Chapter XIII (1)

GLORY AND MADNESS--THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (1811-1812).

It is painful to love one's country and see it advancing to defeat; it is sad to see a great mind, whose good sense recently equalled his power, dragged to ruin by his own faults and dragging after him a wearied nation. In 1812, France began to judge the Emperor Napoleon: and long previously Europe had denounced him as an insatiable conqueror who laid her waste incessantly. She was about to learn once more that neither distance, nor the rigors of climate, nor threatening armies, afforded sufficient protection against the emperor's schemes. Whilst his armies were struggling hard in Spain and Portugal against the insurgent population assisted by England, and whilst still holding in Germany the pledges of his conquests, Napoleon made preparations to attack the Emperor Alexander, who was still officially honored with the name of "ally," and to whom he thus wrote on the 6th April, 1811, when his armaments were already everywhere being prepared: "Has your Majesty ever had reason to repent of the confidence which you have shown me?"

Several reasons urged Napoleon to begin hostilities against the Emperor Alexander--reasons which, though bad and insufficient, weighed in his eyes, and, under the influence of his personal passions, with a decisive weight in the balance. He wished to pursue, everywhere and by every means, his struggle against England and her influence in Europe. Alexander had refused to increase the rigors of the continental blockade. To this infraction of the spirit of the treaties uniting the emperors, Alexander had added, during the Austrian war, an attitude of indifference and reserve which inspired confidence in the Emperor Francis and his advisers. He had shown no eagerness for the family alliance which Napoleon twice offered, while, at the same time, the latter was not deceived as to the annoyance caused at St. Petersburg by the negotiations for the hand of the grand-duchess being suddenly broken off. In short, Napoleon was convinced that the Emperor Alexander was preparing for war, eager to recover his liberty, and be freed from the conditions of the treaty of Tilsit. He, at the same time, believed that the renewal of hostilities would be signalized by important advantages for whichever of the two belligerents could first enter on the campaign. His main efforts, therefore, in 1811, were to hasten his warlike preparations, while using diplomatic artifices to make his adversary sleep, and, at the same time, proving to Europe that the rupture of the treaties was on the part of Alexander, and that the Russians were the first to arm. On sending him Count Lauriston, who was appointed to replace Caulaincourt, Napoleon wrote the Czar: "The man I send you has no consummate skill in business, but he is true and upright, as are the sentiments I bear towards you. Nevertheless I daily receive from Russia news which are not pacific. Yesterday I learned from Stockholm that the Russian divisions in Finland had left to go towards the frontiers of the Grand Duchy. A few days ago I had instructions from Bucharest that five divisions had left the Moldavian and Wallachian provinces for Poland, and that only four divisions of your Majesty's troops remain on the Danube. What is now taking place is a new proof that repetition is a powerful figure of rhetoric. Your Majesty has so often been told that I have a grudge against you, that your confidence has been shaken. The Russians quit a frontier where they are necessary, to go to a point where your Majesty has only friends. Nevertheless I had to think also of my affairs, and consider my own position. The recoil of my preparations will lead your Majesty to increase yours; and what you do, re-echoing here, will make me raise new levies, and all that for mere phantoms! It is a repetition of what I did in 1807 in Prussia, and in 1809 in Austria. As for me, I shall remain your Majesty's friend even when that fatality which rules Europe will one day compel our two nations to take sword in hand. I shall regulate my conduct by your Majesty's; I shall never make the attack: my troops will advance only when your Majesty has torn up the treaty of Tilsit. I shall be the first to disarm, and restore everything to the condition in which things were a year ago, if your Majesty will go back to the same confidence."

The emperor spoke the truth, and his treatment of Russia was nothing new. It had long been a clumsy artifice of his insatiable greed for war and conquest to charge his enemies with taking the sword in hand on account of their fears or expectations, the fear and expectations being usually caused by his attitude and the projects with which he was credited. Military reasons assisted at this time in encouraging him to dissimulate and talk of peace. He had conceived the idea of occupying successively the vast territories by which he was separated from Russia, and gaining first the Oder and then the Vistula before the Russians were in motion to cross the Niemen. The first links of this combination were already begun to be forged; crowds of runaway conscripts were everywhere being dragged from the woods and rocks where they hid themselves; and, by sending columns of militia to scour the provinces, garrison the villages, and freely pillage the houses of the young deserters, there were 50,000 or 60,000 men thus compelled to give themselves up, whose hiding-places had not been discovered. The emperor sent them in troops to the islands of Elba, Corsica, Ré, Belle-Isle, and Walcheren, appointing the sea to keep his deserters. Scarcely had they acquired the most rudimentary notions of military discipline, when they were despatched in a body to Marshal Davout, who was still stationed on the Elbe, with instructions to drill and form them. They often arrived still clad in their peasant's dress, their bodies ill, and their minds revolting against the existence thus forced upon them far from their home and country. About one sixth of these wretches escaped during the march, braving all the dangers and suffering of flight across an unknown country rather than be soldiers. Recruits from all the conquered nations filled up the gaps in the regiments of the ever- increasing army. War supplies as well as soldiers were also constantly accumulating in Germany. Napoleon resolved to collect at Dantzig the resources necessary to support an army of 400,000 men for a year. The marvellous fertility of his mind was entirely occupied in facilitating and rendering certain the movements of that enormous mass of men and horses during a long campaign and across vast spaces. The transport arrangements were in charge of skilled lieutenants, who had been with him in all his battles; and General Eblé was at the head of the engineer division for bridge-construction. "With the means at our disposal, we shall eat up all obstacles," said Napoleon, confidently.

