Chapter XIII: Spion Kop (1)

Warren's Divisions cross the Tugela--The enemy entrenching--The
artillery and transport cross--A long delay--Spion
Kop bombarded--Lyttelton's feigned attack--The
cavalry seize Acton Homes--Desultory movements
before Spion Kop--Change of plan--Advance on the
left ordered--Capture of Three-tree Hill and Bastion
Hill--Death of Major Childe--Assault ordered and
countermanded--Lyttelton's advance--Warren telegraphs
for howitzers--Rumoured relief of Ladysmith--Another
day of little progress--Pathetic humour--Assault
ordered and postponed--Another council of war--Warren
reinforced--The storming force--Ascent of Spion
Kop--A Boer picket surprised--The storming force
halts too soon--Tardy reinforcements--Botha
determines to recapture the hill--Positions of the
opposing forces--The Boers bombard the British
position--Woodgate wounded--Thorneycroft put in
command--A frightful struggle--Lack of artillery
support--Boer attempts to rush the position--The
King's Royal Rifles storm a ridge--Desperate
straits--Confusion of commands--Thorneycroft determines
to withdraw--Scene on the hill after the battle--Losses
in the action--The retreat--Causes of the defeat.

[Sidenote: Warren's Divisions cross the Tugela.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 16-17, 1900.]

All through the night of January 16-17 General Lyttelton's Brigade was crossing the Tugela at Potgieter's Drift, fording the river or ferrying over in the pontoons and ferry-boat. Before dawn the six 5-inch howitzers had followed the infantry and taken their post in the line of kopjes, at One Tree Hill, the foremost point which the British advance had reached. Meantime, General Hildyard with the Second Brigade, to impress the Boers with the belief that the main attack would be delivered from the east, and to divert attention from the west, had deployed his men and made as if to cross at Skiet's Drift. But, as night wore on, he too, had stolen off towards Trichardt's Drift, ten miles to the west, whither in eager haste all Sir Charles Warren's force was marching. Three brigades of infantry, six batteries of artillery, and almost all the cavalry and mounted infantry were concentrating upon this point. Rain fell in torrents, hampering the movement and delaying the transport; yet before dawn the combatants were in place and ready to begin. "It was not possible," says Mr. Churchill, "to stand unmoved and watch the ceaseless living stream--miles of stern-looking men, marching in fours so quickly that they often had to run to keep up, of artillery, ammunition columns, supply columns, baggage, slaughter-cattle, thirty great pontoons, white-hooded, red-crossed ambulance waggons, all the accessories of an army hurrying forward under cover of night--and before them a guiding star, the red gleam of war." The march through the mud, however, had wearied the men; still more so the alternations of running and halting, which showed that the staff, from unfamiliarity with the work of handling and moving large bodies of troops, had made faulty arrangements. And thus, when in the small hours of the early morning the column, anxious for action, looked down upon the river, and up across it at the solemn precipices of Spion Kop beyond, nothing happened. Perhaps the pontoons to bridge the stream had dropped behind on the muddy roads; perhaps the general thought it inexpedient to launch weary troops forthwith against the enemy. But to the men the delay seemed exasperating; they knew that they would pay dearly for it with their lives and that they had made haste in vain, since the Boers were to be allowed time to extend their lines yet further to the west, once more compelling a frontal attack.

[_Photo by Middlebrook._

AMMUNITION COLUMN CROSSING THE TUGELA BY A PONTOON BRIDGE.]

[Sidenote: The enemy entrenching.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 17, 1900.] _Warren's Divisions Cross the Tugela._]

The night and the early hours of the day passed in inactivity. On the hills opposite the Boers were already at their work of raising stone breastworks and laboriously digging and blasting entrenchments, while hour after hour reinforcements poured in. To the Boer the spade was a weapon only one degree less useful than the rifle. Our soldiers, taught to despise cover and untrained in the use of entrenchments, watched with mingled contempt and apprehension these proceedings of the enemy, and, as line after line of defences showed faintly on the green and brown surface of the hills, wondered at the measured deliberation of their own generals, contrasting strangely as it did with the furious energy of the men opposed to them. At last, about 8 a.m. of January 17, the crossing began. A patrol of Light Horse rode down to the river; the Devons and West Yorkshires followed; the field batteries on the heights overlooking the drift drew up in line and prepared to open; from the right through the morning air came the thunder of the howitzers and the heavy thud of the naval guns on Spearman's Hill, telling that General Lyttelton was already in action. The uproar of battle re-echoed through this remote mountain land and reverberated in the lonely eyries of Taba Myama. Thick wet mist still enveloped the hill-tops and gave the country an air of eeriness and mystery; it lifted only towards mid-day as the sun's rays dispelled it. The West Yorkshires were the first to cross, ferried over in pontoons; the engineers set to work to build two bridges, both above the drift, the one of pontoons and the other of trestles. The first was completed in a couple of hours. The work was scarcely interrupted by the Boers. A handful of snipers fired a few shots at the British covering party of infantry and killed a soldier of the Devons, but beyond this the enemy showed no disposition to harass the attacking force, although, had they done so, there is little doubt that they could have inflicted considerable loss. Their unwillingness to leave cover, on this as on many other occasions during the campaign in Natal, permitted operations to be carried on with comparative safety, which a more enterprising enemy could have rendered highly dangerous, or even disastrous. With the Boers it was an object to risk as little as possible their lives and limbs; on our side the error was quite in the opposite direction.

_A. J. Gough._]

DROWNING OF A TROOPER OF THE 13th HUSSARS.

Several men and horses were swept away by the current in the crossing of Wagon Drift, and one trooper was drowned in spite of Captain Tremayne's gallant attempt to rescue him.]

