Chapter XXX: Appendix (2)

101. Though faith itself is not wrought in us, without the Holy Ghost, nor is it (if sincere) a common gift, yet this operation of the Spirit drawing us to Christ, by such arguments and means as are fitted to the work of believing, is different from the consequent covenant right to Christ and the Spirit, which is given to believers, and from the Spirit of adoption, as recovering us, as aforesaid, to the love of God.

102. In this last sense it is that the Holy Ghost is said to dwell in believers, and to be the new name, the pledge, the earnest, the first-fruits of life eternal, the witness of our right to Christ and life, and Christ's agent and witness in us, to maintain his cause and interest.

103. Even as a man, that by sickness hath lost his appetite to meat, is told that such a physician will cure him, if he will take a certain medicinal food that he will give him; and at first he taketh it without appetite to the food or medicine in itself, but merely for the love of health; but after he is doubly brought to love it for itself, first, because he hath tasted the sweetness of that which he did but see before, and next, because his health and appetite are recovered: so is it with the soul, as to the love of God procured by believing; when we have tasted through the persuasion of self-love, our taste and recovery cause us to love God for himself.

104. When the soul is risen to this habitual, predominant love of God and holiness as such, for their own goodness, above its own felicity as such, (though ever in conjunction with it, and as his felicity itself,) then is the law written in the heart; and this love is the virtual fulfilling of all the law. And for such it is that it is said, that the law is not made; that is, in that measure that they love the good for itself, they need not be moved to it with threats or promises of extrinsic things, which work but by self-love and fear. Not but that divine authority must concur with love to produce obedience, especially while love is but imperfect: but that love is the highest principle, making the commanded good connatural to us.

105. And I think it is this Spirit of adoption and love which is called "The divine nature" in us, as it inclineth us to love God and holiness for themselves, as nature is inclined to self-love, and to food, and other necessaries. Not that the specific, essential nature, that is, substance or form, of the soul is changed, and man deified, and he become a god that was before a man; but his human soul or nature is elevated or more perfected (as a sick man by health, or a blind man by his sight) by the Spirit of God inclining him habitually to God himself, as in and for himself. (And this is all which the publisher of Sir H. Vane's notions of the two covenants and two natures, can soundly mean, and seemeth to grope after.)

106. By all this you see, that as the love of God hath a double self-love in us to deal with, so it dealeth variously with each: 1. Sensual, inordinate self-love it destroyeth; both as it consisteth in the inordinate love of sensual pleasure, and in the inordinate love of self or life. 2. Lawful and just self-love it increaseth and improveth to our further good, but subjecteth it to the highest, purest love of God.

107. By this you may gather what a confirmed christian is, even one in whom the pure love of God as God, and all things for God, is predominant and more potent than (not only the vicious, but also) the good, and lawful, and necessary love of himself.

108. Though christians therefore must study themselves, and keep up a care of their own salvation, yet must they much more study God, his greatness, wisdom, and goodness, as shining in his works, and word, and in his Son, and as foreseen in the heavenly glory; and in this knowledge of God and Christ is life eternal. And nothing more tendeth to the holy advancement and perfection of the soul, than to keep continually due apprehensions of the divine nature, properties, and glorious appearances in his works upon the soul, so as it may become a constant course of contemplation, and the habit and constitution of the mind, and the constant guide of heart and life.

109. The attainment of this would be a taste of heaven on earth: our wills would follow the will of God, and rest therein, and abhor reluctancy: all our duty would be both quickened and sweetened with love: self-interest would be disabled from either seducing us to sin, or vexing us with griefs, cares, fears, or discontents. We should so far trust soul and body in the will and love of God, as to be more comforted that both are at his will, than if they were absolutely at our own. And God being our all, the constant, fixing, satisfying object of our love, our souls would be constantly fixed and satisfied, and live in such experience of the sanctifying grace of Christ, as would most powerfully conquer our unbelief; and in such foretastes of heaven, as would make life sweet, death welcome, and heaven unspeakably desirable to us. But it is not the mere love of personal goodness, as our own perfection, that would do all this upon us.

