Chapter IV: Part 4

The soldiers we could chiefly depend upon, were those who originally belonged to the corps, or had come to us from many of the militia regiments, and particularly those who had been brought up to early habits of labour in our agricultural districts. I am aware that many of the men we got as volunteers from the militia, had been called out from our manufacturing population, but their habits and health had been much improved by being obliged to relinquish debilitating practices, by good feeding, and regular military exercises for a length of time before we got them. A long peace has probably brought into our corps a more robust description of men, than we had often to make the best we could of during the late wars, and many of whom were frequently most wretched creatures, so much so, that it was unfair to expect that British officers, however zealous they might be, could always be successful in battle against the finest men of France, which the conscription brought into the French ranks; but if an immediate increase of the army, to any considerable extent, should become requisite, and if the present system of recruiting is to be still pursued, the same generally unprofitable and expensive materials must be resorted to, for augmenting or completing the respective establishments of our old, and also of any new corps which it might be necessary to form, and many of whom must be again found to sink under the fatigues and hardships of war, and the weight of their knapsacks. I must, however, declare that none of the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland are deficient in courage. But let us reflect upon the state into which Sir John Moore's army (which almost set him distracted) had got in the retreat to Corunna. Almost all the corps had become completely disorganized in every respect, and had nearly lost the appearance of regular troops. An opportunity of fighting presented itself, and in a moment steady and well disciplined British battalions appeared in the field. Such were the strange beings British officers had to manage as well as they could.

It would appear that a new plan is about to be adopted for re-organizing and training the militia, and that the men are in future to be raised at a small bounty to serve for a period of five years; and that the whole are to be formed into battalions, of one thousand strong each. The training to take place annually, in portions of two companies at a time, for 28 days, under the adjutant, or permanent staff; which in future is to consist of an adjutant, a serjeant-major, eleven serjeants, one drum-major, and five drummers: one Serjeant to do the duty of quarter-master-serjeant; and it is intended to allow a part of the men to volunteer annually for the line.

This appears to me an exceedingly bad plan. In the first place, the corps of militia must hereafter be composed of a very inferior description of men to what they were of old; and flogging must, as a matter of course, be persevered in; but why in these times are the militia to be embodied and badly trained at a considerable and unnecessary expense to the country; for it is quite time enough to think of calling out this force when the country may be threatened by an enemy with invasion; for with the fine regular army I have in view, the tranquillity of the United Kingdom can be completely secured; and such militia corps, as those that seem to be in contemplation, must be the very worst description of troops which could possibly be employed in case of commotions. I must sincerely hope that the old and constitutional mode of calling out the good and true men of the nation to serve in the militia regiments will never be abandoned, and I yet trust to seeing it extended, as I have proposed, to the Guards and regular army. Surely I have shewn plainly enough the evils of our present recruiting system to dissipate the notion of extending it to the militia. I have long entertained a dislike to the plan of enlistment, unless every possible inquiry were made into the characters of the men who offered themselves as recruits; and I endeavoured to act in this manner some years ago, when commanding a depot at Glasgow. I had an old friend in that city, who had been one of its magistrates, and could look back to the period when only herring boats could come up to the Broomilaw, and who knew every body. I never took a recruit without the approbation of my friend the Bailie; but he rejected so many, who were instantly taken by other depots, of which there were several at the time in Scotland, that I was at last called upon to say why I did not get on quicker with the enlistment of men for the regiment. I gave as my reason, that I was anxious to take only men who could prove that they were respectable in character; but this was not deemed satisfactory, and I had no longer any thing for it but to take such as presented themselves; and then I certainly got on fast enough with recruiting.

Not very long after this, the Bailie came to see me, and I happened at the time to be superintending the drill of several strong squads of my newly enlisted recruits. The Bailie looked closely at them all, and I could not help fancying that I read alarm in the countenances of many of my prizes. "Well, Colonel," said the Bailie, "the city of Glasgow is infinitely indebted to you, for you have freed it of many deserving characters;" but observing that I became rather chop-fallen, he added, "Never mind, man--they'll fight--they'll fight like devils. Was there ever a better fighting regiment in the world than the ----, and they were nearly all raised in Glasgow, which was, to my certain knowledge, very peaceable for many a day after they were gone from it."