The British field batteries opened fire and searched the north bank of the river with a storm of shrapnel, while the infantry discharged a few volleys. There was no return of their fire by the Boers, and the cannonade died away.

[Sidenote: The artillery and transport cross.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 17-18, 1900.]

After the West Yorkshires and Devons, General Hart's Irish Brigade streamed across the river and marched to a bivouac on the further bank. The cavalry and mounted infantry had to use a difficult and dangerous ford, known as Wagon Drift, a mile lower down the stream. Owing to the swiftness of the current, which runs here at something like ten miles an hour, there were some misadventures; several men were swept away, and were with difficulty rescued by their comrades; one unfortunate trooper of the 13th Hussars was drowned although every effort was made to rescue him. It now only remained to pass the artillery, the transport, and the waggons of the column across, but this proved by far the most tedious and troublesome part of the operation. Nearly 500 ox and mule-waggons, in addition to ambulances, guns, and ammunition waggons, were sent over. The work occupied all the afternoon and evening of the 17th and the morning of the 18th. The rest of General Hildyard's Brigade and the whole of General Woodgate's Brigade had already joined the battalions which were bivouacking without tents on the north of the stream. The army was across and ready to strike a blow when its transport would permit, halted in a land which was an earthly paradise--"a country of arable soil and splendid pasture, where brown-clad doves emit plaintive love songs, of twittering tomtits and green-plumaged sunbirds, of huge, gray-coated secretary birds and gaudy butterflies that would gladden the heart of the entomologist."

Was born in Natal some thirty-six years ago, and settled down in the Transvaal when he had nearly reached man's estate. He does not come of a fighting stock, but has hitherto been known as a successful farmer. In the early days of the war, however, he showed such conspicuous military ability that he was, upon Joubert's death, and despite his comparative youth, elected Commandant General of the Boer forces. He is fairly well educated for a Boer, and talks English fluently when he pleases. He is married to a lady of Irish descent, whose maiden name was Emmet, and who claims relationship to Thomas Addis Emmet, the United Irish leader of 1798, and to Robert Emmet, executed for high treason in 1803.]

[Sidenote: A long delay.]

The afternoon and evening of the 17th passed in inactivity so far as the infantry and artillery were concerned. Only a few shots were fired by the artillery to disconcert the Boers. There was much questioning in the British camp as to the reason for the long delay, since to the men rapid movement seemed essential for success against the enemy. The Boers could be seen everywhere, well out of range, at work upon the lines of defences on the hills and kopjes. The British army was sitting still and giving General Botha--who was now in command of the Boers at this point--ample time to concentrate his forces and make all his dispositions. The wait at Potgieter's was easy to explain, for that had not been the point chosen for the decisive attack. But the wait after crossing at Trichardt's Drift admitted of no such simple excuse. Everything depended upon celerity. The facts were that General Warren did not venture to leave his baggage in charge of a small rearguard and to push on along the Boer front, and that the crossing of such a river as the Tugela, with its high banks, awkward approaches, and difficult fords, was necessarily a slow and troublesome work, giving the enemy abundance of opportunity to gather men and oppose a determined resistance.

[Sidenote: Spion Kop bombarded. Lyttelton's feigned attack.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 18, 1900.] _A British Ambuscade._]

On the 18th General Lyttelton's Brigade advanced in widely extended order from One Tree Hill--as the chief of the kopjes near Potgieter's Drift was named--towards the Boer lines, supported by the fire of the naval guns and howitzers. The shells searched the eastern face of Spion Kop, which had been assiduously bombarded on the previous day, causing the Boers, as they themselves admitted, heavy losses, and interrupting communication between their camps and laagers. Clouds, now yellow and green with the fumes of lyddite, now brown with the dust which its explosion threw up, flecked the slopes of the hills. But the enemy made no reply whatever. The great war balloon rose slowly into the air near One Tree Hill, and the officer in the car signalled that he could see the Boers lining their entrenchments, but could discover no guns. Thereupon the British infantry--the Scottish Rifles on the left, the 3rd King's Royal Rifles in the centre, and the 1st Rifle Brigade on the right--pushed forward in a convex line, making all possible use of cover. The object was to draw the enemy, to distract their attention from Sir Charles Warren, and to discover their positions. But they obstinately refused to be drawn; instinctively they had divined our purpose. Only from the hill on the British right front, known as Brakfontein, came a few shots which wounded two men. A second line of kopjes, one mile in advance of One Tree Hill, was reached and gained without incident, and there the brigade halted till night, and then under cover of darkness fell back.

An officer of the Scottish Rifles explaining to his men the dispositions of the enemy.]

[Sidenote: The cavalry seize Acton Homes.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 18-19, 1900.]