Alliances would have been difficult and few in Napoleon's case, if he had insisted on having genuine sympathy and hearty assistance; but he did not ask so much from Prussia, nor even from the Emperor Francis, whose daughter he had just married. Fear was enough for the accomplishment of his wishes, and in that he reckoned rightly. King Frederick William asked for Napoleon's alliance, because he dreaded seeing himself suddenly hemmed in by the attack against Russia. After leaving him for a long time unanswered, and at last bringing his preparations as far forward as he had beforehand determined, the emperor accepted the offers of the King of Prussia and his minister Hardenberg. In their anxiety to close the bargain, the Prussian diplomatist had gone so far as to say that their sovereign could place 100,000 men at the service of France. By skilful system of rotation in their military service, the King of Prussia had been able to exercise all his subjects who were of age to bear arms without appearing to exceed the narrow limits allowed to his army by Napoleon. Thus, under the weight of unjust restriction, were sown the seeds of that military organization which afterwards proved several times so fatal to us. In 1812, Napoleon let the King of Prussia know that he had observed the state of his military resources. By the treaty of alliance, concluded in February, 1812, the Prussian contingent in the war then preparing amounted only to 20,000 soldiers. Large supplies of provisions were to be received in part payment of the war contributions which Prussia still owed France; and on this condition the emperor guaranteed the security of the territory of his new ally--recently his mangled victim. Some hopes were also allowed him of several ulterior advantages; but Napoleon refused to restore Glogau, in spite of the entreaties of King Frederick William.

Austria would have wished to avoid the necessity of joining in the war and allying herself to Napoleon; but the situation of the daughter of the Emperor Francis upon the throne of France, and the eagerness which the Austrian court had shown for the union, prevented any refusal. In his negotiations Metternich insisted that the treaty should be kept secret: "There are only two of us in Austria who wish for a French alliance," said he; "the emperor is the first, and I am the second; but Russia must not know of our feeling towards you." Some regiments were being secretly prepared in Galicia.

In a famous conversation which Napoleon had, on 15th August, 1811, with Prince Kourakin, the Russian ambassador at Paris, he said, "Is it on Austria that you reckon? You made war upon her in 1809, and deprived her of a province during peace. Is it Sweden, from whom you took Finland? Is it Prussia, whose spoils you accepted at Tilsit after being her ally?" The same reproaches could with more justice have been applied to France--or rather, to her ruler. He was soon to understand that truth, and weigh the value of the alliances which he had imposed. On the eve of the Russian campaign he was, and seemed, more formidable than the Czar; and fear made the weak cling to his side, while they still concealed their secret hatred and long-cherished rancor.

Russia, nevertheless, was also negotiating, relying upon her rival's natural and declared enemies. The treaties were not new when they were published, on the 20th July, 1812, between the Czar and the Spanish insurgents, the 1st August with England, and on the 5th April with Sweden.

The powers hostile to France were astonished to hear of the advances made by the new Prince Royal of Sweden. From recollection of the republican enthusiasm of his youth, as well as personal antipathy, Bernadotte had never liked General Bonaparte when they were comrades and rivals for military fame. The fortune of Napoleon had dug a gulf between them. Raised to the throne by a curious freak of destiny, Bernadotte had brought to his new country no attachment for Napoleon, nor the enthusiastic recollections of France with which he was generally credited. He had asked the emperor to grant him Norway; but Napoleon did not wish to rob Denmark, and a contemptuous silence was the reply to the court of Sweden. Bernadotte pursued in another direction the same views of ambition and aggrandizement; and in allying himself to Russia he asked for Norway, urging the importance of the personal and national assistance which he could contribute to the coalition. England was not a stranger to this arrangement. Two months afterwards, disregarding his engagements with Russia, and alarmed at the huge display of Napoleon's power, the Prince Royal of Sweden proceeded to make fresh overtures to France. Norway was to remain as the price of his alliance, together with a subsidy of 20,000,000. Napoleon was extremely angry. Bernadotte had never possessed his good graces; and he, not unnaturally, felt indignant at the manoeuvres of a Frenchman who had so soon forgot his country. "The wretch!" exclaimed he; "he is true neither to his reputation, to Sweden, or his native land, but is preparing bitter remorse for himself. When Russia wants the Sound, her soldiers have only to cross the ice from Aland to Stockholm. The present opportunity of humbling Russia is unique, and he will never have such another. Never again will a man like me be seen marching against the North with 600,000 men! He is not worth thinking about; let nobody mention him again to me; I forbid sending any communication to him, formal or informal." Thus repulsed, Bernadotte remained faithful to his engagements with Russia, and was soon after to make others, which were still more disastrous to his native country.

Soon after the official publication of the treaty uniting Sweden to the enemies of France, the Emperor Alexander concluded a war which had long occupied the greater part of his forces. The hostilities so long waged between Russia and Turkey had not contributed to the glory of Alexander's generals. "Your soldiers are very brave," said Napoleon once to the Czar's ambassador, "but your generals are not worthy of them. It is impossible not to see that they have managed their movements very badly, and acted against all the rules." The fear inspired by the Emperor Napoleon had been of still greater use to the Turks than the bad generalship of the Russians, Alexander being eager to conclude the peace, in order to concentrate his forces against an enemy more formidable than the Sultan. Admiral Tchitchakoff, at the head of the army of the Danube, was empowered to finish the war or negotiate peace. The Czar renounced part of his former claims, contenting himself with Bessarabia, and proposing the Pruth as the boundary for both empires, on condition that Turkey became an active ally. The influence of the English diplomatists turned the balance, and Mahmoud, yielding to the desire for peace, the Treaty of Bucharest was signed on the 28th May, 1812.

