Chapter XXXVI: Section IX

_Observations and Directions for facilitating the Passage of future Navigators round Cape Horn._

The improper season of the year in which we attempted to double Cape Horn, and to which is to be imputed the before-recited disappointment, in falling in with Terra del Fuego, when we reckoned ourselves above an hundred leagues to the westward of that coast, and consequently well advanced into the Pacific Ocean, to which we were necessitated by our too late departure from England, was the fatal source of all the misfortunes we afterwards experienced. For, from hence proceeded the separation of our ships, the destruction of so many of our people, the ruin of our project against Baldivia, and of all our other views on the Spanish settlements, and the reduction of our squadron, from the formidable condition in which it passed the Straits of Le Maire, to a couple of shattered half-manned cruizers and a sloop, so exceedingly disabled that, in many climates, they scarcely durst have put to sea. To prevent, therefore, as much as in me lies, the recurrence of similar calamities to all ships bound hereafter to the South Seas, I think it my duty to insert in this place such observations and directions, as either my own experience and reflection, or the conversation of the most skilful navigators on board the squadron, could furnish me with, as to the most eligible manner of doubling Cape Horn, whether in regard to the season of the year, the course proper to be steered, or the places of refreshment both on the eastern and western sides of South America.

To begin with the proper place for refreshment on the eastern side of South America. For this purpose the island of St Catharines has been usually recommended by former writers, and on their authority we put in there; but the treatment we experienced, and the small store of refreshments we could procure their are sufficient reasons to render all ships very cautious in future how they trust to the government of Don Jose Sylva de Paz; for they may assuredly depend on having their strength, condition, and designs betrayed to the Spaniards, as far as the knowledge the governor can procure of these particulars may enable him. As this treacherous conduct was inspired by the views of private gain, in the illicit commerce carried on to the river Plate, rather than by any natural affection between the Portuguese and Spaniards, the same perfidy may perhaps be expected from most of the governors on the coast of Brazil, since these smuggling engagements are doubtless very general and extensive; and, though the governors themselves should detest so faithless a procedure, yet, as ships are perpetually passing from one or other of the Brazilian ports to the Rio Plata, the Spaniards could scarcely fail of receiving intelligence, by this means, of any British ships being on the coast; and, however imperfect such intelligence might be, it might prove injurious to the views and interests of cruizers thus discovered.

As the Spanish trade in the South Seas is all in one direction, from north to south, or the direct reverse, with very little deviation to the eastward or westward, it is in the power, of two or three cruisers, properly stationed on different parts of this track, to possess themselves of every ship that puts to sea. This, however, can only be the case so long as they continue concealed from the neighbouring coast; for, the moment that an enemy is known to be in these seas, all navigation is prohibited, and all chance of capture is consequently at an end; as the Spaniards, well aware of these advantages to an enemy, send expresses all along the coast, and lay a general embargo on all trade; which measure they know will not only prevent their vessels from being taken, but must soon oblige all cruisers, that have not sufficient strength to attempt their settlements on shore, to quit these seas for want of provisions. Hence the great importance of carefully concealing all expeditions of this kind is quite evident; and hence too it is obvious how extremely prejudicial such intelligence must prove as that communicated by the Portuguese to the Spaniards in our case, in consequence of touching at the ports of Brazil. Yet it will often happen that ships, bound beyond Cape Horn, may be obliged to call there for wood, water, and other refreshments; in which case, St Catharines is the very last place I would recommend; both because the proper animals for a live stock at sea, as hogs, sheep, and fowls, are not to be procured there, for want of which we found ourselves greatly distressed, being reduced to live almost entirely on salt provisions; and because, from that port being nearer the Rio Plata than many others of the Portuguese settlements, the inducements and conveniences for betraying us to the Spaniards were so much the stronger. The place I would recommend is Rio Janeiro, where two of our squadron put in, after separating from us in passing Cape Horn. At this place, as I was informed by a gentleman on board one of these ships, any quantity of hogs and poultry can be procured; and as it is more distant from the Rio Plata, the difficulty of sending intelligence to the Spaniards is somewhat increased, and consequently the chance of continuing there undiscovered is so much the greater. Other measures, which may effectually obviate all these embarrassments, will be considered more at large hereafter.

I proceed, in the next place, to consider of the proper measures to be pursued for doubling Cape Horn: And here, I think I am sufficiently authorized, by our own fatal experience, and by a careful comparison and examination of the journals of former navigators, to give the following advice, which ought never, in prudence, to be departed from: Which is, That all ships bound to the South Seas, instead of passing through the Straits of Le Maire, should constantly pass by the eastward of Staten-Land, and should be invariably bent on running as far as the latitude of 61° or 62° S. before they endeavour to stand to the westwards; and ought then to make sure of a sufficient westing in or about that latitude, before commencing a northern course. But, since directions diametrically opposite to these have been formerly given by other writers, it is incumbent on me to produce my reasons for each part of this maxim.

