Chapter XVIII: Ammunition (1)

From the beginning of the Battle of the Aisne up to the close of the Battle of Loos, at the end of 1915, the scanty supply of munitions of war paralysed all our power of initiative and, at critical times, menaced our defence with irretrievable disaster. Great anxiety on this subject overshadowed all my direction of military operations, and deep concern at the failure of the Government to appreciate and remedy our difficulties from this cause dominated all my work. In this chapter it is my object to make known some of the efforts I made to awaken both the Government and the public from that apathy which meant certain defeat. I exhausted every effort, by urgent official demands to the War Office, and personal appeals to Lord Kitchener and such Cabinet Ministers as I came in contact with. When these efforts got no response, I gave interviews to the press and authorised public men who visited me to urge this vital necessity in their addresses. Nothing less than my deliberate conclusion, after all these measures had failed and nine months of war had elapsed, that the Empire itself was in jeopardy, forced me to act in May 1915 as I did. I was conscious before taking this step, which meant the overthrow of the Government, that it also meant the end of my career in France, with all the hopes and ambitions that only a soldier can understand. But the consciousness of the great results achieved in this upheaval has been my reward, and I trust that a recital of my difficulties may, if occasion arise in the future, protect the British Army in the field from the recurrence of any similar situation.

During my term of office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, from March 1912 to April 1914, I had urged these vital necessities upon the Government, but my demands were steadily opposed by the Finance Department and the Treasury. All our experiences in the South African War, and the warnings which the Manchurian campaign plainly gave, passed altogether unheeded in the years preceding the present war. I was always a strong advocate for the supply of high-explosive shell to our horse and field artillery, but I got very little support, and even such as was given to me was lukewarm in the extreme. I believe the Ordnance Board was not in favour of it.

As early as the middle of September 1914 the British Army in France was subjected to heavy bombardment from German 8-in. howitzers, to which they were quite unable to reply. At the same time the daily expenditure of artillery ammunition became far in excess of the receipts from home, and we were unable to maintain the stocks on the lines of communication up to anything like the proper war establishment. For example, the 18-pdrs. fired an average of 14 rounds a day, whilst the receipts were barely seven. The 60-pdr. guns and the 4.5-in. howitzers fired over 40 rounds a day, against a supply of eight or nine rounds at most. In private letters and telegrams I had repeatedly brought this to the notice of the Secretary of State, and a strong official memorandum on the subject was sent to the War Office on September 28th. A further communication to the same effect was made on October 10th; and on the 29th of the same month the War Office were officially told that the state of the ammunition supply had necessitated the issue of an order restricting expenditure to 20 rounds per gun daily, and that a further restriction to 10 rounds would be necessary if the supply did not improve. This was during the most desperate period of the First Battle of Ypres, when the average daily expenditure of 18-pdr. ammunition had amounted to 81 rounds per gun.

In some cases the expenditure per gun had reached the enormous total of 300 rounds daily.

A proportion of at least 25 per cent. of high-explosive shells for 13 and 18 pdrs. was included in the demands to which I have referred above.

In a communication to the War Office on December 31st, the view was expressed that considerably more high explosive was necessary, and the following table was laid down as our minimum requirements to carry on the war with any prospect of success:--

REQUIRED OUTPUT OF AMMUNITION.

Rounds per gun a day.

13-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
18-pdr. 50 (25 H.E.)
4.5-in. howitzer 40 (35 H.E.)
6-in. howitzer 25 (all H.E.)
60-pdr. 25 (15 H.E.)
4.7-in. gun 25 (15 H.E.)
6-in. gun 25 (all H.E.)
9.2-in. howitzer 12 (all H.E.)

It was explained that this output was necessary for a period of active operations, and should be continued even during a lull, till a reserve of three or four times the amount laid down in war establishments had been accumulated. To this request there was no reply until January 19th. The War Office then declined to work up to more than 20 rounds a day, and refused a request for 50 per cent, of high explosives.

This amazing attitude at a most critical time compelled me to consider means by which the several members of the Government, and the public also, might be advised of this deplorable apathy which, if long continued, meant the destruction of our Army.

In this letter from the War Office, of January 19th, which I have already mentioned, an estimate was attached of the receipts which we might rely upon up to and including the month of May. This estimate was far below our requirements, whilst the actual receipts fell far short of it. The actual supply in May proved to be less than one half of the War Office estimate, which was the only one ever furnished for our guidance. Such failure made it quite impossible to make any reliable forecast of the condition of the ammunition supply at any particular date. This state of uncertainty rendered the formulation of plans for co-operating with the French most difficult, if not impossible.

During the winter of 1914-15 it was hoped to accumulate some small reserve of ammunition, but, during this period, all our efforts in this direction were of no avail, because the number of rounds per 18-pdr. gun throughout this period fell to less than five!

I had serious misgivings that the _morale_ of the Army was becoming affected by this first long and weary winter of inactivity in the trenches, and to render the defence effective it was necessary to undertake an offensive operation.

Early in March a small reserve of ammunition had been accumulated, and the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was fought and won. Had proper steps been taken to increase the supply when my first strong appeals were sent in during September 1914, the offensive operation commenced so successfully at Neuve Chapelle might have been much further developed, and, indeed, possibly have led to great and important results. But the battle had to be broken off after three days' fighting because we were brought to a standstill through want of ammunition.

Immediately afterwards I again addressed the strongest representations I could frame to the War Office. I begged that His Majesty's Government might be informed that, if their object was to drive the enemy off French and Belgian territory during 1915, no progress towards this objective could be obtained unless and until the supply of artillery ammunition should enable the Army to engage in sustained operations. The only official reply which I received to this letter was an injunction to use the utmost economy, but a private letter, dated March 16th, was addressed by Sir James Wolfe Murray to Sir William Robertson, who was then my Chief of Staff. This letter was said to have been dictated by the Secretary of State, and its contents hinted very strongly that an impression prevailed at the War Office that we were wasting ammunition.

The operations at Neuve Chapelle used up all our available resources, and it became necessary to restore them by reverting for a time to a strictly defensive attitude.

It was, moreover, very clear that the Germans had early realised that the war was to be one calling for colossal supplies of munitions; supplies, indeed, upon such a stupendous scale as the world had never before dreamed of, and they also realised the vital necessity for heavy artillery. They began with an inferior field gun, and they never stopped to remedy this defect, but directed all their energies, from the first, to developing their heavy artillery. Whilst their total proportion of guns to bayonets was fully maintained, the proportion of field guns to bayonets was reduced, and all heavy guns enormously increased. Each month the development of heavy artillery became more accentuated until, towards the late spring of 1915, the greater number of projectiles fired by the Germans, whenever operations of any importance were taking place, were of 5.9 and upwards. This was in defence as well as in attack, and by this means the enemy endeavoured to shatter the _morale_ of the attackers, as well as to inflict very heavy casualties.

