Chapter XII: The Divorce (1809-1810) (2)

All the leaders of the insurrection were found henceforth at Cadiz; the central Junta and its executive commission had abdicated in favor of a royal regency. The preparations for resistance in this place, fortified on the side of the land by man, as on the side of the sea by nature, disquieted King Joseph, who had long been desirous of detaching a _corps d'armée_ against Cadiz. "Assure me of Seville, and I will assure you of Cadiz," said Marshal Soult. Now it was found necessary to guard Seville, Granada, and Malaga; a corps of observation was being maintained before Badajoz; the forces which were laying siege to Cadiz were necessarily restrained; everywhere the Spanish armies were forming again.

Napoleon had been for a long time weary of the war in Spain, which he had at first regarded as an easy enterprise; he had conceived ill-feeling towards his brother, whom he rightly judged incapable of accomplishing the work which he himself had been wrong in committing to his charge. The continual demands for men and money which came to him from the peninsula hindered his operations and his schemes; he resolved upon modifying the organization of the government in Spain. On the 28th of January, 1810, he wrote to the Duke of Cadore (Champagny): "Write by the express, and several times, to the Sieur Laforest, at Madrid, in order that he may present notes as to the impossibility of my continuing to sustain the enormous expenses of Spain; that I have already sent there more than 300,000,000; that such considerable exportations of money exhaust France; that it is, then, indispensable that the engineers, the artillery, the administrations, and the soldiers' pay should be henceforth supplied from the Spanish treasury; that all which I can do is to give a supplemental grant of two millions per month for the soldiers' pay; that if this proposition is not agreed to, it will only remain for me to administer the provinces of Spain on my own account--in that case they will abundantly supply the maintenance and pay of the army. To see the resources of this country lost by false measures and a feeble administration, and to send thither my best blood, is impossible. The provinces have plenty of money, when the soldier is not paid he will pillage, and I know not what to do with him."

It was in the midst of his joy and his easy triumph in Andalusia that the severe protests of Napoleon arrived to surprise King Joseph. A few liberalities he had permitted himself with regard to his servants had succeeded in exasperating the emperor. He decreed the state of siege in all the provinces [Footnote: Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, and Biscay.] to the left of the Ebro, confiding the military command to four generals-- Augereau, Suchet, Reille, and Thouvenot. All the administrative powers were at the same time, committed to these generals, who were to correspond directly with the emperor. The idea of Napoleon, with which he acquainted his lieutenants, was to unite to France the territories which he thus isolated from the rest of the empire, as an indemnity for the sacrifices which the war had imposed upon him. General Suchet was charged with completing the conquest of the towns in Catalonia and Aragon which were still held by the insurgents. He achieved brilliantly the siege of Lerida.

At the same time, and in order to take away from King Joseph an authority which he knew not how to use, the armies in the country were divided into three corps. The army of the south was confided to Marshal Soult; the army of Portugal was waiting for the arrival of Marshal Masséna; the army of the centre--the least important of all--was alone left under the personal direction of King Joseph, who was appointed its general-in-chief. The embassies of King Joseph, the complaint of his wife, who was still in Paris, remained without result. In place of a central, powerless, and insufficient power, Napoleon was desirous of establishing delegates of his supreme authority. He had sanctioned anarchy; the rights of the hierarchy had disappeared before the lieutenants of a chief arbitrary, but until now constantly attended by victory. Far from the presence of Napoleon, in a country given over for two years to the disorder of civil war, obedience had given place to mistrust, and regularity to disorder. Scarcely had Marshal Masséna joined the army of Portugal, of which he had accepted the command with regret, than he had immediately a perception of the difficulties which awaited it. The emperor had given orders to commence by the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo and of Almeida. Marshal Ney and General Junot, whose corps were placed under the command of Masséna, made such clamorous protests that the old marshal was obliged to display all his authority. "They say that Masséna has grown old," cried he with just anger; "they will see that my will has lost nothing of its force." Already Sir Arthur Wellesley, become Lord Wellington, was preparing not far from Lisbon, between the Tagus and the sea, that invulnerable position which history has designated "the lines of Torres Vedras." It was thither that he counted on drawing the French army, slowly exhausting its forces before an enemy patiently unassailable. The orders of Napoleon, and the deference of Masséna to these instructions, had spared us the danger of being attacked in the rear; when the French army advanced to encounter Lord Wellington, it had taken possession of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, but the two sieges had been long and painful, having cost the lives of many soldiers; important garrisons occupied the places. In accordance with a mental habit which grew upon him through default of contradiction, the Emperor Napoleon did not admit the enfeeblement of his forces, whilst depreciating beforehand those of his enemy. "My cousin," wrote he on the 10th of September, 1810, to Marshal Berthier, "let a French officer set out immediately as bearer of a letter for the Prince of Essling, in which you will make him understand that my intention is that he should attack and rout the English; that Lord Wellington has no more than 18,000 men, of which only 15,000 are infantry, and the remainder cavalry and artillery; that General Hill has no more than 6000 men, infantry and cavalry; that it would be ridiculous for 25,000 English to hold in suspense 60,000 Frenchmen; that, by not groping about, but by attacking them openly, after having reconnoitred them, they will be made to experience severe repulses. The Prince of Essling has four times as many cavalry as he needs for defeating the enemy's army. I am too far off, and the position of the enemy changes too often, for me to be able to counsel you as to the manner of leading the attack, but it is certain that the enemy is not in a state to resist."

