Chapter VIII: Part 8

In the next place, and in farther illustration of the inefficiency of the French état-major, I beg to ask, was not the extension of the French left till it became weakened, and of which Lord Wellington so ably availed himself, a great error on the part of Marmont, or rather of his staff, at the battle of Salamanca? Could Marshal Soult and his état-major not have been aware of our situation before the battle Toulouse, when our pontoon bridge was unavoidably removed, or it would have been carried away by the floods in the Garonne, and by the masses of timber, &c. sent down, I conclude, by the Marshal's orders; and when part of our troops, having previously crossed, were left apparently at his mercy--and that of his whole army: and why was not advantage taken of such a favourable opportunity to attack us? For I cannot imagine, that Soult's prudence in reserving his army for the defence of the field works about Toulouse, ought to be looked upon as an excuse for his not having done so, and for what I am more inclined to attribute to his, or his staff's want of intelligence. Picton, his generals, and his division had certainly made up their minds to fight lustily on that occasion; and, having only a short time before, single handed, disposed handsomely of two French divisions at Vic Bigore, even when fighting in their own favourite manner--skirmishing on a large scale--certainly did not diminish their confidence in themselves, and in their chiefs, who I firmly believe, would have liked nothing better, had the light division been only within a reasonable distance of them, than to have contended with Soult and his whole army. Every precaution was, however, taken, and preparation made for the expected attack; for we were well aware of the situation in which circumstances, that could not have been foreseen, had placed us, and that we could only look for assistance from our splendid artillery, supporting effectually our right by firing across the Garonne. Soult, his generals, and état-major, however, allowed the opportunity to escape, but in a few days after, this very confidence in himself, and in his division, was the cause of Sir Thomas Picton receiving at Toulouse a severe check--the only one instance, as well as I remember, in which the 3rd division was ever repulsed, or rather obliged to be brought back from an assault during the whole war.

I had every reason to suppose Sir Thomas Picton was aware that the passage of the canal could not be forced, and that the very point he was induced to attack, was covered by a tête du pont, and another field work which the enemy had recently constructed. I believe he was told that the passage could be easily forced; but this, as the result, and a careful examination afterwards proved was impossible. But it was most mortifying, indeed, to the 3rd division, that its last feat in arms, and after so long and brilliant a career, should have terminated in a failure, and in the loss of many gallant officers and men killed and wounded, and amongst the latter Sir Thomas Brisbane, who had so often before led on his brigade to victory.

But I must give another conspicuous instance, out of many which might be adduced, in support of what I assert respecting French generals and staff; but I beg in the first place, to ask what could be more extraordinary than their evident want of knowledge of the country, and even of preparation for the battle of Vittoria? For I cannot suppose that the French Commander-in-Chief and his état-major could have been ignorant of our vicinity, or of the positions we occupied the evening before the action; or, in the second place, could they have calculated upon Lord Wellington not venturing to attack their fine army, when concentrated under so many renowned chiefs.

The Duke of Wellington had adopted an excellent plan, which ought to be followed by all commanders of armies, of never issuing his orders or instructions, for any movement or object of importance, until within a very few hours of the time at which they were to be executed, so that the enemy could not possibly know, either through spies, or by any other means, what he intended to do the following day; it was therefore towards the middle of the night of the 20th of June, 1813, that I received from an orderly dragoon, as senior staff officer in camp, for the 3rd division, the following concise and excellent instructions, or order of battle for the morrow.

"_Arrangements for the movements of the Army, the 21st of June._

"_Subejana de Murillos, June 20th, 1813._

"Extract.

"The 3rd division, followed by the 7th division, will move (marching by the left of divisions), at day break, and will proceed near the village of Anda, and thence (turning to the right) towards the village of Los Questos, on the road from Anda to Vittoria.

"On approaching Los Questos, this column will throw out detachments to the right towards Mancharez, to put itself in communication with detachments, which will be thrown out from the left of the column which moves upon the village.

"Lieut.-General the Earl of Dalhousie will have the immediate command of the column composed of the 3rd and 7th divisions.

"The baggage of these divisions will remain sufficiently in the rear of the troops, not to become an embarrassment to the column under any circumstances.

"The left column of the army (divisions moving by the left) must move from Murquia towards Vittoria. Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham will put himself in communication as soon as possible with the column of the 3rd and 7th divisions, at Los Questos, and these divisions will therefore throw out parties when near Los Questos, towards Murquia, to facilitate this communication.

"The movements of the two columns on the left, viz. the Earl of Dalhousie's and Sir Thomas Graham's, are to be regulated from the right; and although these columns are to make such movements in advance as may be evidently necessary to follow the progress of the two columns on their right (that moving on Mancharez and Sir Rowland Hill's), they are not however to descend into the low grounds towards Vittoria on the great road, nor give up the advantage of turning the enemy's position, and the town of Vittoria by a movement to their left. This part of the instructions more particularly applies to the column under the orders of Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham.