First then, as to the propriety of passing to the eastward of Staten-Land. Those who have attended to the risk we ran in passing the Straits of Le Maire, the danger we were in of being driven upon Staten-Land by the current, when, though we happily escaped being driven on shore, we were yet carried to the eastward of that island: those, I say, who reflect on this and the like accidents which have happened to other ships, will surely not esteem it prudent to pass through these straits and run the risk of shipwreck, and find themselves, after all, no farther to the westward, the only reason hitherto given for this practice, than they might have been, in the same time, by a more secure navigation in an open sea. And next, as to the directions I have given for running into the latitude of 61° or 62° S. before any endeavour is made to stand to the westward. The reasons for this precept are, that, in all probability, the violence of the current setting from the westward will be thereby avoided, and the weather will prove less tempestuous and uncertain. This last circumstance we experienced most remarkably; for after we had unexpectedly fallen in with the land at Cape Noir, we stood away southward to get clear of it; and were no sooner advanced into the lat. of 60° S. or upwards, than we met with much better weather and smoother water than in any other part of this whole passage. The air indeed was very sharp and cold, and we had strong gales, but they were steady and uniform, and we had at the same time sunshine and a clear sky: whereas in the lower latitudes, the wind every now and then intermitted, as it were, to recover new strength, and then returned suddenly in the most violent gusts, threatening at every blast to blow away our masts, which must have proved our inevitable destruction.

Also, that the currents in this high latitude would be of much less efficacy than nearer the land, seems to be evinced by these considerations: That all currents run with greater violence near the shore than out at sea, and that at great distances from the land they are scarcely perceptible. The reason of this seems sufficiently obvious, if we consider that constant currents, in all probability, are produced by constant winds; the wind, though with a slow and imperceptible motion, driving a large body of water continually before it, which, being accumulated on any coast that it meets with in its course, must escape along the shore by the endeavours of the surface to reduce itself to the level of the rest of the ocean. It is likewise reasonable to suppose, that those violent gusts of wind which we experienced near the shore, so very different from what we found in the lat. of 60° S. and upwards, may be owing to a similar cause; for a westerly wind almost perpetually prevails in the southern part of the Pacific Ocean, and this current of air being interrupted by the enormously high range of the Andes, and by the mountains on Terra del Fuego, which together bar up the whole country as far south as Cape Horn, a part only of the wind can force its way over the top of these prodigious precipices, while the rest must naturally follow the direction of the coast, and must range down the land to the southward, and sweep with an impetuous and irregular blast round Cape Horn, and the southermost part of Terra del Fuego. Without placing too much reliance on these speculations, we may assume, I believe, as incontestable facts, that both the rapidity of the currents, and the violence of the western gales, are less sensible in lat. 61° or 62° S. than nearer the coasts of Terra del Fuego.

Though satisfied, both from our own experience and the relations of other navigators, of the importance of the precept here insisted on, of proceeding to lat. 61° or 62° S. before any endeavours are made to stand to the westwards, yet I would also advise all ships hereafter not to trust so far to this management as to neglect another most essential maxim: Which is, to make this passage in the height of the _antarctic summer_, or, in other words, in the months of December and January, which correspond exactly to the months of June and July in our northern or arctic hemisphere: and the more distant the time of passing may be from this season, so much the more disastrous the passage may reasonably be expected to prove. Indeed, if the mere violence of the western winds be considered, the time of our passage, which was about the antarctic autumnal equinox, was perhaps the most favourable period of the whole year. But then it must be considered that there are, independent of the winds, many other inconveniences to be apprehended in the depth of winter, which are almost insuperable. For, at that season, the severity of the cold, and the shortness of the days, would render it impracticable to run so far to the southward as is here recommended. The same reasons would also greatly augment the danger and alarm of sailing, at that season, in the neighbourhood of an unknown shore, dreadful in its appearance, even in the midst of summer, and would render a winter navigation on this coast, beyond all others, most dismaying and terrible. As I would, therefore, advise all ships to make their passage, if possible, in December and January, so I would warn them never to attempt doubling Cape Horn, from the eastward, after the month of March, which is equivalent to our August. As to the remaining consideration, in regard to the most proper place for cruizers to refit at, on their first arrival in the South Seas, there is scarcely any choice, the island of Juan Fernandez being the only place that can be prudently recommended for that purpose. For, although there are many ports on the western side of Patagonia, between the Straits of Magellan, one of which I shall particularly notice in the sequel, in which ships may ride in great safety, and may also recruit their wood and water, and procure some few refreshments, yet that coast is in itself so extremely dangerous, owing to its numerous rocks and breakers, and to the violence of the western winds, which blow upon it continually, that it is by no means advisable to fall in with that coast, at least till the roads, channels, and anchorages in each part of it have been accurately surveyed, and both the perils and shelters with which it abounds are more distinctly known.