The necessity for a great preponderance of heavy artillery was also recognised by the French long before our War Office could be persuaded to move in that direction. From early in the war they aimed at obtaining one heavy gun of 6-in. calibre and upwards for every field gun they held, without reducing the proportion to bayonets of the latter which obtains in the French Army. To meet these requirements the French were taking guns from their old warships and coast defence ships, and straining every nerve to get guns of heavy calibre into the field.

In May, 1915, the proportion of field to heavy guns above 6-in. calibre in the French Army was 2.3 to one. At this time the British Army had but 71 guns altogether above 5-in. calibre against 1,416 below it, and no adequate steps whatever had yet been taken to bring the proportion more nearly to the requirements of modern warfare. The supply of trench guns and mortars, with their ammunition, hand-grenades, and other most necessary munitions of war, was almost negligible, nor was there any active attempt to understand and grapple vitally with the new problems calling for the application of modern science to the character of warfare that had developed.

I have referred before to the disinclination of the War Office, prior to the war, to take up seriously the question of high explosives; the natural consequence was that the true nature of high-explosive shells, and the correct particulars which govern their construction, were not properly understood, as they had too little experience of them.

The deadly nature of modern rifle and machine-gun fire had brought about trench warfare, which enabled the troops opposite to one another to approach to ranges which were customary in the days of the Peninsula and Waterloo. The time-honoured grenades, which were so marked a feature in those days, were thus resuscitated.

Although the War Office received detailed reports from the Front as to the employment by the enemy of these new and unfamiliar weapons, no proper attention was ever paid to these reports. It was their duty to bring these old-time weapons up to date, and to compete with the new mechanical inventions constantly being devised by the great organisation of a thoroughly prepared enemy. But reports from the Front as to these new and unfamiliar weapons were received with a carelessness which bordered on incredulity. The critical days in the early part of November, and during the First Battle of Ypres, compelled me to devise a plan to meet the exigencies of this grave emergency. As the fighting settled into trench warfare, the inadequacy of our weapons to enable us to reply to an enemy thoroughly equipped with every contrivance for this sort of warfare became painfully apparent; while even our hand-grenades, by reason of their faulty construction, frequently did not explode. I was therefore compelled to conduct experiments in the field, and improvise new weapons as well as possible. For such work the Army had no organisation. In this I received invaluable assistance from my friend, George Moore. Mr. Moore is an American who has had wide experience of large construction developments in the United States. Although a young man, he was deeply versed in the method of scientific research as applied to mechanical invention. Add to this that he was a great personal friend of my own and passionately interested in the success of the Allies, and it will be seen how naturally I turned to him for help and advice in this terrible crisis. Under Mr. Moore's advice and direction, experiments were carried out with the maximum of speed, energy and resource, covering the field of the proper construction and use of high explosives, hand-grenades, trench mortars and bombs; and a number of factories and small plants were set up for the production, for use in the field, of properly constructed hand-grenades, bombs and trench mortars.

As a result of this work in the daily trench struggle that had then developed, we were rapidly enabled to acquire the accurate knowledge of the proper use of high explosives, and the appliances necessary to meet the enemy on his own ground under these novel conditions of warfare. Mr. Moore from time to time brought men in whom he had trust and confidence to help in the work. Among them I will only specifically refer to Colonel Lewis, an American, whose machine gun, bearing his name, proved of such enormous help in this war, and to Lieutenant Lawrence Breese. This gallant young officer of the Blues, to which magnificent regiment he belonged, did wonderful work, and conducted experiments the result of which was of the highest value; and, after several months of tireless energy, gave his life in carrying out one of these experiments. This hastily improvised organisation worked night and day in these trying times, with the results which enabled us, with success, to meet the enemy in trench warfare.

During this time I received visits at my Headquarters from prominent members of both Houses of Parliament, to whom I told, in course of conversation, the great anxiety I felt on the subject of the shortage of heavy guns and ammunition.

On March 22nd I gave an interview to the Press, which appeared generally in the English papers, from which I quote: "It is a rough war, but the problem it sets is a comparatively simple one--munitions, more munitions, always more munitions; this is the essential question, the governing condition of all progress, of every leap forward." On March 27th I gave an interview to _The Times_, in which I said as follows: "The protraction of the war depends entirely upon the supply of men and munitions. Should these be unsatisfactory, the war will be accordingly prolonged. I dwell emphatically on the need for munitions."

To the public men who visited me, I appealed that they should make known this grave necessity to the public in their speeches. I quote a line from a speech of the Earl of Durham, who, at my request, said: "What we want and must have is more and more munitions."

At a conference at Chantilly with Lord Kitchener, I reminded him of my constant representations on the subject of munitions, both officially and privately, and warned him that the danger would be fatal if instant action were not taken to supply our needs.

It must be remembered that all this time, when the British Forces in France were in absolute jeopardy owing to these deficiencies, trainloads of all kinds of ammunition were passing along our rear _en route_ to Marseilles and the Dardanelles.

This was the situation when on April 22nd the Germans made their first attack with poisoned gas in the Second Battle of Ypres and, in a gigantic effort, again attempted to break through; and the defence called for the most desperate kind of fighting, only surpassed in intensity by the struggle in the First Battle of Ypres. Just about this time, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, made his famous Newcastle speech, in which he stated that the Army had all the ammunition it required. When I read this speech, after all my public and private appeals, I lost any hope that I had entertained of receiving help from the Government as then constituted. So that, on May 9th, 1915, when we commenced the Battle of Festubert, an operation undertaken to relieve the intense pressure on the troops at Ypres, my mind was filled with keen anxiety. After all our demands, less than 8 per cent. of our shells were high explosive, and we had only sufficient supply for about 40 minutes of artillery preparation for this attack. On the tower of a ruined church I spent several hours in close observation of the operations. Nothing since the Battle of the Aisne had ever impressed me so deeply with the terrible shortage of artillery and ammunition as did the events of that day. As I watched the Aubers ridge, I clearly saw the great inequality of the artillery duels, and, as attack after attack failed, I could see that the absence of sufficient artillery support was doubling and trebling our losses in men. I therefore determined on taking the most drastic measures to destroy the apathy of a Government which had brought the Empire to the brink of disaster. A friend was standing by my side on the tower, and to him I poured out my doubts and fears and announced my determination. He warned me that the politicians would never forgive the action I proposed, and that it meant my certain recall from the command in France. But my decision was made, and I immediately started for my Headquarters, fully determined on my future course of action.