"All communications intended for the Commander of the Forces, are to be sent to the column composed of the light division and the troops which follow it, which is the column which moves on Mancharez.

(Signed) "G. Murray, Q.M. General."

About the dawn of day on the 21st of June, 1813, the 3rd division moved off under its chief, Sir Thomas Picton, to perform perhaps more than the part assigned it in the splendid scenes with which we were about to treat our spectacle-loving foes. I went on with the advance, consisting of our Light Infantry companies, and the 5th battalion 60th German riflemen, all experienced troops, and well acquainted with and accustomed to their work. To my surprise, and I believe that of Sir Thomas Brisbane, and many others, we met with no opposition in passing the Zadorra, on the banks of which, as is well known, the Black Prince, in olden times, astonished his foes, not only by his own valour and knightly bearing, but also by the deeds of such soldiers as I wish to bring into the ranks of our regiments, and of whom there are still abundance in Great Britain and Ireland. I must however here take the liberty to remark, that I have often since wondered, why Lord Wellington did not allude, just before the troops went into battle, to what history tells us was by that gallant prince achieved on the ground which then lay before us. Napoleon, and I think Nelson also, would have done so; but Lord Wellington, perhaps less enthusiastic, very likely considered that his army required no such incitement to perform what he looked upon as merely their duty. I believe I am not wrong, but I have always fancied this seeming want of enthusiasm, to be a kind of defect in the Duke of Wellington, for it certainly has had at all times, and in all situations, when judiciously worked upon, a most surprising influence upon the minds and hearts of mankind in general.

Whilst the troops were passing this, in a military point of view, formidable object, over some very narrow bridges, I again went on some distance, and even in front of our light troops, to ascertain, if possible, what might be before us, for by this time Lord Hill was sharply engaged considerably to our right, and we began strongly to suspect, that the French still intended to be for once patient, and to deceive us; so much so, that I every instant expected to see their masses and cannon crown the rising ground just before us, prepared to attack us, whilst still embarrassed in the passage of the deep, high banked, but narrow river.

I very soon observed on the more distant heights a few videttes, whose attention seemed entirely attracted to their left, in which direction the firing had greatly increased.

Sir Thomas Picton and his generals were also soon aware of the mistake the French had evidently committed in neglecting or overlooking this essential position; Sir Thomas therefore (for I know not what had become of Lord Dalhousie and the 7th division) with his usual impetuosity, pushed his light troops, cannon and columns, rapidly for the unoccupied heights, of which he got possession without firing a shot, and before the enemy seemed to be aware of their importance; or else they had erroneously calculated, that the natural difficulties we should encounter at the Zadorra would either greatly delay, or perhaps deter us altogether from advancing in the direction we had taken. As soon, however, as they saw what we had achieved, and which threatened them with such ruinous consequences, they quickly brought forward a large body of troops of all arms, to recover what they ought never to have lost. A desperate struggle ensued, especially in a village just behind the heights, and which ought to have been guarded with the utmost care by the French, being an important point in their position; but Sir Thomas Brisbane, with his brigade, after a severe contest, and by turning their left with his right regiment, had got full possession of it, and the fate of the battle was thus, I may say, in a moment decided, for their centre being forced, the wings, especially the left, had also to give way, and to my delight, I beheld at this critical moment, our old and often tried friends, the light division, coming on in our own style, upon our right, carrying all before them.

When we had repulsed the enemy, who had fought very gallantly, from the village, and were again advancing upon them in the usual manner of the 3rd division, Lord Wellington rode up to us, followed by his staff; and he knew well how to profit from what had been, at least to us, so unexpectedly accomplished.

There was much hard fighting after this, and many brilliant feats were performed by the three brigades, in following up the French, who were so hard pressed, that even before they reached Vittoria, they were unable to offer any effectual resistance to our continued and impetuous attacks.

I apprehend, as will appear by referring to the instructions from Sir George Murray, that this was not the manner in which it had been intended that the action was to have been fought; and I even fear that I am not borne out in my statements by the Gazette account of it; but I feel convinced they can be corroborated by many, and I think I owe this detail of the part it performed to the 3rd division and its chiefs. I have, however, no intention of farther detailing what occurred between us and the French during the remainder of that eventful day; yet I must observe, that the loss of the 3rd division, in consequence of Sir Thomas Picton's perhaps too rapid advance, was great in officers and men; for undoubtedly he had thus drawn upon it the brunt of the battle; but my chief object, in at all alluding to it, was to shew that the French Marshal, who commanded under Joseph, and his état-major, committed great errors, especially in neglecting, or not understanding their position, and which in the end became irretrievable and ruinous to their brave army.

