Chapter VI: Part 6

It is at all times very hazardous to allow the roads in the vicinity of an army, especially when near the enemy, to become blocked up, but especially in bad weather, by heavy waggons or carts of any kind; so that pack-horses or mules, (the breeds in Great Britain and Ireland of the former have mostly become too large for this purpose) with well fitted saddles, and perhaps panniers, are the only conveyances for provisions or stores, which should be allowed to come up to an army in the field. But all such subjects require much consideration, and also able arrangements, which should, as far as possible, be completed before troops are allowed to quit our shores. The expense is always great to provide even what is indispensable in this respect for an army, but it would cost, in all probability, twice as much, to form such an establishment in a country in which war had already commenced. This naturally leads the mind to form plans so as to meet the difficulties which will certainly present themselves, and to calculate as to the manner in which a well-organized department, with means at its command, can be produced; and though its vast extent may be apt to discourage, yet it ought to be wisely looked into by a Commander of the Forces, his quarter-master and commissary generals. But if the commissariat consists of able, responsible and experienced officers, much apprehension on this head may be removed. The selection therefore of gentlemen qualified for this branch of the service, ought always to be of primary importance, and their advancement in rank, and consequent higher payment, should depend upon the ability and habits of business they evinced in the discharge of their duties; and to the exclusion, if such a thing can be, of interest or patronage.

I hope I shall be excused for here introducing what I may call a commissariat anecdote; which those who knew Sir Thomas Picton will at once recognize as characteristic of him.

During the splendid movement which Lord Wellington made from the frontiers of Portugal, and which ultimately compelled the French to concentrate their army and fight the disastrous battle of Vittoria; the Assistant-commissary-general attached to one of the divisions, had, through mistake, come into a part of the country, the supplies to be got from which were allotted to the 3rd; and he was waiting patiently, in a neat Spanish village, for the baking of a large quantity of bread, to be finished; which he intended for his own division. Whilst this was going forward, he had taken care, as commissaries usually did, to establish himself in one of the best houses. Sir Thomas Picton very soon learnt what he was about; and ordered that he should be brought before him. "How dare you, Sir, to plunder that village?" "I am no plunderer, Sir, and am only procuring bread for my division," "Neither you nor your division, have a right to any thing in that village; and if you don't instantly be off, Sir, I will order the provost-marshal to hang you up on that tree." The zealous commissary (indeed he was one of the most efficient in the army, and well known to be so by Sir Thomas, who during the scene could scarcely conceal how much he was amused), set off in great alarm, and without further reply, at speed, to head-quarters; which happened to be not very distant, where, we were told, he requested to see Lord Wellington: "What is the matter?" demanded his Lordship, upon observing the commissary's great perturbation. He told his story; concluding by declaring, "and he was actually going to hang me!" His Lordship, now scarcely able, as the story was told--to keep his gravity, asked with much apparent earnestness, "Did he really say, that he would hang you?" "Yes, he really did." "Then," said his lordship, "take my advice, and keep out of his way, or he will certainly do so." The worthy commissary now began, for the first time, to suspect that he had been made to cut a ridiculous figure.

Sir Thomas Picton, though stern in aspect, possessed a most warm, benevolent, and feeling heart. As an instance of this I cannot help relating what occurred on one occasion in Spain. An officer, commanding one of the regiments of his division, was killed in action. He, like too many soldiers who fell in battle, left his widow and a child in very narrow circumstances. This by some means or other came to Sir Thomas Picton's knowledge, when he sent for a field-officer of the regiment, to find out from him the widow's address; and his feeling remark on the occasion was, "that both grief and poverty were hard to be borne at one time." Having got the information he wanted, he took care that a large sum of money (being apprehensive of making a mistake, I shall not venture to say how much) was paid to her.

Towards the close of the war in the South of France, the Duke of Wellington had brought his army--not only improved in its staff, but in many other respects--into a complete state for service; indeed he had made it as much so, as a British force, composed as it was and still is, can be; and his plan of giving good commissariat establishments to divisions and brigades, which enabled them to act at all times efficiently and independently, was most admirable, and should, as far as possible, be always imitated whenever our troops, in any considerable numbers, may be hereafter required to take the field; but those, who from experience, could properly form such establishments, may most probably have then passed away, and the advantages which might have been looked for from their practical knowledge of commissariat duties, cannot be available, and I do not know where I could recommend any one to look for correct information upon such subjects. But does not this most clearly point out, the want of established system in this as well as in other essential branches of our service, and for which I do perseveringly contend.

It may appear to some, that to accomplish the various objects I have alluded to, would be attended with vast expense to the country, yet this will not be found, upon a calm consideration, or rather investigation, to be so great as might be imagined; but no one acquainted with military matters will pretend to say, that they can be dispensed with, if the country is to be served by its armies as it ought to be; and, I trust, that I have already shown in what manner savings can be effected, more than sufficient to meet any increase of expenditure I may venture to propose. I must now, however, leave the subject of the staff of an army for the present, and proceed to other matters which must still be brought before the reader.