If any additional proof were required of the hopelessness of any relief coming from the War Office, I found it waiting for me when I reached Headquarters that afternoon, in the shape of a telegram from the Secretary of State for War, directing that 20 per cent. of our scanty reserve supply of ammunition was to be shipped to the Dardanelles. I immediately gave instructions that evidence should be furnished to Colonel Repington, military correspondent of _The Times_, who happened to be then at Headquarters, that the vital need of high-explosive shells had been a fatal bar to our Army success on that day. I directed that copies of all the correspondence which had taken place between myself and the Government on the question of the supply of ammunition be made at once, and I sent my Secretary, Brinsley FitzGerald, with Captain Frederick Guest, one of my A.D.C.s, to England with instructions that these proofs should be laid before Mr. Lloyd George, who had already shown me, by his special interest in this subject, that he grasped the deadly nature of our necessities. I instructed also that they should be laid before Mr. Arthur J. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law, whose sympathetic understanding of my difficulties, when they visited me in France, had led me to expect that they would take the action that this grave exigency demanded. Together with the correspondence, I sent the following memorandum:--

(_Secret._)

INFORMATION REGARDING AMMUNITION

1. Large quantities of high-explosive shells for field guns have become essential owing to the form of warfare in which the Army is engaged. The enemy is entrenched from the sea to the Swiss frontier. There is no flank in his position that can be turned. It is necessary, therefore, for all offensive operations to start by breaking the enemy's line, which presupposes the attack of formidable field entrenchments. Shrapnel, being the man-killing projectile which is used against troops in the open, is primarily used in defence. In offensive operations it is used for searching communication trenches, preventing the enemy's reinforcements intervening in the fight, repelling counter-attacks, and, as an alternative for high-explosive shell, for cutting wire entanglements. It is, however, ineffective against the occupants of the trenches, breastworks, or buildings. It is, therefore, necessary to have high-explosive shell to destroy parapets, obstacles, buildings, and many forms of fortified localities that the enemy constructs, more particularly his machine-gun emplacements. Without an adequate supply the attack is impotent against the defenders of field fortifications, as the first step cannot be taken. Guns require 50 per cent. of high-explosive shell. Howitzers use high-explosive shell almost exclusively.

2. We have found by experience that the field guns actually engaged in offensive operations, such as Neuve Chapelle, fire about 120 rounds per gun per day.

Heavy guns and howitzers, according to their calibre, fire less in proportion. The guns of the whole Army are of course never equally heavily engaged at the same time, but the number of guns available and the amount of ammunition are the limiting factors when a plan of attack is being considered. There is, therefore, scarcely any limit to the supply of ammunition that could be usefully employed. The more ammunition, the bigger the scale on which the attack can be delivered, and the more persistently it can be pressed.

Demands must, however, be reasonable, and our position would be very greatly improved if our supply reached the figures in the attached Table "A" within three months. Up to the present it has been below these figures.

WANTED THREE MONTHS HENCE, SAY, AUGUST 1ST.

_Table "A."_

| Guns |Rounds per Gun | Total Rounds
Nature. |now in | per Day. |required Daily.[3]
|Country. |Shrapnel.| H.E. |Shrapnel.| H.E.
| | | | |
18-pdr. | 700 | 12 | 12 |8,500 | 8,500
13-pdr. | 125 | 12 | 12 |1,500 | 1,500
15-pdr. BLC. | 200 | 12 | 12 |2,500 | 2,500
4.7-in. gun | 80 | 8 | 8 | 650 | 650
60-pdr. | 28 | 8 | 8 | 250 | 250
5-in. howitzer | 50 | -- | 15 | -- | 750
4.5-in. howit- | 130 | 4 | 16 | 500 | 2,000
zer. | | | | |
6-in. howitzer | 40 | -- | 12 | -- | 500
9.2-in. howit- | 12 | -- | 12 | -- | 150
zer. | | | | |
| | | | 13,900 | 16,800
| | Grand Total | 30,700 daily.
| | Grand Total | 921,000 monthly.

[Footnote 3: Round numbers are given. Expansion
must be provided for at a similar rate. We need
more guns and a correspondingly larger amount of
ammunition.]

3. Table "B" shows the percentage of high explosive of certain natures received since application for increased quantities was made between September and December last.

PERCENTAGE OF HIGH EXPLOSIVE RECEIVED SINCE FIRST APPLICATION FOR IT IN INCREASED QUANTITIES.

_Table "B."_

Nature of Gun. | Dec. | Jan. | Feb. | March.| April.| May.
| Per | Per | Per | Per | Per | Per
| Cent.| Cent.| Cent.| Cent. | Cent. | Cent.
13-pdr. | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil | Nil
18-pdr. | 3.8 | 6.8 | 8.3 | 8.2 | 6.1 | 8
4.5-in. howitzer |44.4 | 68.5 | 88 | 75 | 59 | 65
60-pdr. | -- | 66 | 60 | 56 | 53 | 50
7-in. howitzer |55 | 59 | 51 | 77 | 69 | 50

Colonel FitzGerald and Captain Guest reported that on May 12th and 14th they had carried out my instructions and laid the facts before Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Bonar Law. On May 15th, Colonel Repington's article appeared in _The Times_. The world knows what then happened. The Coalition Government was formed, with Mr. Lloyd George as Minister of Munitions; and, though delays afterwards occurred, the problem was at last faced with the intelligence and energy that its gravity demanded, and I feel that for his work on munitions we owe unmeasured gratitude to Mr. Lloyd George. The successful solution of the problem came when he applied to it that matchless energy which has enabled him to come through the great ordeal as England's most valued leader in her direst hour.

For my unprecedented action I claim that no other course lay open to me. To organise the nation's industrial resources upon a stupendous scale was the only way if we were to continue with success the great struggle which lay before us, and I feel that the result achieved fully warranted the steps I took.

INDEX

ABBEVILLE, 182, 199, 205;
Railway junction, 200.

Admiralty, _see_ British Admiralty.

Aeltre, 208.

Aeroplane Squadrons, 2, 3, 4, 5;
R.F.C., 25.

Aeroplanes and Aircraft,
effect on warfare, 12;
at Amiens, 33;
potentialities realised by French, 155;
menace of, to London, in event of Germans reaching Calais, 215.

Aerial Reconnaissances, 12, 43-4, 90, 121, 145, 185, 200 _passim_;
Future of, 144.

Air Services (_see also_ Royal Flying Corps),
spirit of, 340.

Aire, 200.

Aire-Bethune line,
2nd Corps directed on, 199, 201, 202.

Aire-La Bassee Canal reached by 2nd Corps, 203.

Aisne,
Battle of the, 13, 16, 142 _sqq._, 193 _sqq._;
day of opening, 146;
British share in, 115, 118 _sqq._, 140-1;
French's dispositions of, how influenced, 157;
French share in, 115, 121, 123, 135, 140 _sqq._, 145, 146,
154, 157, 158-9, 160, 161, 164;
German forces believed to be in position for, 116;
German heavy artillery in, 119, 144, 212;
Germany's lost opportunity in, 216;
Intense artillery fire in, 144, 145-6, 149, 150, 212;
Last days of (Oct. 1 _sqq._), 193 _sqq._;
Last repulse of the enemy at, by the 1st Corps (Oct. 11), 211;
Losses, 152-3, 159, 160;
Operations hampered by,
Lack of artillery and machine guns, 101, 347, 356;
Rain, 157;
Tactical aspect of, 140, 159;
Value in, of British "moral," 55;
Battlefield, Features of,
Strategical, 148;
Topographical, 143, 145, 147-8.