I am at this moment reminded, by what occurred upon the retreat to Corunna, of the state into which many of our men were brought upon that and other occasions from want of shoes. I may venture to say, that we had seldom taken the field a fortnight--and our armies had even more than once to halt on this account--when the greater part of the soldier's shoes had gone to pieces, and others could not always be got to replace them. This destruction of shoes was in a great measure occasioned by the previous injudicious practice of highly polishing them with injurious kinds of blacking, which I suppose must continue to be the fashion in these quiet times; and I hope I may be allowed to say, that whenever a corps of infantry is ordered upon service, this practice should be positively forbidden. Two good pairs of boots--not such clumsy concerns as some of the Russian soldiers wore in France--should be properly prepared for every man--that is, well saturated with the water-proof stuff, now so much used by sports-men, and they should never after have anything else put upon them but some of this composition, which not only softens, but also tends to preserve them for a considerable time. Such boots will certainly not look so well as those now in general use; yet for grand occasions, the soldier might be made to carry another finer polished pair; but with the boots I want, and good stockings, every soldier should be furnished, or he cannot march as he ought to do, and is, therefore, so far unfit for service. Some people may consider this trifling, but experienced soldiers will think otherwise.

The plan I have suggested of calling out the regular army, of course, overturns the present defective depot system, which seems to me to be only calculated to give officers habits of idleness and restlessness; and their frequent removals from the companies abroad to those forming the depots, requiring others to be sent out to replace them, afford opportunities of indulging in such pernicious habits. Depots are but very inferior schools for the instruction of officers, non-commissioned officers, or privates. The ten companies assembled form a fine battalion, well adapted for all kinds of military movement and instruction: a depot is quite the reverse of this.

There are now before me notes upon certain points, which I wish to bring under consideration; but if they should appear to some readers tiresome, or uncalled for, I can only regret that they should seem so, and I must request that they will arm themselves with patience sufficient to enable them to accompany me to the end of the chapter.

Regimental bands are looked upon as very pretty and necessary appendages to corps; but as it is most essential that as few soldiers as possible should be taken out of the ranks, it might be advisable to consider whether it would not be wise to place them upon a different footing. The present plan takes away from their companies perhaps twenty soldiers to make second-rate musicians; as more men are almost always occupied in this way, (at least it was so formerly) than regulations would admit of; and supposing that all our regiments were made light infantry, there would, I conclude, be neither drummers nor fifers; but, in place of them, one sergeant as bugle-major, and two buglers per company, and two extra buglers to accompany (when necessary) detachments, the whole to be clothed almost the same as the other soldiers; and I would also arm them with light muskets--indeed, those which belonged to light companies generally contrived, when in the field, to arm themselves. These muskets might be slung over their shoulders when they were required to cheer the regiment on a march, or to attract the fair to the windows as corps passed through towns; and most delightful strains, at least, to a military ear, can be produced by key bugles, French horns, trumpets, &c. There should, however, be one good sized drum, on the new principle, allowed to mark the time; and surely twenty-three men per regiment are quite sufficient for such purposes, especially if some of them were also taught to perform upon a few other instruments.

The corporal and ten pioneers per regiment, who are generally nothing else but so many attendants upon the quarter-master and his sergeant, should be done away with; that is, I would keep the men hitherto employed in this way where they ought to be--in the ranks. If men are wanted for fatigue, as it is termed, the soldiers should be employed on it as a duty, and their time can never be better occupied than in all kinds of labour or works, especially those which may tend to instruct them in what is likely to be required of them at sieges, or during campaigns; and above all, they should have a knowledge of the best and quickest methods of making roads, temporary bridges, &c., and even of preparing food, and lighting fires; if they were also taught to be boatmen and good swimmers so much the better. It certainly would be very desirable that soldiers had more practice in this way than is the fashion in our army. But having mentioned preparing food, I think it important to say a few words upon the subject.

The comfort in which the men of the 5th battalion 60th regiment (who were chiefly Germans,) lived upon service was very striking, when compared with the wretched diet of the generality of British soldiers. I must, however, preface my remarks upon this subject by the following division order which was issued by Major-general Colville, at Moimenta de Beira, in Portugal, on the 29th March, 1813, respecting this corps:

"No. 9. A detachment of the 5th battalion 60th, has arrived at head-quarters under the command of Captain Kelly, and which having left Lisbon consisting of fifty men, has brought up all but one man who was left sick at Coimbra, and no prisoners.

"This is so unlike the report of any detachment of the British part of the division that has arrived at quarters since the Major-General's taking the command of it, that he cannot help mentioning the mortifying distinction, in the hopes that there may be yet left among the good men of the division regard enough for their own honours to keep a check upon the conduct of those of an opposite character."