Towards the close of this battle, and when I thought the 3rd division had got well through its day's work, in the usual manner, and when the part of the French infantry before us were going off in hopeless and irretrievable confusion, intermixed with their baggage, their cavalry suddenly appeared before us, presenting a firm and most imposing front. Our cavalry--I think they were all light--had now got in front of us, in considerable force; it was therefore evident, that an important moment in the battle approached; and as Sir Thomas Brisbane was anxious to see how our cavalry would accomplish a charge, which we concluded must be made, I most willingly went on with him some distance before his brigade, still advancing in column. Our cavalry went on bravely to the attack, but the French did not wait to receive it: on the contrary, they advanced boldly, rapidly, and in fine order, to meet our people. The shock was severe. But I soon saw, and I believe so did my general, that it was high time for us to be off to the infantry, for I must confess that the battle of Marengo flashed across my mind at the instant. We soon rejoined the brigade, when commanding officers of corps were requested to keep them well in hand, and ready, if necessary, to form squares. But the French seemed to have accomplished what they had in view; that is to say, to cover the retreat of their discomfitted infantry.

Having, in the course of this work, occasionally touched upon military tactics and arrangements, I must, in corroboration of what I ventured to say with regard to the Duke of Wellington and Massena at the lines of Torres Vedras, and in farther proof that the French were not superior to us as tacticians, here allude briefly to what occurred upon the Nivelle. Let the reader cast his eyes over a good map of the country, or rather a plan of the action, which bears that name, and which may be seen in Colonel Jones's account of the Peninsular war; and let him consider and calculate upon the apparent consequences of an attack upon a position of such strength, taken up after due examination by Soult, and covered by his directions, with strong and well planned redoubts, mutually supporting each other; and I think he will admit that the French lines upon the Nivelle, and those held by our army at Torres Vedras were not very dissimilar. It could not also have been unknown to Massena, that a very great part of the troops under Lord Wellington were untried Portuguese, destitute of military reputation; and which had only been recently placed under British officers.

It is not to be supposed, that the commander of a French army was without information, or that he was not allowed to incur the expense of employing spies, or otherwise obtaining intelligence; I cannot, therefore, imagine he was entirely ignorant of the preparations making by his adversary for his reception at Torres Vedras; and he might also have learnt that the redoubts and lines of connection in that position could not be finished by the time he might arrive before it. If, therefore, he were to advance at all into Portugal, he undoubtedly should have made his arrangements for attacking the lines of Torres Vedras the moment he could reach them; but whether what I have stated was known or not to Massena, he had probably been spoiled by too much good fortune, until it was his fate to meet Lord Wellington in the field.

But how did the Duke of Wellington act when nearly similarly situated to what Massena was before the lines of Torres Vedras?

His army was encamped in the month of November in the Pyrenees, exposed in crowded tents, to severe sufferings, from cold, rain, and snow, enough to make any men, and especially British soldiers, anxious to fight three times their numbers, or to storm all the redoubts or intrenched camps in the world in order to get out of such a situation, and some even fancied that his Lordship kept them there with that intention.

I partook along with the brigade to which I was attached, and with the rest of the 3rd division, of the comforts of that encampment in the Pyrenees. On the 9th of November I was sent for by Sir Thomas Brisbane, and I think he will remember the awful kind of cavern, with the torrent rushing through it at Zugarramurdi, in which he gave me directions for bringing down the division to where it was to remain, until the hour should arrive for its advance, under Sir Charles Colville, against the lines of the Nivelle. I scrambled back to the camp, leading my horse the greater part of the way, which was an excellent climber; but I had to look well about me, for by this very path, if it deserved the name, I was to bring down, as soon as it became dark, the fighting division; every individual of which then in camp being perfectly ignorant, that the moment was at hand, when they were to resign the comforts which they had there enjoyed. At the hour fixed upon, the bugle sounded for the troops to get under arms, and in twenty-five minutes more, the usual time allowed, the right brigade, followed by the other two, commenced the descent, the whole being cautioned to look carefully, if they could in the dark, to where they placed their feet. The baggage was to remain upon the ground, and to follow by another circuitous road, when ordered, in the morning, after some hours of pretty hard work, we at last found ourselves at Zugarramurdi, through which the division passed, and the brigades, in contiguous columns, were allowed to repose upon the ground for the remainder of the night, under the canopy of heaven, and until the hour for assaulting the redoubts and entrenchments arrived. Of course the same difficult operation had been performed unknown to the enemy, by the other divisions of the army, for the third had not advanced far when the cannon on our left belonging to Sir Lowry Cole's division, announced that others as well as ourselves were awake; and when day dawned, our army, to the right and left of us, was seen moving in most perfect order to make combined attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments.