Marshal Masséna was wrong in accepting a mission of which he foresaw the immense dangers, and in refraining from personally impressing the emperor, by the weight of his old experience, as regards the illusions that were prevalent in Paris on the subject of the respective situations of the two armies. Counting upon victory on the day when he should succeed in meeting the enemy, he became involved, with 50,000 men in the impracticable roads of Portugal in the vicinity of Lord Wellington, already his equal in forces, and seconded by the whole Portuguese nation in insurrection against the French. The lieutenants of Masséna, as bold and more youthful, estimated as he did the disastrous chances of the campaign. "Do not stand haggling with the English," replied Napoleon. He was obeyed.

Lord Wellington remained in his retreat upon the heights of Busaco, above the valley of Mondego, in front of Coimbra; he barred the passage to Marshal Masséna, who resolved to give battle. After a furious and sanguinary combat (27th of September, 1810), the attack of the French was decisively repulsed. For the first time the Portuguese, mixed with the English troops, had courageously sustained their allies. "They have shown themselves worthy of fighting beside English soldiers," says Lord Wellington in his report. The road remained closed, and the English, masters of their position, saw already Marshal Masséna constrained to retreat. He had recovered on the field of battle all his indomitable ardor. "We ought to be able to turn the hills," said he to his lieutenants, and he detached immediately General Montbrun upon the right, to traverse an unknown country, hostile, and already enveloped in the darkness of night. The perspicacity and perseverance of the marshal had not been deceived; his scouts discovered a passage which the English had not occupied. On the 29th, at sunset, Lord Wellington learnt all of a sudden that the French army had defiled by the little village of Bazalva upon the back of the mountain; it was already debouching upon the plain of Coimbra, when the English saw themselves compelled to evacuate the town in all haste: the French passed through behind them, only leaving their sick and wounded. The Portuguese militia immediately resumed possession of the town. Masséna advanced upon Lisbon by forced marches; on the 11th of October he arrived before the lines of Torres Vedras, by this time completely finished, and furnished with 600 pieces of ordnance. Behind three successive series of formidable entrenchments, supplied with resources of every kind, and supported on one side by the Tagus and on the other by the ocean, Lord Wellington had resolved to shut up his army, until then victorious, and to wait until hunger, sickness, and exhaustion should at length deliver him from his enemies, whatever might be the difficulties of the undertaking, and the clamors that might be raised against him.

"I am convinced," wrote the English general to his government, "that the honor and the interest of the country require us to remain here to the latest possible moment, and, with the aid of Heaven, I will hold on here as long as I can. I shall not seek to relieve myself of the burden of responsibility by causing the burden of a defeat to rest upon the shoulders of ministers; I will not ask from them resources which they cannot spare, and which will not contribute perhaps in an effective manner to the success of our enterprise; I will not again give to the weakness of the ministry an excuse for withdrawing the army from a situation which the honor and interest of the country compel us to guard. If the Portuguese do their duty, I can maintain myself here; if they do not do their duty, no effort in the power of Great Britain to make will suffice to save Portugal; and if I am obliged to retire, I shall be in a situation to bring away the English army with me."

It was with this firm and modest confidence in a situation that he had prudently chosen, and of which all the resources had been multiplied by his foresight, that Lord Wellington awaited the attack of Masséna, and the seasoned troops who were deploying before his lines. The soldiers were exasperated at this unforeseen obstacle raised by the hand of man, and of which no one had penetrated the secret. "We shall succeed, as we should have succeeded at Busaco, if we had been allowed to," said the troops. Masséna judged otherwise.

On the 10th of October the marshal with his staff-officers examined with care the enemy's lines; one discharge of a cannon, one only, resounded in their ears, and the wall upon which the telescope rested was overthrown. Masséna looked at his lieutenants. "The only thing to do is to occupy both shores of the Tagus, and keep them and Lisbon blockaded," said he: "we will wait for reinforcements, and when the army of Andalusia shall have arrived we will see if, behind those cannons there, there are other cannons and other walls, as the peasants say."

In their rigid simplicity, the conceptions of Lord Wellington had taken little account of the sufferings of the Portuguese nation. Resolved upon defending Portugal to the last extremity, he had left Lisbon exposed to cannon-balls, and the country a prey to the systematic depredations of the French. Masséna decided upon constituting a military establishment in face of the enemy's lines. Everywhere the resources of the surrounding country were stored in the magazines; an hospital was prepared; General Eblé, old and fatigued, but always inexhaustible in resources, was preparing boats in order to form a bridge. Effecting a movement in rear, Masséna and his lieutenants occupied all the positions from Santarem to Thomar, eager to instal themselves upon the two shores of the Tagus, to seize upon Abrantes, and to invest the English each day more closely in their lines. Already discontent was great in Lisbon, where provisions arrived with difficulty. Wellington urged upon the regency of Portugal the devastation of the country districts, and especially that of Alemtejo, the natural resource of the French army; the Portuguese authorities resisted. "Deliver Portugal, instead of famishing it," said they.

