,000
Farm and |30. | | | | | | | | |
Nicholson's | | | | | | | | | |
Nek | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Belmont |Nov. | 3 | 50 | 25 | 220 | 0 | 0| 298 | 8,000|3,000?
|23. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Willow Grange|Nov. | 0 | 11 | 1 | 66 | 1 | 8| 87 | 3,500| 2,000
|23. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Enslin |Nov. | 3 | 13 | 6 | 163 | 0 | 9| 194 | 7,500| 2,500
|25. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Modder River |Nov. | 4 | 66 | 20 | 393 | 0 | 2| 485 | 9,000| 8,000
|28. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Stormberg |Dec. | 0 | 32 | 7 | 51 | 13 | 619| 722 | 2,500|1,000?
|10. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Magersfontein|Dec. | 23 |148 | 45 | 646 | 0 | 108| 970 |12,500|10,000
|11. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Colenso |Dec. | 7 |128 | 43 | 719 | 21 | 207| 1,125 |15,000|10,000
|15. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Week of |Jan. | | | | | | | | |
Battles and |17-24.| 27 |245 | 53 |1,050| 7 | 351| 1,733 |17,500|12,000
Spion Kop | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Vaal Krantz |Feb. | 2 | 23 | 18 | 326| 0 | 5| 374 |15,000|10,000
|5-7. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
-------------+------+-----+----+-----+-----+-----+----+-------+------+------

Some remarks appear to be called for as to the lessons to be derived from the war, and the directions in which some modification of our present military system and methods may seem desirable. These remarks will fitly find a place at the conclusion of our work. In the meantime let us not forget that if errors of judgment have been committed, they have been committed by men whose zeal and patriotism has never been doubted. We cannot refrain, however, from alluding here to the greatest of all the lessens which this war has taught, not us alone, but all the world--the solidarity of the Empire. And for that great demonstration what sacrifice was not worth making!

ERRATA.

p. 4, note beneath top illustration, _for_ "February 26"
_read_ "February 27."

p. 6, note beneath illustration at foot of page, _for_
"74th regiment" _read_ "94th regiment."

p. 16, note beneath second illustration, _for_ "£250,000"
_read_ "£25,000."

p. 35, line 4 from bottom, _for_ "Dublin Fusiliers" _read_
"Royal Irish Fusiliers."

p. 108, note beneath portrait of Col. Long, _for_
"mortally wounded" _read_ "severely wounded."

p. 129, line 15, _for_ "1st Worcesters" _read_ "2nd
Berkshires."

p. 151, line 15, _for_ "Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy"
_read_ "Lieutenant Taylor of the 2nd Yorkshire Light
Infantry."

p. 204, first paragraph: The identity of the prisoner here
referred to has not been established, but the Editor
has received statements which have satisfied him that
ex-Sergeant-Major Greener, of the Royal Engineers,
was never with the Boer army, and that the strong
expression used with regard to him was misapplied.

p. 248, line 39, _for_ "ankle-deep" _read_ "axle-deep."

p. 275, lines 3 and 4, _delete the words_, "Grey though he
was, this was his first action." (Major Childe, whose
age was 46, had served in the Egyptian campaign of
1882.)

p. 277, note beneath portrait, _for_ "Sir Reginald Clare
Hart, K.C.B., &c." _read_ "Major-General A. FitzRoy
Hart, C.B., commanding the 5th Brigade of the 10th
Division" _and cancel remainder of note_.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

PAGES

CHAPTER I.--THE EXPLOSION. Oct. 11, 1899. AND EVENTS PREVIOUS THERETO.

The Boer Ultimatum--Intrigues against British
supremacy--Great Britain's interest in the Dutch
Republics--Common interests of the white peoples--Early
history of Cape Colony--Unpopularity of the Dutch
East India Company--British capture Capetown--"The
Great Trek"--England recognises the Republics--Their
attitude towards us--Sir Bartle Frere--Majuba--The
Outlanders--The Jameson raid--Kruger--His character--Sir
Alfred Milner--The Bloemfontein conference--Transvaal
refuses England's demands--War 3-16

CHAPTER II.--THE OVERRUNNING OF NORTHERN NATAL. Oct. 11-Oct. 27, 1899.