I have been so far minute to show in how able a manner Lord Wellington's arrangements were invariably made for combined movements; but I have no intention of entering into a detail account of the action; and shall only say, that at night, the 3rd division, having carried the redoubts and entrenchments before them, and having accomplished, as usual, the work assigned them, found themselves beyond St. Pé; and we were able to congratulate ourselves that Lord Wellington had at last thought fit to allow us to find a way into a part of the country blessed with a more genial climate than the Pyrenees. Had Massena acted thus at Torres Vedras, there is no saying what might have been the result, for the Portuguese, as I before observed, were then young and inexperienced as soldiers, and but little to be depended upon, had the parts of the position occupied by them been assailed by the French.

It was an extraordinary occurrence in the action upon the Nivelle that a redoubt carried by our 88th regiment should have been defended by the greater part of the French 88th, the latter thus becoming prisoners to the former. And it was likewise the fate of the French 45th at Talavera to have been nearly destroyed by the fire of ours, as was ascertained by the numbers of killed and wounded left upon the ground, and also by the late Major-General Guard (who then commanded our 45th), who was left amongst the wounded at Talavera when our army retreated after the action.

I believe it is an axiom in war, at least it ought to be, that no extended position--fortify it as you please--can be held for any length of time against a properly combined movement of good troops. Had not we to fall back through the Pyrenees before Soult, and did we not find ourselves unable to make any effectual stand before him till we reached the ground in front of Pampeluna? Sir Thomas Picton certainly, the previous evening, checked the French for a short time; but after a night's march we found ourselves in the excellent position selected by him, and in which, when our army was more concentrated, we were able to frustrate all Soult's efforts, great as they were.

I must not here omit remarking, that it was insinuated, and even believed by many, that if Lord Wellington had not arrived in time, followed by a part of the army at this position, Sir Thomas Picton intended to have abandoned it, and to have retired behind Pampeluna, and thereby would have removed our blockading force, and thrown it open to Soult.

I can positively say that he had no such intention, and I feel I ought to make this assertion, if it were only in justice to Sir Thomas Picton's military reputation, and I know I can be borne out in it. I had been particularly employed with the 3rd division in originally forming the blockade of Pampeluna; that is to say, in taking up with the troops the positions to be occupied around it, and Sir Thomas Picton was aware that, in consequence, I was likely to be well acquainted with the various roads in the neighbourhood; he therefore sent for me on the night previous to the day upon which it was insinuated that he intended to have abandoned the position. He told me he expected to be attacked by Marshal Soult in the morning, that he was determined to stand his ground; but wished to know, if, before Lord Wellington could come to his assistance, and if such a misfortune should happen as that of his being obliged, by very superior numbers, and the unforeseen events of a battle, to fall back, if I was sufficiently acquainted with the roads around the city to enable me to undertake, under such circumstances, to conduct the troops, so as to keep them out of the range of the cannon upon the ramparts of the city. I replied, that I knew the roads sufficiently for the purpose, and was about to retire, when he repeated his determination to maintain his position, and even betrayed a kind of feeling of delight at the idea of giving Soult and his army battle, with only the few troops he could oppose to him, until the arrival of Lord Wellington.

Almost at this moment, as I learnt afterwards, an engineer officer (I don't remember his name) arrived to report himself, who had been looking for the 3rd division amongst the mountains; I think he said he had been sent to supply the place of Colonel Burgoyne, who had been taken ill, and was obliged to go to the rear. Sir Thomas, who at such a time, would have wished not to be plagued by a stranger, desired him, partly, it was fancied, with the intention of getting rid of him, to go and find out the different roads leading to the rear of Pampeluna; and I have often since wondered if in this could have originated the silly story of Sir Thomas Picton's intention of abandoning the position in which the battle was fought, and in which the 3rd division performed its usual brilliant part.

I think it but fair next to mention, that the dispositions made by the French at Orthes, were not only superior to what we usually met with, but they also fought that battle with seemingly more confidence in themselves, and in their chief, than they had latterly done. For some time after the action commenced, neither the 3rd nor 4th divisions, whose movements came more particularly under my observation, were able to gain any ground to their front, or to set properly to work; indeed, it was next to impossible for the former to advance, the position before them being judiciously and most formidably occupied by a considerable part of Soult's army; and we were aware that the moment we should attempt to go forward, we would have been taken in flank by a large body of troops, of whom part held very strong ground, and part possessed a wooded ravine, which separated the 3rd from the 4th divisions. We were thus most provokingly brought to a complete stand, exposed to a heavy cannonade, and also to the fire of the infantry in our front; and the French troops will fire away in that manner, and usually with considerable effect, as long as their opponents please.