110. The soul that is troubled with doubts whether he love God as God, or only as a means of his own felicity in subordination to self-love, must thus resolve his doubts. If you truly believe that God is God, that is, the efficient, dirigent, and final cause, the just end of every rational agent, the infinite good and chiefly to be loved, in comparison of whom you are vile, contemptible, and as nothing; if you feelingly take yourself as loathsome by sin; if you would not take up with an everlasting sensual pleasure alone, without holiness, if you could have it; no, nor with any perfection of your intellectual nature, merely as such, and for yourselves, without the pleasing and glorifying God in it; if you practically perceive that every thing is therefore, and so far, good and amiable, as God shineth in it as its cause, or as it conduceth to glorify him, and please his will; if, accordingly, you love that person best, on whom you perceive most of God, and that is most serviceable to him, though not at all beneficial to yourself; if you love the welfare of the church, the kingdom, the world, and of the heavenly society, saints, angels, and Christ, as the divine nature, interest, image, or impress maketh all lovely in their several degrees; and would rather be annihilated, were it put upon your choice, than saints, angels, kingdoms, church should be annihilated; if your hearts have devoted themselves, and all that you have, to God, as his own, to be used to his utmost service; if your chief desire and endeavour in the world be to please his blessed will; and in that will, and the contemplation of his infinite perfections, you seek your rest; if you desire your own everlasting happiness in no other kind, but as consisting in the perfect sight of God's glory, and in your perfect loving of him, and being pleasant or beloved to him, and this as resting more in the infinite amiableness of God, than the felicity which hence will follow to yourselves, though that also must be desired; if now you deny your own glory for his glory; if your chief desire and endeavour be to love him more and more, and you love yourselves best when you love him most; in a word, if nothing more take up your care than how to love God more, and nothing in the whole world (yourselves or others) seem more amiable to your sober, practical judgment, and your wills, than the infinite goodness of God as such;--if all this be so, you have not only attained sincerity, (which is not now the question,) but this divine nature, and high, confirmed holiness; though, withal, you never so much desire your own salvation, which is but to desire more of this love; and though your nature have such a sensitive, selfish desire of life and pleasure, as is brought into subjection to this divine love.

If any be offended that so many propositions must be used in opening the case, and say that they rather confound men's wits than inform them; I answer, 1. The matter is high, and I could not ascend by a shorter ladder. Nor have I the faculty of climbing it _per saltum_, stepping immediately from the lowest to the highest part. If any will make the case plainer in fewer words, and with less ado, I shall thankfully accept his labour as a very great benefit when I see it. 2. Either all these particulars are really diverse, and really pertinent to the matter in question, or not: if not, it is not blaming the number that will evince it, but naming such particulars as are either unjustly or unnecessarily distinguished or inserted. And if it be but repeating the same things that is blamed, I shall be glad if all these words, and more, would make such weighty cases clear; and do confess that, after all, I need more light, and am almost stalled with the difficulties myself. But if the particulars can be neither proved false nor needless, but the reader be only overset with multitude, I would entreat him to be patient with other men, that are more laborious and more capable of knowledge: and let him know, that if his difficulties do not rather engage him in a diligent search, than tempt him to impatience and accusation, I number him, not only with the slothful contemners, but therefore also, with the enemies of knowledge; even as I reckon the neglecters, and contemners, and accusers of piety among its enemies.

But ere I end, I must answer some objections.

_Object._ I. Some will say, Doth not every man love God above himself and all, while he knoweth him to be better, and so more lovely? For there is some act of the will, that answereth this of the understanding.