It seemed to be settled amongst themselves, that every man of the mess of the 5th battalion 60th, had to carry something, that is say--highly-spiced meats, such as sausages, cheese, onions, garlic, lard, pepper, salt, vinegar, mustard, sugar, coffee, &c.; in short, whatever could add to or make their meals more palatable, nourishing, or conducive to health. As soon as the daily allowance of beef was issued, they set to work and soon produced a first-rate dinner or supper, which were often improved by certain wild herbs which they knew where to look for, whereas, in attempting this, I have known instances of our men poisoning themselves; and what a contrast to this were the ways of our too often thoughtless beings who rarely had any of the above articles--day after day they boiled their beef, just killed, in the lump, in water, which they seldom contrived to make deserving the name of soup or broth. This and their bread or biscuit was what they usually lived upon. But I lament to be obliged to add, that their thoughts, of course unconnected with military matters, were too often directed to ardent spirits and to the means of procuring enough of it; for though a certain allowance, usually of rum, was issued daily, this was not sufficient to satisfy their longings for more. And it was always known when the rum was about to be given out when we heard a shout in the camp, and from many voices a cry of "turn out for rum!"

Our mode of messing in barracks is extremely regular, and much in the style so carefully exhibited in Russia to visitors of importance, and is well calculated to produce effect. In general (at least in former times,) cooks were hired, and the soldiers' wives were sometimes engaged for this purpose, so that most of the men were kept almost in ignorance of learning the simple art of boiling beef and potatoes: they only knew, that at fixed hours daily, they were sure of a breakfast and dinner; and although this was to be admired in quiet times, it sadly unfitted soldiers for what they were afterwards to turn their minds and hands to in the field; and it also sometimes left them more money than they could spend with propriety. But if their thoughts could now be more directed to the German and French style of living it would be attended with the best results, and we should hear less of drunkenness and the crimes arising from out of it in our regiments. These hints might, perhaps, be thought useful to those interested in the welfare of our population in general, whose early habits are too often very pernicious and demoralizing.

The observations of his Grace the Duke of Wellington, on the 1st and 3rd of October, 1812, at the siege of Burgos, will shew the necessity of our soldiers' being accustomed to labour and the consequences of their not being habituated to it:--"The Commander of the Forces is concerned to state, that the working parties in the trenches do not perform their duty, notwithstanding the pains which have been taken to relieve them every six hours, &c.;" and his Grace adds--"The officers and soldiers of the army should know that to work during a siege is as much a part of their duty as it is to engage the enemy in the field; and they may depend upon it, that unless they perform the work allotted to them, with due diligence, they cannot acquire the honour which their comrades have acquired in former sieges." The Guards were exempted from the censure contained in this order; indeed their conduct was most exemplary on all occasions. And we can again read in a general order, dated Cartaxo, 4th March, 1811:--

"No. 2. As during the two years which the brigade of Guards have been under the command of the Commander of the Forces, not only no soldier has been brought to trial before a general court-martial, but none has been confined in a public guard; the Commander of the Forces desires that the attendance of the brigade, at the execution to-morrow, may be dispensed with."

This ought surely to convince the country, that though the changes I have proposed, as to the officers of the Guards, may be necessary for the general good of the army; yet the idea of disbanding such troops can only be entertained by an ignorant and absurdly prejudiced mind.

I have often wondered it has never been deemed indispensable, that an uniform system of regimental economy was adopted for the whole army. This most desirable object is by no means attained by the book of general regulations and orders; for although there is to be found in it much that is useful, still a vast deal more is required to come up to what is necessary for the guidance of a regiment in the various situations in which it may be placed; and the want of such a well digested plan is the reason we see such a difference in the state of corps; some being in every respect in the highest possible order, whilst others are the very reverse. The former is entirely owing to their being commanded by talented and judicious officers; the latter is evidently occasioned by their being under men who are themselves ignorant, inexperienced, and yet very likely self-sufficient. Many regiments have good standing orders if they were steadily acted up to; but much depending upon the will of the commanding officer, he most probably adopts something of his own, which is often injudicious, or even injurious; or as much only of the old standing orders as he thinks fit; or perhaps he allows the whole to become a dead letter. A matter of such importance as this should not be left to whim or caprice; but a simple, uniform, and sufficiently comprehensive system should be established for the whole army, for the guidance of regiments in barracks and quarters at home and abroad; upon a march, or when on board ship, or in any situation, but especially when employed in the field. If this were done, and positive orders given, that there should not be the slightest deviation from the system laid down, on the part of commanding officers, we should hear less of corps being more annoyed and teazed by one commander than another; and we should not be able to observe that remarkable difference to be met with amongst them, both in appearance and discipline.

There could not be much difficulty in effecting this most important object. The standing orders of some corps, though in general too diffuse and complicated, and requiring too many returns or reports from companies, &c., would afford ample ground-work for all useful purposes, except in what is essential for the field; in which respect, all those I have seen were totally defective; but uniformity in every point is as necessary in this as it is in military movements; and if judiciously adopted, would be found as strikingly beneficial, as the changes were from the fancies of every commanding officer to the well known "eighteen manœuvres."