Sir Thomas Brisbane saw plainly how his brigade, the most advanced of the three, was situated; and though most anxious to push forward to assail the enemy, so well posted in his front, and to fight as the 3rd division always did, yet in this state of things, it would have been decidedly wrong to have done so. I was carefully observing what the French before us, as well as those hitherto successfully opposed to the 4th division, were about; and seeing a body of cavalry assembling behind the infantry, with which we were more particularly engaged, I pointed them out to Sir Thomas Brisbane, who took such steps as he thought necessary in case of their venturing to charge us. Impolitic as it was, with such a large force to contend with, it was evident that there was nothing for it, but to detach some companies into the ravine, to drive out the French skirmishers, who invariably took in flank the 4th division, in the several gallant attempts successively made on the narrow tongue of land, by the regiments composing it, to get forward. I conclude Lord Wellington saw how the two divisions were situated, and sent a considerable part of the light division to our support, and to clear the ravine; and to my delight, I saw Sir Andrew Bernard coming on at their head for that purpose.

He soon completely scoured out the ravine, in the style the light division were accustomed to do every thing they undertook; and it was then no longer difficult for the 3rd and 4th divisions to advance, and in a few minutes, the advantageous ground, upon which the French had made so brave a stand, was in possession of the leading brigade. A chase then commenced, during which it was found very difficult to restrain the ardour of the troops, and had it been deemed advisable for our cavalry to have charged sooner than they did, the loss of the enemy must have been much greater than it was reported to be.

I have been again rather minute in detailing the part performed in this battle by the 3rd division, as I wish to attract attention to the mode of fighting invariably practised, and with so much success, by Sir Thomas Picton, who would have thought but little of any commander of a brigade or regiment who did not instantly, but in compact order, push forward upon the enemy; a mode of fighting which he knew to be most suitable to British soldiers and the least relished by their foes, who would always have preferred firing away, either skirmishing or even in line.

It was not in the power of the British armies either at Talavera or Waterloo (the actions which most resembled each other in fighting under a heavy fire,) to go forward in the manner I have mentioned against the French; and our losses were, consequently, in both these actions, very great from the enemy's fire.--Since the battle of Fontenoy, in which a long-continued steady advance of British troops, in compact order, effected such wonders, and which would have been completely successful if supported by the Dutch and the rest of the Duke of Cumberland's army, down to the present day, I cannot find that the style of fighting practised in the 3rd division was ever unsuccessful; but, on the contrary, was always attended with the best results, and even with much less loss than would have been sustained in any other mode of acting: I therefore trust I may be pardoned for having endeavoured to illustrate the correctness of the opinion I entertain in this respect, not only by what I have related of the battle of Orthes, but also by the rather minute description I ventured to give of the achievements of the 3rd division at Salamanca.

But even in acting as skirmishers on a large scale, when Sir Thomas Picton's division had, at Vic Bigore, to contend with two French divisions, each at least equal in number to the 3rd, the same system of fighting was, as far as practicable, observed. Besides the 5th battalion 60th, a battalion of Portuguese caçadores and our light infantry companies, whole regiments, (and here we felt the want of knowledge of light infantry movements in all corps,) only retaining some companies in reserve and for support, were engaged as sharpshooters. They were, however, constantly pushed forward upon the French, and recommended not to throw away their fire in long shots, but rather, as much as possible, to endeavour to close with them; and if a halt was any where perceived in any part of the advancing skirmishers a staff officer was invariably sent to the point to ascertain the cause. The French, therefore, invariably gave way, and in their confused retreat they became exposed, in running from one enclosure to another, to the fire of our troops. After driving them for a considerable distance before us in this style, the coming of night stopped our career, but had we stood and fired, as usual upon such occasions, this brilliant feat of the 3rd division would never have been heard of. At dark, Lord Wellington came up to Sir Thomas Brisbane's brigade, which was still warmly engaged.--He wished to know how the French, we had so long followed up, were situated; but so thickly wooded, enclosed, and covered with vineyards was the neighbourhood of Vic Bigore, near to which this splendid affair terminated, that it was impossible to give him any information about them.

A soldier of the 88th, hearing what had been said, volunteered to get up into a tree, and thereby to make himself an object to be shot at. This he accomplished with some difficulty, and being asked what he could see; replied, "Och, nothing but them wearisome vineyards, and bad luck to them, and a power of their scrimigers." Night closed the scene, the firing had ceased. The French sentinels and ours being posted not twenty yards from each other, they, as usual, thought no more of strife; but in the course of the night, the enemy silently and quietly moved off towards Tarbes. The day following we crossed the Adour at that town. Picton was again advancing against the enemy, whose right having been turned by the divisions on our left, they were marching, or rather running in great confusion along the road, which passes through a wooded height above Tarbes to Tournay. Sir Thomas Brisbane's dispositions were even made to have had a dash at them; when an order, which greatly surprised us, came for the troops to halt, when without almost meeting with any resistance, we must have cut off and taken vast numbers of the fugitives, who were thus allowed to "live to fight another day." Upon receiving this order to halt from Sir Thomas Picton's aide de camp, (who was questioned in order to ascertain if he was sure he was correct in the message he delivered) I went back to find out what could possibly have occasioned it. I soon met Sir Thomas, and venturing cautiously to express my regret at such an opportunity having been allowed to escape, of intercepting so considerable a number of the enemy's troops, he replied, "That is no fault of mine; but go now, Sir, and desire your general to move on." But before I could return to the brigade, which were greatly amazed at being kept back, the last of the French were just disappearing behind a hill about half a mile off.