CHAP. VI.

As I find that I have not yet touched upon some of the subjects which I am anxious to bring under consideration. I must again beg here to remind the reader, that having shown, in several instances, in what manner considerable savings can be effected, I will now go on to point out a very injudicious piece of economy, the consequences of which have been always felt in our regiments, viz. that of never allowing one quarter enough of ammunition for practice; and the result was, that our soldiers, in general, I will venture to say, were probably as bad marksmen as any in the world. Our game laws are in a certain degree the cause that the lower orders of the people are all so ignorant of the use of fire-arms; but this is a subject with which I do not intend to meddle, and shall only say, that when English archers were so formidable, the people were encouraged and even compelled to assemble at various times of the year to practise this to them amusing craft; and the result of this wise policy on the part of their rulers was fully evinced in battle. I must, however, observe, that our old-fashioned heavy muskets recoil, or kick so violently, after firing even a few rounds, that if they then go off at all, they cause a man to think twice, and probably to raise his eye from the object aimed at, before he ventures to pull the trigger; but since I made a note of this, with the intention of bringing the subject under consideration, I find that an improvement in fire-arms, for the army in general, is actually in contemplation.

I by no means wish to increase the quantity of blank cartridges usually allowed to amuse grown children at mock-fights, &c. but of ball and buckshot ammunition; for it is most desirable that the soldier should know and be able to calculate, at what distances he ought to use both with proper effect.

A general officer, now long in his tomb, entertained certain very odd notions, in which I sometimes fancy that I participate; in one of his usually laconic addresses, or exhortations, in which he was fond of indulging even when going into action, upon one occasion, and rather to the astonishment of the soldiers he led, though accustomed to his ways, and after cautioning them, that he would not give the word _fire_ until he could see the white of the enemy's eyes; and he was very near-sighted--he thus addressed them--"Now, lads, there is the enemy, if you don't kill them, they will certainly kill you; and it is better to break their shanks than to fire o'er the crown of their heads." There was much to be admired in this pithy address, which could be perfectly understood by soldiers. But I must say, that I have often regretted seeing a useless, distant fire kept up, which had no effect whatever upon the enemy, and certainly did not improve the taste of our soldiers for the bayonet, in whose hands it may be always made a very useful instrument for deciding the fate of battles. I must, however, apologize for taking up the reader's time with these remarks, and also for having so unceremoniously introduced the general, my worthy ancestor, to him; yet I must beg to add, that a very brave and esteemed friend of mine, Major Smith, 45th regiment, who fell fighting gloriously, but too rashly, for he really went up to the French bayonets at Busaco, had also sometimes a very odd way of expressing himself. I remember hearing him on one occasion emphatically observe, "I don't like your prudent officers, Sir, who deal in long shots, and who talk so much of sparing the effusion of human blood--their prudence, Sir, always increases it in the end, Sir." But those who knew him will readily recognize this to be genuine; and it may be well supposed, that he must have come up to Sir Thomas Picton's ideas of what a good soldier should be; at all events, he considered that the 3rd division and the country, sustained an irreparable loss when Major Smith fell. But to proceed--I beg to recommend, that there be erected, as near as may be deemed consistent with the safety of the passers by, and even against the high walls of barracks, sufficient mounds of earth against which to fire with ball; and this should not only be made the means of useful instruction, but also, like the bayonet and sword exercises, conducive to the soldier's amusement; and whilst I would greatly increase the allowance of ammunition for practice, I would also suggest that a sum of money be annually granted to regiments to be laid out at the discretion of commanding officers, in rewards to the best shots and the best swordsmen. This is very essential, as light troops are so much employed in modern warfare, that their being good marksmen cannot be dispensed with; therefore, with a superior description of musket, having a good percussion lock, serviceable in wet as well as in dry weather, and fire never being uselessly thrown away in action in a volley like a single report, which in former times was considered so fine, our soldiers would be more than a match for the Yankee Back-woodsmen, or any other troops in the world.

I have now arrived at a part of my undertaking in which I am very much interested, and to which I am desirous of attracting attention; for I am sure it will be readily allowed, that amongst any body of men, there will always exist irregularities and misconduct; it is therefore indispensable, that there should be at hand the means of making those guilty of offences promptly feel the consequences of committing them. With this in view, I conclude it will be thought necessary, that there should be several small, dark, dry, and well ventilated cells in all prisons attached to barracks at home and abroad, in which offenders can be separately confined, either upon bread and water, low diet, or otherwise for fixed periods, according to the present system, and to the sentences of courts-martial, for I am obliged to write so as to suit the times, and whilst undergoing this kind of punishment, the inmates should be subjected to the most perfect silence; which, if duly attended to, will soon be found to constitute the severest part of the punishment, and to produce the most desirable results; every necessary precaution should, therefore, be taken on this head; but it should never be overlooked, that such kinds of punishment for the maintenance of discipline, can never be resorted to when regiments are in the field.