Having proposed to do away with regimental pioneers, to make up efficiently for them, two men of good character should be enlisted--but that only for service in the field, to take charge of and lead a bat-horse each, to carry on well fitted pack-saddles a few of such useful tools as might be required for ordinary military purposes. The surgeon, at such times, also requires a man and a horse of this kind for his instruments and medicines; and so do the pay-master and adjutant, for the conveyance of money, books, and various indispensable papers and returns. These ought always to march in the rear of the corps to which they belong. Thus, by doing away both with generally indifferent musicians and misappropriated pioneers, I would save to each regiment about thirty soldiers, or about half the effectives of a company of the present day.

It will surprise those who know nothing of war, and even many military men, when I mention how many soldiers are lost, I may say, to the service, taken out of the ranks of corps to be employed as non-combatant clerks, servants or bat-men, horse-keepers or grooms, &c. The head-quarters and staff sweep off numbers in this way beyond belief. The general officers and staff of divisions and brigades, including engineer officers, staff surgeons, commissariat, &c. if allowed, quite as bad. Then come field officers and regimental staff, and perhaps forty captains and subalterns per regiment, all of whom must be supplied; a few with two, for taking care of their chargers and pack-horses or mules, and all with at least one each to look after pack-horses for the conveyance of baggage; most of it probably indispensable, if it is expected that these gentlemen are to be kept efficient. But there is another demand of a man per company for the care of pack-horses for the carriage of tents, &c. as wheel carriages for such purposes ought never to be allowed upon the line of march.

For these various occupations, I have no hesitation in saying, many hundreds of soldiers are taken away from where they should be, and corps are thus deprived of their best men, and greatly weakened before they come into contact with an enemy.

This must appear almost incredible to many good people, who will naturally be surprised what Mr. Hume, that mirror of economists, could have been about; but who, they may depend upon it, invariably contrives to have, at last, the candle burnt at both ends. But how indignant they must now be to hear, probably for the first time, that they were obliged to pay for such a number of soldiers, who only made a figure upon paper to the disadvantage of the general's reputation who commanded the army in the field, who was supposed to have had, perhaps, 30,000 men to act with, whereas in reality he could not bring into action 25,000; and when a battle took place, there were a few more drains from the ranks besides the killed and wounded; for the latter and sick required attendants at the several hospital stations, and also on the road to them; and how often have I, as a Brigade-major of the 3d division, had to encounter the cross looks of commanding officers of regiments, when I could not avoid calling upon them for officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, for such purposes, when the enemy had, perhaps, sufficiently thinned their ranks.

I would suggest that money should be allowed, and, if possible, no soldiers whatever for any of these purposes at home or abroad, and certainly not upon service; and even at home it would be advisable to make officers a proper allowance for private, or non-combatant servants, so that an end might at once be put to the custom of taking away soldiers from their duties to be employed as such. All servants should however, be regularly enlisted as soldiers are at present, but for a limited period only; and they should be bound to accompany their masters abroad, or upon any kind of service; and commanding officers of regiments should have the power of discharging, at their master's request, these servants if found guilty of bad or improper conduct, and of enlisting others to replace them, of course, such servants come under martial law; but what I have proposed, in this respect, is nothing new, for does not history tell us, of non-combatant servants being of old attached to armies; and allow me to ask, with what intention is it, that officers receive at the commencement of a campaign, and at fixed periods afterwards, bat and forage money? If the sums granted are insufficient--which they undoubtedly are--for providing servants, field equipments, pack-horses, &c. more should be given, as it must be admitted, that they are all indispensable. It could never, however, have been intended, that the number of muskets and bayonets in the ranks, were to be so much reduced, as I have shown is the case, to supply men for the purposes enumerated, when by a trifling comparative increase of the expenses of a war, our armies could be kept efficient, and in such a complete state, as to enable a General to carry it on with that vigour, which is always so essential towards its successful and speedy termination.

But the necessity of what I have just recommended being adopted, appeared in so strong a light, to one of our best officers, that we read in a general order, dated Tholen, 20th of December, 1813, as follows:--

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces being desirous to render the army for the field as effective as possible, directs that all soldiers acting as servants to officers, shall always appear in uniform, and carry their arms and accoutrements on the march. The servants of regimental officers to be in the ranks on the march, and the Commander of the Forces calls upon the General and other officers in command strictly to inforce this order."

"No. 2. With a view to diminish, as much as possible, requisitions on regiments for soldiers as servants, General Sir Thomas Graham authorizes any officer who is entitled by the usage of the service to appear mounted and keep a horse, to hire a servant as bat-man in lieu of a soldier, for which he will be allowed at the rate of 4_s._ 6_d._ (quite insufficient) per week and a ration; but it is distinctly understood, that the allowance is not to be extended to any persons attached to this army, who, by the custom of the service, are not entitled to soldiers to wait upon them, and whenever it is drawn, an effective soldier is to be thereby restored to the army."