This was repeated in England, where the Prince of Wales had just assumed the regency, in consequence of a decided relapse into madness of King George III. The opposition thought itself returning to power; it had long sustained against the ministers of his father the policy of the heir to the throne; it now pleaded the cause of peace. The dangers to which the army of Portugal was exposed, the evils it might have to undergo, formed the subject of the debates in Parliament. The Prince Regent did not hasten to change his cabinet, but the violence of the recriminations in the ranks of the opposition affected the Marquis of Wellesley; he pressed his brother to make an effort to relieve England from the enormous weight that was crushing her. "I know it will cost me the little reputation I have been able to obtain, and the good will of the population that surrounds me," said Wellington; "but I shall not accomplish my duty towards England and this country, if I do not persevere in the prudence which can alone assure us success." Marshal Masséna had sent the eloquent and adroit General Foy to Paris, charged with representing to the Emperor the difficulties of the situation of the army, and the absolute need of a supreme effort in its favor.

The general arrived at Paris at the moment when new complications were preparing. The harshness of the proceedings of Napoleon, the violence which he had displayed towards the small independent princes whose territories he had confiscated, the yoke of iron under which he claimed to place all the commercial interests of Europe, had, little by little, effaced the remains of the youthful admiration and confidence with which his brilliant genius had inspired the Emperor Alexander. Personally wounded by the sudden abandonment of the matrimonial negotiations, the Czar experienced serious uneasiness at the insatiable ambition which threatened to invade the most distant regions. He had made some preparations for defence, of little importance in themselves, and simply manifesting his fears. Napoleon took umbrage at it; the mad passion for conquests was again roused in his mind; he already meditated a new enterprise, bolder and less justifiable than all those which he had hitherto accomplished, necessitating efforts which became every day more difficult. No resource would be neglected; no reinforcement could be detached for Portugal and Spain from the armies which were being prepared in France and Germany. The intelligent ardor of General Foy, his loyal pleadings on behalf of Marshal Masséna, did not completely succeed in enlightening Napoleon as to the situation of affairs in the peninsula; he understood enough of it, however, to order new dispositions of his troops. The corps of General Drouet, in Old Castile, and the fifth corps of the army of Andalusia, commanded by Marshal Mortier, were to proceed to the aid of Marshal Masséna. The emperor recommended the latter to occupy without delay the two shores of the Tagus--to throw a couple of bridges across, as formerly over the Danube at Essling, in order to assure his communications whilst waiting for the reinforcements, which would permit him to attack the English lines with 80,000 men, perhaps to seize them, and in any case to inflict such sufferings upon the Portuguese population and upon the English that the latter should be obliged to retire. "The policy of the English Government inclines to change," added Napoleon; "my grand and final efforts will at last bring us the general peace." He commenced at the same moment his preparations for the Russian campaign.

"Everything depends of the Tagus!" Such was the watchword sent back to Spain by General Foy, and the tenor of the correspondence between Major- General Berthier and the leaders of the armies in the Peninsula. General Drouet began the march with his army reduced to 15,000 men, which Napoleon reckoned as 30,000. In consequence of the delay of the operations, only one division of 7000 men was effectively at the disposal of the general when he took the road from Santarem. General Gardanne, sent forward in advance, had become alarmed through the report of a movement of the English, and had promptly fallen back upon Almeida, leaving to the soldiers of Massena, and to the general-in-chief himself, the wretchedness of a hope deceived. The instructions sent to General Drouet still gave evidence of the obstinate illusions of the Emperor Napoleon as regards the respective situation of the two armies in Portugal. "Repeat to General Drouet the order to go to Almeida," wrote Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, "and to collect considerable forces, in order to be of use to the Prince of Essling, and to aid in keeping open his communications. It will be necessary that he should give to General Gardanne, or any other general, a force of 6000 men, with six pieces of cannon, in order to reopen the communication, and that a corps of the same force should be placed at Almeida, to correspond with him. In short, it is important that the communications of the army of Portugal should be re-established, in order that during all the time that the English remain in the country the rear of the Prince of Essling may be securely guarded. Immediately the English have re-embarked he will make his headquarters at Ciudad Rodrigo, my intention being that only the ninth corps should be engaged in Portugal, unless the English still hold it; and even the ninth corps ought never to let itself be separated from Almeida; but it ought to manoeuvre between Almeida and Coimbra."