During this interval of inactivity and demonstrations the mounted men under Lord Dundonald had been employed on more serious work. While Sir Charles Warren was collecting his baggage and transport, and moving his infantry force slowly a couple of miles northward, under the shadow of Spion Kop, the cavalry and mounted infantry rode six miles up the road to the north-west to the hamlet of Acton Homes. About mid-day a small force of Boers was made out, also moving west, and Major Graham of the Natal Carbineers, with 350 men of that body, of the Imperial Light Horse, and of the King's Royal Rifles' Mounted Infantry, was permitted to snare it if he could. He pushed forward rapidly, unobserved by the enemy, and seized a point commanding the road, where his men lay in ambush and waited. The Boers with unusual carelessness had sent out a German to scout, who reported that the way was clear. They came on unsuspectingly, and, but for a carbineer who fired before orders had been given, would have been destroyed to a man. As it was, at 300 yards range, they received a deadly volley and at once broke and ran over the smooth, open plain, some to the nearest kopje, others, more daring, across the veldt towards the Boer camps some miles away. The party which had taken refuge in the kopje was speedily surrounded, and an attempt was made--and abandoned when the Boer fire showed that it must cause unnecessary loss--to rush the position with the bayonet. "We got within fifty yards of the Dutchmen," said one of the King's Royal Rifles, "but it was too hot to go further." So the storming force retired, and a steady rifle fire was directed upon the kopje to bring the Boers to their senses. Once they showed the white flag without ceasing their fire, but the British troops had been warned what to expect, and paid no attention. Then a second time the white flag fluttered up and the shooting of the Boers stopped; with difficulty the British officers checked their indignant men. Several of the enemy rose and held up their hands; the kopje was taken. Twenty-four unwounded Boers were made prisoners, and, in addition to these, eight were found badly wounded. Ten more lay dead on the kopje, among them Field-Cornet de Mentz of Heilbron, who, though badly wounded at the beginning of the fight, had continued firing till he bled to death. Besides these losses, the party of Boers which had made its escape eastwards had also suffered to the extent of fifteen or twenty killed and wounded. The British casualties were only four--two men shot through the head and killed, and an officer and a private wounded. The affair, however, had no serious results and no strategical importance, though it showed that our Colonials were fully a match for the Boers in wiliness. To the Natal Carbineers the credit belongs.

No sooner had the enemy surrendered, than the British soldiers vied with each other in striving to comfort and succour the Boer wounded. The soldiers crowded round them, "covering them up with blankets or mackintoshes, propping their heads with saddles for pillows, and giving them water and biscuits from their bottles and haversacks. In an instant anger had changed to pity. The desire to kill was gone," wrote Mr. Churchill. The British mounted troops were ordered to return after their success, as the news had been heliographed from Ladysmith that a large force of Boers was moving with guns to cut them off, and they were beyond the reach of infantry support. Thus the original intention of seizing the Boer line of communications to the Drakensberg was abandoned without further effort.

[Sidenote: Desultory movements before Spion Kop.]

On the 19th, in very leisurely manner, Sir Charles Warren began his infantry movement along the western foot of Spion Kop. That height was the pivot upon which the Boer centre rested; its slopes and precipices parted the two wings of the British army--the right wing under General Lyttelton at Potgieter's, watching the eastern face of the great mountain, the left wing, five miles away, watching the western face and endeavouring to work round it without delivering a frontal attack upon the works which crowned its ridges. The artillery vigorously shelled the Boer lines; the naval guns from Spearman's Hill enfiladed the eastern ridge of Spion Kop, and two brigades of British infantry in skirmishing formation pushed forward up the rocky slopes and ridges in the direction of Spion Kop, at once to guard the baggage from molestation and to occupy the enemy.

[_Photo by Gregory._

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR CHARLES WARREN G.C.M.G., K.C.B., R.E.

A few facts concerning Sir Charles Warren's career are given below the small portrait on page 215. He was appointed by Lord Roberts (April 26, 1900) Military Governor of Griqualand West "while that part of the country is in a disturbed condition."]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 19, 1900.]

The transport was forwarded to Venter's Laager, an advance of four whole miles in the day, while the mildest kind of long-range fighting proceeded, and the troops wondered whether "make haste slowly"--"slowly" in this case being at the pace of the snail--was wise tactics. On the right of the British troops the Boers looked down from the hills--it might seem with ironical contempt--upon the half-hearted, purposeless moves of the great army below. They were active enough in ever extending their lines of defence to the north-east, whatever the British were doing. Yet, prudently guarding against possibilities, their heavy waggons were already on the road to the Free State and the Transvaal. Sir George White, they argued, might well break in upon their retreat if General Buller's army gained any success. In the afternoon the action slowly relaxed its vigour; the steady and continued rifle and cannon fire gave place to desultory sniping, and the troops bivouacked in their aerial perches among the rocky ridges.

[Sidenote: Change of plan.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 19, 1900.] _Frontal Attack to be Made._]

"In war," says the great Prussian organiser of victory, Scharnhorst, "what the general does matters little. Everything depends upon the unity of action and vigour with which he does it." And so it was no very reassuring symptom when, after reaching Venter's Laager, Sir Charles Warren assembled the generals, the staff, and the commanders of the artillery and engineers, and pointed out to them that there were two lines of advance--the one devious and round-about, by way of Acton Homes, the other passing up by Fair View and the centre of the Boer position to the western side of Spion Kop, at a point where the summit of the ridge dropped considerably. To move by Acton Homes, he urged, was impossible, as his food and provisions would not permit of it. To take waggons up the Fair View road would necessitate sending all the transport back to the south of the Tugela and capturing the enemy's positions by a frontal attack, the men marching with three or four days' provisions in their haversacks. The assembled generals acquiesced; and thus, in spite of a general order, which is said to have been issued by General Buller at the beginning of the flank movement, to the effect that there would be "no turning back from the relief of Ladysmith," the original flank movement was abandoned. A message was sent to General Buller couched in the following terms:--

"Sent 7·54 p.m. Received 8·15 p.m.
"Left Flank, 19th January.
"To the Chief of the Staff,

"I find there are only two roads by which we could possibly get from Trichardt's Drift to Potgieter's, on the north of the Tugela, one by Acton Homes, the other by Fair View and Rosalie; the first I reject as too long, the second is a very difficult road for a large number of waggons, unless the enemy is thoroughly cleared out. I am, therefore, going to adopt some special arrangements which will involve my stay at Venter's Laager for two or three days. I will send in for further supplies and report progress.--WARREN."