"No. 6. The Commander of the Forces strongly recommends to all general officers of the army to return immediately any bat-men they may have to their corps, and to direct their staff to do the same, at all events no officer of any rank is to employ more than one soldier of this army to attend upon him, whether he acts as his own personal servant or bat-man."

"No. 7. Field officers of regiments are entitled each to a servant and bat-man, and of course to draw the allowance for each, when men from the ranks are not employed."

"No. 9 Announces that such servants come under martial law."

I believe that I could not any where, more conveniently or properly, introduce some observations, I consider it necessary to make upon the baggage of an army in the field, and upon some other matters connected with it, than at the close of this chapter, and I feel convinced that experienced officers will allow, that is a difficult subject to enter upon. It must, however, have been obvious to many, how much the quantity of baggage gradually increases as a campaign advances. Various articles are accumulated in all sorts of ways, but chiefly by servants upon the line of march, in the towns they pass through, in the field of battle, and above all at sieges.

We unluckily have many wants, almost unknown to the people of other countries, arising out of our early habits of indulging in many comforts; indeed, so many and so productive are they of enjoyment, that in spite of what some philosophers may say to the contrary, we cannot easily divest ourselves of the remembrance of them, for with most of us they too frequently become indispensables, or in other words, they are apt to make us rather selfish. But a General who may wish to keep such wants within reasonable bounds, or who is determined not to be overwhelmed with baggage, followers, and animals of burden, must be wholely uninfluenced by any other feeling than that of the good of the public service, and must cut off, at once, with an unsparing hand, all superfluities of every description; and he must endeavour to keep the whole under due restrictions. All the odium of this ought not, however, to be thrown upon the Commander of any army about to take the field, as it must, to a certainty, render him unpopular with many; but it would be much wiser that a British army should have, at all times for its guidance, established regulations, which no one could, on any account, be allowed to deviate from.

Selfish feelings never, I believe, show themselves more strongly than amongst landsmen on board ship, and amongst too many men in the field. Some, I have no doubt, have seen individuals retire to a snug corner, to enjoy unobserved something good which they had in their haversacks, lest they should be obliged to offer part of it to hungry comrades. Others have been known to sleep sound, warm, and dry in their tents, having probably offered shares of them, but in such a way to the officers of their own companies, that even they could not accept of their liberality, and preferred reposing at the roots of trees, or behind hedges, exposed to the pitiless storm. My only object in alluding to such trifling matters is, in the first instance, to show that these things do sometimes occur, and, moreover, to try to inculcate, if I can, into such badly brought up men, at least a little feeling for the wants of others. Yet I would not leave it in their power thus to enjoy their comforts--at all events in such situations, for I would make the officers of a company live and sleep in the same tent or hut, and be partakers of the same fare whatever it might be.

A regimental mess at home or abroad, is admirably calculated to keep up respectability, by insuring a proper degree of genteel economy; but of this the officers of corps cannot avail themselves in the field, and then it becomes requisite to act upon established regulations. The officers of a company should be made to have in common, a tent of a particular size and shape, and they should all three contribute towards its purchase, as well as towards the procuring of two horses or mules, which they should be obliged to keep. I would also fix upon a trunk or rather a portmanteau for each, of a certain size and shape. One of the horses should carry, on a well-fitted pack-saddle, the two subaltern's portmanteau, and the tent between them. The other horse should carry the captain's portmanteau, which might be a very little larger than those allowed to subalterns, but care should be taken that its size was also fixed upon; and this should be balanced upon the horse's back by a canteen (bought also amongst them) for the use of the mess, and between them a bag of a certain size, made of some water-proof stuff, could be placed, in which might be conveyed some useful articles for general comfort, especially such as might be considered necessary, when the country, the seat of war, could afford but few supplies.

It appears to me that the officers of a company could not possibly contrive to get on, for any length of time, with less than those two animals; but in the portmanteau should be carried, besides their clothes and a blanket each, their mattresses made air tight, so as to be inflated when necessary, and which can be rolled up into very small compass, when not wanted for use; and such mattresses not only make excellent beds, but also secure those who use them completely from damp from the ground. This is all that could or ought to be allowed to company officers in the field; and positive orders should prevent any other article whatever from being put upon the horses, as all good purposes are at once defeated if they are permitted to be overloaded; and even the private servants or bat-men should be made to carry their own knapsacks, in place of fastening them, as they will always try to do, upon the loads. I at the same time conclude, that the baggage of a company, regiment, brigade and division, marches in proper order, and if one overloaded or sore backed animal knocks up, the whole is most annoyingly and injuriously detained in consequence upon the road. In any arrangement, however, of this kind, I should expect that the baggage and animals allowed to field officers and regimental staff, and to commissariat and medical officers, &c. were likewise strictly brought under regulations, and the name of the owner, or the number of the troop, company, and corps, being conspicuously painted on a water-deck or cover, to go over the load of each animal, any irregularity, and the individual who might occasion it, could be at once ascertained.