When General Drouet, collecting all his forces, arrived at length with 8000 or 9000 men at Thomar (January, 1811), Marshal Massena had been struggling for five months in complete isolation against a situation which became every day more critical. He had successively seized Punhete and Leyria, constantly occupied in preparing for that passage of the Tagus which Napoleon was recommending to him without fathoming the enormous difficulties of the task. The soldiers had been organized into companies of foragers, from day to day obliged to go out further from the encampments in order to be sure of some resources, exposing themselves in consequence to attacks from a population everywhere hostile. Marauders often detached themselves from their regiments, living for several weeks by veritable pillage before returning under their flags. The officers suffered still more than the soldiers, for they did not pillage. Money and rations failed them; their clothes were worn to rags; courage alone remained inexhaustible; discipline grew feeble in every rank of the military hierarchy. The lieutenants of Marshal Masséna did not experience the same confidence in him which sustained the soldiers. The bridges at length reached completion, thanks to prodigies of perseverance and cleverness; bitter discussions arose every day as to the most favorable point for the passage, when the approach of General Drouet infused joy and hope into the entire army. General Gardanne, who commanded the vanguard, announced the arrival of all the straggling divisions of the ninth corps, and the orders sent to Marshal Soult for the movement of Marshal Mortier. Money as well as reinforcements was about to rain upon the army. The instructions of the emperor were precise. The English were to be speedily dislodged from their famous lines; and, if it was necessary still to blockade them for some time, the Tagus once crossed, the troops would no longer want for resources. The plain of Alemtejo would be open to them; the fine season was approaching; all efforts would become easy. Confidence and cheerfulness spread through all the encampments.

Marshal Masséna alone remained sad and uneasy. He had read the despatches which General Drouet brought him; he had smiled bitterly at the hopes and counsels of the Emperor Napoleon; he comprehended that the reinforcements were insufficient, and that the attempt at resistance was in advance condemned to failure. General Drouet had the order to maintain communications between Santarem and Almeida; already the insurrection had closed up all the roads behind him, and new skirmishes were necessary to open a passage. Only the corps of General Gardanne was destined to remain in the encampments, and that corps did not amount to 1500 men. Masséna resolved upon keeping General Drouet near himself; not without pain did he arrive at this conclusion. Discouragement was already penetrating the army, with a true knowledge of the situation and of the notorious insufficiency of the succors. General Foy had just arrived, accompanied by a small corps of recruits or convalescents, which he had formed at Ciudad Rodrigo. Before quitting that post, he had written to Marshal Soult, continually occupied in Andalusia: "I beseech you, Monsieur le Maréchal, in the name of a sentiment sacred to all French hearts--of the sentiment which inflames us all for the interests and glory of our august master--to present at the soonest possible moment a corps of troops upon the left bank of the Tagus, opposite to the mouth of the Zezere. It is scarcely four days' journey from Badajoz to Breto, a village situated opposite Punhete. The English are not numerous on the left bank of the Tagus; they cannot dare anything in this part without compromising the safety of their formidable entrenchments before Lisbon, which are only eight leagues from the bridge of Rio Mazac. According to the decision that your Excellency may arrive at, the army of the Prince of Essling will pass the Tagus, hold in check the English on both banks of the river, will fatigue them, will prey upon them, will keep them in painful and ruinous inaction, will form between them and your sieges a barrier likely to accelerate the surrender of the towns; or, on the other hand, this army, failing to effect the passage that has become necessary, will be forced to withdraw from the Tagus and from the English in order to find sufficient to eat, and by the same movement will give the day to our eternal enemies, in a struggle in which till now the chances have been in our favor. The country between the Mondego and the Tagus being eaten up and entirely devastated, there can be no question as to the army of Portugal having to make a retrograde step of about five or six leagues. Hunger will follow it even into the provinces of the north. The consequences of such a retreat are incalculable. It appertains to you, Monsieur le Maréchal, to be at once the saviour of a great army and the powerful instrument in carrying out the ideas of our glorious sovereign. On the day when the troops under your orders shall have appeared on the banks of the Tagus, and facilitated the passage of this great river, you will be the true conqueror of Portugal."

When Marshal Soult received this eloquent and truthful summing up from General Foy, already forestalled by the formal orders of the emperor, he was personally in a grave embarrassment. Like Masséna in Portugal, he was disposing in Andalusia of forces less considerable than Napoleon estimated them in France. General Suchet, after having brilliantly accomplished his enterprise against Tortosa, which was reduced on the 2nd of January, had immediately commenced the difficult siege of Tarragona, which occupied almost all his forces. General Sebastiani with difficulty sufficed for guarding Granada; Marshal Victor was detained before Cadiz, where the Cortes had solemnly assembled on the 4th of September. The resistance was to be long, the place being manned by good troops, and constantly revictualled by the English vessels. Generals Blake and Castaños had collected their forces, and ceaselessly harassed the corps occupied by the sieges, as well as the armies which kept the country. Marshal Soult had just asked for important reinforcements from Paris, when he received the order to attempt the difficult enterprise of an expedition into Portugal. He thought he had the right to comment on the instructions sent to him, and whilst urging the obstacles which were opposed to his prompt obedience, he announced his intention of proceeding to the aid of Marshal Masséna, by reducing the hostile towns found upon the road to Portugal. The sieges accomplished, nothing more would hinder the march upon Santarem. He advanced then, with Marshal Mortier and the fifth corps, to the attack of Olivença, which did not oppose a long resistance. On the 27th of January he invested Badajoz.