Having thus given the best directions in my power, for the success of our cruizers that may be hereafter bound to the South Seas, it might be expected that I should now resume the narrative of our voyage. Yet as, both in the preceding and subsequent parts of this work, I have thought it my duty not only to recite all such facts, and to inculcate such maxims, as had even the least appearance of proving beneficial to future navigators, and also to recommend such measures to the public as seemed adapted to promote the same laudable purpose, I cannot desist from the present subject without beseeching those persons to whom the conduct of our naval affairs is confided, to endeavour to remove the many perplexities and embarrassments with which the navigation to the South Sea is at present encumbered. An effort of this kind could not fail of proving highly honourable to themselves, and extremely beneficial to their country; for it is sufficiently evident, that whatever improvements navigation shall receive, either by the invention of methods by which its practice may be rendered less hazardous, or by the more accurate delineation of the coasts, roads, and harbours already known, or by the discovery of new countries and nations, or of new species and sources of commerce, the advantages thence arising must ultimately redound to the emolument of Great Britain. Since, as our fleets are at present superior to those of the whole world united, it must be a matchless degree of supineness or meanness of spirit, if we permit any of the advantages deriveable from new discoveries, or from a more extended navigation, to be ravished from us.

Since it appears, from what has been already said, that all our future expeditions to the South Seas must run a considerable risk of proving abortive, while we remain under the necessity of touching at Brazil in our passage thither, the discovery of some place more to the southward, where ships might refresh, and supply themselves with the necessary sea stock for their passage round Cape Horn, would relieve us from this embarrassment, and would surely be a matter worthy of the attention of the public. Neither does this seem difficult to be effected, as we already have an imperfect knowledge of two places, which might perhaps prove, on examination, extremely convenient for this purpose. One of these is Pepy's Island, in the latitude of 47° S. and laid down by Dr Bailey about eighty leagues to the eastward of Cape Blanco, on the coast of Patagonia.[1] The other is Falkland's Islands, in lat. 51° 30' S.[2] nearly south of Pepy's Island.

[Footnote 1: Isla Grande, supposed to be the Pepy's Island discovered by Cowley, is in lat. 46° 34' S. and is placed by Mr Dalrymple in long. 46° 40' W. while the illustrious navigator Cook makes its long. 35° 40' W. a difference of longitude of no less than eleven degrees.]

[Footnote 2: The centre of Falkland's Islands is in 51° 45' S. Janson's Islands, the most north-westerly of the group, or the Sebaldines, is in 51°; and Beauchene's Isle, the most southerly, in 53° S.--E.]

The first of these was discovered by Captain Cowley in 1683, during his voyage round the world, and is represented by that navigator as a commodious place for ships to wood and water at, being provided with a good and capacious harbour, where a thousand sail of ships might ride at anchor in great safety, being also the resort of vast numbers of fowls; and as its shores consist of either rocks or sands, it seems to promise great plenty of fish. Falkland's Islands have been seen by many navigators, both French and English. It is laid down by Frezier, in his chart of the extremity of South America, under the name of the New Islands. Woods Rogers, who ran along the N.E. coasts of these islands in 1708, says they extend about two degrees in length,[3] and appeared with gentle descents from hill to hill, seeming to be good ground, interspersed with woods, and not destitute of harbours.

[Footnote 3: The west extremity of this group is in long. 62° W. and the east extremity in 56° 43' W. so that their extent is 5° 12' in difference of longitude.--E.]

Either of these places, being islands at a considerable distance from the continent, may be supposed, from their latitude, to be situated in a sufficiently temperate climate. They are both, it is true, too little known at present to be recommended as the most eligible places of refreshment for ships bound to the South Seas: But, if the admiralty should think proper to order them to be surveyed, which might be done at a very small expence, by a vessel fitted out on purpose; and if, on examination, either one or both should appear proper for serving the end in view, it is scarcely possible to conceive how exceedingly important so convenient a station might prove, so far to the southward, and so near Cape Horn. The Duke and Duchess of Bristol, under Woods Rogers, were only thirty-five days from losing sight of Falkland's Islands to their arrival at Juan Fernandez, in the South Sea; and, as the return back is much facilitated by the western winds, a voyage might doubtless be made from Falkland's Islands to Juan Fernandez and back again in little more than two months. Even in time of peace, this station might be of great consequence to the nation; and in time of war, would render us masters of those seas.