_Answ._ You must know that the carnal mind is first captivated to carnal self and sensuality; and therefore the most practical and powerful apprehensions of goodness or amiableness in every such person, doth fasten upon life and pleasure, or sensual prosperity. And the sense having here engaged the mind and will, the contrary conclusions (that God is best) are but superficial and uneffectual like dreams, and though they have answerable effects in the will, they are but uneffectual velleities or wishes, which are borne down with far stronger desires of the contrary. And though God be loved as one that is notionally conceived to be best, and most to be loved, yet he is not loved best or most. Yea, though ordinarily the understanding say God is best, and best to me, and for me, and most to be loved; when it cometh to volition or choice, there is a secret apprehension which saith more powerfully, _et hic nunc_, this sensible pleasure is better for me, and more eligible. Why else is it chosen? Unless you will say that the motion is principally sensitive, and the force of the sensitive appetite suspendeth all forcible opposition of the intellect, and so ruleth the locomotive faculty itself. But whether the intellect be active or but omissive in it, the sin cometh up to the same height of evil. However it be, it is most evident that while such men say God is most to be loved, they love him not most, when they will not leave a lust or known sin for his love; nor show any such love, but the contrary, in their lives.

_Object._ II. But do not all men practically love God best, when they love wisdom, honesty, and goodness in all men, even in strangers that will never profit them? And what is God but wisdom, goodness, and greatness itself?

_Answ._ They first idolize themselves and their sensual delights; and then they love such wisdom, goodness, and greatness, as is suitable to their selfish, sensual lust and interest. And it is not the prime good which is above them, and to be preferred before them, which they love as such, but such goodness as is fitted to their fleshly concupiscence and ends. And therefore holiness they love not. And though they love that which is never like to benefit them, that is but as it is of the same kind with that which, in others nearer them, may benefit them, and therefore is suitable to their minds and interest. And yet we confess that the mind of man hath some principles of virtue, and some footsteps and witnesses of a Deity left upon it; but though these work up to an approbation of good, and a dislike of evil, in the general notion of it, and in particular so far as it crosseth not their lust, yet never to prefer the best things practically before their lust; and God is not loved best, nor as God, if he be not loved better than fleshly lust.

_Object._ III. But it seems that most or all men love God practically best. For there are few, if any, but would rather be annihilated, than there should be no God, or no world. Therefore they love God better than themselves.

_Answ._ 1. They know that if there were no God or no world, they could not be themselves, and so must also be annihilated. 2. But suppose that they would rather be annihilated, than continue in prosperity alone, were it possible, without a God, that is but for the world's sake, because the world cannot be the world without a God; which proveth but that they are so much men, as to love the whole world better than themselves. But could the world possibly be what it is, without a God, I scarce think they would choose annihilation, rather than that there should be no God. 3. But suppose they would, yet I say that some sensual men love their lusts or sensuality better than their being; and had rather be annihilated for ever, so they might but spend their lives in pleasure, than to live for ever without those pleasures. And therefore they will say, that a short life with pleasure, is better than a long one without it. And when they profess to believe the life to come, and the danger of sinning; yet will they not leave their sinful pleasures to save their souls. Therefore, that man that would rather be annihilated than there should be no God, may yet love his lusts better than God, though not his being. 4. And I cannot say that every one shall be saved, that loveth God under a false idea or image better than himself; no more than that it will save a distracted, melancholy, venereous lover, if he loved his paramour or mistress better than himself. For God is not loved as God, if he be not loved as infinitely great, and wise, and good, which containeth his holiness, and also as the Owner, and holy Governor and end of man. If any therefore should love God upon conceit that God loveth him, and will indulge him in his sins; or if he love him only for his greatness, and as the fountain of all natural, sensible good; and love him not as holy, nor as a holy and just Governor and end, it is not God indeed that this man loveth; or he loveth him but _secundum quid_, and not as God.

_Object._ IV. But suppose I should love God above all, as he is only great, and wise, and good in the production of all sensible, natural good, without the notion of holiness, and hatred of sin, would not this love itself be holy and saving?

_Answ._ Your love would be no holier or better, than the object of it is conceived to be. If you conceive not of God as holy and pure, you cannot love him with a pure and holy love. If you conceive of him but as the cause of sun and moon, light and heat, and life and health, and meat and drink, you will love him but with such a love as you have to these: which will not separate you from any sin as such, but will consist with all sensuality of heart and life. And it is not all in God, that nature, in its corrupted state, doth hate, or is fallen out with: but if you love him not so well as your lusts and pleasure, nor love him as your most holy Governor and end, you love him not as God, or but _secundum quid_; but if you love him holily, you love him as holy.