It is quite impossible to make arrangements for company officers who may be taken ill, and obliged to go to the hospital stations in the rear. A company in the field is what must be kept in view in any plan of this kind. The medical department, with the means I have yet to propose to place at its disposal, would have to look to such casualties. I must, however, here observe, that in Portugal especially, we had often far too many officers at such stations--for instance at Lisbon, or rather Belem, Coimbra, &c. where it was well known many of them staid so long, that Lord Wellington had often to give them very broad hints, that it was high time they should remember that their regiments were in presence of the enemy. Some of these gentlemen, when absent from their corps, had well supplied their wants, and returned at last to their divisions, nicely mounted on a horse, probably purchased in Lisbon, attended by a soldier, and perhaps a Portuguese boy, leading a mule or two heavily loaded with the good things of this world. Thus the baggage and animals with the army were always increasing. The mule or horse had very likely soon to be sold, from want of food and people to look after them, so that the good things brought up being consumed, the temporary campaigner again fell so sick, that it became indispensable for him to revisit an hospital station, to recruit his health and replenish his supplies. This is by no means an over-drawn picture; and when it was sometimes asked by those with the army, what had become of so and so, the common answer was, that he had taken up a strong position near Lisbon, his right upon the Tagus, and his left at Belem; or that he was teaching the good people of Lisbon to cross the river in cork boats,--for these gentlemen were not without their amusements. It however strikes me at this moment, that as many of these frequenters of hospital stations were really seriously ill, it would be desirable, that when young gentlemen presented themselves to be examined for commissions, it should not only be ascertained that they had been educated, but also that they were fit for service. But I must proceed with other matters. The large bell tents now in general use for soldiers in the field, accommodate certainly a great many of them at night, when well packed with their feet to the poles; but they are much too heavy to be carried on the backs of animals when wet, or when they must be struck before sunrise, saturated with heavy dew. The baggage mules were often knocked up by them in this state. It is a bad plan that of carrying the large iron camp kettles upon animals for the use of companies; the light tin ones carried in turn by the soldiers themselves, in a bag made for the purpose, are greatly to be preferred, as they are always at hand.

It must altogether depend upon circumstances, but it would at all times require serious consideration, whether company officers should be allowed to keep riding horses or not. When they are allowed to ride on the line of march, they are certainly enabled to go unfatigued into action, and to look more closely after their men at the end of a day's work; but I beg to ask (servants being along with the baggage) who are to take the charge of their horses, when they must dismount when near the enemy, on going into action; and no soldier should be taken out of the ranks for such a purpose; how can any country be supposed capable of furnishing the enormous quantity of forage required for such increased numbers of animals, after regiments of Cavalry, Infantry, (I mean those that must be kept by them) Artillery, and the other departments have been supplied? Here therefore an almost insurmountable difficulty presents itself, and it becomes wise to curtail as much as possible in time, for every animal allowed to be kept, must be fed in some way or other.

The fewer women permitted to accompany an army the better, for they are generally useless, and tend immensely to increase the number of animals and quantity of baggage. I once knew a general, who, in an order he issued, was so ungallant, as to style these ladies, "his advanced guard of infamy;" and I must admit that he had too often just cause to style them so.

His Grace the Duke of Wellington was often greatly annoyed at the enormous consumption of forage by his army, and found it necessary to issue many orders upon the subject, of which I shall now give a few.

"G.O. _San Pedro, 19th May, 1809._

"No. 10. As the Commander of the Forces has reason to believe many horses and mules are kept by even the soldiers of the army, and maintained by means entirely inconsistent with discipline and good order, he desires officers commanding regiments and brigades, to inquire into the number of horses and mules which are attached to the regiments under their command, and to enforce the immediate sale of those not allowed to be kept by the regulations of the army."

"G.O. _Zarza Mayor, 4th July, 1809._

"No. 17. The Commander of the Forces requests the attention of general officers commanding divisions and brigades, to the general orders of the 4th and 5th of March, by the late Commander of the Forces, relative to the use of mules allowed for conveying camp kettles, in any service, except for the carriage of camp kettles.

"No. 18. The consequence of loading them with other baggage is, that they are unequal to carry the kettles which they are given to convey, and the loads are so ill put on, that they fall from the mules, and the camp kettles do not arrive from the march till after the hour, at which they ought to be used by the troops."

"G.O. _Merida, 25th August, 1809._

"No. 3. The army must not forage for themselves, but must get it from the Commissary according to the usual mode, by sending in returns of the number of animals for whom forage is required, and receiving from him the regular rations; or if forage cannot be provided in that mode, and it is necessary it should be taken from the fields, it must be taken according to the general orders of the 17th of June, 1839."