In no regiment that I have ever had any thing to do with, have I yet found the link of responsibility perfectly kept up. For instance, the majors were not made answerable for the state of their respective wings. The captains were almost never interfered with by the majors, who were really little else than sinecurists: indeed, commanding officers in general, did not like their doing so; as they too frequently looked upon it as meddling with what did not concern them; and they too often rendered the captains also mere nonentities with their companies; managing all promotions, &c. (so powerful is the love of patronage) between themselves and their adjutants. It was the same as to granting leave of absence from the regiments, or even from common parades; and thus captains were entirely stripped of influence. It was also much the same with regard to men guilty of crimes or irregularities: their names were found in guard reports; the adjutants were made to inquire into the reasons of their confinement, and they were sometimes sentenced by courts-martial, and even punished, without any reference whatever being made to their captains; and I have heard commanding officers say, that there was no use in consulting them, as they knew nothing about their companies; but whose fault was that, and why were they not encouraged and made to do their duty, and to look after their men's conduct?

In former days (and I may go back even to the days of Marlborough) captains were men of some importance, and were allowed to exercise much more authority over their companies, than has for many years past been the fashion. They could keep them at drill, or confined to barracks, or camp, if their conduct was irregular, till the offenders were found out, and punished by the soldiers themselves. These offenders were tried by what were then called Company Courts-Martial, which consisted of a non-commissioned officer and four privates. The sentence (nothing else being written) having been approved of by the captain, or officer commanding the company, it was in presence of the non-commissioned officers, and sometimes of a subaltern, privately carried into execution, either by the drummers of the company giving the culprit a certain number of blows, or else all the soldiers had to do so with the slings of their firelocks. This having been properly, and often severely done by _themselves_, the company was considered as purified, and were then dismissed from drill, or released from confinement to barracks or camp. If a plan of this kind in spirit was properly followed up, how admirably it would be found calculated for service in the field even in our days. When the importance of company officers is raised, so is proportionally that of the non-commissioned officers; and does not the superiority of our companies of guards consist in the respectability of their non-commissioned officers?

Not very long ago, what, I believe, was called Picketting, was practised as a punishment in our regiments of cavalry for minor offences, and I have heard from old officers, that the soldiers had a great dread of it; they assured me it did not in the least injure their health, or unfit them for immediate duty; and it almost entirely obviated the necessity for flogging. Would it not therefore be well, if the reviving of this kind of punishment in every corps, when an army took the field, were to have due consideration. I am aware of the outcry which most likely would be raised by injudicious men against such a plan, and nothing would have induced me to venture to mention it, but my abhorrence of flogging, and my fear that capital punishments might become frequent and unavoidable, if there were no other mode, of maintaining discipline amongst our troops. I therefore must not shrink from suggesting it, as I feel convinced, that in the field, our military police, might be safely trusted with the power of using it as a punishment; and it would, I have no doubt, deter soldiers from straggling from their corps in search of liquor or plunder.

We are constantly hearing of the horrors of flogging in our regiments, and scarcely an instance occurs, but that some of the newspapers endeavour to hold it up in the most exaggerated language, and strongest colouring, to the detestation of the nation; but after all, what is such punishment, as now inflicted, to what takes place all over Germany, and in the armies of the Czar? We are told--and it should be known in Great Britain--that the kind of bastinado, by which the flesh is most cruelly torn off by the point of the stick, is so severe in the German and other armies, that few men can stand many blows of the corporals who inflict it; and as for the Russian knout, half a dozen strokes, or even less, can be made fatal by a skilful hand.

Unluckily, by our mode of proceeding, punishment is, in some measure, converted, by its slowness, into a kind of torture; and if flagellation is to be unfortunately allowed to continue in a British army, it most probably would be better if fewer lashes were awarded by the sentences of courts-martial, but to be inflicted more after the manner practised in our navy. At all events, what may be termed the teasing system, which now prevails in regiments, and to which commanding officers, in compliance with existing circumstances, must adhere, cannot be productive of good, and must from necessity, and want of time and means, be nearly abandoned when our army is actually in the field. In what way then, I beg to ask, are officers to maintain discipline, if their power and influence in their companies are not increased?

It has always been the practice in our army to direct attention--and in this commanding officers of regiments had no choice--more particularly to what was necessary for home service, or garrison duty abroad, or their attention was called (as in the Russian service) to what would produce effect, through a splendid display of neatness, uniformity, and regularity in dress, messing, barrack and other arrangements; which in themselves are much to be lauded and admired; but with regard to what were really essential and indispensable in the field, for which most of this instruction or knowledge, but little prepared them, such matters seemed generally to be left to chance, or to be acquired by both officers and men when once there; and this was one of the reasons why so few regiments did not fall off in every respect, the very first campaign in which they were employed.