Napoleon was afraid of this peace, and had tried to prevent it. Perpetually trying to gain time, he succeeded in throwing off the scent Nesselrode, who had been sent with instructions to put the question of peace or war simply. Lauriston was directed to dwell constantly upon the emperor's friendly feeling towards the Czar. Napoleon was at the trouble of conversing for a long time with a Russian of position who was visiting Paris. Czernicheff was sent to gather information as to the importance of our armament, and had learned much, when the emperor sent for him to come to the Elysée, to unfold his intentions with regard to Poland. He had formerly said to Prince Kourakin, "I shall give you nothing in Poland-- nothing! nothing!" Now he declared his resolution never to restore to Poland its national independence. "I had no wish to engage in the convention which was proposed to me," said he, "because that engagement was not compatible with my dignity; but I am well resolved on that point. I have no other reason for arming except the notoriously unkind disposition of the Russian court towards me. She is deceived as to my intentions; she serves England, whose commerce extends to all parts of her territory. I only ask her to come closer; by ourselves we two shall crush all our enemies." Napoleon gave Czernicheff a letter for the Emperor Alexander, which made him a sort of accredited agent at the Russian court. "My brother, after the arrival of the courier sent by Count Lauriston on the 6th instant, I laid down my views of the troublesome events of the last fifteen months in a conversation with Colonel Czernicheff. It only depends on your Majesty to finish it all."

At the same time a despatch of the Duke of Bassano (Maret), who had succeeded the Duke of Cadore (Champagny) as minister of foreign affairs, informed Lauriston of the importance of the mission. "The emperor is anxious," said he, "that the troops should gradually advance upon the Vistula, rest there, settle there, strengthen their position, fortify their bridges; in short, make use of every advantage, and be certain of taking the initiative in military movements. The emperor has shown great kindness to Colonel Czernicheff, but I must tell you that officer has used his time in Paris intriguing and disseminating corruption. The emperor knew it without interfering. The preparations of his Majesty are really enormous, and the more they are known it will only be the better for him. The Emperor Alexander will, no doubt, show you the letter sent him by his Majesty; it is very simple.... The emperor has no wish for an interview, or even a negotiation which should take place out of Paris. He has no confidence in a negotiation of any sort, unless the 450,000 men whom his Majesty has put in movement, and their enormous mass of war apparatus, should have caused the cabinet of St. Petersburg to reflect seriously, and, by loyally restoring the system established at Tilsit, place Russia again in the state of inferiority in which she then was. Your single aim must be to gain time. The head of the army of Italy is already at Munich, and the general movement is being everywhere declared. Maintain on all occasions that, should war take place, it is Russia who wished for it."

It was no longer from Paris that the emperor dictated his diplomatic orders and directed the movements of his armies. Since March he had lived at St. Cloud, to avoid an opposition Which vexed him to the bottom of his heart, and which he had in vain attempted to disarm. The Parisians, long enthusiastic in favor of his glory, were showing discontent, aversion, and complaint. After the long drought of the summer of 1811, bread was dear; and the financial measures which had been tried to reduce the prices in the capital were extremely onerous for the Treasury without acting successfully upon trade. Corn was scarce, and the threat of an arbitrary tariff kept back the supply of provisions. The strain upon all the commercial relations caused by the continental blockade reacted unfavorably on the necessary resources during a dearth. The Food Council appointed by the emperor tried in vain to supply by artificial means the beneficent action of commercial freedom and confidence.

Other causes contributed to the agitation and ill-temper of the Parisians; and the discontent, as well as the suffering caused by the dearness of corn, was not confined to the capital. Too clear-sighted, in spite of the mad impulses of his ambition, not to feel what risks he was running, and making France run, Napoleon wished to provide some protection. Though long inexhaustible in men and devotion, the country was becoming tired, and about to be deprived of its means of defence at the very moment when a new European conflagration was bursting forth. The emperor had therefore ordered the formation of a certain number of cohorts of the national guard, under the name of "First Ban" (Body of Defence). Thus 120,000 men, borrowed from the "sedentary contingents" of 1809 to 1812, had been formed into regiments, on the assurance that they should not have to leave their departments. Their families, however, were deprived of them, and the present hardships combining with their fear of the future, there was great dissatisfaction in the country. The number of deserters having increased, the columns of militia recommenced their hateful work: and in the conquered countries, Holland and the territory of the Hanse towns, the conscription was violently resisted. Insurrections took place, followed by executions. Several of the regiments raised in the ancient free towns had mutinied, and kept themselves for several days in the isle of Heligoland. These troops were incorporated with Marshal Davout's army, and put under the most rigid guard. In Italy itself, and even in the army of Prince Eugène, the discontent and fatigue were unmistakable. The hard service of Napoleon had become a slavery. His severity towards the Pope also assisted in alienating the Italians, and throughout the Roman States he was hated by the population.