Hurried Preparations for War--The Reserves
Mobilised--Enthusiasm of the British Public--Strength
of the Forces in Natal and Cape Colony--Strength of
the Enemy--The Attack Delayed--Disposition of the
Boer Forces--Positions of the British at Dundee and
Ladysmith--Battle of Dundee--Symons wounded--Storming
of Talana Hill--The Treacherous White Flag--Yule's
March--Battle of Elandslaagte--British and Boer
Losses--"Remember Majuba!"--Action at Rietfontein--The
Boer Tactics--White decides to hold Ladysmith 17-34

CHAPTER III.--THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH, MAFEKING, AND KIMBERLEY.
Oct. 27-Nov. 1899.

The Boers seize the heights dominating Ladysmith--The
Battle of Farquhar's Farm--White withdraws to
save the town--The guns brought off--Dramatic
advent of the Bluejackets--Loss of Carleton's
column--Neglect of precautions at Ladysmith--The
town beleaguered--Condition of affairs on the
Western Frontier--Doubtful attitude of the Schreiner
Ministry--First act of war--Attempts to capture
Mafeking--The Boers seize Vryburg--Kimberley
isolated--Bombardment commenced--Stormberg district
abandoned by the British--Attitude of the Cape Dutch 35-56

CHAPTER IV.--THE DISPATCH OF THE ARMY CORPS. Oct. 25-Dec. 9, 1899.

Dilatoriness of the Government--Full notice to the
enemy--Mobilisation begins--Small proportion of
cavalry--Loyal action of the Colonies--The greatest
Expeditionary Force ever sent over seas--Embarkation
of the troops--Food supplies--The voyage out--The plan
of campaign--Character of the country--New tactics
required--Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions 57-69

CHAPTER V.--THE BEGINNING OF THE ADVANCE IN NATAL AND CAPE COLONY.
Oct. 30-Dec. 14, 1899.

Natal threatened--Armoured trains--Ladysmith
bombarded--Assault on the town--The Boers
at Chieveley--Armoured train wrecked near
Chieveley--Endeavours to clear the obstruction--Capture
of Mr. Winston Churchill--The Estcourt garrison in
danger--Shelling of Mooi River Camp--Boer advance
checked at Nottingham Road--The Willow Grange
fight--Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General
Buller--Comparison of the opposing armies--The forward
movement begins--Boer position at Colenso--Buller
determines to attack 70-89

CHAPTER VI.--THE FIRST BATTLE OF COLENSO. Dec. 15, 1899.

The battle begins--Bombardment of Fort Wylie--Artillery
pushed forward--The Boers open fire--The guns
abandoned--General Hart's position--The Dublin
Fusiliers attempt to ford the Tugela--Their retirement
ordered--Failure to carry Hlangwane--Advance of
Hildyard's Brigade--General withdrawal ordered--Death
of Lieutenant Roberts--Guns and men captured by
the Boers--Retirement effected in good order--Our
losses--Scarcity of water--Bravery of the Army Medical
Corps--Impressions of an eye-witness--Armistice--A day
of blunders 90-109

CHAPTER VII.--THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG. Nov. 2-Dec. 10, 1899.

Mistakes of the Boer Generals--British withdraw from
Naauwpoort and Stormberg--General Gatacre takes
command--Advance of the Boers--Omnibus Horses for the
Artillery--Conditions of successful attack--Gatacre
moves upon Stormberg--The forces detrain at Molteno--The
wrong road taken--The column surprised--The
fight--Fatigue of the British troops--A gun
abandoned--Order to retreat given--The dead and wounded
left--Narrow escape of the armoured train--The return to
Molteno--British losses--Disastrous results--The Boers
seize Colesberg--British re-occupy Naauwpoort--Arrival
of General French 110-129

CHAPTER VIII.--LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE. Nov. 10-23, 1899.