Aisne Canal,
suggested French extension to, 186.

Aisne, Department of, 48.

Aisne-Compiegne-Soissons line,
withdrawal to, 91.

Aisne Front, withdrawal from, object of,
plan first conceived, 155-6, 157, 301;
_pourparlers_ on, with Joffre, 163, 164 _sqq._;
the Northern move begun, 193;
progress of, 235-6;
French views on, 305 _sqq._

Aisne Heights,
a reconnaissance from, 161.

Aisne River:
Bridges (road) over, 147;
All under artillery fire, 148;
Constructed over by British Corps (Sept. 13), 150, 151;
British positions on, 146-7, 158, 160, 165, 182;
Steep banks of, 145;
Reported German troop-transfer to, 223;
Roads and railways in valley of, 147-8;
Wooded country N. of, marches through,
consultations on, with Joffre, 143.

Aizy,
German counter-attack at, 151.

Albert, King of the Belgians,
characteristics of, 344;
French invited to H.Q. of, at Louvain, 42-3;
sortie directed by, 143-4;
and the withdrawal from Antwerp, 175;
and French's scheme for Anglo-Belgian military co-operation
(Dec. 28-30), 343 _sqq._

Albert, French progress near, 325.

Alfrey, Lieut., killed at Moncel, 120.

Allenby, Major-General E. H. H. (now General Sir E. H. H., G.C.M.G.,
K.C.B.), G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, later G.O.C. Cavalry
Corps (_q.v._), 16, 24, 323;
At Mons and after,
Instructions to, 47;
support given by, to Fergusson (Aug. 24), 65;
During the Retreat from Mons,
protection given by, to infantry, &c., 60, 64, 65, 71, 72, 75,
84-5, 87;
view of, on Smith-Dorrien's situation on Aug. 25, 76;
help given by, to 2nd Corps at Le Cateau, 78;
During the Marne operations, 109;
Marne bridges seized by, 133;
fine leadership of, 137;
During the Aisne operations, 146, 161;
During the Move North and the Battle of Ypres,
_role_ assigned to, and finely carried out by, 200-1,
202 _sqq._, 233;
the stand on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 204, 233, 238, 244,
246, 247, 277;
consummate skill shown by, 261;
later work, 278, 280;
On the services of the London Scottish on Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 262-3.

Allied Commanders,
views of, before the Retreat from Mons, 47, 55, 56, 57;
wishes ignored in London (Oct. 4, &c), in reference to Antwerp,
180 _et proevi_.

Allied Forces (_see also_ Belgian, British, _and_ French);
support of, to Belgium inadequate to prevent retreat, 46;
positions of, on Aug. 29, 91;
offensive planned for, for Sept. 6, 107, 109-10;
and the end of the Great Retreat, 110;
situation of, on Oct. 6, 181-3;
object of, on Oct. 6, 182;
combined eastward advance of, planned for Oct. 13, 203;
condition, if the enemy had driven a wedge between, 225;
position of, and enemy forces opposing, on the night of Oct. 21,
231-2;
enormous enemy superiority to (Oct. 30), 240;
dispositions of, at the 1st Battle of Ypres (Oct. 29 p.m.), 242;
loyalty and fine feeling between, as evidenced in the 1st Battle
of Ypres, 256;
augmentation of, in the West, some resources of, 301-2;
plans for, in the West, at close of 1st Battle of Ypres, bases of,
301;
needs and alternatives, 301-2;
combined attack by (Dec. 14), on the Hollebeke-Wytschaete ridge
line, 322;
ability of, to keep the line inviolate, proven, 345.

Allied Nations, spirit of, at close of 1914, 345.

Alost-Termonde-Lokeren line, German move on (Oct. 11), 203.

Alsace, French offensive in, 48.

Alston, General, G.O.C. Naval Detachments for Antwerp, 181.

Alternatives in Campaigns, the faculty of choice of, 217.

America, entry of, into the War, 346.

American Civil War, lesson of, as to interference by Home
Government with Commanders in the Field, 111, 178.

Amiens,
British concentration point, 6, 14, 32;
aircraft at, 33;
6th French Army forming at, 89;
German forces operating through, 105.

Ammunition
(_see also_ Artillery, Guns, High Explosive, Machine-Guns,
Royal Artillery, _&c._), 44;
British lack of, and the consequences, French's constant
representations on, before and during the war, 162-3, 241;
Kitchener on, 309-10;
French's reply, 313, 316;
results, 332-3, 343, 347, 349, 351;
the upshot of the agitation, 347 _sqq._;
the Memorandum to the War Cabinet, 357-60;
and the results, 360;
Gun-fire, 1st Battle of Ypres, restricted for lack of, 349;
Output of, required for,
Reserve, 349-50;
Use, 349;
Russian (reported) deficiency in; Joffre's information concerning
(Dec. 27), 341.

Ancre River, Bulkeley Johnson killed at, 136.

Anley, Colonel F. G., O.C. (_temp._) 12th Infantry Brigade, 26.

Annequin--Pont Fixe--Festubert--Chapelle--Fosse line, 2nd Corps at
(Oct. 12), 210.

Ansell, Lieut.-Colonel, O.C. 5th Dragoon Guards, killed in action, 76.

Antwerp, 48, 163, 304;
Belgian retirement on, 45, 46;
sortie from, 143;
danger to, not envisaged, 157;
Belgian withdrawal from, planned, 175;
relief of, French's efforts for, 176 _sqq._;
Kitchener's action, 177, 179, 181;
French's views on (Oct. 6), 182-3;
and Joffre's, 178-9;
British Government's anxieties on, 191;
position at, 198;
fall of, 175 _sqq._, 192, 201;
menace of, to the Channel ports, 176;
and effect of, on French's plans of Sept., 164, 302;
French's steps to keep in touch with events at, 184 _sqq._;
German advances from, 208-9.

Appomattox, Lee's surrender at, 231.

Archangel, disadvantages of, 315.

Ardennes, the,
anticipations concerning, 11, 39;
Rivers rising in, 51.

Argyll and Sutherland (Princess Louise's) Highlanders:
2nd Batt., 23, 61; in the Battle of Ypres, 243;
7th Batt. (T.), 296.

Armentieres, 209;
3rd Corps' fighting near, 219, 220;
the town taken, 221;
and shelled, 222;
German forces N. of, 240;
success of the 6th Division near (Oct. 28), 241.

Armentieres--La Bassee, Indian Corps' fighting between, 284.

Armies, Decision to form, communicated to Corps' Commanders, 337.

Arques, 329.

Arras, and the Sea,
German strength between (Oct. 10), Foch's estimate of, 223;
attack N. of, by de Maud'huy (Dec. 16-17), 324-5;
weather difficulties at, 337;
Joffre's plan to break through W. of, 342;
French success near (Dec. 27), 345.