_Object._ V. God himself loveth the substance or person more than the holiness; for he continueth the persons of men and devils, when he permitteth the holiness to perish, or giveth it not.

_Answ._ As the existence and event, and the moral goodness, must be distinguished; so must God's mere volition of event, and his complacency in good as good. God doth not will the existence of a reasonable soul in a stone or straw; and yet it followeth not, that he loveth a stone or straw for its substance, better than reason in a man: for though God willeth to make his creatures various in degrees of goodness, and taketh it to be good so to do, and that every creature be not of the best; yet still this goodness of them is various, as one hath more excellency in it than another. The goodness of the whole may require that each part be not best in itself, and yet best respectively in order to the beauty of the whole. As a peg is not better than a standard, and yet is better to the building in its place; and a finger is not better than a head, and yet is better to the body in its place, than another head would be in that place. The head therefore must be loved comparatively better than the finger, and the finger may be cut off to save life, when the head must not: so God can see meet to permit men and devils to fall into misery, and thieves to be hanged, and use this to the beauty of the whole, and yet love a true man better than a thief, and a good man better than a bad.

And either you speak of goodness or holiness existent or non-existent. In a devil there is substance, which is good in its natural kind, and therefore so far loved of God; but there is no holiness in him, and that which is not, is not amiable: but if you meant existent holiness, in a saint, then it is false that God loveth the person of a devil better than the holiness of a saint. Nor is it a proof that he loveth them equally, because he equally willeth their existence; for he willeth not they shall be equal in goodness, though equally existent: and it is complacency, and not mere volition of existence, which we mean by love.

Otherwise your arguing is as strong if it run thus: that which God bringeth to pass, and not another thing, he willeth and loveth more than that other; but God bringeth to pass men's sickness, pain, death, and damnation, and not the holiness, ease, or salvation of those persons: therefore he loveth their pain, death, and damnation better than their holiness: therefore we should love them better, than the devils or miserable men should love their misery better than holiness. God showeth what he loveth oft by commanding it, when he doth not effect it; he loveth holiness _in esse cognito_, and _in esse existente_, respectively as his image.

_Object._ But at least it will follow, that in this or that person as the devils, God loveth the substance better than holiness; for what he willeth he loveth: but he willeth the substance without the holiness; therefore he loveth the substance without the holiness.

_Answ._ It is answered already. Moreover, 1. God willed that holiness should be the duty of all men and devils, though he willed not insuperably and absolutely to effect it. 2. The word "without" meaneth either an exclusion or a mere non-inclusion. God willeth not the person excluding the holiness: for he excludeth it not by will or work; but only he willeth the person, not including the holiness as to any absolute will. And so God loveth the person without the holiness; but not so much as he would love him if he were holy.

_Object._ But you intimate, that it is best as to the beauty of the universe, that there be sin, and unholiness, and damnation; and God loveth that which is good as to the universe, yea, that is a higher good than personal good, as the subject is more noble, and therefore more to be loved of us as it is of God.

_Answ._ 1. I know Augustin is oft alleged as saying, _Bonum est ut malum fiat_. But sin and punishment must be distinguished: it is true of punishment presupposing sin, that it is good and lovely, in respect to public ends, though hurtful to the person suffering; and therefore as God willeth it as good, so should we not only be patient, but be pleased in it as it is the demonstration of the justice and holiness of God, and as it is good, though not as it is our hurt. But sin (or unholiness privative) is not good in itself, nor to the universe: nor is it a true saying, that It is good that there be sin; nor is it willed of God, (though not nilled with an absolute, effective nolition,) as hath been elsewhere opened at large. Sin is not good to the universe, nor any part of the beauty of the creature: God neither willeth it, causeth it, nor loveth it.

_Object._ At least he hath no great love to holiness in those persons, that he never giveth it to; otherwise he would work it in them.