The place was strong, protected by the Guadiana and by solid ramparts; it communicated by a stone bridge with Fort St. Cristoval, built upon the right bank, and defending the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia. At the moment when Marshal Soult approached Badajoz, the corps of the Marquis de la Romana, formerly occupied in Portugal in the service of the English, and recently recalled by the Spanish insurrection, took possession of these entrenchments; its indefatigable chief had just died at Lisbon. It was in presence of these hostile forces that the fifth corps commenced the work of a siege destined to detain them for several weeks. A successful attack on a little detached fort permitted the marshals to attempt the passage of the Guadiana, then much swollen by the rains, and to give battle to the Spanish army. On the 19th of February, in the morning, upon the banks of the Gevara, the corps of the insurgents were completely defeated, without having been able to succeed in establishing themselves in the entrenched camp of Santa Engracia. Marshal Soult was now in a situation to hasten the taking of Badajoz, and to push forward into Portugal before the Spanish army could be re-formed. He does not appear to have conceived this idea, and resumed with perseverance the work of the trenches. "I hope that Badajoz will have been taken in the course of January, and that the junction with the Prince of Essling will have taken place before the 20th of January," wrote the emperor, meanwhile. "If it is necessary, the Duke of Dalmatia can withdraw troops from the fourth corps. I repeat to you, everything depends upon the Tagus."

The cannon of Badajoz were heard at Santarem and at Torres Vedras, and the hearts of the two armies beat with uneasiness and hope. Upon the arrival of General Foy, in presence of the insufficiency of the disposable forces, the question lay between a retreat upon Mondego and an attempt at the passage of the Tagus. The wish of the emperor strongly expressed to Foy himself, the patriotic honor which animated all the generals, even the most dissatisfied, had made the balance incline in favor of a prolonged occupation. It was necessary, then, to attempt to cross the river; the distress which reigned in certain divisions, absolutely reduced by famine, did not permit of hesitation; the shores of the stream were reconnoitred with care. For a moment the idea was entertained of making use, as a guiding mark, of the isle of Alviela, situated in the midst of the river, as the isle of Lobau was found placed in the midst of the Danube. The materials of the bridge were collected at Punhete, but horses were wanting. General Eblé opposed an attempt, the advantages of which were to be too tardily recognized. The passage from Santarem to Abrantes offered the inconvenience of an immediate attack from the enemy in possession of that town, recently fortified by General Hill. It was resolved to wait for the arrival of Marshal Soult, or for the reinforcements which he had been ordered to send into Portugal. Masséna had never believed, and did not believe, in the promises which had been made him on this side; he consented, however, upon the advice of all, to retard for a few days a retrograde movement which became necessary, the impossibility of attempting alone the passage of the Tagus being recognized. The enemy had occupied the isle of Alviela; all the local resources were exhausted; the reserve of biscuit assured still fifteen days' provisions to the army. The weeks passed without news: the wind no longer brought the sound of the cannonade; the soldiers felt themselves abandoned at the end of the world; the anger of the generals no longer permitted them to reanimate the failing courage of an army famished and without hope. Masséna commenced the skilful preparations for his retreat upon Mondego. Under pretext of effecting a concentration of the corps necessary for the passage of the Tagus, he detached Marshal Ney towards Leyria, with a view of cutting off from the enemy the roads to the sea, in order to form afterwards a rear- guard. The wounded and the sick had been taken on before. On the 5th of March, at the end of the day, the whole French army was on the march, sad and gloomy in spite of their joy at quitting the places where they had suffered without compensation and without glory. The materials of the bridges, prepared with so much care by General Eblé, were burnt. General Junot pressed forward, in order to occupy Coimbra and the Mondego--a rallying-point indicated beforehand to all the corps.

Lord Wellington issued forth from his entrenchments on learning the movements which announced to him our retreat. His accustomed prudence kept him from precipitating the pursuit by an effort that might become dangerous; the well-known character of Marshal Ney protected the rear- guard no less than the valor of his troops. He ranged his forces in order of battle before Pombal, which obliged Wellington to recall the troops which he had detached for the succor of Badajoz. But the hurry of the retreat had resumed possession of the mind of General Drouet, ever haunted by compunctions for his disobedience to the formal orders of Napoleon. Ney was not in a position seriously to defend his positions against the English; after a brilliant skirmish, he fell back upon Redinha. His division of infantry had constantly fought under his orders in all the campaigns of the six previous years; it disputed the land, foot to foot, with the 25,000 English, who followed the French army, without letting itself, for a single moment, be troubled or pressed by the superiority of the enemy. The least offensive movement of the English columns was responded to by a charge from our troops, which soon re-established the distance between the two armies. Masséna, who was present at the manoeuvres of Marshal Ney, admired them without reserve, beseeching his clever and courageous lieutenant not to abandon the heights, in order to give the other corps the time and space necessary for the continuance of their march. A last engagement, which took place upon the banks of the Soure, in front of the position of Redinha, permitted Ney at last to cross the river, and gain the town of Condeixa.