Colonel Napier says, in speaking of French and British soldiers, "place an attainable object of war before the French soldier, and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing, he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy; the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt any thing."

This is a well-drawn picture of the French, yet I hope he will excuse me for saying, that I think an officer of great experience, like Colonel Napier, must often have seen supernatural efforts made by French officers, both to bring on their men and to make them stand their ground, but all in vain, when they saw British troops about to close with them. Again Colonel Napier speaks of the unrelenting vigour of British infantry, and of their deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle, more full and terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong and unwavering charge. All this must be fully acquiesced in, and the British soldier well merits this praise; for I do not think that Colonel Napier ever had any difficulty in getting his men to stand or follow him, either to the charge or to the assault of the most rugged and impracticable breach; on the contrary, I should suppose he must have found more difficulty in restraining them in their headlong course, with their officers, still more daring than themselves, at their head. In the comparison, therefore, drawn between French and British soldiers, I consider that Colonel Napier scarcely does the undaunted brilliant courage of the latter justice, when he only speaks of the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry. I conclude, when Colonel Napier composed this passage, he had the fields of Talavera and Waterloo before his eyes, where, certainly, great endurance of fire was necessary on the part of British troops, and where the French had full scope for displaying their best qualities as soldiers; but in the 3rd division, when it fought in Picton's style, and was led as he expected his officers to lead, he would, on all occasions, have witnessed the fine qualities attributed to French soldiers most amply displayed, and even surpassed. Much, however, as I admire the undaunted courage of British soldiers in following the bravest and most noble-minded officers in the world, I cannot be blind to their imperfections, and especially to their conduct after victory, and upon other occasions, which often threatened us with the most serious consequences; and it is this makes me so anxious to have more of the good and true men of the British empire brought into our ranks, and of whom there are enough to be found to form a well conducted invincible army.

But let us imagine such troops as these, in a high state of discipline, and properly supported by our splendid heavy dragoons and artillery, charging an enemy sword in hand, in the manner I have before alluded to, and it may be readily allowed that the fate of a campaign, or even that of a kingdom, would be decided in a single battle; for the enemy's troops, thus closed with, could not well escape from the field; and we should no longer be incredulous when we read of the consequences resulting from a charge of Roman legions. It has pleased Divine Providence to form the men of the British empire for such a kind of warfare; having bestowed upon them daring hearts, and powerful arms to execute whatever may be required of them.

If ever the plan of calling out men by ballot is adopted, I would beg leave to suggest, that a certain number of battalions of the regular army, from adjoining districts, should be permanently considered a division; and when a force was wanted in any part of the world, either the division, or a brigade of it, should compose the whole or a part of that force; and would not thus an esprit du corps be established in such a division, like what was found so admirably calculated for mutual support amongst the battalions and brigades of the light, 3rd, 4th, &c. divisions under the Duke of Wellington; and which induced them readily to make any effort, or any sacrifice, to aid each other in battle. And how often have I witnessed this feeling prevail, to a great extent, among the officers and soldiers of the 45th, 74th, 88th regiments, and 5th battalion, 60th, which composed the brigade to which I was so long attached as brigade-major. I can never forget one instance of this kind in particular, which occurred at the battle of Fuentes d'Onor. After a long and dreadful struggle in that village, between the British and a large body of the French Imperial Guard and other troops which supported them, the right brigade of the 3rd division was at last brought up to take the place of the fatigued regiments so long engaged, under a heavy fire, without any decided advantage being gained by either party, the French holding the lower and our troops the upper part of the village. The 88th, supported by the 45th, was ordered to charge into it and drive out the enemy. They soon did so in the usual style of the 3rd division. But I shall ever think with pleasure, of the extraordinary eagerness evinced by the 45th to advance to the help of their old friends the Rangers, who on that occasion wanted none. This feeling, however, between these two corps in particular, was always most strongly marked throughout the whole war; and I have no doubt would be revived, if they ever met again in presence of an enemy.