_Answ._ He cannot love that existent which existeth not. Nor doth he any further will to give it them than to command it, and give them all necessary means and persuasions to it. But what if God make but one sun, will you say that he hath no great love to a sun, that will make no more? What if he make no more worlds? doth that prove that he hath no great love to a world? He loveth the world, the sun, and so the saints, which he hath made: and he doth not so far love suns, or worlds, or saints, as to make as many suns, or worlds, or saints, as foolish wits would prescribe unto him. Our question is, What being God loveth, and we should most love, as being best and likest him, and not what he should give a being to that is not.

_Object._ VI. Holiness is but an accident, and the person is the substance, and better than the accident; and Dr. Twiss oppugneth, on such accounts, the saying of Arminius, That God loveth justice better than just men, because it is for justice that he loveth them.

_Answ._ Aristotle and Porphyry have not so clearly made known to us the nature of those things or modes which they are pleased to call accidents, as that we should lay any great stress upon their sayings about them. Another will say that goodness itself is but an accident, and most will call it a mode; and they will say that the substance is better than the mode or accident, and therefore better than goodness itself. And would this, think you, be good arguing? Distinguish then between physical goodness of being, in the soul, both as a substance, and as a formal virtue; and the perfective, or modal, qualitative or gradual goodness; and then consider, that the latter always presupposeth the former: where there is holiness, there is the substance, with its physical goodness, and the perfective, modal, or moral goodness too; but where there is no holiness, there is only a substance deprived of its modal, moral goodness. And is not both better than one, and a perfect being than an imperfect?

And as to Arminius's saying, He cannot mean that God loveth righteousness with a subject or substance, better than a subject without righteousness; for there is no such thing to love, as righteousness without a subject (though there maybe an abstracted, distinct conception of it). If therefore the question be only, Whether God love the same man better, as he is a man, or as he is a saint, I answer, he hath a love to each which is suitable to its kind. He hath such complacency in the substance of a serpent, a man, a devil, as is agreeable to their being; that is, as they bear the natural impressions of his creating perfections, yet such as may stand with their pain, death, and misery. But he hath such a complacency in the actual holiness, love, and obedience of men and angels, as that he taketh the person that hath them to be meet for his service, and glory, and everlasting felicity, and delight in him, as being qualified for it. So that God's love must be denominatively distinguished from the object; and so it is a love of nature, and a love of the moral perfections of nature: the first love is that by which he loveth a man because he is a man, and so all other creatures; the second love is that by which he loveth a good man, because he is good or holy. And if it will comfort you, that God loveth your being without your perfections or virtue, let it comfort you in pain, and death, and hell, that he continueth your being without your well-being or felicity.

_Object._ VII. All goodness or holiness is some one's goodness or holiness (as health is). And as it is the person's welfare and perfection, so it is given for the person's sake: therefore the person, as the _finis cui_, and utmost end, is better than the thing given him, and so more amiable.

_Answ._ That all goodness is some one's goodness, proveth but that some one is the subject or being that is good, but not that to be is better than to be good, as such. And as he is in some respect the _finis cui_, for whom it is, and so it is good to him; yet he and his goodness are for a higher end, which is the pleasing of God in the demonstration of his goodness: that therefore is best which most demonstrateth God's goodness. And there is no subject or substance without its accidents or modes; and that person that is not good and holy, is bad and unholy. Therefore the question should be, Whether a person bad and unholy, be more amiable than a person good and holy, that hath both physical and moral goodness. And for all that the name of an accident maketh action seem below the person: yet it must be also said, that the person and his faculties are for action, as being but the substance in a perfect mode, and that action is for higher ends than the person's being or felicity.

_Object._ VIII. Love is nothing but benevolence, _velle bonum alicui ut ei bene sit_. But who is it that would not wish good to God, that is to be blessed as he is? But how can holiness then be loved, but rather the person for his holiness; because we cannot wish it good, but only to be what it is.