Arras front, the, 234.

Artillery _see_ German, Guns, Heavy Artillery, Royal Artillery.

Artists' Rifles (28th (County of London) Batt. the London Regiment),
arrival in France (Nov.), 27, 271, 295;
converted into an Officers' Training Corps, 272, 295, 297.

Asia Minor, action in, French's view on, 316.

Asquith, Rt. Hon. H. H., 305, 308, 329, 331;
and the _Entente_, 3;
at the Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914, 3;
French's relations with, and the ammunition shortage, 332;
the Newcastle speech, 356.

Ath, route from, across Haine Valley, 49;
German advance to, 57.

Attack, how best warded off, 313.

"_Attaque_!" General Foch's constant cry, 198, 274.

Aubers Ridge, artillery shortage at, 356.

Augustovo, German disaster at, 230.

Aulnoy, 2nd Corps at (Sept. 8), 123.

Aulnoye, Railway junction at, 52.

Austria-Hungary, War declared by, on Serbia, 2;
French and British declarations of War with, 2.

Austro-German defeats, 268, 274.

Avesnes, 50, 67.

Bailleul, 227, 234, 241, 245, 258;
German defeat at, 207.

Balfour, Rt. Hon. A. J., and the Munitions question, 357, 360.

Balloon observation and heavy artillery, 12.

Baltic Sea, 315.

Barrow, Lieut.-Col. G. de S., A.D.C. Chief of Staff to Allenby, 243.

Barry, Lieut.-Col. S. L., A.D.C. to French, 255.

Bassevelle, advanced troops at, 126, 127.

Battenberg, H.S.H. Prince Maurice of, death from wounds, 240.

Battles, past and present, names of, and time-limits of, 218.

Bavai, 2nd Army Corps' retreat on (Aug. 24), 63, 64;
French's advanced H.Q. at, 65, 66, 68;
conditions in, and around, 69-70;
strategic importance of, 65.

Bayonets, demand for, by British cavalry (Sept. 21), 161.

Bazaine and Metz, warning from, 71.

Bazoches, 148.

Beale-Browne, Major, 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119.

Beaumont, French movements near, 38-9.

Becherelle-Maison Neuve road, fighting in woods near, 128.

Bedfordshire Regiment:
1st Batt., 23;
2nd Batt., 29.

Belgian Army (_see also_ Allied Forces);
nearest French force to, 38;
entrenched near Louvain, 41;
retreat on Aug. 21, 45-6;
later position, 48;
in Antwerp, 143, 176;
co-operation of anticipated, 182;
position in combined advance as planned, 203;
retreat of, to Bruges and the Yser, 183, 192, 201, 208, 212;
fatigue of, 217, 224;
stand of, on that stream, 278;
German attack on, at Nieuport (Oct. 19), 227;
in the Battle of Ypres, 232;
active hostilities resumed by (Dec. 2), 336;
French's scheme for co-operation with, by amalgamation, 343-5.

Belgian Coast-line (_see also_ Channel Ports),
Plans for regaining command of, 303;
Commandant of Antwerp, French in communication with, 191;
Defence of Frontier fortresses, 7, 176;
Government, Message from, to French, on the retirement on Antwerp,
45-6;
departure of, from Antwerp (Oct. 3), 175;
Neutrality, British guarantee of, 9, 14;
Pre-war attitude as to conduct in a general war, 9;
Refugees near Le Cateau (Aug. 24), 68-9, 83.

Belgian Luxemburg, German forces in, 41.

Belgium, Central Plains of, 50;
French cavalry operations in, 44, 67, 68;
German turning movement in, 57;
Industrially important districts of, 49, 50, 51;
Inundation of, 242-3;
Further, considered, 313.

Bellot, fighting at, 126.

Beluchi Regiment, 129th (Duke of Connaught's Own), 238.

Bercelaere, the Worcesters at (Oct. 31), 254.

Berinage coalfield, 49, 51, 53.

Berry-au-Bac, French capture of Prussian Guards at (Sept. 17), 157.

Berthelot, General, Chief of Staff to Joffre, first impressions of, 35.

Bertie, Rt. Hon. Sir Francis Leveson, G.C.B. (now Lord Bertie),
British Ambassador to the French Republic, a tribute to, 33;
views of, on Kitchener's functions (Sept. 2), 99;
telegram to, from Grey on the Coastal advance (Dec. 9),
305 _sqq._

Bethune, 209, 235;
2nd corps at, 209, 210.

Bethune--Aire line, 2nd corps approaching, 201, 202.

Bethune-Lille-Tournai road, assigned for French advance (Oct. 13),
203.

Beyers, General, a chivalrous act by, 339.

Bhopal Infantry, 9th Regiment, 238.

Bidon, General, French Territorials under, 233.

Binche, distances from, to Conde and to Le Nouvion, 48;
strategic importance of, 53;
occupied by enemy, 60.

Bingham, Brigadier-General Hon. C. E., G.O.C. 4th Cavalry Brigade,
24, 65, 247.

"Black Country"-like area, 2nd Corps' operations in, 209.

"Black Marias," _see_ "Jack Johnsons".

Black Watch, The (Royal Highlanders),
1st Batt., 17, 126, 250, 328;
5th Batt. (T.), arrival of, in France, 295.

Bleu to Berthen, German positions on, 207.

Bleu to Neuve Eglise line, secured by 3rd Corps, 207.

Boers, the, chivalry shown by, in fight, 339.

Bois l'Eveque, roads and railways, traversing, 52.

Bois Grenier, capture of, by 3rd Corps (Oct. 18), 221.

Boitron, enemy fire from, 127;
Church, artillery action N. of, counter-attack near, and Guards'
action in woods N.W. of, 128.

Bombs, use of, 144.

Bonnet, 1st Army Corps H.Q., 65;
fighting watched from, by French, 66.

Bordeaux, 305, 346.

Border Regiment, the,
2nd Batt., 28;
5th Batt. (T.), 27, 295.

Borodino, Battle of, 217.

Bouchain, Scheldt crossing at, 50.

Boulogne, 173, 176, 180, 183, 188;
French's landing at, 13;
German menace to, 171, 176;
Napoleon's menace from, 215;
a possible execution of in the present century foreseen, 155-6.

Bourg, the Aisne crossed at, by 1st Corps, 151.

Bouvignies, Scheldt crossing at, 50.

Bowes, Brigadier-General, G.O.C. 8th Infantry Brigade, 21, 322.

Bradbury, Captain, killed in action, 101.

Braine and district cleared by Allenby's cavalry, 146.

"Brand, Tom" (Viscount Hampden), O.C. Hertfordshire Territorials,
powers of, with his men, 271.

Brandenburg Corps, and its commander in the Franco-German War of
1870, 285.

Bray, 60.

Braye, French extension to, suggested, 186.

Breese, Lieutenant Lawrence, of the Royal Horse Guards, scientific
experiment of, on new weapons, costing his life, 355.

Breteuil, de Castelnau's H.Q. at, 199.