It may, perhaps, be considered out of place, but, before closing this chapter, I must beg leave to observe that I read--as I think every one else must have done--with great interest what the Marquis of Londonderry has told us in the account he has given of his visit to Russia, of the enormous establishments of the Czar for the instruction of those intended for the staff and other branches of his military and naval services. The country ought always to feel indebted to officers who can, like his Lordship, give useful information upon such subjects; for we certainly, by some means or other, should be made acquainted with what is going on in the military and naval world. And although the grand reviews, or showing off of troops and establishments were evidently got up in order to produce strong impressions, I feel confident it must, hereafter, be found that the expense of keeping up the latter will be much greater than the advantages to be derived from them. But our army does not require such an extended and overgrown system, which is neither suited to the feelings, ideas, or the genius of the free people of the British Empire.--An absolute government, which may one day have cause to tremble at the effects of what it has produced, could alone be supposed capable of creating and carrying out a plan of such magnitude, and which must, I should fear, prove hazardous to the safety of the country in which it is adopted, and also to its institutions.--I certainly would require that all gentlemen intended for commissions in our service should have had a certain military or naval education, but I would not ask where it had been acquired, provided they could pass the examinations I have already alluded to.

From our staff, at their own cost, well and probably expensively educated, we might naturally expect that officers would be selected, to be employed as consuls or otherwise, in ascertaining what might be going forward in countries likely to be, or which have already become the scenes of warfare, and about which, or the parties engaged, Great Britain might be deeply interested, yet not altogether justified in taking an active part in the contest, such as Circassia, Persia, South America, and perhaps Spain; and, above all, we might constantly have an eye upon our North American democratic neighbours, who can only be properly dealt with by a military governor-general of the whole of our North American territories, and who should be entrusted with much authority, both civil and military, so that he could act at all times with decision and promptitude.

Accomplished staff officers, such as I have in view, could give such information as might be relied upon, and would enable those, who direct the affairs of this great empire, to act judiciously and advantageously; and when these officers wished to do so, they ought to be allowed to go wherever war of any kind was carrying on, if it were only with the view of acquiring greater knowledge of their profession; for no matter what might be the nature of the warfare, some things may always be learnt. But these officers should, at the same time, be strictly prohibited from meddling with, or in any way aiding, or advising either party, without permission to do so from our Government. Civilians, in general, ought to be looked upon as not calculated for employment such as that I speak of, and we had once a lesson given us in this respect, if we will only profit by it, when Sir John Moore's army was so nearly lost through the foolish presumption of our agent or minister, sent out to the Spanish government of that day.

Many think that France could not be better governed than it is at present by Louis Philip, who is universally allowed to be an able sovereign; but I have often heard the question asked, how it was, that Paris, and all France in its train, fell so easily and unaccountably into the hands of the men of July, 1830. Although I know Paris tolerably well, and a good deal of France and Frenchmen, yet the only answer, I believe, that can be given is, that it did not suit the views, prejudices, or feelings of the military, that the existing order of things should be maintained; many of them, very probably, at the time belonging to the political coteries, with which Paris in particular always abounds, and in which are broached and discussed the strangest possible doctrines and dogmas. British officers can never belong to such dangerous associations, if they even did exist in the United Kingdom.

Any tumultuous assemblage of men, if even partially armed, can at first, as was the case the other day at Newport, be easily dispersed or put down, by rightly disposed and well officered regular troops. As for the barricades, of which we heard so much, they could only have led, had the troops done their duty, to the greater destruction of the city and the rioters; but as they were put up, why did an able and enlightened officer like Marshal Marmont, who commanded, send his soldiers in the manner he did into the streets of Paris, for this was quite as useless as our going headlong into those of Buenos Ayres, where some streets, and almost every house, were strongly barricaded, and yet I believe we forced them all; but probably, if he had ever heard of our exploits there, he had forgotten them. It appears strange to many, that Mont-Martre and other commanding points in and about Paris were not occupied by the Marshal in force with cannon and mortars, his communications with the country secured by his cavalry, and that he did not, without delay, bring up to the capital a sufficient number of troops to restore order. But even before their arrival, it is likely, that the peaceable and well-disposed part of the inhabitants, and especially the householders, would have found it to be their interest to declare openly against a lawless mob and their political leaders; and to have taken part with the troops opposed to them; but should this not have been the case, and it then clearly appearing, that all were leagued to resist the established government, which it is the duty of armies in all countries to uphold, the Marshal, however painful it might have been to his feelings, could have had no alternative but to announce to the riotous people, that if tranquillity and obedience to the laws, and to the constituted civil authorities, were not instantly restored, Paris, with the view of punishing its lawless inhabitants, would be laid in ruins. It will no doubt be asked, if such reasoners would have consented to destroy that large, beautiful, and populous city, the seat of the arts, and where every thing magnificent is to be found? Blucher would have done this for them sometime before, for he had a great fancy to treat Paris as General Steinbock did Altona years ago, had it not been for Lord Wellington; and for this, I fear, the French people were not afterwards even grateful to him. But this question is very like one I had put to me some time ago, when I ventured to hint, that a certain determined mode of acting, would, in the end, but in another country, prove to be the most humane, viz. "Would you shoot the people--the poor misguided people of Ireland?" I answered, that as an officer, I should be obliged to do so, however reluctant I might be to adopt such a measure; but I would begin with their selfish agitators, if they would not discontinue their wicked practices, and cease holding out expectations to the people of a dismemberment of the empire, and allow the laws, whatever they may be, to be obeyed. If the laws are bad, or fancied to be bad, and if they do not please all men, without regard to difference of religion, and in other respects, upon an equality, let the Government, whose business it is, endeavour to have them altered; but as long as they stand the laws of the realm, it is the duty of officers and soldiers to uphold them, and the civil authorities in the execution of them, and they have nothing more to say to the matter. Had the French acted thus, and upon such principles--for I cannot suppose that their officers had lost all influence and command over their men--and as I am convinced, British officers, if necessary, would act, we should not now have before our eyes the awful example, of an established government overturned, as was the case in 1830, and which, with what has occurred in that country for many years past, ought to be held up for ever as a lesson to the United Kingdom. I hope, however, that Great Britain will never become so humbled, as to require salvation from naval and military patriotism; but I boldly assert, and without fear of contradiction, that no where on earth, amongst men, is this virtue to be found so pure as in the hearts of the officers of our navy and army.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: N.B. Many of the absentees did not, as was supposed, fall into the hands of the enemy, but had gone off in search of liquor or plunder.]