"G.O. _Villa Formosa, 13th April, 1811._

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces requests, that, if possible, the green corn may not be cut for the horses, &c. belonging to the army; and that they may, if possible, be turned into the grass fields in preference to the green corn. It must be understood, however, that the horses, &c. attached to the army, must be fed, and must have the green corn, if they cannot get grass."

"G.O. _Nave de Rey, 16th July, 1812._

"No. 1. The Commander of the Forces particularly requests the attention of the commissariat attached to divisions and brigades of Infantry, and to regiments of Cavalry, and of the general officers of the army, and commanding officers of regiments, to the orders which have been issued regarding the cutting of forage.

"No. 2. He desires, that whenever it is possible, grass may be given to the horses and other animals, instead of straw with the corn in the ear.

"No. 3. The Assistant Provosts must be employed to prevent the plunder of the corn-fields, and their destruction by turning cattle into them."

"G.O. _Frenada, 25th November, 1812._

"No. 4. The Commander of the Forces has taken the precaution of having the grass mowed, and saved as hay, in many parts of the country in which the troops are now, or may be cantoned, which resource is ample for the food of all the animals of the army during the winter, if duly taken care of, and distributed under the regulations of the service.

"No. 5. The Commander of the Forces is sorry to learn, however, that much of what was thus provided in this part of the country, has been already wasted, or trampled upon and destroyed, and in particular 35,000 rations of hay, which were at Espeja, and of which Lieutenant Holborne took possession, has been destroyed.

"No. 6. He entreats the attention of general officers, and commanding officers of regiments, to these orders, as they relate not only to the hay provided by the orders of the Commander of the Forces, but to the forage, and other resources of the country."

Much more might be given and said upon this most important subject; but being apprehensive that I have already exhausted the patience of many readers, I shall only farther observe, that in the French armies they act in a very summary manner with respect to carriages and animals kept contrary to the rules of the service. All such carriages and animals, and the persons along with them, are laid hold of by the police, and taken to head-quarters, to be delivered up to the provost, who reports the circumstances to the major-general, and who commonly orders the transgressors to be punished by the provost-corporals, and the carriages and animals to be sold for the benefit of the captors.

It now becomes necessary to consider other subjects connected with the higher branches of the military profession, and which require to be so well weighed, that I may, if possible, give offence to no one; at least it shall be my study to endeavour to avoid doing so.

CHAP. V.

There are many schools in which officers should study in order to gain a perfect knowledge of the military profession, but certainly none can be selected superior to that of experience, in which previously acquired science or theory can be usefully exemplified. But the best of all teachers is decidedly Cæsar, who still speaks to soldiers in a language which they can understand; and of this Napoleon was so well aware, that he always expected his officers to have carefully studied that great general's Commentaries, and which are so well translated into French by General Toulongeon. As an instance--selected out of many to be found in that finely written narrative--what can possibly be a more admirable piece of military policy, than when Cæsar, as he tells us, having found that his army had become alarmed at the accounts received of the warlike appearance, and desperate valour of the Germans under Ariovistus, he decides at once, to allow all who had no stomach for fighting to depart, if they thought fit to do so; and which instantly produced the effects he so wisely anticipated. And let me ask, if a British army were again to get into a scrape, like that in which the 3rd division, and part of our troops, found themselves on the Garonne, just before the battle of Toulouse, and had at least four to one pitted against them; and if our General announced, that those who did not like the appearance of matters might go home; how many would go?

Cæsar perfectly understood the feelings of a Roman army, and knew how to act upon them; but let us see what were those of even a commander of a British regiment.

Colonel Forbes was left by order of Sir Thomas Picton, after the 3rd division moved up the Garonne towards Toulouse, with the 45th regiment, to guard the pontoon bridge across it, where a considerable part of the army had passed. He had reason to think that a battle was about to be fought; and the idea of his remaining in the rear in command, even of such a regiment as the 45th, and though employed upon an important duty, was intolerable. Almost every hour I received a letter from him, urging me to represent to Sir Thomas Brisbane how unhappy he and his regiment felt, at being left in such a situation; and entreating that he might be allowed to give up his post to some troops more in the rear, or to detachments coming up to join the army. His impatience was for some time laughed at; but at last I had the pleasure of sending him orders to abandon his post, and to replace himself and his regiment at the head of the right brigade of the 3rd division. He came up just in time for the battle of Toulouse; and in it he fell, gallantly leading on his regiment in the unfortunate attempt made to force the passage of the canal.

To be able to take advantage of the proper moment for acting upon national feeling or character, is a strong proof of an officer being qualified to command. But a Commander-in-Chief cannot give the world a stronger proof of his fitness or unfitness for his high station than in the men by whom he surrounds himself or employs--if the choice is left to him--upon the staff of the army placed under his orders.