His pacific protestations, however, deceived nobody. The Czar had no wish for war; he dreaded it, and his people had also long dreaded it; but now he felt it to be inevitable, and the patriotic passion of defending their soil took possession of the Russian nation. Lauriston was besieged with attentions, but he lived alone, having no intercourse with the Russian upper classes, who were now urging the emperor forward. "Everything will be against us in this war," said Napoleon boldly to some of those about him who knew Russia well, especially Caulaincourt and Ségur. "On their side, love of country and independence; all private and public interests, even to the secret wishes of our allies! On our side, against so many obstacles, glory alone, even without the hope of plunder, since the frightful poverty of those regions renders it impossible."

The events proved, in a startling manner, the justice of what the military diplomatists anticipated. From the history of the secret negotiations we learn that advices and promises were largely bestowed by Austria and Prussia upon the Emperor Alexander. The leaders of our armies, which had for several months occupied Germany and Poland, could not pretend not to see the increasing hatred which was silently brooding under the disguises of popular submission and princely attentions. General Rapp, who commanded at Dantzig, felt it his duty to inform Marshal Davout of the precarious state in which our rule in Europe then stood. "If the French army has a single check," wrote the general, "there will quickly be from the Rhine to the Niemen only one single insurrection." Davout, in transmitting this information to Napoleon, made only one remark: "I recollect, sire, true enough, that in 1809, without the miracles wrought by you at Ratisbon our situation in Germany would have been very difficult."

It was upon those miracles of his genius, and upon a destiny which he justly considered superhuman, that the Emperor Napoleon always reckoned. The information brought vexed him without persuading him, and made him somewhat distrust those who ventured to give it him. The brilliant renown of Marshal Davout, the justice and consistency of his administration in Poland, and the admirable order which reigned in his army, had made Napoleon somewhat displeased and gloomy. The rivals and enemies of Davout skilfully utilized the occasion. "One would think that the Prince of Eckmühl commanded the army," they said constantly in the emperor's presence. Some even accused him of aiming at the throne of Poland. Napoleon had dispensed with Masséna's services; and now he showed a coolness towards Davout, as if he were jealous of his glory and power, and at the moment of engaging in the supreme struggle wished to be surrounded with servants only!

Marshal Davout, nevertheless, went on his way, executing the emperor's instructions with consummate skill and prudence. There were now 450,000 men marching against Russia; an army of reserve of 150,000 men was about to be formed in Germany from the recruits sent from all parts of France; 120,000 men of the national guard were to protect the French soil, in combination with 150,000 soldiers, sick or new, who were still in the military depots. According to the "cadres," which were often deceptive, there were 300,000 men engaged in Spain. On leaving Italy to march to Germany, Prince Eugène had left about 50,000 soldiers in the strongholds. Thus for one man's quarrel, and in his name, there were under arms more than 1,200,000 soldiers. The Russian army did not exceed 300,000 men: on their side they had the weather, extent of country, and climate. "Don't come into collision with the Emperor Napoleon," said Knesebek, the Prussian envoy to the Czar; "draw the French into the interior of Russia. Let fatigue and hunger do the rest." The Emperor Alexander had just learnt that Davout had appeared at Elbing: having crossed the Vistula, he was on his way to the Niemen. The feeling of the people as well as the ardor of the court called the Czar to head-quarters, but he still hesitated, having a repugnance to give the sign of general conflagration; and at last, on the 21st, set out for Wilna after telling Lauriston that there was still time for negotiations. The population of St. Petersburg were all present at his departure, earnest and full of interest, and the churches were crowded with people praying at the altars. "I go with you. God will be against the aggressor." Such was the Czar's proclamation on reaching his head-quarters.

Europe was no more deceived than Russia and France herself; in spite of Napoleon's precautions, nobody was ignorant as to the real aggressor. The emperor remained at St. Cloud till 9th May, 1812, waiting till an act of the Czar's should give him the liberty of his movements. Before leaving France, and as a last indication of his pacific intentions, he despatched Narbonne to Wilna, with instructions to propose to the Czar an interview and armed negotiation, on the Niemen. "My aide-de-camp, Count Narbonne, who is the bearer of this letter to your Majesty, has at the same time important communications for Count Romanzoff," wrote Napoleon on the 25th April; "they will prove to your Majesty my desire to avoid war, and my constancy to the sentiments of Tilsit and Erfurt. In any case your Majesty will allow me to assure you, that if fate renders this war inevitable between us, it will make no change in the sentiments with which your Majesty has inspired me, and which are safe from all vicissitude or alteration."

It was at Dresden, whither he had gone on leaving France, that Napoleon received the refusal to negotiate, brought by Narbonne from the Czar. England had replied by a similar refusal to the pacific manifesto which the emperor, as usual, had addressed to her before recommencing new hostilities in Europe. The orders for the positions of the troops were already given. Davout was to concentrate between Marienwerder, Marienburg, and Elbing; the Prussians had been appointed to the advance-guard, and still remained on their right, advancing to the banks of the Niemen. Marshal Oudinot occupied the suburbs of Dantzig, forming Davout's right; while Ney's body, at Thorn, supported his left. Prince Eugène, with the Bavarians, advanced to Plock, on the Vistula; the Poles, Saxons, and Westphalians were united at Warsaw, under the orders of King Jerome; and the guard, who held Posen, were commanded by Mortier and Lefebvre. General St. Cyr was appointed to lead the Bavarians in the field, and General Régnier was responsible for the Saxons. The Austrians were to invade Volhynia. Already wherever the troops passed there was raised a chorus of complaints from the pillaged and ill-treated populations, and from the King of Prussia, who had seen Spandau and Pillau occupied by the French troops, on pretext of depositing the war-material there. King Frederick William had set out for Dresden, to present his claims personally to the conqueror.