It will be observed that it did not in clear language state that a frontal assault was to be substituted for the flanking movement, yet it contained enough to tell the Commander-in-Chief in Natal that a radical change of policy was purposed. Sir Redvers Buller appears to have offered no objection. He answered to the effect that further supplies would be sent.

[Sidenote: [JAN. 19-20, 1900.]

It would be supposed that this discovery might have been made by a personal reconnaissance two days earlier, as soon as General Warren's troops had effected their passage at Trichardt's Drift. The saving of these two days might well have meant the difference between victory and defeat. Even if the maps were bad--and General Buller described the march as a march "into an unknown country," while it is a fact that Spion Kop was not shown in the sketch of the country round Ladysmith, issued by the Intelligence Department--an examination of the lie of the land by the generals must have disclosed on the 17th what does not appear to have been realised till the evening of the 19th. The desperate straits of Ladysmith rendered prompt and rapid action of the most vital importance. Yet two days were spent in bringing the transport across, and then in making the discovery that it was the most dangerous encumbrance and had better have been left on the south side of the Tugela.

[_After a sketch by a British officer._

THE ACTION AT THREE TREE HILL.

In this sketch the Boer position is along the crests of the hills. Halfway up the hill near the centre the British are seen advancing; on the nearer hill are two batteries of Royal Artillery, and the Lancasters and Lancashire Fusiliers "sniping"; in the foreground the ambulances. In the actual battle little or no smoke was to be seen; it has been exaggerated in the sketch in order to make the positions clear.]

[Sidenote: Advance on the left ordered.]

On the 19th there had been nothing more than long-range skirmishing in which the British losses were comparatively small. On the 20th it was determined to force the attack. Accordingly, on the night of the 19th, General Warren instructed General Clery, with General Hart's and General Woodgate's Brigades, and the six field batteries, to push the advance on the extreme left, against the enemy's positions on the long ridge which ran down from Spion Kop to the north-east. The ground over which the British troops were to advance is described as a succession of ridges, intersected at right angles by watercourses, cutting deep gorges in the mountain side, and thus sundering and separating the attacking force. Of shelter there was little or none; the advance had to be made from ridge to ridge, always under the fire of the vigilant enemy.

[_Photo by Bartlett, Shrewsbury._

MAJOR CHILDE.]

_Alec Ball._]

PRIVATE TOBIN CAPTURES BASTION HILL.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 19-20, 1900.] _Capture of Three Tree Hill._]

[Sidenote: Capture of Three Tree Hill and Bastion Hill.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 20, 1900.]

During the night of the 19-20th a forward move was made. General Woodgate pushed out from the British camp and seized Three Tree Hill--a bastion jutting out from the north-western flank of Spion Kop. The Boers offered no resistance. The hill was the centre of a vast amphitheatre, crowned on all sides by Boer entrenchments; and though far below the crests which towered above it, it was the best artillery position that could be found, and here three of the British field batteries were planted. When day broke, the battle opened with the usual bombardment on the part of the field guns, the naval guns from Spearman's Hill and the howitzers from Potgieter's shelling the Boer position on Spion Kop from the other side. All day "the hills crashed with guns and rattled with musketry. At a little distance you might have supposed," writes Mr. Atkins, "that the resonant noises came from some haunted mountain, for the hills looked sleepy, and peaceful, and deserted, and there seemed to be no reason for all these strange sounds--the bark of field guns, the crackle of musketry, the rapping of Vickers-Maxims, and the tat-tat-tat-tat-tat-tat of Maxims." All day the thin straggling lines of British infantry pushed slowly forward--almost invisible upon the slopes of the hills--but in spite of splendid efforts the progress was painfully slow. The advance was made at first by small scattered parties of men, quickly following each other and using all the cover that could be found, hurrying from kopje to kopje. Then in heavier masses the main body of the infantry followed. General Hildyard's Brigade was on the left, General Hart's in the centre, and General Woodgate's on the right. On the extreme left were the cavalry and mounted infantry, who accomplished the one great feat of the day--the capture of Bastion Hill.

[_From a sketch on the spot by F. A. Stewart._

THE IRISH BRIGADE STORMING THE KOPJES NEAR WARREN'S CENTRE. January 20, 1900.]

Bastion Hill, like Three Tree Hill, ran out at right angles from the main range of Spion Kop. By Lord Dundonald's order the South African Light Horse under Major Childe were sent to examine it, and if they did not find it strongly held, to seize it. They extended, approached under a heavy fire from the Boers at over 7,000 yards--a range at which British field artillery is useless--and climbed in open order its steep, almost precipitous sides. A private named Tobin led them all. Alert and agile, he bounded up the slopes, and reached the summit ten minutes before the rest of his comrades. All watched him, expecting every instant to see him fall, but he found only a picket of Boers, who fled at his appearance. Turning round, he waved his helmet on his rifle, and the Light Horse rushed up and occupied the hill. There was something ominous in the ease with which it had been taken, and the Boer reason for leaving it unfortified was soon manifest.

[_Photo by Caney._

CAPTAIN C. A. HENSLEY.

Killed at Venter's Spruit (see page 275).]

[Sidenote: JAN. 20, 1900.] _Bravery of the Irish Brigade._]

[Sidenote: Death of Major Childe.]

Behind it rose a crescent-shaped ridge, hardly visible from below, but which was now seen to command it. The top of Bastion Hill itself was bare of shelter, and upon it from this further crest was poured a murderous fire--shrapnel and rifle. Towards evening Major Childe was struck and killed by a well-timed shrapnel, which laid low six of his brave troopers. Upon him, in the days before the battle, the presentiment of death had sat heavily. He had asked the night before that on his grave should be placed this epitaph, with its words of eternal hope and consolation: "'Is it well with the child?' And she answered: 'It is well.'" His wish was fulfilled. Beneath Bastion Hill he lies to-day, and on the cross which marks his grave these simple words are carved. Around him, on the solemn hills, within sight of his resting-place, sleep the valiant comrades who in these sorrowful days of defeat laid down their lives for their country. And his epitaph is theirs.