One of the chief objects which I have in view being, however, to do away with corporal punishment, and still to insure our having a well-conducted and highly disciplined army, I consider as essential towards securing this, that the utmost attention should be paid to what was formerly so lamentably neglected--that is to say--the religious instruction, and general education of corps. Without this all our efforts must be useless and unavailing.

To expect that such objects can be attained by merely paying the clergymen of towns, where troops are usually quartered, a certain sum annually for performing clerical duties, is altogether out of the question. Every regiment ought to have its own chaplain, and the changes which have of late years taken place in the religious, as well as in the moral feelings of the country, (for we ought not to attend to the wild ideas and effusions of men, who in the present day are leading the unwary astray,) have rendered their appointment to corps no longer objectionable. The regimental chaplains should be required, before appointment, to produce to the chaplain general, certificates from bishops of the church of England, or from, at least, two ministers of the church of Scotland, setting forth the respectability of their characters, their fitness to discharge the religious duties, and to direct and superintend the instruction of the regiment, to which they might be attached, and in which a higher description of education was hereafter to be looked for.

I must here declare, and I do so after long and serious consideration of the subject, that the consequences of a mixture in corps of men professing Protestant and Roman Catholic creeds have always been, that religion, of any kind, became altogether a forbidden subject, and I firmly believe, that much of the depravity and irregularities committed by our soldiers, may be attributed to this cause; for what could be expected from men, who, I may say, never gave religion even a thought. The officers were almost all Protestants, whilst a considerable proportion of the soldiers, in many regiments, from having been raised in Ireland, were Papists; and it, unfortunately, yet clearly, became the duty of those under whose command they were placed, to show no respect of persons, or to hurt the feelings of either party on account of religious opinions or differences; and thus what is commonly looked upon as sacred amongst men, could not even be named, and much less brought to the assistance of officers in the management of their men, so that fear of punishment was all they had to depend upon (and even corporal punishment when too frequently resorted to, lost its effects,) for the maintenance of discipline, it was, therefore, to the system pursued, and not to the officers that blame ought to have been attached for much of the misconduct which the commanders of our armies, and Lord Wellington in particular, had to lament and contend with. Much more might be said upon this subject, but I do not wish to pursue it farther.

But let us for a moment look at the effects of unanimity in religious views in a Russian army, in which, however, is to be clearly seen far too much of the old Prussian severity of discipline to be productive of good; and I am also aware, that in consequence of the power that the upper class--themselves exempted from the conscription--possess over their serfs, many bad characters are forced into their ranks; yet their Emperor, generals, officers and soldiers are, I may say, of one mind and of one religion. See the whole joining in its--to them--sacred offices, and imposing ceremonies; and who then can deny, but that their chiefs thus establish a firm hold upon the minds and affections of their soldiers, who may, by this means, be led to respect morality, and to imitate praise-worthy conduct, whilst they are at the same time rendered more formidable as enemies.

Regimental chaplains ought to be married, and should be allowed sufficient means to provide themselves with suitable lodgings, and when it could be done, outside the barrack walls; and to insure their respectability and fitness for the performance of their important duties, they ought to receive the same pay and allowances as pay-masters.

Very few churches in provincial towns, or villages, can afford proper accommodation for the troops quartered in them, and they ought not to be dependant upon this; and as regiments would thus have their own clergymen, there should be attached to every barrack, at home or abroad, a large comfortable school-house, in which divine service might be performed twice a day on Sundays; so that one wing of a regiment could be accommodated in the morning, and the other in the afternoon.

Every corps ought to have a well paid, and highly respectable school-master, with whom no one should have a right to interfere, but the commanding officer and chaplain; and part of the duty of the latter should be to superintend the school and to direct the system of education to be pursued in it. Every school-house ought to be furnished with a carefully selected collection of books, which should be handed over, in good order, from one chaplain to another, and according to an inventory kept for the purpose. Of course the regiment relieved would have to pay for any books lost or damaged. There ought to be also a sufficient allowance of fuel and candles granted for the school-house; and it would be most desirable that the soldiers should, as much as possible, be induced to spend their evenings there; and in order to increase this inducement, the books should not only be instructive, but also amusing; and as far as practicable, different at every station. A place of public resort of this kind, where a certain number of non-commissioned officers should be required to be present, would be particularly desirable everywhere, but especially in our North American possessions, where in winter it is so difficult to find means of amusement, for soldiers, and thereby to keep them out of mischief. But all kinds of out-door amusements ought also to be encouraged in every part of the world, and even money should be allowed to commanding officers to provide what is required for them; and every thing possible done, so as to make soldiers feel that their regiments are their homes, and their officers their best friends. With this most desirable object in view, officers must see what vast responsibility devolves upon them, and how much they are called upon to teach by example.