In the sight of the crowned crowd which at Dresden thronged around Napoleon, there was something at once brilliant and sad. Amongst the sovereigns who claimed the honor of presenting their homages, there were very few who did not cherish against him some secret grievance or bitter rancor. All dreaded some new misfortunes, and were endeavoring to charm them away by servile flatteries. The Empress Marie Louise accompanied her husband, showing her delight and want of tact in displaying her splendor so near her native country, before the eyes of her father and mother-in- law, who had just met her in Dresden. All purely military display had been forbidden at the magnificent court around Napoleon. Murat and King Jerome themselves had been ordered to their head-quarters, yet the couriers followed each other night and day, frequently disturbing the brilliant _fêtes_ by the fear of the first cannon-shot ready to go off. At Paris, Prince Kourakin, discontented and uneasy, had asked for his passports, thus anticipating the official rupture. At St. Petersburg, Lauriston received the order to join the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, and again lay before him the proposals of peace. It was necessary to let the grass grow --to let the sun dry the roads--to give Napoleon's emissaries the opportunity of acting on the minds of the Poles, and stirring up amongst them a national movement in favor of France, a mission to which Abbé Pradt, afterwards Bishop of Malines, had been appointed. Talleyrand, of whom the emperor at first thought, did not then enjoy his good graces. "Set out, my lord," said Napoleon to the bishop, "set out at once; spare no expense; rouse their enthusiasm; set Poland a-going without embroiling me with Austria, and you will have well understood and fulfilled your mission." The prelate's vanity was fired, surrounded as he was by the apparatus of his new grandeur. He set out to stir up Poland in the name of France!

The work was more difficult then than it had been in 1807, when Napoleon had personally remarked the distrust of the great lords and the apathetic indifference of the peasantry. The formation of the grand-duchy of Warsaw did not please the Poles, who had already seen their hopes vanish. They were poor, and a large number of their best soldiers were serving under Napoleon. The continental blockade had ruined the trade of the Jews, who had always been numerous and influential in Poland. The Abbé Pradt had to use his efforts in the midst of an excited people, who wished for the future something different from promises. His mission was to produce but trifling results, because the penetration of the Poles guessed Napoleon's thoughts, and his resolution to wage no decisive battle in their favor. He set no great value on the political spirit of the race, their patriotic passions meeting with scarcely any response in him. He wished to drag the living force of Poland in his train, in order to support him in his struggle; but it was in vain that he gave to the new aggression which he was about to attempt the name of a second Polish war--the public voice was no more deceived than history. The campaign of Russia was about to begin.

On leaving Dresden, Napoleon at last urged forward the advance of his armies. In spite of the precautions he had taken, the transports moved slowly and with difficulty, the staff officers dragging after them much useless baggage, and on reaching Thorn he ordered some important reductions. When pushing on towards Marienburg and Dantzig he was attended by Davout and Murat. Cold in his manner to Davout, who was perpetually quarrelling with Marshal Berthier, he was uncivil to Murat, who was tired and ill. "Are you not satisfied with being king?" he asked, dryly. "I scarcely am king, sire," retorted Murat. "I did not make you kings, you and your brothers, to reign as you liked, but as I liked," returned the emperor; "to follow my policy, and remain French on foreign thrones." Napoleon had given orders for the last supply of provisions for the strongholds, and completed the organization of inland navigation by streams and rivers. On the 17th June he arrived at Intersburg, having resolved to cross the Niemen at Kowno, in order to direct his march upon the Dwina and Dnieper by the road leading to Moscow, passing first by Wilna, the capital of Lithuania. It was, in fact, upon those two rivers, the real frontiers of the Russian empire, that the Emperor Alexander had concentrated his forces. The army of the Dwina was commanded by General Barclay de Tolly; the army of the Dnieper marched under the orders of Prince Bagration. The emperor went straight towards the enemy, hoping to open the campaign by one of those brilliant strokes by which he had been accustomed to terrify Europe. He reckoned upon passing the Niemen on the 22nd or 23rd, and on the 16th wrote from Koenigsberg, authorizing Lauriston to ask his passports. The despatch was dated the 12th, from Thorn, the ambassador having been told of the artifice. Napoleon soon learned that Lauriston had not been allowed to leave Wilna. It mattered little now; having reached the banks of the Niemen, his proclamation was everywhere read to the troops:--

"Soldiers! The second Polish war is begun. The first finished at Friedland and Tilsit! At Tilsit Russia swore an eternal alliance with France, and war with England. To-day she is violating her oaths. She will give no explanation of her strange conduct unless the French eagles recross the Rhine, thus leaving our allies to her discretion. Russia is drawn on by fate; her destiny must be accomplished. Why does she think we are degenerated? Are we no longer the soldiers of Austerlitz? She places us between dishonor and war. Our choice cannot be doubtful! Let us march forward; let us pass the Niemen; let us carry war into her territory. The second Polish war will be glorious to French arms; but the peace which we shall conclude will bring with it its guarantee; it will bring to a close the fatal influence which for fifty years Russia has exercised upon the affairs of Europe."

The river was there, rolling at Napoleon's feet, like a natural and majestic barrier, fulfilling its function of holding him back from ruin; the enormous mass of his army surrounded him; on the opposite bank reigned silence and solitude. Several sappers who had crossed in a small boat, having landed, a Cossack came up to them, in charge of a patrol, who followed him at a short distance. "Who are you? and what do you want here?" he asked. "We are Frenchmen, and we are come to make war upon you," replied one of the sappers. The Cossack turned his horse round, and disappeared in the forest, unhurt by the bullets which they fired after him. They were there to throw a bridge across.