The position was strong, and Masséna counted on the energetic resistance of his rear-guard, in order to hinder the English, and leave time for the different corps to reassemble at Coimbra. Marshal Ney on this occasion failed to realize the just hopes of his chief; after a slight skirmish, he abandoned Condeixa, and overtaking in his haste the corps that his movement had exposed, he fell back upon the main body of the army. A position at Coimbra became impossible, as Lord Wellington was following closely on our divided forces. Masséna gained the Alva by a series of clever manoeuvres, constantly thwarted by the want of discipline in his lieutenants. Marshal Ney had let himself be surprised at Foz d'Arunce by the English; General Régnier extended his camp to a distance, without care for the safety of other corps; the position of the Alva was no longer tenable. Masséna, exasperated and grieved, continued his march towards the frontier of Spain; re-entered it without glory, after having displayed, during six months, all the resources of his courage, and the energy of his will in a situation which had been imprudently imposed upon him by peremptory orders. He led back an army inured to fatigue and privations, but disorganized by an existence at once idle and irregular, directed by chiefs soured and discontented. The consequences of this state of things were not long in bursting forth; scarcely had the troops taken a few days' rest in Spain, when Marshal Masséna conceived the idea of assuming the offensive by descending upon the Tagus by Alcantara, in order to re-enter Portugal and recommence the campaign. Marshal Ney frankly refused to follow him without the communication of the formal orders of the emperor. In consideration of this act of revolt, twice repeated, Masséna took from Ney the command of the sixth corps, which was confided to General Loyson. Ney obeyed, not without some regret for his conduct; the ill-humor of all the chiefs of the corps rendered the resumption of the campaign in Portugal utterly impossible: the army was cantoned between Almeida, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca. The emperor had just confided the general command of all the provinces of the north to Marshal Bessières; the latter had promised much to Marshal Massena, who still nursed the hope of a great battle. Lord Wellington, following the French, had entered Spain.

The situation of affairs became critical, in spite of the _éclat_ of the taking of Badajoz, which had been at length reduced to capitulate, on the 11th of March, on the eve of a general assault. Marshal Soult now found himself pressed to fly to the assistance of Cadiz. Marshal Victor was threatened in his positions of siege by the Spanish general Blake, and by an English corps recently embarked at Gibraltar. But already the energetic defence of Victor had triumphed over the enemy in the battle of Barossa. The assailants had retired, but remained in a threatening attitude. The army of Wellington, formerly kept immovable by Massena at Torres Vedras, became every day a danger for those who had not been able, or who had not been willing, to go to the aid of the expedition in Portugal. Our forces, everywhere dispersed, were everywhere insufficient. Marshal Soult, justly uneasy, demanded reinforcements from all sides. General Foy had returned to Paris, in order to explain to the emperor the retreat of Masséna.

Great was the wrath of Napoleon. He had not yet opened his eyes to the profound causes of so many repeated checks. He did not comprehend the lessons which events were pointing out to his conquering ambition. He imputed to his lieutenants faults sometimes inevitable, or easily to be foreseen, in the circumstances in which they were placed. The inexhaustible resources of his military genius were not, however, at a loss on the occasion of this first outburst of embarrassments, destined daily to increase. He recalled Marshal Ney, incapable of serving under any other than himself, and replaced him by Marshal Marmont, more docile, more skilled in questions of military organization, and very earnest in the service of Marshal Masséna. The latter was charged with watching Lord Wellington, and with closely following the English army. Marshal Soult received the reinforcements which had become necessary to him in order to defend the frontiers of Estramadura. The garrison of Badajoz was insufficient; that of Almeida had been furnishing provisions for several weeks to the troops of Masséna cantoned in the environs of the place; resources began to be exhausted. Wellington was triumphing in Portugal, in Spain, and even in England. His detractors had been constrained to admire the wisdom of his contrivances, and to admit their success; the opposition loudly proclaimed it in Parliament; the war party prevailed in the councils, and nobody any longer haggled over the succors to the victorious general. Past clamor did not trouble Lord Wellington; the flatteries of public favor did not intoxicate him. He decided on laying siege to the places recently conquered by the French. He himself proceeded to the environs of Badajoz, in order to settle his plan for the campaign. The bulk of his army were menacing Almeida.

Masséna was informed of the departure of Wellington; he conceived the hope of profiting by his absence to inflict upon the English a startling defeat. Hastily collecting a convoy of provisions destined to revictual Almeida, he pressed Marshal Bessières to join with him in order to attack the army of the enemy. Bessières lingered; the lieutenants of Masséna did not give evidence of the ardor which still inflamed the heroic defender of Genoa. Using on this occasion all his rights as general-in-chief, Masséna ordered at length the concentration of the forces. He was getting ready to set out, "without bread, without cannons, without horses," wrote he to Marshal Bessières, resolved upon no longer deferring his attack. The Duke of Istria (Bessières) arrived at last, on the 1st of May, with a reinforcement of 1500 horses and a convoy of grain. When the troops quitted Ciudad Rodrigo, on the 2nd of May, they had appeased their hunger. About 36,000 men were under arms. Wellington had had time to rejoin his army.