It is well known, that in the United Kingdom, society is very differently circumstanced to what it is in any other part of the world. No nation can boast of such a high-minded and enlightened middle class as we possess; and education and manners place most of them upon a level with the highest. Almost all the officers of our army and navy are taken from this middle class; but I regret to say, that too many of them, as well as the first class, know as little of the habits or feelings of the lower orders, as the latter know of theirs. Thus the very formation of society is against that community of feeling and interest, which ought to exist between officers and soldiers, or sailors; and to the want of this sympathy among us, may be attributed much of that powerful influence which dangerous men are able to exercise over the lower orders of the people of the present day; for they are generally destitute of the virtues or principles to be found among men in a similar state; and the dependence in which they are held by the more wealthy part of the community, engenders feelings of jealousy and even dislike towards them, which may be expected at any time, when opportunity offers, to burst forth in those acts of open violence, which occasionally disturb the tranquillity of the empire.

The fancies and absurdities of some of our commanders in former times, were most truly surprising; but to us who were their victims they were any thing but amusing or laughable. Some of them ought to be held up as beacons to warn others to avoid them; but doing so, and showing their effects upon those under them, would occupy much more time and space than I can devote to the purpose. But how rapidly an army whose spirit has been already subdued by a too severe system of discipline is vanquished, was clearly proved, by what occurred in the year 1806. On the 7th of October in that year, the Emperor Napoleon announced to the Senate, that he had quitted his capital to repair to his army in Germany. Already had the Prussian army, completed to its war establishment, passed their frontier, in all the confidence of discipline, and had invaded Saxony; and their advanced posts had even made their appearance not far from the cantonments of the Imperial army.

The French were instantly put in motion to cross the Rhine, and by forced marches, the several corps occupied the points assigned them, and every thing was arranged for advancing against the Prussians. By the evening of the 8th, the French, after several brilliant affairs, in which the Prussians were invariably beaten, had passed the Saale. Events succeeded each other with great rapidity, and according to the Emperor's account of what occurred, Marshal Davoust arrived at Naumbourg on the night of the 12th of October. The Prussian army being thus caught, "en flagrant délit," their left being turned, and many of their depots of provisions taken. The king of Prussia intended to have commenced hostilities on the 9th of October, by moving his right upon Frankfort, his centre upon Wurtzbourg, and his left upon Bamberg; but the Emperor seems to have anticipated this arrangement by marching upon Saalbourg, Lobenstein, Schleitz, Gera, and Naumbourg, when the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, were necessarily occupied by the Prussians in changing their positions, and in recalling their detachments; so that upon the 13th they were, by concentrating their troops, in number about 150,000, enabled to offer battle to the French between Capelsdorf and Amerstadt.

At two o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, the Emperor arrived at Jena; and from a height occupied by his advanced guard, he reconnoitred the Prussian position, and made his dispositions for the morrow.

The Prussian army on the morning of the 14th displayed a splendid front of infantry, cavalry, and seven or eight hundred pieces of cannon. All their manœuvres were executed with that precision and rapidity which might be expected from troops who spent their lives at constant drill, and in military evolutions; in all of which the French were very inferior; yet they had been sufficiently taught their business as soldiers, without that severity of discipline having been resorted to, which too frequently dispirits men, and renders them indifferent to events.

The results of this campaign, of seven days duration, and the famous battle of Jena, were 30,000 prisoners, and amongst them twenty generals; upwards of twenty colours, three hundred pieces of cannon, and great quantities of provisions taken by the French. The Prussian loss was estimated at 20,000 in killed and wounded; and the wreck of their army fell back in consternation and disorder, whilst the French admitted only the loss of a few generals, and about 1,500 men killed and wounded.

We are not to suppose that the Emperor Napoleon could have gained such advantages over a Prussian army, manœuvred by such able officers as those who led it, by superiority of tactics, though he evidently wished the world to think so; and we must attribute the results of the battle to the gallantry and superior intelligence of the French officers and soldiers over troops in whom such a spirit no longer existed; for had it not, in a great measure been banished, for the time, from amongst them, by the severity of Prussian discipline, which is most certainly calculated to eradicate courage out of any army in the world but that composed of English, Scotch, and Irishmen, upon whom its effects were but too long tried; and though it did not exhaust their innate national bravery, and love of war, yet it rendered them at all times ready and anxious to free themselves from the restraint under which they were so tightly kept; and when once they could contrive to get out of the sight of their officers, and to _think_ for themselves,--to do which they perhaps had very few opportunities in the course of their lives--they bade farewell to subordination, and took good care, in every kind of excess, to make up for what they had suffered, under the kind of discipline we had in a great measure copied from the Prussians; and to this I venture to ascribe many of our soldiers' irregularities, and even their crimes.