On the morning of the 25th, Napoleon himself crossed the river on horseback, galloping as if he wished to find the enemy, still absent and invisible. The light cavalry had already taken possession of Kowno. The emperor wishing bridges to be thrown over the Vilia, ordered a squadron of Polish lancers to cross the river, in order to sound the depth, and a large number of the unfortunate men perished in the attempt. When they felt themselves carried away by the current, they turned round to shout "Long live the emperor!" Meanwhile the army was still defiling across the Niemen, and it was only on the 30th June that it had entirely reached the left bank.

After a violent discussion among the Czar's advisers, Alexander decided to evacuate Wilna, the minister of police being appointed for the last time to carry a conciliatory message to Napoleon. A detachment of cavalry disputed for a moment with the French the gates of the capital of Lithuania, the passage being forced by Murat. On the 28th June, about mid- day, Napoleon made his entry into Wilna, annoyed at not meeting the enemy, whom he would have liked to fight, overcome, and crush on the first day. The Lithuanians received him eagerly, as in expectation of freedom. The same day the Diet assembled at Warsaw proclaimed the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, and several members of the Senate hastened to Wilna, to announce officially to Napoleon the resurrection of their country. "The Poles have never been subjected by either peace or war," said they, "but by treason! They are therefore free _de jure_ before God as well as before men, and to-day they can be so _de facto;_ and their right becomes a duty. We demand the independence of our Lithuanian brothers, and their union to the centre of all the Polish family. It is from Napoleon the Great that we ask this word, 'The Kingdom of Poland exists!' It will then exist if all the Poles devote themselves ardently to the orders of the chief of the fourth French race, before whom the ages are but a moment, and space an infinitesimal point."

Napoleon did not believe in the restoration of Poland, and was resolved not to create beforehand an insurmountable obstacle to peace by forming engagements with the Poles. He received the deputies of the Diet coldly, and did not yield to their desire of seeing Lithuania at once joined to Poland. A special government had just been organized, which seemed to be entrusted to the great Lithuanian lords, but was practically administered by young "auditors" of the Council of State. Distrust had already secretly begun, and mutual recriminations; the Lithuanians dreaded the vengeance of Russia, not being certain of having permanently got rid of her government; robbery was scandalously common; the weather was bad, and many soldiers were ill. Everywhere throughout the province, corn, cattle, and forage were requisitioned for the army, and a dearth threatened Lithuania as soon as the French entered upon their soil. Half of the carriages, a third of the horse, and a fourth of those in charge of the transports, had already perished on the roads from the Elbe to Wilna. Napoleon had ordered a levy of four regiments of infantry in Lithuania, and five regiments of cavalry; but the money and military outfits were both wanting. It was necessary to organize some columns of militia, to pursue those who pillaged, and protect the peaceful inhabitants. Our soldiers were ordered to look after the burial of the dead. From the reports of chiefs of divisions the emperor was fully informed of some of the wretched consequences. The Duke of Trevisa wrote:--"From the Niemen to the Vilia I saw nothing but houses in ruins, wagons and carriages abandoned; we found them scattered on the roads and in the fields; some upset, others open, with their contents strewed here and there, and pillaged, as if they had been taken by the enemy. I thought I was following a routed army. Ten thousand horses were killed by the cold stormy rains and the green rye, which is their only food, and new to them. They lie on the roads and encumber them; their bodies exhale a poisonous smell--a new plague, which some compare to famine, though the latter is much more terrible. Several soldiers of the young guard have already died of hunger."

The necessity for a speedy victory was being already felt. The Russian army had been cut in two by the rapid march of the French, Prince Bagration being isolated on the Dnieper, where Marshal Davout was already hemming him in, and soon after gained an important victory, at Mohilew, 23rd July, 1812. The Czar, with General Barclay de Tolly, had fixed himself in the intrenched camp at Drissa before the Dwina; and it was upon this principal division that Napoleon directed his march when he left Wilna, on the evening of the 16th July. Murat commanded the advanced guard, followed first by Ney, and then by Oudinot; Prince Eugène, who advanced towards the right, was to join Marshal Davout. The forces of King Jerome and Prince Poniatowski remained in the rear. Desertion and fatigue were already decimating the soldiers. The King of Westphalia, placed under Marshal Davout's orders, had with difficulty accepted that secondary position. Difficulties having arisen, the prince returned towards Germany, and thus lessened the marshal's success at Mohilew.