Bridges, Colonel Thomas, 4th Dragoon Guards, character summary of,
184-5;
sent to Brussels, 185;
report from, on the situation in Antwerp, 198;
French's representative with H.M. the King of the Belgians, the
co-operative scheme discussed with, 343-4.

Bridoux, General, Commanding French Cavalry Corps, _role_
assigned to, 143;
killed, 158.

Brigades, _see_ Infantry Brigades.

Briggs, Brigadier-General C. J., G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Brigade, 24.

British Admiralty, views of, on the Zeebrugge schemes, 311, 320-1.

British Army, _see_ each component part, _and_ Names of
Commanders;
_see also_ British Expeditionary Force, _and_ Indian
Corps;
Disadvantages of (_circa_ 1914), 140;
One of its most sacred Traditions, 330;
Possibility of Employing elsewhere than as on Jan. 9, 1915;
Memorandum of War Council, 313-14;
and French's reply, 315 _sqq._;
Secret of its fighting power, 330.

British Empire at stake in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16;
two fateful dates for, 237, 252, 260;
saved by the Cavalry Corps, 261;
jeopardised by the shortage of Munitions. French's consequent
action, 347, 356, 357;
practically inviolate throughout the War, 331.

British Expeditionary Force for France, command given to French, 2,
8, 17;
Composition of, 4;
at start and later, with names of Commanders, 16 _sqq._;
Combined action with the Navy considered by French and discussed
with Churchill, 157, 164;
further consideration of, 302 _sqq._;
objections of the French, 305, 307, 342, 343;
the substituted plan in operation, 322 _sqq._;
Concentration on left flank of the French fixed, 5, 6-7, 14;
and effected, 33, 35, 40;
general instructions for action when completed, 42;
order of the day referred to, 212;
_see also_ Move northward, _below_;
Condition of, after Le Cateau, 89, 95, 111;
Co-operation of, with the Belgians, French's scheme for, 302, 303,
343-5;
Belgian promise of, 43-6;
Deficiencies after Le Cateau due to Losses (_q.v._) (Aug. 31),
95;
Despatch of, to France; Instructions to C.-in-C. on his departure,
13-15;
Feeling of, for the Prussian invaders of East Prussia, 194;
French's talks with the men, 88-9, 136;
German estimate of (Sept. 3), 105;
the thing forgotten by them, 107;
H.Q. in London; Locale and Staff, 5-6;
Imperilment of, by the abandonment of the French offensive, 94;
Losses (_see also_ that head) in Officers, how made good, 272;
Marching of, 94;
Message to, from the King, 275;
Moral of, _see_ Spirit Animating, _below_;
Moral sustained through the Great Retreat, 107;
Motive and Task of, 14;
Move of, to the N., to left flank of French forces, envisaged by
French in Sept., 157, 162;
the _pourparlers_ on, 163 _sqq._;
Joffre's views on, 166-9, and dispositions suggested by him,
169 _sqq._;
urged on by French in early October, 176;
further urgent representations on, to Joffre, and the replies,
185 _sqq._;
the march begun (Oct. 1), 193, 195 _sqq._;
its progress, 198 _sqq._;
how thwarted, 341 _sqq._;
combined advance east planned for (Oct. 13), 20;
New base decided on, 93;
Offensive action by, urged by Joffre and others (Aug. 31), and
refused by French, 95;
Orders of the Day issued to, by French;
Sept. 8, 131-2;
Special:
Aug. 22, paragraph 2, quoted, 212;
Oct. 16, 211-12;
Oct. 23, 229;
Nov. 1, 257;
Nov. 3, 260-9;
Nov. 3, 269-70;
Position desired for, for Sept. 6, by Joffre, 107;
Positions held by (_see also_ Concentration, _above_),
and movements of, before and during the:
(_a_) Retreat from Mons, 47 _sqq._;
(_b_) Battle of the Marne, 117 _sqq._;
(_c_) Battle of the Aisne, 145 _sqq._;
(_d_) Movement N., after that Battle, 193 _sqq._;
(_e_) 1st Battle of Ypres, 214 _sqq._;
(_f_) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 1914, 326 _sqq._;
Qualities shown by all ranks in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 238, 239;
Reserves and reinforcements available, 113, 228;
continued lack of both, 265;
War Council's view on (Jan. 7, 1915), 309;
Roads and Supply Railheads allotted to, for the Battle of the
Marne, 132-3;
Services of, acknowledgments of, by,
Joffre, 85, 98;
Poincare, 198;
Spirit animating, 55, 78, 88-9, 98, 110, 111, 113, 238, 239, 266,
269, 270, 271;
Strain endured by, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 237;
Successive instead of united action by, envisaged by Joffre
(Oct. 4), 189 _sqq._;
Wilson's share in preparation of, 108.

British Force for Relief of Antwerp, 177, 179, 181;
what befell it, and what might have been done with it, 183;
Poincare's view on, 198.

British Forces, _see_ British Army.

British Government, _see also_ War Cabinet;
offensive action urged by, on Aug. 31, 95;
objective unattainable without adequate Munitions, insistence on
by French, 351 _sqq._, 357 _sqq._;
_see also_ 347, 358 _sqq._;
Guarantee of Belgian neutrality, 9, 14.

British Imperial General Staff, French's resignation from, 1;
and French's appointment to Command of B.E.F., 2;
conferences of, with French General Staff, 5, 9.

British Losses at Le Cateau, 78-9, 83-7, 89, 153;
in the Battle of the Aisne, 152-3, 159, 160;
on the Marne, 137, 138;
in the Battle of Ypres, 251, 279, 285-6.

British Naval co-operation arranged for, 226-7;
Detachments for relief of Antwerp, and their Commander, 179, 181;
difficulty of withdrawing, 201;
Transport Service line, efficiency of, 40.

British Navy (_see also_ Naval co-operation)
Combined action with plans for, 157, 164 _sqq._, 302
_sqq._;
French objections to, 305, 307, 342, 343;
Position of in Aug. 1914, 4;
and at the close of the year, 345.

British Reservists, in Aug. 1914, 42.

British Soldiers, military characteristics of, 42;
Moral superiority of, over German, value of, 55;
and Officers, instinctive sympathy between, 88;
Qualities of, saving the Armies from disaster, 94;
Spirit of, at and before the Battle of the Marne, 113, 121;
Troops, mobilisation of, 3.

Brooke, Colonel Lord, and the Warwickshire Battery of Horse
Artillery (_q.v._), 295.

Broome, a pause at, with Kitchener, 333.

Bruges, Belgian retreat on, covered by Rawlinson, 201;
German advance on, 208;
and arrival at, 219;
plan for clearing, 221, 226;
failure of, 235.

Brussels, Belgian evacuation of, 45-6;
German cavalry advance on, 58;
Colonel Bridges despatched to, 185;
Railway to and from, 53;
route from, across Haine valley, 49.

Brussels-Givet line, German menace to, 41.