Let us see the effects of such absurd discipline upon a Russian army. In the month of June, 1807, the Russians occupied Heilsburg, where they had collected vast quantities of provisions, and all that was necessary for an army. Their position was excellent, and during a period of four months every thing possible had been done to render it, by field works, more formidable. The Russians even attempted to be the first to commence hostilities, but they were attacked by the French, and completely beaten with the loss of 30,000 killed and wounded, and 4,000 prisoners; while the French lost (and the results go to prove their statements to be correct) only 700 killed, and about 2,000 wounded; and I do not hesitate to attribute the loss of the battle of Eylau to the same cause as I do that of Jena; that is to say, the injurious, depressing effects of Prussian discipline; and which system seems to be even to this day followed up in the Russian armies.

In further proof of this, I must beg the reader's attention to what I am going to mention, and which actually occurred in a regiment that shall be nameless.

The day was fixed upon which it was to be reviewed. Its commanding officer was suddenly taken ill, and he was confined to his bed. So far had preparations been carried for this great event, that even the large cards, as was the practice in those days, containing the manœuvres to be performed, had been made out for the inspecting General. This illness of the Lieutenant-Colonel was an event quite unforeseen, and the senior Major, a good-natured old gentleman, whose military career had been in the West Indies, and who was more agreeably occupied at the time than in studying Dundas, was completely thunderstruck when he found that at the shortest notice he had to make up his mind to assume the command on this truly alarming occasion; for the General was well known to be a first-rate tiger. It was, therefore, a very hopeless case with the gallant Major, as he really could not at any time manœuvre a battalion, and much less under such trying circumstances; and what made matters worse, his Lieutenant-Colonel would rarely allow him to try whether he could do so or not, for he was one of those commanders who carried on every thing himself, aided by his adjutant, and a well trained set of drummers, whom he kept in constant practice.

His Adjutant was a well-meaning man, and in kindly feelings, and good will towards the Major, and in his great zeal for the reputation of his corps, he went with the beautifully written out card of the manœuvres (the produce of many an anxious hour of the Lieutenant-Colonel's valuable time) to the Major, to explain it fully to him, and also comfort him with the hope, that as the regiment had most diligently practised every march, counter-march, and wheel of it, things must go off well, if he would only not be alarmed. Accordingly, that very evening, well prompted by the Adjutant, he actually got the regiment through it handsomely enough. At night the Adjutant went to see and condole with his most yellow, billious-looking commander. "How will ever the poor Major get through with the review to-morrow?" "O, there is no fear whatever of him, for he put the regiment through _it_ tolerably this evening." "Through what, Sir--have you presumed to show him my manœuvres?" "Yes, Sir, but I thought there could be no harm in doing so, as----" "You thought, Sir--no harm, Sir. Go immediately, Sir, and bring back my manœuvres, and let Major ---- make out a review for himself--he shall certainly not have mine."

The cards were consequently delivered up to their unselfish owner. But the Adjutant, who flattered himself, that he was also something of a manœuvrer, though, at the risk of irritating the Lieutenant-Colonel, thought it would be well, before he should terrify the Major out of his senses with this awful intelligence, to sit down and concoct a very pretty review--one, at all events, which would show that the battalion knew how to act against an enemy in its front and rear, and probably upon both its flanks at the same moment. In short, he went that very night with a splendid plan, which he proudly and confidently displayed before the astounded Major; who, at last, after a good deal of trouble, made so far to comprehend it, that he was able next morning, at five o'clock, to put the regiment through it very tolerably. But this was rather sharp work upon all concerned; for the grand review was to take place at 11, A.M.--the Major was quite hoarse--and a new card had to be finely written out for the General.

The review came off admirably--the Major (his voice cleared by the yolks of eggs) was not often wrong; at least this was not observed, and it did not signify, as both officers and men had fully determined to do well, not only on the Major's account, but on their own.

At the long wished-for conclusion, the General came solemnly forward, and in front of the regiment, really covered the blushing, but exhausted, Major with praises and honourable acknowledgments, and approbation of his own and the corps' most admirable performances.

On the return of the Adjutant from the field, he, as in duty bound, waited upon his Commanding officer. "I suppose, poor ---- made a very pretty business of it to-day?" "A most admirable review; and I have, upon no occasion, ever seen the regiment do better; so much, so, that the General expressed in the strongest terms his admiration of our day's performance!"

This was quite enough, but the symptoms of the Lieutenant-Colonel's attack of bilious fever, were not alleviated by the account of the Major's unlooked-for success. Such were the men to whom the command of our regiments was too often confided, and who generally contrived to render soldiers indifferent to events, and reckless in their conduct.