The English occupied the village of Fuentes d'Onoro, between the two streams of the Dos Casas and the Furones; they covered thus their principal communications with Portugal by the bridge of Castelbon over the Coa, and defended against us the road of Almeida. The combat began (3rd May, 1811) upon the two shores of the Dos Casas. Extremely furious on both sides, it left the English in possession of the village. Our columns of attack found themselves insufficient, and dispersed over too wide an extent of country. They occupied, however, both shores of the stream, when, night falling, caused the combat to cease. On the morrow Marshal Masséna, changing the point of his principal effort, marched with the main body of his forces upon Pozo-Velho. He attacked on May 5th, at daybreak. Some brilliant charges of cavalry threw the English into disorder, but the guard refused to act without the orders of Marshal Bessières, who was not found in time on the field of battle. The division of General Loyson went astray in the woods, while General Reynier limited himself to keeping back the English brigade which was directly opposed to him. The ammunition failed; Marshal Bessières, alleging the fatigue of the teams, refused to despatch immediately the wagons to Ciudad Rodrigo, where there was a store of cartridges. Discussion and want of discipline had borne their fruits. The first glorious outburst at the beginning of the day remained without result. Masséna slept upon the field of battle, within range of the guns of the English; but the latter had not recoiled, and everywhere maintained their position. When the marshal, provided with ammunition, wished to recommence hostilities, the most devoted amongst his lieutenants dissuaded him from the enterprise. Discouragement spread among the soldiers, as ill- humor among the officers. With despair in his heart, Masséna remained in face of the English whilst he gave orders to blow up the ramparts of Almeida. The movement of retreat had scarcely commenced, on the 10th of May, when the explosion was heard which announced the execution of the orders given. The town of Almeida existed no longer. The garrison had succeeded in escaping the watchfulness of the English, rejoining the corps of General Heudelet, who had been sent to meet it. "That act is as good as a victory!" cried Lord Wellington in anger. Masséna, however, did not allow himself to be deceived.

A few days later (16th May, 1811), Marshal Soult failed in his turn to overcome the resistance of the English posted before Badajoz, on the shores of the Albuera. A corps of the Anglo-Spanish army had laid siege to the place. The efforts of the French general to seize the village of Albuera were not successful. The marshal was constrained to place his cantonments at some distance, without, however, withdrawing from Badajoz. Masséna had just been recalled to France, and replaced in his command by Marshal Marmont. He had the misfortune to be constantly sacrificed to an ambition bolder and cleverer than his own, and to bear more than once the punishment for faults which he had not committed. His soul remained indomitable, even in his bitter sorrow; but his military career was terminated. Henceforth he was to fight no more: none of the last efforts of Napoleon were confided to the warlike genius of an ancient rival, who had become a loyal and useful lieutenant, without ever sinking to the _rôle_ of the courtier or the servant.

For three years past, the stubborn antipathy of the Spaniards to the foreign yoke had been struggling foot to foot against the power of Napoleon. For two years the most brilliant efforts of our courage had been vainly employed against the boldly-planned resistance of the English. The enormous sacrifices necessitated by the conquest of Spain were not compensated for, either by repose or glory. The armies were exhausted, and the generals grew weary of struggling with enemies impossible to destroy, whilst they fled only to form again immediately, like the Spaniards; or whilst they defended intrepidly positions cleverly chosen, like the English. The power and the reputation of Wellington went on increasing in proportion to our defeats. King Joseph, feeble and honorable, unjustly imposed by a perfidious contrivance on a people who repelled him, carried to France the recital of his griefs and sorrows.

Such was the situation in Spain in the month of May, 1811, after the hopes and long illusions of the campaigns of Andalusia and Portugal. The emperor had just experienced a great joy; he possessed at last a son. The King of Rome was born at Paris on the 20th of March. But day by day the situation was becoming more grave. The rupture with Russia was imminent. We had lost one after the other our most important colonies. In 1809 the English had seized upon our factories in the Senegal, and had succeeded in destroying our power in St. Domingo; in the months of July and December, 1810, the Isle of Bourbon and the Isle of France were in their turn snatched away. Our courageous efforts on the seas were powerless to defend the ancient possessions of France, as our brilliant valor failed in Spain to assure us an unjust conquest. In the interim, the industrial and commercial crisis was developing, though the superabundance of production in face of a European market more and more restricted. At the same time the Emperor Napoleon found himself battling with the heedlessly contracted difficulties of the spiritual government of the Catholic Church. The new prelates were still waiting for their bulls of institution, and the Pope still continued a prisoner.

Napoleon took his decision. He gave orders to the appointed bishops of Orleans, St. Flour, Asti, and Liège to repair to their sees without any other ecclesiastical formalities. He had elevated his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, to the archbishopric of Paris, after the death of Cardinal de Belloy. Fesch provisionally accepted, whilst continuing to hold his archbishopric of Lyons, the titles of which were canonically regular. The emperor flew into a passion. He had been to pay a visit to Notre Dame without being received by Cardinal Fesch. "I expect," said he, "to find the Archbishop of Paris at the door of his cathedral." He ordered the newly-elected prelate to take possession of his see. "No," said the cardinal; "I shall wait for the institution of the holy father." "But the chapter has given you powers." "It is true, but I should not know how to use them in this case." "Ah!" cried the emperor, "you condemn those who have obeyed me. I shall certainly know how to force you to it." "_Potius mori_," replied the cardinal. "Ah! _mori, mori_," repeated the emperor. "You choose Maury; you shall have him!"