_R. Caton Woodville._]

THE DANGERS OF MERCY: INDIAN AMBULANCE BEARERS UNDER FIRE.]

[Sidenote: Assault ordered and countermanded.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 20, 1900.]

Nearer Sir Charles Warren's centre the Irish Brigade under General Hart displayed all its usual and reckless valour. The men went forward with dash and fury, eager to wipe out old scores, and, had they been given a free hand, might have secured then the success which a month later their efforts and self-sacrifice achieved. Upon them the Boer artillery opened with great effect, the Pom-Poms and captured British 15-pounders from Colenso maintaining a rapid fire. The guns were hard to locate, and so were not easily silenced by the British batteries. There fell Captain Hensley, who had fought all through the war, in Natal, at Dundee, at Farquhar's Farm, and at Colenso--a man greatly beloved. Towards the middle of the afternoon it was determined to press home the assault on the enemy's position. The British batteries accordingly redoubled their fire; the grass along the amphitheatre of hills took fire, and great clouds of smoke rose, blowing down upon the Boer marksmen. But for some reason or other, not for the first time, the generals changed their minds. The assault was countermanded, and the troops fell back a very little from the most advanced positions. As the evening wore on, General Hildyard extended his left to Bastion Hill, driving back a small Boer commando, and sent a force of infantry to relieve the South African Light Horse. With darkness the firing died down, and the troops had again to bivouac on the bare mountain sides. The day had been one of scorching heat, and to it, as is not unusual at high altitudes, succeeded a night of bitter cold. The British casualties in General Warren's force from the arrival at Trichardt's Drift to the evening of the 20th were 34 killed, 293 wounded, and 2 missing, so that the losses were fast mounting up. What were the enemy's casualties it is impossible to say, but by their own accounts they suffered heavily from our shell fire. The Boers claimed a victory, and asserted that General Botha had checked the British advance. Nor were they altogether wrong, since we could show only the most trivial advantage gained. The one point in our favour was that the British casualties could be replaced, whereas the Boer casualties could not. Throughout the day the conduct of the civilian stretcher-bearers excited the most unstinted admiration and praise. They went forward stolidly to the very firing line, and could be seen bending over the dead and succouring and removing the wounded with faithful devotion and superb coolness amidst the hail of bullets and shells. The Boers fired on them with the utmost impartiality, for the enemy either could not or would not see the red-cross badge. Not a few of the bearers were themselves killed or wounded.

The conduct of the day's fighting provoked some bitter, perhaps intemperate, complaints of the British generals' tactics. It was said of one of the Brigade Commanders that "he took personal command of the York and Lancaster and the South Lancashire regiments, and ordered a futile bayonet charge at an enemy nearly fifteen hundred yards away. This attracted such heavy fire that the two regiments sought shelter and declined to follow their officers another yard."

[_Photo by Chas. Knight._

MAJOR-GENERAL HART.

Major-General A. FitzRoy Hart, C.B., commanding the 5th Brigade of the 10th Division.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 20-21, 1900.] _Ineffectiveness of the British Guns._]

[Sidenote: Lyttelton's advance.]

On the afternoon of the 20th, to support Sir Charles Warren's attack, General Lyttelton advanced directly upon the Boer trenches which lined the eastern slope of Spion Kop and the southern slope of Brakfontein. This was a totally distinct movement from Sir Charles Warren's, and was directed from Potgieter's Drift. The howitzers and naval guns aided the infantry with their fire. At the same time Bethune's Mounted Infantry were ordered to move along the river to the east; they speedily came into contact with the enemy in strong force, and as their orders were to do nothing more than demonstrate, retired. But the presence of the enemy in strength in this quarter, close to Skiet's Drift, seriously menaced the British line of communications. Meantime, General Lyttelton pushed up to within 1500 yards of the main Boer entrenchments, and after long-range firing slowly fell back, with two killed and fifteen wounded or missing.

RUSSIAN DOCTORS WITH THE BOER ARMY PICKING UP BRITISH SHELLS.]

[Sidenote: Warren telegraphs for howitzers.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 21, 1900.]

On January 21 Sir Charles Warren renewed the engagement on the left. The day again opened with an artillery bombardment conducted by the six field batteries. But though the guns fired thousands of shells they produced little effect. Being so far below the level of the Boer trenches, they could not direct their fire to advantage, and they failed to silence the enemy's works or to overpower the Boer artillery. This latter could use its range to advantage, while good positions for the British guns could not be found. Three Tree Hill--the trees on which had already vanished--was too far off for the capacity of our 15-pounders; on the steep slopes where the infantry were fighting it was impossible from the nature of things to handle artillery. Howitzers alone could do the work, and there were but six howitzers in General Buller's whole army, and all these at Potgieter's Drift with General Lyttelton. For them Sir Charles Warren telegraphed, but to move them from One Tree Hill to Three Tree Hill over mountains and along bad roads was necessarily the work of some time. Four were sent and arrived early in the morning of the 22nd.

[Sidenote: Rumoured relief of Ladysmith.]