I had the luck to be stationed in the West of Ireland under a General, who considered that nothing tended so effectually to make first-rate soldiers, as to accustom them to prolonged exposure, under arms, to deluges of rain, and to all kinds of weather; and certainly in that part of Ireland, there was no want of his favourite specific--rain. I must, however, at the same time acknowledge, that of this he himself took ample doses. Two other regiments, and the one to which I belonged, and a body of cavalry and artillery, formed his brigade; and the more gloomy and threatening the weather, the more certain were we of a repetition of the General's admired refrigerant system, for his practice in this line was extensive and unwearied; we had frequently, on such occasions, to take up favourite positions, and to make long and fatiguing excursions, over high sand-hills, which were some miles distant from our cantonments. But, notwithstanding this excellent treatment, our soldiers did not become a whit the more water-proof; and many of them most provokingly went into hospitals with violent pains in their backs, bones, &c. and which, to the General's surprise, often terminated in fever.

How differently were Sir Thomas Brisbane's kindly feelings evinced for those placed under his care (indeed Sir Thomas Picton always wished his commanding officers to act in the same manner). No officer commanding a corps was allowed, under any pretence, to keep his men unnecessarily under arms, especially after a march. As soon as the soldiers reached their cantonments, or ground of encampment, they were ordered to be instantly dismissed, and allowed to go into their quarters or tents to take off their accoutrements, knapsacks, &c. so that they might as soon as possible recover from the fatigues of the march; for keeping men standing, after being heated, till they became chilled, was always found to be injurious to their health.

After the troops came down the river Plata from Buenos Ayres, we were kept in what our Generals chose to denominate, barracks afloat--that is to say--in transports off Monte Video. One of these great officers came unexpectedly on board our head-quarter ship, which was certainly kept in fine order. The moment he set his foot on deck he called for the officer of the day, who happened to be also the senior officer on board, and ordered him to show him all over the ship. I believe he must have been surprised at the man-of-war style adopted, and at the extreme cleanliness and regularity of every thing (for even in spite of the remonstrances of the masters of the transports, as to their decks being ruined, the soldiers were kept constantly rubbing away with the holy stones), at all events, he found no fault, but unfortunately in passing the ship's coppers, he thought fit to demand what was in them, and being told rice for the soldiers' dinners, he, with great dignity and gravity, inquired of the alarmed officer the quantity of rice in them? The unlucky wight, not knowing well what to say, and being fully aware, that to betray ignorance upon such important points, was an unpardonable crime, answered at once, about 1000 pounds--terrible mistake, at least the threatened consequences were terrible--for this worthy coadjutor of General Whitelock, in an instant, set upon the unlucky miscalculator of boiled and unboiled rice, and declared that he had never met with such a downright ignorant blockhead in all his life; for the hold of the ship (and she was 700 tons burden) could not contain that quantity when boiled; "and now, Sir," continued this great commander, "I shall take care to make you suffer for such ignorance and inattention to your duty, and shall report your conduct upon this occasion to the Horse Guards, in order to have your promotion stopped." Whether he kept his word or not I cannot tell; but I am rather inclined to believe, that he had other matters to occupy his attention, on his return to England, which came more home to himself.

I could bring many more examples of this kind forward, but I must no longer occupy the reader's attention with such frivolous matters.

But it is impossible to show in a more satisfactory manner, what was the state of a British army in the field than by giving, as I intend to do after a few observations, a letter from his Grace the Duke of Wellington to the Generals commanding divisions and brigades; yet, I trust it will not be deemed presumptuous if I venture to say that the real causes of irregularities and bad conduct on the part of soldiers, are not always perceived or ascribed even by men of the greatest talents and experience to the proper sources; but having, in the retreat from Madrid and Burgos, which is that alluded to by his Grace, had much to do with the part of the rear-guard under Sir Edward Pakenham, who then commanded the 3rd division of infantry, during the absence of Sir Thomas Picton, and having also seen a good deal on many other occasions, I hope I may be considered authorized to remark, that owing to the admirable management and unwearied exertions of Sir Edward Pakenham, the conduct of the division on that retreat was, I may say, tolerably good, except upon the night after we left Madrid; when many a pig was slain in the woods, and the lives of the staff and other officers of the division and brigades seriously endangered in their endeavours, under a sharp fire of musketry, kept up at these animals, to put a stop to such disorderly conduct on the part of the soldiers, as actually left the division, from the hunt having become almost general, at the mercy of the French, had they known what we were about; for they were close at hand, and must have wondered what could have occasioned the uproar and firing in our camp. But what occurred, day after day, during the retreat amongst the numerous disorderly stragglers from the several divisions, some of whom, in spite of all that could be done, occasionally fell into the hands of the enemy, most clearly evinced very bad conduct on the part of the troops, and also a want of management somewhere; but the irregularities, his Grace laments, were comparatively nothing to what occurred in the retreat to Corunna. In this instance, also, the weather, as usual in Spain, in the month of November, was very severe, so much so, that some men who had been barely able to reach the resting, or rather halting place for the night, which was, perhaps, an open ploughed field, become quite a swamp from the rain, were in the morning found dead, from the effects of cold, wet, and want of sufficient food, much of which, from those having charge of it, not knowing in what direction to move, had gone astray; and in one instance, we, as rear-guard, obtained a supply of biscuit, by taking a quantity of it off the hands of a conductor of a brigade of mules, who, in a few minutes more, had he not been prevented, would have led them in amongst the enemy.