Bucy-le-Long-Bourg line, held by British, 150, 152.

Bug, the, Russian operations near, 334.

Bulfin, Brigadier-General E. S., G.O.C. 2nd Infantry Brigade, 18, 244;
given command of the 1st Division, 251-2.

Bulgaria, Joffre's hopes from, 34.

Bull Run, Battle of, 231.

Bully beef, exchange of, for loan of Guns, by Haig, 159.

"Bunching up" of infantry, 130.

Bussieres, attempt to cut off enemy retreat at, 128.

Bussieres-Boitron-Hondevilliers line, British left on, 131.

Butler, Brigadier-General R. H. K., G.O.C. 3rd Infantry Brigade, 18.

Buzancy, French's view from, of the Aisne combat, 145.

Byng, Major-General Hon. Sir Julian, G.O.C. 3rd Cavalry Division, 29;
operations by, 201;
during the Battle of Ypres, 227, 239, 243, 244;
Appointed to command Cavalry Division for relief of Antwerp, 181.

Bzura, the, Russian retreat to, and stand on, 230.

Cabinet, The (_see also_ War Cabinet), anxiety of (Dec. 1914),
332.

Cabinet Ministers, French's efforts to rouse to the need for more
Munitions, 347.

Calais, 183;
menace to, and from, of the fall of Antwerp, 176, 214-15, 304.

Calais-Dover, distance well within range of modern heavy artillery,
215.

Cambon, Paul, French Ambassador in London, 3.

Cambrai, 77;
canal by, 49-50;
Scheldt crossing at, 50;
British troops near, 72;
German reinforcements at, 182.

Cambrai to Conde and to Le Nouvion, distances, 48.

Cameron Highlanders, 1st Batt., 27;
at the Petit Morin, 126;
in the Battle of Ypres, 250;
at Givenchy, 328.

Cameronians, The (Scottish Rifles), 5th Batt. (T.), 295.

Campaigns, alternatives offered by preliminary conditions of, 217-18;
Development of, often quite unlike the preconceived plan, 217;
success in, from what resulting, 217-18.

Campbell, Lieut.-Colonel D., 9th Lancers, at Moncel, 119;
and wounded, 120.

Canal Du Centre, junction of, with the Conde Canal, 53.

Capper, Major-General T., G.O.C. 7th Infantry Division, 28, 227;
sent to relief of Antwerp, 181;
at Ghent, 201, 203;
retreat thence, 208.

Carency, French line advanced at, 345.

Carvin and Lens, French Cavalry operating between, 182.

Cassel, French's interviews at, with Foch, 233, 274, 277-8;
on the inundation question, 242-3.

Castelnau, General de, efforts of, to turn the German flank, 13, 145,
159, 160, 162, 197, 216, 325;
Fine leading of, and the results, 158-9;
Seen by French on October 8, personal losses sustained by, and
pressure on troops of, 199.

Catillon, Bridge at, 51.

Cattenieres, German move on, 77.

Cavalry, _see_ British, French, German, Cavalry.

Cavalry, British (_see also_ Indian Cavalry, _and_ each
unit _under_ Brigade, Corps, Division, Regiment, _and_
Names of Commanders) of the Expeditionary Force, 4;
Composition and Commanders of, 16, 17 _sqq._ (_see
also_ Cavalry Brigades, Corps, Divisions),
Demand of, for Bayonets, 161;
Guns saved by, at Le Cateau, 77;
Memorandum on the Employment of, 129-30;
Operations of, before, during, and after the,
(_a_) Retreat from Mons, 44, 47 _sqq._;
(_b_) Battle of the Marne, 119 _sqq._;
(_c_) Battle of the Aisne, 146, 152, 165;
(_d_) Move northwards, 172 _sqq._;
(_e_) 1st Battle of Ypres, 220 _sqq. passim_;
(_f_) Operations of Dec. 14-19, 238;
Reconnaissance work of; shared with Aircraft, 43-4;
Superiority of, to that of the enemy, 94;
Brigades:
1st, 24;
fine work of, at Braine, 146;
2nd, 24, 65, 73;
guns saved by, 77;
at Moncel, 119-20;
3rd, 24, 65;
at St. Quentin, 87;
fighting on the Marne, 129, 132;
filling gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135;
energy of, 137;
at Chassemy, 152;
4th, 24, 25, 63;
at Messines, 247, 263;
5th, 25;
at Binche, 47;
at Cerizy, 87;
near Compiegne, 93;
on the Marne, 132;
following gap between 3rd and 2nd Corps, 135;
in Marne Battle, 135;
French's talk to, after the fight, 136;
energy of, 137;
at Chassemy, 152;
6th, 29;
at Gheluvelt, 250;
7th (_see also_ Kavanagh), 30;
in the Battle of Ypres, 250, 251;
at Messines, 246;
fine work by, 256, 272;
Corps (_see also_ Allenby),
formation of, 24, 200, 202;
fine work by, 203, 204 _sqq._;
operations planned for, in the Battle of Ypres, 219;
and executed by, 220, 221;
victories of, 223;
front held by, 225, 232;
falling back on Messines, 227;
hard pressed at Zonnebeke, 233;
glorious stand by, and by associated troops on the
Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 238, 244 _sqq._;
support sent to, 250;
admirable aid given by, 261;
repulse of the enemy by, back to the Lys, 277;
Divisional, _see_ Divisional Cavalry;
Divisions:
1st, 16, 24, 61;
fine reconnaissance work by, 64, 65, 72, 73, 75, 76, 84, 87,
119, 126;
orders to, before the Battle of the Marne, 132;
at Braine, 152;
and the move N., 169, 171, 173, 188;
the move begun, 193, 193, 198, 200, 202;
fine work by, 204, 205;
fighting on the Lys, 220;
in support at Messines, 244;
fierce fighting by, 245, 246, 247;
withdrawal to Wulverghem, 258, 259;
London Scottish joining in the trenches, 263;
supporting Conneau, 264;
reinforcing Haig, 280;
2nd, 25, 146;
move to the N., 170-1, 172, 174, 193, 195, 200;
capture by, of the Mont des Cats, 204;
and of Mont Noir, 205;
capture by, of Mont Kemmel, 208;
at Warneton, 220;
reinforcing Haig, 243;
and hard pressed, 244;
at Messines, 246;
at Gheluvelt, 250;
heavily attacked on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 237, 258,
259;
French support of, 261;
London Scottish detached to support, 263;
3rd, 16, 29, 165, 178, 188, 273;
detailed for Relief of Antwerp, 180, 181, 192, 201;
at Thourout, 204;
fighting in Houthulst Forest, 220;
near Menin, 224;
increasing pressure on, 227, 233, 239;
intense fighting near Hollebeke, 243, 244, 246;
value of, 276;
critical situation, 251;
fighting at Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 260;
8th, 169.

Cavalry Commanders, French's discussions with, before Mons, 43.

Cavalry on Foot, disadvantages of, 261-2.