All the morning of the 21st the advance continued in the centre and on the extreme left, where Generals Hildyard and Hart were engaged. The Boers were massing in this quarter, and two batteries had to be moved from the British right to the left to give additional support to the troops. As on the previous day, General Hart's Irishmen were again foremost in battle--"perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill"--and suffered heavily. The men were gladdened and roused to the most desperate efforts by a rumour which ran along the line, to the accompaniment of cheering, that Ladysmith had been relieved by Lord Dundonald's cavalry while the enemy's attention was occupied by the infantry attack. Like other rumours this story was absurd; it needed little reflection to show that if the mounted men had not been able to remain at Acton Homes without fear of being surrounded, they could not have pushed through the very heart of the Boer position with waggons and stores. Their arrival in Ladysmith without supplies would have been only a serious embarrassment for the garrison; to move with a heavy train of transport under the Boer trenches was almost impossible.

A curious fact, which illustrates the difference between British and Colonial methods of fighting, was observed on this day. A squadron of South African Light Horse held a kopje all day under heavy fire, but, by carefully taking cover, without losing a man. Near at hand two companies of British regulars held a hill under much the same fire, and, untrained in the art of concealing themselves, lost no less than twenty men.

[_After a sketch made on the spot._

GENERAL VIEW OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE BEFORE SPION KOP.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 21, 1900.]

The fighting on the 21st precisely resembled that of the 20th. Ground was gained, but so slowly that it became evident the advance to Ladysmith at this rate would be the affair not of weeks but of months. Bastion Hill, captured on the previous day, had to be abandoned, as it was found shelterless and useless. Its loss was of no importance. And if the advanced Boer line of trenches was taken, with considerable loss, behind it showed a second line at a distance which varied from 400 to 1,000 yards, composed of earth redoubts, stone breastworks or schanzes, and deep trenches blasted or hewn with pickaxes and crowbars in the friable rocks. These defences gave ample cover; the artillery could not properly reach them; rifle fire made no impression upon them; and in front of them stretched a smooth, grassy slope forming a superb glacis. The text-books were useless; theory gave little help, for it had been anticipated that artillery would so shake the defenders' nerves as to destroy the accuracy of the enemy's fire and render assault possible. But whenever an attempt was made to rush the Boer positions, the enemy showed in the most unpleasant fashion that their nerves were not shaken and their fire was as well aimed as ever. Undoubtedly it would have been possible, with such superb troops as the seasoned veterans of Colenso, to storm the Boer line, but only with the heaviest losses. What prevented the attempt being made was the fear that behind this second system of defences might lie a third, and behind that again a fourth, so as to render the effort unavailing. Yet there were voices raised for this desperate and determined course, and a bold general might well have decided upon it, as likely to prove less bloody and less trying in the end than these days of protracted and ineffectual skirmishing.

[Sidenote: Another day of little progress.]

The painful fact was that Sir Charles Warren's army was assaulting a fortress of immense strength held by splendid soldiers--assaulting, too, without the assistance of an overpowering artillery and long-range field guns. No effort was spared by the brigadiers and subordinate officers. General Hart, sword in hand, was in his usual place, the van; the bravest of men, he sent his staff to cover, that the risks he faced might not be theirs. But the hopelessness of the work was slowly dawning upon everyone. At the close of the day, when the firing ceased, the army had again to mourn grievous losses. Twenty-four were killed, 223 wounded, and four missing, yet practically nothing had been accomplished beyond a display of splendid courage and endurance. Once more the troops bivouacked amongst the rocks, but it was evident that their efforts could not be indefinitely repeated.

[Sidenote: Pathetic humour.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 21-22, 1900.] _Buller holds Councils of War._]

A few incidents may be chosen from the many reported by the chroniclers of this arduous day to show the spirit of our troops and the tragi-comic humours of the battlefield. A lad of nineteen, says Mr. Churchill, sat behind shelter in the Irish Brigade's firing line. "His right trouser leg was soaked with blood. I asked him whether he was wounded. 'No, sir; it's only blood from an officer's head,' he answered, and went on munching his biscuit." Two soldiers sat side by side in one of the lulls of firing, the one eating biscuit, the other flicking stones at him. Something struck the eater a sharp blow on the neck, and he turned angrily to the other man. "What did you throw that stone at me for?" "I didn't throw it." "Liar!" And the two were ready to fight, when the red stain showed that the second spoke the truth. It was a bullet. A private was seen trudging into the firing line with a puppy under his arm. Did he wish for companionship in the loneliness of a modern battle, where each man has to stand or fall by himself?

_Alec Ball._]

TOMMY'S TRUSTY COMRADE.]

[Sidenote: Assault ordered and postponed.]

On the 22nd General Coke's Brigade marched to reinforce General Warren, from Potgieter's Drift; the howitzers arrived, and two on each flank began to fire, while the infantry held the ground already won and made no more effort to advance. There was, all this and the following day, a desultory engagement in which no advantage was gained by the British troops. Early on the 22nd General Buller rode over to see what progress had been made. A council of war was held, and it was decided that the last hope of success was to storm Spion Kop. To reach this decision had taken nearly a week--a week of useless marching, counter-marching, and bloodshed for the army, a week of starvation and agonised suspense for Ladysmith. The orders were issued to General Coke to assault Spion Kop that night with his Brigade. The General, however, objected most strongly--and with good reason, after Stormberg and Magersfontein--to making such an attack over ground which he did not know and had not personally reconnoitred. In response to his objections Sir Charles Warren postponed the attempt till the night of January 23.

These bullets have a coating of metallic oxide, which could not fail to poison any wounds they might make. It is perhaps not necessary to suppose they were intentionally poisoned, but the use of bullets in such condition shows a callous and criminal disregard of the laws of civilised warfare.]

[Sidenote: [Jan. 23, 1900.]

[Sidenote: Another council of war.]