CHAP. VIII.

There is no country with which Great Britain is likely so soon to come into hostile contact as the United States of America, and for such a war we must certainly want an army such as I have in view.

It has long been the fashion, and I believe it is the object of many interested and designing men, to endeavour to have the United States of America considered as much more powerful and dangerous to Great Britain then they really are. No nation, nor body of men, be they who they may, composed of such heterogeneous materials, scattered over so vast an extent of territory, in which the laws, enacted by an often unruly legislature, are so powerless, and in many places so weakly administered, as not to be able to prevent aggressions upon an unoffending neighbour, or to afford sufficient protection to the peaceably inclined against the hand of violence, can possibly be considered powerful. I am aware that parts of the United States ought, to a certain extent, to be looked upon as exceptions, but, generally speaking, this is by no means an over-drawn picture of what is the state of society in that part of the world.

If Great Britain was only prepared to convince the world of her strength in steam ships, and to send forth even a portion of them from the St. Lawrence, and from other points in our valuable North American possessions, she must in a very short time destroy, or shut up in their ports, in hopeless inactivity, all the so much boasted of Navy or traders of the United States. And it might be asked--would any other power, when they saw we were really in earnest, dare to aid them in their difficulties; and what would then become of their immense commerce, from which alone they derive their present importance? Are not the feelings and interests of the Northern, Southern and inland States directly opposed to each other; and would not the continuance of the last war, for even a short time longer, have had the effect of causing discontents and divisions amongst the several States, already independent of each other, which could never again, in all human probability, have been brought in consequence to act in unison.

But to convince even the most incredulous of this, and of the kind of spirit which was found to exist amongst the people of the States, and to point out clearly with what zeal and patriotism we were opposed in the last war in the march of our troops upon Plattsburg, I have only to lay before them some Brigade orders which were issued by Sir Thomas Brisbane at the time.

"No. 5. None of the inhabitants of the country are to be prevented from passing the advanced posts either to the front or rear, from one hour after sunrise till sunset; and they are to be permitted to drive in cattle, or any thing else they may think fit; but officers commanding picquets are to be very careful in examining those who pass; and must take up, and send to the head-quarters of the Brigade (Dowy's house) such as may appear suspicious.

"No. 7. Major-General Brisbane having received instructions to advance with the troops under his command into the territory of the United States, avails himself of the opportunity, to request that commanding officers will use every exertion to maintain the strictest discipline in their corps; and he holds them responsible, that in every instance when a complaint is made to them of any injury sustained by the inhabitants, that it is inquired into, and if necessary redressed; and whatever damage is done, that it is instantly paid for and charged against those concerned, and where this cannot be ascertained to the corps in general, so that unoffending people may not be sufferers.

"In taking the necessary precautions against individuals, who may so far forget what is due to themselves and their country, as to commit acts of plunder or violence, the Major-General is at the same time fully convinced, that the troops in general are determined, that their conduct shall not bring disgrace upon the British name; he therefore calls upon them to discover those who may be guilty of acts of plunder or oppression, that they may be brought to the punishment they merit; and the soldiers must soon find that such a line of conduct will add much to their comforts; for the inhabitants of the country finding that they are properly treated and protected, will bring every article requisite into the camp; for those who remain quiet in their homes are not in the smallest degree to be molested, nor is their property to be taken from them without their full consent and its being paid for; as it is not against such persons that Great Britain makes war, but against the Government whose folly and ambition have brought the miseries of war into their country, and the army and individuals in arms for its support.

"The Major-General commanding has requested the magistrates of the country, to explain to the people his object and determination, on entering the American territory; and he trusts that the conduct of the soldiers will be such as to reflect no shade of dishonour on their country."