Cavalry spirit, advantages of, 262.

Cavan, Brigadier-General the Earl of, G.O.C. 4th (Guards Brigade),
19, 244, 271;
later command of, 252, 271;
fine work by, 272;
marvellous influence over his men, 271.

Celles, spurs near, 150.

Cerizy, German cavalry repulse at, 87.

Cerseuil, 7th Brigade at, 195.

Chailly and Jouy-sur-Morin, 1st Corps at, 123.

Chalons, rail to, from Maubeuge, 53.

Chamigny, Marne crossed at, by part of 3rd Corps, 138.

Champagne, Plain of, 117;
German forces giving way in, 142.

Changis, Marne crossings near, 124, 129;
French difficulties at, 133-4.

Changis-Coulommiers line, British position on, before the Marne
Battle, 115.

Channel Ports, German menace to, 341;
constantly in French's mind, 11, 155-7;
increased by the fall of Antwerp, 176;
possibility of averting, 183;
gravity of, in the 1st Battle of Ypres, 214-16, 224;
the advance checked by that battle, 235-6, 277;
moment of greatest danger to (Oct. 31), 252, 260;
saved by the Territorials, 294;
rendered grave by German hold on Belgian coast, Grey on, 306-7;
French's plan for extinguishing this menace, 302 _sqq._;
Joffre's views and alternative plan, 307, 310-11;
and memorandum on, 317-18.

Channel Tunnel, 214;
views on, of French, 156.

Chantilly, meetings at, with Joffre, 336, 340;
conference at, with Kitchener, the Munitions question urged at,
355-6.

Charleroi, country near, 50;
German advance on, 58.

Charleroi Canal, canals connected with, 53.

Charly-sur-Marne, bridge at, seized by Allenby, 133.

Chassemy, Gough's cavalry at, 152.

Chateau-Thierry, French forces falling back on, 104;
taken by the enemy, 105;
French advance directed on, 115;
German concentration near, 151.

Chatillon, the French G.H.Q. at, 142.

Chemin des Dames, position maintained by the French, 157;
plateau S. of, 161.

Cheshire Regiment:
1st Batt., 22;
6th Batt. (T.), 296.

Chetwode, Brigadier-General Sir Philip P. W., G.O.C. 5th Cavalry
Brigade, 25, 47;
German cavalry repulsed by, at Cerizy, 87;
1st Corps' retirement covered by, 93;
French's visit with, to the tired troops, 136.

Chichester, Brigadier-General, O.C. Territorial Training Camp,
St. Omer, 294.

Chivalry in war, importance of maintaining, instances of, in the
Boer War, 339.

Chivres Plateau, German artillery concentration on, 151-2.

Chivres Plateau-Missy line held by 5th Division, 152.

Chivres Spur, Aisne Valley, 147.

Christmas Day, 1900, a Boer Christmas present after, 339.

Christmas Day, 1914, how spent by French, 337;
an armistice believed to have been suggested for, by the Pope, 337;
German fraternisation on, 338.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, and the _Entente_, 3;
on the situation of the British Navy on August 5, 1914, 4;
attacks on, repudiated by French, and valuable help acknowledged,
164;
character-summary of, 302-3;
visits of, to French, and plans for naval co-operation sketched
out during, 163-4;
and letters after, 302 _sqq._;
later visit to French (Dec. 17), the difficulties of British
coastal advance discussed, 305;
French dislike of the plan, 305;
and substitute for it, 307;
on the French attitude to the Zeebrugge plan, 307;
telegram from (Jan. 2), on the development of Zeebrugge as a
submarine base, 308;
text, 311.

Clive, Major, Grenadier Guards, liaison officer at French H.Q.,
news from, 72;
a tribute to, 274.

Cloth Hall, and other glories at Ypres, 248.

Coast-line, menace to, _see_ Channel ports.

Coldstream Guards, The,
1st Batt., 17, 250;
at Givenchy, 328;
2nd Batt., 19, 125, 128, 244;
3rd Batt., 19, 125, 127, 128, 244.

Command of Ground, chief value of, 149.

Commander-in-Chief, demands on the brain of, 80;
functions of, as exercised by Kitchener in South Africa, 333;
responsibility of, for all blame always maintained by French,
329-30.

Commanders of Armies in the Field, and Interference by Home
Government, _see_ Divided Command.

Committee of Imperial Defence, 1, 8;
warning to, by French, on the command of the Channel ports, 155-6,
214;
suggestion to, on sectional construction of submarines made by
French, 216;
French a member of, 8.

Compiegne, French's G.H.Q. at, 86, 89, 90, 93;
conference at, with Joffre, 92;
pivot of French cavalry operations, 146.

Compiegne-Clermont line, French forces falling back to, 93.

Compiegne-La Fere line, gap in, Joffre's desire for the British to
fill, and French's replies, 92, 94, 95.

Compiegne-Longueil-Pont Ste. Maxence area, 3rd Corps directed on,
187.

Conde, the Scheldt at, 48, 50;
military value of, 53, 54;
roads from, route of, 54;
2nd Corps' difficulties S.E. of, 65;
Aisne crossing at, 150.

Conde Bridge, British cavalry (entrenched) covering, 195.

Conde-Cambrai-Le Nouvion-Binche area,
Features of,
Strategical, 52 _sqq._;
Topographical, 48 _sqq._

Conde Canal line, British forces on, 47, 50;
junction of, with Canal Du Centre, 53;
bridges gained by German cavalry, 62.

Conde Fort, Missy, cleared of enemy, 149.

Conde-Manette line, British forces on, 60.

Conde-Mons-Erquelinnes line, British on, 59;
heavy pressure on, 61.

Conde-Valenciennes-Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies road, 54.

Congreve, Brigadier-General W. N., V.C., G.O.C. 18th Infantry
Brigade, 28.

Connaught Rangers,
1st Batt., 19, 128, 238;
2nd Batt., 19, 160.

Conneau, General, French cavalry under, operations of, 204, 227, 235;
at Messines, 264, 278;
relieved, 280.

Cormicy-Rheims-Verzy line, held by 5th French Army, 146.

Corps Commander, discussions with before Mons, 43.

Coulommiers, French at, with Haig, 106;
French's G.H.Q. at, 131.

Council of War of Aug. 5, 1914,
Members and Military Officers present at, 3-4;
topics discussed and conclusions arrived at, 4-5.

County of London (London Regiment):
9th Batt. (Queen Victoria's Rifles), 295;
12th Batt. (The Rangers), 296;
13th Batt. (Princess Louise's Kensington Batt.), 295.

Courcelles, 1st Corps H.Q., 152.

Courtacon-Esternay-La Villeneuve-les-Charleville line reached by
5th French Army, 121.

Courtacon-Esternay-Sezanne line, 5th French Army directed on, before
the Marne battle, 115.

Courtrai, Rawlinson's operations towards, 201, 219;
German advance to, 208;
and reinforcements at, 240.