The morning of this day a fresh council of war was held, though councils of war have ever been considered the refuge of the irresolute. General Buller--Commander-in-Chief of the Natal army--"pointed out" that for four days Sir Charles Warren "had kept his men continuously exposed to shell and rifle fire, perched on the edge of an almost precipitous hill; that the position admitted of no second line, and the supports were massed close behind the firing line in indefensible formations," and that "it was too dangerous a situation to be prolonged." But the Commander-in-Chief gave no orders; he only told his subordinate either to attack or withdraw, and shrank from the responsibility of making the decision himself. To use his own phrase, he still "advocated" a turning movement by the left. But finally he assented to the storming of Spion Kop--it was the second time this question had been debated--though he thought General Woodgate better suited for the work, inasmuch as General Coke was still lame from a broken leg.

[_Photo by the Absent Minded Beggar Corps._

THE 2nd LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS EMBARKING AT SOUTHAMPTON, December 2, 1899.

This battalion greatly distinguished itself under General Woodgate in the "week of battles" leading up to the attack on Spion Kop, and furnished the largest contingent for that bloody battle.]

[Sidenote: Warren reinforced.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 23, 1900.] _The British Silently Ascend Spion Kop._]

Throughout this day the troops were exposed to a heavy shell fire, which, without causing many casualties, was yet exceedingly galling, and it grew hourly clearer and clearer that there were no other alternatives but General Buller's "withdraw or assault." Steps were taken to prepare for the attack on Spion Kop. Careful reconnaissances were made, and the Imperial Light Infantry and other reinforcements were added to Sir Charles Warren's command. From Chieveley, where General Barton's Brigade had exchanged long-range fire with the Boers on the 19th and 23rd, two battalions were withdrawn and added to General Lyttelton's Brigade. In this direction nothing of importance had happened. On the 19th a picket of South African Light Horse, while scouting along the Tugela to the west of Colenso, had been ambushed by the Boers and six men captured; on the 23rd a patrol near Hlangwane had been surprised, but was able to make its escape. It was clear, however, that the enemy were in no great strength at Colenso, so that the two battalions left at Chieveley were ample to hold the rail-head. It is now known that General Joubert expected the main attack at Potgieter's Drift, and had concentrated most of his men opposite this point, leaving his left at Colenso and his right beyond Spion Kop, towards Acton Homes, excessively weak. On the Spion Kop side, according to Boer accounts, General Botha had but 2,000 men. The Boers persistently understated their real force, but it is possible that their strength in this quarter did not exceed 4,000.

[Sidenote: The storming force.]

At six in the evening the storming force paraded. It was composed of eight companies of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, six companies of the 2nd Royal Lancaster, two companies of the 1st South Lancashire, 190 dismounted men of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, and half of the 17th Company of Royal Engineers--in all about 1,800 men. The officers--General Woodgate himself--carried rifles. The orders were the usual ones for night attack--no firing, but attack with the bayonet. The night was favourable--intensely dark with a fine rain--but if this concealed the approach of the forlorn hope from the enemy, it added greatly to the difficulty of climbing the precipitous mountain. Before the foot of the height was reached it was 10 o'clock. The ground traversed up to this point had been rough in the extreme, steep hillocks alternating with deep-cut watercourses and mimosa copses. Over these the men blundered in the dark, taking every precaution to hide their movements from the Boers. Smoking and talking were forbidden; the little force picked its way in silence. All was still but for the fitful sputtering of the rifle fire exchanged between the outposts, which echoed in the mountain hollows on the left. The cannon on Three Tree Hill were silent; the bivouacs and positions of the two combatant armies were veiled in darkness. Only from Three Tree Hill came the gleam of lanterns--the signals telling the column that all was well.

[_Photo by Bassano._

MAJOR-GENERAL WOODGATE.

Edward Robert Prevost Woodgate, C.B., C.M.G., was a son of the Rector of Belbroughton, Worcestershire. Born 1845; entered the Army as ensign in the 4th (King's Own Royal Lancaster) regiment in 1865; served with the Abyssinian Expedition against King Theodore, 1868; in the Ashanti War of 1873-74; on the staff in the Zulu War of 1878-9, when he obtained the Brevet of Major; served as staff officer in the West Indies, 1880-5, and as regimental officer in India, 1885-89; promoted Lieut.-Col., 1893; C.B., 1856; and Colonel, 1897; appointed to command the Regimental District of the Kings Own at Lancaster, September, 1897; raised the West African Frontier Regiment in Sierra Leone, and suppressed the native rebellion, 1898-9; invalided home and made C.M.G., and given command of Leicestershire district. In December, 1899, he was appointed to the command of the Ninth Brigade in South Africa; he led the assault on Spion Kop, and was killed while defending the position gained upon that hill, January 24, 1900.]

[Sidenote: Ascent of Spion Kop.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 23, 1900.]

At this point began the real ascent of the mountain by an exceedingly steep and narrow path, which worked up the almost precipitous slopes. After a short halt, General Woodgate and Colonel Blomfield led the way, in front of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the whole force in Indian file moved upwards with the utmost caution. The mountain side abounded in boulders and brushwood, offering the best of cover for the enemy; there were many points where the track, which was at best only a goat path, ran along narrow ledges with a sheer drop on the outside, and here a single determined enemy might have caused heavy loss and even defeated the assault. Along this difficult and tedious route crawled the infantry in light marching order, expecting each moment to hear among the rocks the crack of the Boer rifles. But no sound or cry of alarm came, and, shrouded in obscurity, the forlorn hope slowly neared the shoulder where was known to be one of the "mauvais pas" of the mountain. Hereabouts a large white spaniel suddenly emerged from the darkness, and discovery seemed certain. Yet the animal came quietly up, and allowed a soldier to catch it, when it was promptly led to the rear.