Before leaving Wilna the emperor had dismissed, without satisfying him, Balachoff, the bearer of the Czar's last offers. Napoleon repeated his former complaints, going back bitterly to the happy future which was unrolled before Russia when her emperor walked in harmony with France. "What an admirable reign he might have had, if he had liked!" repeated Napoleon; "all that was necessary was to keep on good terms with me. I gave him Finland, and promised him Moldavia and Wallachia, which he was about to obtain, when all at once he allowed himself to be surrounded by my enemies, and turned against me the arms he ought to have reserved for the Turks; and now his gain will be having neither Wallachia nor Moldavia. And now, what is your object in coming here? What are the Emperor Alexander's intentions? He is only general on parade: whom will he put against me? Kutusof, whom he does not like, because he is too Russian? Benningsen, who is old and only recalls to him frightful memories? Barclay, who can manoeuvre, who is brave, who knows war, but who is a superannuated general? Bagration is the best soldier; he has no imagination; but he has experience, quickness of vision, and decision; he cannot prevent my throwing you beyond the Dnieper and Dwina. These are the results of your rupture with me. When I think of the reign which your master might have had!" Napoleon summed up by a demand to occupy Lithuania, Russia to undertake to resume permanently her alliance against England. Balachoff set out again, assuring Napoleon that if the sentiment of religious patriotism had disappeared throughout Europe, it still remained in Spain and Russia. The bitterness of the discussion envenomed several wounds already deep enough. When Balachoff rejoined the Czar in order to give account of his mission, Alexander was no longer at Drissa. Waiting in an entrenched camp tired and humiliated the Russians. The plan of campaign was the work of Pfuhl, a German general, high in the emperor's favor; but the feeling of the whole army was expressed so emphatically against the tactics at first adopted, that the Czar agreed to quit head- quarters, and fall back with his staff upon Moscow. There, they assured him, the mere fact of his presence was enough to animate the national enthusiasm of the old Russians, and stir up the whole country against the invader. General Barclay, henceforward free in his movements, began on the 10th July to march up the Dwina as far as Vitebsk, hoping to be joined by Bagration opposite Smolensk. Our road to Moscow was thus intercepted; and Count Wittgenstein, with 25,000 or 30,000 men, was to cover St. Petersburg between Polotsk and Riga. Marshal Macdonald, at the head of the left wing of the French army, threatened the coasts of the Baltic.

Napoleon guessed this movement of the Russian general, and determined to push forward, prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy, attack them by suddenly crossing the Dwina, and thus render impossible the continuous retreat of the Russians, who were now drawing him in their pursuit into the interior of the empire, without giving him an opportunity of striking the blow which was to be their destruction. He therefore left Gloubokoé on the 23rd July, advancing upon Vitebsk; and two brilliant engagements of the advance-guard, by Murat and Ney, on the 25th and 26th, redoubled the ardor of our troops. On reaching Vitebsk after another engagement, the Russian army was seen, drawn up in order of battle, beyond a small tributary of the Dwina. Napoleon urged forward the march of all his forces. The Russian forces seemed to count about 90,000 or 100,000 men. The French army was reduced by illness, by the desertion of some Poles and Germans, and by the death of young recruits who could not endure the heat, fatigue, and bad food. The body accompanying the emperor, however, still amounted to 125,000 men, excellent troops. Napoleon felt certain of success.

Barclay de Tolly was of the same opinion. At first he had resolved to give battle, in order to keep the roads open for Prince Bagration, with whom he had made an appointment to meet at Babinowiczi; but the news of the check received by the Russian army at Mohilew convinced him that their junction must now be delayed, and that his colleague felt himself compelled to look forward to a long movement before succeeding in passing the Dnieper. A battle was no longer necessary, and, on the night of the 27th, Barclay raised his camp, to advance upon Poreczie, behind the Kasplia. Thus the St. Petersburg and Moscow roads were covered by the Russian army, and the two main divisions might look forward to a junction in the neighborhood of Smolensk.

Napoleon was excessively annoyed on learning of the enemy's retreat, and in spite of the overpowering heat ordered immediate pursuit. Count Pahlen, however, at the head of the Russian cavalry, protected their main body, while at the same time retiring before us. After a day's work as fatiguing for the troops as a long engagement, Napoleon returned to Vitebsk, where he encamped several days, in order to rest his soldiers, and rebuild the store-houses, everywhere overthrown by the Russians, who also destroyed the crops and every kind of forage. Up to this point, in spite of his able combinations, the plan of campaign decided upon by Napoleon at Wilna was a complete failure; and by the persistent retreat of the Russians, the circle of his operations had to be constantly increased. The immense space spread out before us, solitary and vacant; and for the future it was impossible to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces. On our side Marshal Davout had just joined the great army; and the emperor took advantage of this combination of the greater part of our forces to inspect his troops. In every regiment, except the old guard, the leaders were struck with consternation at the results ascertained by the roll-call.

It is a good thing to know the cost of enterprises begun in folly and pursued through excessive difficulties, whatever may have been the superior genius, the consummate foresight and experience, of the general. Ney counted 36,000 men as they crossed the Niemen, but only 22,000 were in line at Vitebsk. The King of Naples had lost 7000 men out of 28,000. The young guard had seen 10,000 men disappear out of 28,000. Prince Eugène reckoned 45,000 on the banks of the Dwina, and entered Kowno with 40,000. Even Davout, the most skilful in drilling and managing his soldiers, saw his 72,000 men diminished by 20,000. In King Jerome's division, 22,000 were wanting, the number formerly being nearly 100,000 men. The emperor still had at his disposition 255,000 soldiers; but Macdonald on the Baltic, and Oudinot at Polotsk, ought still to have 60,000, and General Reynier remained on the Dnieper with a body of 20,000 soldiers. Napoleon already spoke of calling Marshal Victor, with his 30,000 men of reserve, cantoned between the Niemen and the Rhine. Thirty thousand Austrians advanced towards Minsk under the orders of Prince Schwartzenberg. The emperor sent orders to Paris to despatch all his guard still left in the depots. He rejected the idea of an establishment on the Dnieper and Dwina being a sufficient result of the campaign. Better than all his lieutenants he at last foresaw the dangers and difficulties of the work which he had undertaken, which he still wished, but which he was anxious to finish in a brilliant manner. Europe was waiting for the news of a victory. Napoleon had reached the centre of the Russian empire, but without a battle. The prestige of his glory and his power demanded a decisive blow; and the emperor prepared for it at Vitebsk.