_Answ._ 1. The definition is false, as hath been showed, and as the instance proveth; else a man could not be said to love learning, virtue, or any quality, but only to love the person that wanteth it, or hath it. But love is a complacency, and benevolence is but its effect or antecedent. 2. The unholy wish not good to God, for they would all depose him from his Godhead: they would not have him to be a hater of their sin, nor to be their holy and righteous Governor and Judge.

_Object._ IX. It is better to be a man, though a sinner and miserable in hell, than not to be at all. Else God would never ordain, cause, or permit it.

_Answ._ It is better to the highest ends, God's glory, and the universal order, to be a punished man, than to be nothing (when God will have it so); because punishment, as to those highest ends, is good; though it is not best for the poor miserable sinner: but the same cannot be said of sin. It is indeed better also to those highest ends, to be a man though a sinner (while God continueth humanity); but not to be a man and a sinner: for the latter implieth some good to be in the sin which hath no good, and therefore God neither causeth it, nor willeth it, though he permit it. But though a sinful man is better than no man to God's ends, it followeth not, that to be a man is better than to be a good man.

_Object._ X. If that be best and most amiable which is most to the glory of God, then it is more amiable to be a sinner in hell torment glorifying his justice, than not to be at all, or to be a brute.

_Answ._ It is neither of these that is offered to your love and choice, but to be holy. All good is not matter of election; but that good which is in hell is not the sin, but the punishment. For the sin doth reputatively, and as much as in it lieth, rob God of his glory, and punishment repaireth it. Therefore love the punishment if you can, and spare not, so you love holiness better; for that would honour God more excellently, and please him more.

_Object._ XI. If I must love to be like God, I must love to be great, and I must love the greatest as most like him.

_Answ._ You must love to be like him in those perfections which you are capable of, and the ends and uses of your proper nature: therefore you must be desirous to be like him in your measure, even in such power and greatness as are suitable to the nature and ends of a rational soul. Not in such strength as he giveth a horse, or such magnitude as he giveth a mountain, which is not to be most like him; but in the vital activity and power of an intellectual free agent: to be powerful and great in love to God and all his service, and in all good works, to be profitable to the world, to be lively and ready in all obedience, strong to suffer, and to conquer sin and all temptations; in a word, to be great and powerful in wisdom and true goodness. Thus seek even in power to be like God in your capacities.

_Object._ XII. God himself doth not love men only for their goodness, nor love that best which is best. For he loveth his elect while enemies and ungodly; and he telleth Israel he loved them because he would love them, and not because they were better than others; and in the womb he loved Jacob best, when he was no better than Esau.

_Answ._ 1. Distinguish between God's complacence and benevolence. 2. Between the good that is present, and foreseen good with a present capacity for it.

1. God had a greater benevolence to Jacob than Esau, and to the Israelites than to other nations that were perhaps not much worse. And it is not for our goodness that God decreeth to make us good, or to give us a double proportion of any of those mercies, which he giveth not as Rector, but as Dominus and Benefactor, as an absolute Owner and free Benefactor. And with this love of benevolence he loveth us when we are his enemies, that is, he purposeth to make us good; but this benevolence is but a secondary love and fruit of complacency, joined with the free, unequal distribution of his own.

2. But for complacency, which is love in the first and strictest sense, God so loveth the wicked though elect, no further than they are good and lovely, that is, (1.) As they have the natural goodness of rational creatures: (2.) And as they are capable of all the future service they will do him, and glory they will bring him; (3.) And as his infinite wisdom knoweth it fit to choose them to that service. Or, if the benevolence of election do go before his first complacence in them above others, as being before his foresight that they will serve and love better, yet still this proper love, called complacence, goeth not beyond the worth of the thing loved.

_Object._ Doth God love us complacentially in Christ, beyond the good that is in us?

_Answ._ Not beyond our real and relative good, as we are in ourselves, by his grace, and as we are in Christ related to him, and both ways such as demonstrate the divine perfections, and shall love, and glorify, and please him for ever.

So much for the opening of the true nature of love to God, ourselves, and others, and of man's ultimate end, and of the nature of holiness and goodness, and those mysteries of religion which are involved in these points.