[_Photo by Caney._

THORNEYCROFT'S HORSE IN CAMP AT PIETERMARITZBURG.]

Lieut.-Colonel A. W. Thorneycroft, in command of Mounted Infantry in South Africa, was born in 1859. He was originally in the Militia; joined the Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1879; fought in the Zulu campaign, and in the Transvaal War of 1881, when he defended Pretoria; was appointed Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General in Natal in September, 1899, and formed the regiment of Irregulars which did service at Colenso and Spion Kop. Colonel Thorneycroft is a brave and daring leader and a great sportsman, and has trained his men to be excellent scouts.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 24, 1900.] _The Attacking Force Challenged._]

Those who have clambered among our British hills--and better those who know the Alps--will realise some of the perplexities of this night ascent. At times the path was lost, and was recovered with difficulty; no lantern could be used in awkward places, and the men had simply to trust to luck and to the fidelity of the guides, helping each other at every turn, and giving a hand at the points where the way was dangerous. General Woodgate, who was in bad health and had constantly to be assisted, was always in the very forefront. Progress was necessarily slow, and the greatest care had to be taken to prevent the men losing touch of each other. When the shoulder of the mountain was reached, Colonel Thorneycroft deployed his men to the left, while General Woodgate, with the Lancashire Fusiliers, took post in line on the right. The most critical moment of the assault had come.

[_After a sketch by Ernest Prater._

BAYONETING THE BOER SENTRY ON SPION KOP.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 24, 1900.]

[Sidenote: A Boer picket surprised.]

It was now half-past three of the morning of January 24--a day hereafter to be one of dark memory in the British army. Impenetrable blackness shrouded the summit of the mountain; a thick, wet mist encompassed it, and hid from the sight of the expectant officers and men the details of the strange new land upon which the forlorn hope had debouched. It could be felt rather than seen that the shoulder opened out to a plateau, which rose steadily towards the north, but how far it extended was not known. From below it had appeared only a narrow ridge, bounded on all sides, except that from which the night assault had been delivered, by sheer precipices, and the utmost caution had to be used in the obscurity, as at each step an abyss might open before the feet of the advancing line. In the preternatural stillness which prevailed upon the mountain top there was no token of the enemy's presence. No outposts had been encountered; the only sign of life visible was when from time to time the mist lifted, and far below and behind the lights of Three Tree Hill could be discerned twinkling in the darkness. The land seemed to lie lapped in sleep. And then suddenly the looked-for challenge came. Out of the mist sounded the shrill cry of a man in mortal terror. It said in Dutch, "Halt! Who goes there?" Instantly General Woodgate answered "Waterloo!" There was the flash of many rifles, a rush, a scuffle, and the Lancashire Fusiliers were among the Boers. It was only a weak picket, ten or fifteen men strong; the Boer sentry was bayoneted at once; half-a-dozen others who had taken refuge behind a stone wall were surrounded, and, though they made a gallant stand, were overborne by numbers. In this fight Colonel À Court, of General Buller's staff, had a narrow escape. Closing with one of the enemy, he tried to use his Mauser pistol, but in this critical moment found the safety catch was set, and had to snatch up a great stone, with which he felled his opponent.

[_Photo by Middlebrook._

GENERAL VIEW OF SPION KOP FROM ACROSS THE RIVER.]

[Sidenote: The storming force halts too soon.]

This brush with the Boers took place a little south of the real summit, at a point where stood a grove of mimosa bushes, and where there was fair cover. But from this point onward no difficulty was encountered; the slope relented; the ridge opened out into one of those table-lands which are a feature of South African mountain scenery. Breathless and weary, the men pushed forward without any opposition, their movements veiled in the mist through which the first grey light of dawn was now breaking. They stood upon "a fog-bound island in the air." The plateau, 400 yards wide, seemed to trend away interminably to the north-east. And here the first great mistake, as after events proved, was committed. Instead of pushing on to the uttermost extremity of the summit, the forlorn hope halted about 5 a.m. at a Boer trench which was captured without episode. Possibly the troops, wearied by their seven hours' climb in the darkness, were incapable of any further desperate effort. They must needs be prepared to maintain their position throughout the day--a day which might well be one of the fiercest fighting--and so rest was essential.

Some attempt was made to provide cover while the mist still veiled the mountain top. Yet, by reason of this very mist, the exact position of the enemy could not be ascertained or the defences constructed where they were most needed. The surface of the hill was not favourable to entrenching; it was of rock, friable indeed, but not to be cut with spades, and the covering of earth was of the thinnest. Perhaps the weariness of the infantry and the want of sufficient entrenching tools would have precluded the construction of serious defences even had the ground been wholly favourable. The men were in no condition to set to work as navvies. All these things must be remembered when it is asked why the troops did not entrench themselves. Here, as at Majuba, the omission was fatal; here, as there, the same explanation will suffice for the neglect of so obvious a precaution. What trenches were made were only scratched in the thin soil, a few inches deep, and though serviceable enough against rifle fire, were utterly ineffectual against artillery. Stones to build breastworks were wanting; there were many boulders on the summit, but these were too large to be moved. The Boer works were remodelled as well as was possible under the circumstances. This done, the little force waited for the lifting of the mist, when the ordeal of battle would begin, and when for the first time the exact situation could be discerned.

The photograph was taken outside Ladysmith; guns and gunners were removed to Spion Kop when Warren developed his attack.]

[_From a photograph taken at Newcastle Station._

PRESIDENT STEYN'S VISIT TO NATAL.]

[Sidenote: JAN. 24, 1900.] _The Attacking Force not Promptly Supported._]

[Sidenote: Tardy reinforcements.]

[Sidenote: [JAN. 24, 1900.]