After the troops from Madrid and Burgos met, the army, when there were roads running nearly parallel to each other, marched generally in two columns; but I must say matters were not always well managed, and we had no properly organized police, who could have promptly, when necessary, enforced discipline, for what were a few provosts with their infantry guards, generally accompanying the baggage? The columns sometimes unfortunately and probably unavoidably, came into contact with each other on the same road, occasioning a certain degree of confusion, which afforded opportunities for some of the soldiers to escape from under the eyes of their officers, however watchful they might be, and to become as usual irregular; and at other times the columns (probably also unavoidably), considering the state of the weather, the nature of the country, and the then bad roads, were at times too far asunder, and the communication not having been kept up as it should have been by either our cavalry or infantry, the army became liable to sudden and unlooked for events; and in one instance of this kind, I believe it was, that one of our generals was taken by a French patrole, that through mistake, occasioned by the rain, and a hazy state of the atmosphere, and a want of proper precaution on our part, had actually contrived to get in between our columns, certainly not very much to our military credit.

When his Grace's letter reached us after the retreat, the feeling of the officers commanding brigades and corps was, that, in this instance, if nothing were said about the pig hunt, the 3rd division, although a few of its soldiers had fallen into the hands of the enemy, did not deserve the censure pronounced against the army in general; and it was thought right that Sir Edward Pakenham should be waited upon, in order to induce him to point out this to Lord Wellington, for they were besides hurt at the implied superiority of the French in even making fires and in quick cooking. Sir Edward, however, soon settled the matter, by declaring in his usually laconic manner, that "he would do no such thing," and adding, "let whoever the cap fits wear it."

They all knew well in what this supposed superiority of the French lay, for the truth was, they never hesitated to turn a town or village inside out, if it suited their purposes, or to pull down a house, or half a dozen of them, if necessary, so as to get dry wood for their fires, whereas our people had to be marched regularly under officers for beef, bread, water, and wood, and they had seldom any thing else for it, but to cut down, bring in, and use the green branches of trees as fuel to cook with. This accounts for the observable difference between the two armies, for when our soldiers occasionally, and when not a tree was to be seen, got a house or two to burn, which were always paid for, they could then cook as quickly as their practised foes.

"Sir, _Frenada, Nov. 28th, 1812._

"I have ordered the army into cantonments, in which I hope that circumstances will enable me to keep them for some time, during which the troops will receive their clothing, necessaries, &c. which are already in progress by different lines of communication to the several divisions and brigades.

"But besides these objects I must draw your attention in a very particular manner to the state of discipline of the troops. The discipline of every army, after a long and active campaign, becomes in some degree relaxed, and requires the utmost attention on the part of the general and other officers to bring it back to that state in which it ought to be for service; but I am concerned to have to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect in the late campaign to a greater degree _than_ any army with which I have ever served, or of which I have ever read. Yet this army has met with no disaster; it has suffered no privations, which but trifling attention on the part of the officers could not have prevented, and for which there existed no reason whatever in the nature of the service; nor has it suffered any hardships, excepting those resulting from the necessity of being exposed to the inclemencies of the weather at a moment when they were most severe.

"It must be obvious however to every officer, that from the moment the troops commenced their retreat from the neighbourhood of Burgos on the one hand, and from Madrid on the other, the officers lost all command over their men. Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained which ought never to have occurred.

"Yet the necessity for retreating existing, none was ever made in which the troops made such short marches; none in which they made such long and repeated halts, and none in which the retreating armies were so little pressed on their rear by the enemy. We must look therefore for the existing evils, and for the situation in which we now find the army to some cause, besides those resulting from the operations in which we have been engaged.

"I have no hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitual inattention of the officers of the regiments to their duty, as prescribed by the standing regulations of the service, and by the orders of this army.

"I am far from questioning the zeal, still less the gallantry and spirit of the officers of the army, and I am quite certain, that if their minds can be convinced of the necessity of minute and constant attention to understand, recollect, and carry into execution the orders which have been issued for the performance of this duty, and that the strict performance of this duty is necessary to enable the army to serve the country as it ought to be served, they will in future give their attention to these points.

"Unfortunately the inexperience of the officers of the army has induced many to consider that the period during which an army is on service is one of relaxation from all rule, instead of being, as it is, the period during which of all others every rule for the regulation and control of the soldier, for the inspection and care of his arms, ammunition, accoutrements, necessaries, and his field equipments, and his horse and horse appointments, for the receipt and issue and care of his provisions, and the regulation of all that belongs to his food, and the forage of his horse, must be most strictly attended to by the officers of his company or troop, if it is intended that an army, and a British army in particular, shall be brought into the field of battle in a state of efficiency to meet the enemy on the day of trial.