Lord Methuen takes charge of the Western
Campaign--Reconnaissance towards Belmont--Heavy loss
of officers--Lord Methuen reinforced--Advance to
Fincham's Farm--British victory at Belmont--Chaplain
Hill's bravery--Contraventions of usages of war--Boers
retreat--Frontal attack criticized--Lord Methuen
congratulates the troops 130-144

CHAPTER IX.--LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE--_continued_. Nov. 23-Dec.
2, 1899.

March to Swinks Pan--Advance of Ninth Brigade--Battle of
Enslin--Bombardment of the Boer position--Reinforcements
sent for--The Bluejackets and Marines take the
kopje--British losses--The Queen congratulates
the Naval Brigade--Boer losses--Lack of water at
Enslin--Lord Methuen's address to the troops--March
to Klokfontein--Lord Methuen's available forces--The
Boers in force at the Modder River--Disposition of
troops--Scene of the battle--Boer preparations--Battle
of the Modder--The torture of thirst--Sleep during
battle--Arrival of an additional Field Battery--Attempts
to cross the river--Retreat of the Boers--Comparison
of British and Boer losses--British artillery
fire--Characteristics of the fighting--The Boers
fire on the Red Cross--Conduct of the Free Staters
impugned--Kruger's remonstrances 145-171

CHAPTER X.--THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN. Nov. 29-Dec. 12, 1899.

New bridge over the Modder--Lord Methuen
reinforced--British communications
threatened--Position of Magersfontein--Boer
defences--Boer methods--Difficulty of relieving
Kimberley--Skirmishing--Lord Methuen's plans--Choice of
Sunday--Disposition of troops--Attack on Magersfontein
kopjes--General Wauchope's premonitions--Night
march--Boers open fire--Demoralisation of Highland
regiments--Accounts of the fighting--General Wauchope's
death--Collapse of Highland Brigade--Artillery
support--Reinforcements--Heroism on the field--Protest
against Lord Methuen's orders--Artillery cover
Highlanders' retreat--Incidents of the battle--British
retirement to Modder River--British losses--Cronje's
account--Criticism of Lord Methuen's tactics--Burial of
General Wauchope 172-204

CHAPTER XI.--THE NATION UNDER DEFEAT. Dec. 12, 1899-Jan. 1900.

Critical position of Great Britain--Her
prestige in danger--Crass ignorance of military
affairs--German system--Responsibility of Statesmen
and Generals--Government unprepared--Necessity of
reorganisation--Former national crises--Measures taken
for defense--Change of Generals--Lord Roberts' military
career--Lord Kitchener in the Sudan--Embarkation for
South Africa--General Hector Macdonald--Offers of the
Colonies--Australian and Canadian contingents--Mr.
Seddon's loyal speech--Volunteers from Asiatic
dependencies--London's contribution--Imperial
Yeomanry--Gloomy outlook 205-234

CHAPTER XII.--THE FLANK MOVEMENT IN NATAL. Dec. 15, 1899-Jan.
16, 1900.

Further preparations for the relief of Ladysmith--Burial
of Lieutenant Roberts--Destruction of Colenso
road-bridge--Picket surprised by Boers--Fifth Division
reaches Natal--Want of howitzers--Arrival of a balloon
and traction engines--Christmas in camp--Disposition
of relief force--Boer positions--Mr. Winston Churchill
escapes--Boer attack on Cæsar's Camp--Messages from
Ladysmith--Relief force attacks Colenso--Advances
on Springfield and Hussar Hill--Fail to draw the
Boers--Further message from Ladysmith--Storm ends
a desultory movement--The flag still flying in
Ladysmith--Heroes in rags--Mud everywhere--Composition
of the relief force--The army moves--Hampered by
baggage--Difficulties of the march--Dundonald
seizes Zwart Kop--The pont intact--The Boers
entrenching--General Buller's plan of attack--The
crossing of Potgieter's Drift 235-262