Marshal Macdonald, however, had taken possession of Courland, after one battle before Mittau. The Russians everywhere retreated before him, evacuating even the stronghold of Dunaburg. The marshal laid siege to Riga, but his forces were insufficient to guard this vast territory, and he in vain asked for reinforcements. Everywhere the men succumbed under the extent of the task imposed upon them. Marshal Oudinot, who formerly supported Macdonald at Polotsk, had crossed the Dwina, and was advancing, by the emperor's orders, against Count Wittgenstein. After a brilliant engagement at Jakoubowo on the 20th July, he found it prudent to retreat upon the Drissa. On the 1st August there was another successful battle, but the troops were tired, and had lost many men; the enemy were threatening. Oudinot returned to Polotsk, requiring rest and more soldiers, like Macdonald. The marshal did not succeed in demolishing the entrenched camp at Drissa, as he had been instructed to do.

On the south-east, in the upper part of the course of the Bug, General Reynier found himself at last obliged to retreat, in order to protect the grand duchy of Warsaw, and invade Volhynia. This expedition was at first intended for the Austrians, but the will of the Emperor Francis, as well as that of Napoleon, called them to head-quarters; and Reynier's forces were to replace them in the posts which they held.

Nevertheless, the Russian General Tormazoff threatened the grand duchy, after taking possession of Kobrin, which was badly defended by the Saxons. The Diet of Warsaw took alarm. A large number of wealthy Poles collected their most valuable property, and crossed to the left bank of the Vistula. They asked assistance from the Abbé Pradt, who was as disturbed as the Poles. He wrote to Wilna, where Bassano was installed as the emperor's representative, and at the same time addressed himself to General Reynier. The latter having called Prince Swartzenberg to his assistance, they both advanced upon the Bug, thus protecting the grand duchy, without being able to rejoin the grand army or support the general movement. Admiral Tchitchakoff had just signed the peace with the Turks, and was expected to come to Tormazoff's assistance.

Following Marshal Davout's advice, after mature consideration the emperor resolved at Vitebsk to advance with his main body from the banks of the Dwina upon those of the Dnieper, cross the latter at Rassasna, and ascend quickly to Smolensk. He reckoned upon finding the town without defence, and then by a sudden movement taking the Russian in flank, and so at last inflicting upon his enemies a great military disaster. The movements of the French army were to be concealed from the enemy behind the forests abounding everywhere. It was important to conceal our march from the Russians, who were about to form their junction at Smolensk.

The Emperor Napoleon was not alone in his enthusiastic ardor for battle. Prince Bagration was, like him, fervently wishing for the moment of conflict. The soldiers of high rank who were of Russian birth and manners, were greatly vexed and prejudiced against Barclay de Tolly, and his prudent tactics, every day accusing him of cowardice, and suspecting his patriotism. Born of a Scottish family which had long been settled in Russia, Barclay was ardently devoted to his adopted country, and could scarcely endure their unjust reproaches. The passion of the Russian generals at last gained the day, and the council of war resolved to take the offensive against the French cantonments. The projected march of our armies was unknown to the enemy when, on the 9th August, their vanguard made an attack upon General Sebastiani, who was badly defended. He at once called General Montbrun, and they both charged the Russian squadrons forty times in the course of the day, and then fell back upon Marshal Ney's forces. The Russians observed the solidity of our lines, saw the large force under Prince Eugène, and believed there were indications of a march towards St. Petersburg. Barclay took advantage of the uneasiness which he saw around him, and fell back upon Smolensk. The Emperor Napoleon now commenced the march.

On the morning of the 14th August, the whole army had crossed the Dnieper. With 175,000 men under the flags, an immense artillery, wagons and innumerable troops, the vast solitude of the ancient Borysthenes was suddenly transformed into a camp. The march continued towards Smolensk: before Krasnoe, after a rather keen fight, General Névéroffskoi was driven back to the town of Korytnia. Nearly all the corps had rejoined the emperor when, on the 16th August, the advance guard debouched before Smolensk. At a single glance of the eye, the generals were convinced that the town was in a state of defence. A useless attempt was made to take the citadel by storm; Ney, who had imprudently advanced, fell into an ambush, and was only with difficulty rescued by his light cavalry. The Russians were already seen occupying the heights on the right bank of the Dnieper, in the suburbs, and above the new town. Barclay had taken up his position there, and a large force occupied the old town on the left bank, both parts of the town being connected by a bridge. Prince Bagration had advanced beyond Smolensk, to protect the banks of the Dnieper, and prevent Napoleon, on crossing the river, from attacking the town and its defenders from behind.

Though the taking of Smolensk formed no part of his original plan, Napoleon was obliged to make the attack. The possession of that ancient and venerable town had great importance in the eyes of Russians. Nevertheless the emperor had the river sounded some distance off, hoping to find a ford which would allow of a surprise. It was impossible to throw over bridges, on account of the nearness of Prince Bagration, whose troops lay on the banks of the Kolodnia, a tributary of the Dnieper; and, so far as these observations were taken, the river was not fordable. Napoleon waited for a day, hoping that Barclay would leave the heights of the new town to offer him battle; and, on the Russian making no movement, the assault was ordered.