Cardinal Maury, formerly the fiery defender of the rights and liberties of the Catholic Church before the Constituent Assembly, was appointed Archbishop of Paris on the 14th of October, 1810. On the 22nd, Osmond, the Bishop of Nancy, was called to the vacant archbishopric of Florence. Command was given to the two prelates to take possession of their sees. From Savona, Pius VII. had often succeeded in causing some canonical dispensations and some indications of his spiritual authority to reach the French and Italian clergy. Several associations were formed in order to supply him with the means for doing so. The Pope profited by them to send to Cardinal Maury, as Archbishop of Florence, a prohibition against ascending episcopal chairs without his institution. The brief addressed to Florence was promptly circulated in the city. A canon and two priests were on this account thrown into prison. At Paris the brief was secretly committed to the Abbé d'Astros, grand capitular vicar, cousin of Portalis, the councillor of state, and the son of the former minister of religion. The canon was moderate in his opinions as in his conduct; he conformed, however, to the instructions of the holy father. When Cardinal Maury wished to have the episcopal cross borne before him, the chapter abandoned him _en masse_, in order to retire to the sacristy. A second brief from the Pope fell into the hands of the police, "removing from the appointed archbishop all power and all jurisdiction, declaring null and without effect all that might be done to the contrary, knowingly or through ignorance." The emperor flew into a rage, attributing the resistance to the Abbé d'Astros, whom he violently apostrophized in public in a reception at the Tuileries. "I avow that I had kept myself a little on one side," Astros himself says; "but I did not wish to have myself sought for, and I always presented myself when the emperor asked for me." "Before all, monsieur, it is necessary to be a Frenchman," cried Napoleon; "it is the way to be, at the same time, a good Christian. The doctrine of Bossuet is the sole guide one ought to follow. With him one is sure of not losing one's way. I expect every one to acknowledge the liberties of the Gallican Church. The religion of Bossuet is as far from that of Gregory VII. as heaven is from hell. I know, monsieur, that you are in opposition to the measures that my policy prescribes. I have the sword on my side; take care of yourself!" The Abbé d'Astros was put in prison at Vincennes, and was to remain there until the fall of the empire. It was not long before the Cardinals de Pietro and Gabrielli were brought there also. Portalis had secretly learnt of the papal interdiction from his relative. He limited himself to informing Pasquier, recently charged with the direction of the police. He was expelled in full sitting of the Council of State by the emperor, with the most harsh reproaches on his perfidy. "Go, monsieur," said he to him, "and let me never again see you before my eyes!" At the same time, and in accordance with formal orders received from Paris, Pius VII was surrounded with the most paltry vexations; henceforth he was deprived in his captivity of all his old servants. The papers and portfolios of the Pope were all seized. "Never mind my purse," said the holy father; "but what will they do with my breviary and the office of the Virgin?" He did not consent to deliver to Prince Borghese the ring of the Fisherman, which he wore habitually on his finger, until he had himself broken it. About the same time, on several occasions, Italian priests who had refused to swear allegiance to the new state of things were transported to Corsica. Napoleon had himself given his instructions to the minister of religion. The boundaries of the dioceses and parishes in the Pontifical States underwent a complete alteration. Their number was much restricted. All the archives of the court of Rome were transported to Paris.

The emperor had not lost the remembrance of the concessions he had formerly obtained from Pius VII, when strong and free: he had reckoned upon a complete submission from the aged prisoner. Already the refusal of the holy father to the insinuations of the Cardinals Spina and Caselli had disquieted Napoleon: he had formerly flattered himself that he could make the Pope accept the suppression of his temporal power and the confiscation of his states by offering him palaces at Paris and Avignon, a rich income, and the noble grandeur of his spiritual authority over the whole Catholic Church. The extent of this authority, such as the emperor conceived it, was beginning to reveal itself. Napoleon wished to be the master in the Church as in the State. The authority of the Czar over the Russian Church, or of the Sultan over the Mussulmans, could alone satisfy his ideas. "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," limiting within the narrowest boundaries that portion which he still ostentatiously reserved for God. He thought for a moment of regulating by a law the question of episcopal institution. Diverted from this project by the wise counsels of Cambacérès and of Bigot de Préameneu, he resolved upon consulting a commission of ecclesiastics upon the convocation of a national Council. Already a first Council had been gathered, at the time of the debates on the investiture of the bishops. The illustrious Superior of St. Sulpice, the Abbé Emery, had sat in it, strongly against his will. "The emperor has appointed a commission of bishops and cardinals to examine certain questions," wrote the Abbé Emery, to his disciple, the Abbé Nageot, Superior of the Seminary of Baltimore. "He has desired that I should be added to it. All that I can say to you is, that I have come forth from it without having anything to reproach myself with; that I think God has given me the spirit of counsel in this affair. I am sure that He has given me the spirit of power through His holy mercy."

The Emperor Napoleon judged soundly of that spirit of power and counsel for which the Abbé Emery piously ascribed to God all the praise. "M. Emery is the only man who makes me afraid," said he; "he makes me do all that he wishes, and perhaps more than I ought. For the first time, I meet a man gifted with a veritable power over men, and from whom I ask no account of the use to which he will put it. On the contrary, I wish to be able to confide to him all our youth; I should die more reassured as to the future."