It is the opinion of many of our best soldiers, that no officer should ever be taken from his regiment to be employed upon the staff, unless his place in it be immediately and permanently supplied by another; for no corps ought thus to be deprived of those allowed for carrying on its duties; and such appointments have often been found to injure, in some degree, the individuals themselves ever after as regimental officers. What a corps might suffer in being thus deprived of its officers, seemed to be always overlooked; and interest or patronage alone too often guided those who had the power of recommending or selecting officers for such important appointments; their fitness to perform the duties attached to them was quite another matter, with which they did not appear to trouble themselves; and I have no doubt but I would be set down as a mere simpleton in the ways of the world, if I were to imagine that they would ever act otherwise.

It must be acknowledged, that our selections of officers for staff appointments were too often injudicious; but I do not allow that they were ever carried to the extent, shewn by an able French writer, that they were brought in France at the commencement of the year 1792, when the Etat Major of their armies were in so wretched a state, that it was found necessary to re-establish, quietly, but imperfectly, what had been destroyed by a decree of the 5th of October, 1790. The difficulties of the service augmented incessantly, from their ignorance even of the old forms gone through, and which some fancied they could remedy, by multiplying the numbers employed. The power of attaching assistants to the Etat Major consequently grew into a complete abuse; and at last, in the month of April, 1792, rose to such a pitch, that what with the numbers employed, and through the choice made, the Minister of War saw himself forced to try to put things to rights, by a circular letter addressed to Generals commanding military divisions, and which led to the dismissal from their employments of the whole of these assistants. It, however, soon after became necessary to employ the same, or others equally useless; and this letter did not by any means put a stop to the increasing evils of interest and patronage, for there were still appointed to the Etat Major the most improper and ignorant men, and even girls, who had mounted uniforms, and substituted the sword for the distaff. We are told that there is still to be seen a letter from General Dumourier to Pache, the Minister of War, reproaching him for having sent to his army an opera dancer as an adjutant-general. Men of abilities were, as may be well supposed, disgusted, whilst they were overwhelmed with business, to make up for the ignorance of others; and they were necessitated to use every expedient in order to get through, in any way, the tasks assigned them; and thus the service only presented one mass of confusion, the Minister of War not receiving connected reports or returns; and, as a matter of course, he could not give satisfactory information, when called upon to do so, to those really interested in knowing the state of the army. Another circular was, in consequence, issued by the Minister of War, dated Paris, the 20th of April, 1793; but it had no effect whatever, because it was not only unreasonable, but ridiculous, to require from men what they neither could do, nor knew how to do. The Committee of Public Safety, struck with this state of things, set about putting matters to rights; but two or three of its members, interested that the disorders should continue, found means to overturn all, and the state of the Etat Major was allowed to remain as hopeless as ever. It was not therefore until about the 4th year of the Republic, that they were able in some measure to put things into order, by turning out ignorant and incapable men, and the Etat Major then became composed of some good officers, who established plans to keep its machinery in movement; but France had then had time to see the danger, which there always is, in even slightly disorganizing useful establishments, under the pretence of reforming them. These remarks do not apply directly to us, farther than in the occasional appointment, through interest, of inefficient officers, for the returns of a British army, at least its regiments, were and are still well and regularly kept. Yet, I must say, that for the guidance of our staff in the field, we can scarcely show that we have a system, or what ought to be considered as such.

The staff of an army ought to be a distinct and permanent branch of the service, and no officers should be employed upon it but those who had received such an education, as is usually given to our engineers, the usefulness of which is so ably demonstrated by experiments and practice under Colonel Pasley, whose establishment for instruction (if we except what the artillery are taught at Woolwich,) is the only one worth keeping up; but it is a great drawback to our military service, that the officers of engineers are not more frequently placed in high responsible situations, and intrusted with high important commands and missions; at all events, officers employed even as Aides-de-Camp, but certainly as Brigade-Majors, or in the departments of the Adjutant and Quarter-Master-General, should have had a first-rate military education; but I repeat, that I would not ask where it had been acquired, whether in France, Germany, or wherever it can be had upon the most reasonable terms, for in England it is far too expensive.

Staff officers ought to be men of talents and of great enterprise and perseverance, and should possess even a certain knowledge of what is considered business, both in a civil and military point of view, which would render them capable of ascertaining and calling forth the various resources of a country. They should also be well acquainted with military police duties, or the best modes of exercising military law, in all its bearings, and to enable them to do this with advantage to the army, and to the country, they should have attached to them an intelligent _mounted police corps_. From the want of such an establishment, which it is the work of years to form, how often, and how severely have our armies suffered, and must continue to suffer till a change takes place.