As all discoveries of this kind, though extremely honourable to those who direct and promote them, may yet be carried on at an inconsiderable expence, since small vessels are much the most proper to be employed in this service, it were greatly to be wished that the whole coasts of Patagonia, Terra del Fuego, and Staten-Land, were carefully surveyed, and the numerous channels, roads, harbours, and islands, in which they abound, accurately examined, described, and represented. This might open to us vast facilities for passing into the South Seas, such as hitherto we have no knowledge of, and would render the whole of that southern navigation greatly more secure than it is at present: Particularly as exact draughts of the western coast of Patagonia, from the Straits of Magellan to the Spanish settlements, might furnish us with better and more convenient ports for refreshment, and better situated, both for the purposes of war and commerce, than Juan Fernandez, as being above a fornight's sail nearer to Falkland's Islands.

The discovery of this coast was formerly thought of so much importance, by reason of its neighbourhood to the _Araucos_ and other Indians of Chili, who are generally at war, or at least on ill terms, with the Spaniards, that, in the reign of Charles II. Sir John Narborough was purposely fitted out to survey the Straits of Magellan, the neighbouring coast of Patagonia, and the Spanish ports on that frontier, with directions, if possible, to procure some intercourse with the Chilese Indians, and to establish a commerce and lasting correspondence with them. His majesty's views, on this occasion, were not solely directed to the advantage he might hope to receive from an alliance with these savages, in restraining and intimidating the king of Spain, but he even conceived, independent of these considerations, that an immediate traffic with these Indians might prove highly advantageous to the nation; for it is well known that Chili, at its first discovery by the Spaniards, abounded in vast quantities of gold, much beyond what it has ever produced since it came into their possession. Hence it has been generally believed, that the richest mines are carefully concealed by the Indians, as well knowing that their discovery would excite in the Spaniards a greater thirst for conquest and tyranny, and would render their own independence more precarious. But, in regard to their commerce with the English, could that be established, these reasons would no longer influence them; since it would be in our power to supply them with arms and ammunition of all kinds, together with many other conveniences, which their intercourse with the Spaniards has taught them to relish. They would then, in all probability, open their mines, and gladly embrace a traffic of such mutual advantage to both nations: For their gold, instead of proving an incitement to enslave them, would then procure them weapons with which to assert their liberty, to chastise their tyranny, and to secure themselves for ever from falling under the Spanish yoke; while, with our assistance, and under our protection, they might become a considerable people, and might secure to us that wealth, which was formerly most mischievously lavished by the house of Austria, and lately by the house of Bourbon, in pursuit of universal monarchy.

It is true, that Sir John Narborough did not succeed in opening this commerce, which promised, in appearance, so many advantages to the nation: But his disappointment was merely accidental; and his transactions on that coast, besides the many advantages he furnished to geography and navigation, are rather an encouragement for future trials of this kind, than any objection against them. His principal misfortune was in losing a small bark that accompanied him, and having some of his people trepanned at Baldivia. It even appeared, by the fears and precautions of the Spaniards, that they were fully convinced of the practicability of the scheme he was sent to execute, and were extremely alarmed with apprehensions for its consequences. It is said that Charles II. was so far prepossessed with the belief of the advantages that might redound to the public from this expedition, and was so eager to be informed of the event, on receiving intelligence of Sir John Narborough passing through the Downs on his return, that he had not patience to wait till his arrival at court, but went himself in his barge to meet him at Gravesend.

The two most famous charts hitherto published, [i.e. in 1745,] of the southern parts of South America, are those of Dr Halley, in his General Chart of the Magnetic Variation, and of Frezier, in his Voyage to the South Seas. Besides these, there is a chart of the Straits of Magellan and some parts of the adjacent coast, by Sir John Narborough, which is doubtless infinitely more exact in that part than Frezier's, and even in some parts superior to Halley's, particularly in regard to the longitudes of different places in these straits. We were in some measure capable of correcting, by our own observations, the coast from Cape Blanco to Terra del Fuego, and thence to the Straits of Le Maire, as we ranged along that coast, generally in sight of land. The position of the land to the northward of the Straits of Magellan, on the western side of Patagonia, is doubtless laid down very imperfectly in our charts; and yet I believe it to be much nearer the truth than any hitherto published; as it was drawn from the information of some of the crew of the Wager, which was shipwrecked on that coast; and as it pretty nearly agrees with what I have seen in some Spanish manuscripts. The channel, called Whale Sound, dividing Terra del Fuego, towards the western extremity of the Straits of Magellan, was represented by Frezier; but Sir Francis Drake, who first discovered Cape Horn, and the south-west parts of Terra del Fuego, observed that the whole coast was indented by a great number of inlets, all of which he conceived to communicate with the Straits of Magellan: And I do not doubt, when this country shall be thoroughly examined, that this conjecture will be verified, and that Terra del Fuego will be found to consist of several islands.

I must not omit warning all future navigators against relying on the longitude of the Straits of Le Maire, or of any part of that coast, as laid down by Frezier; the whole being from eight to ten degrees too far to the eastward, if any faith can be given to the concurrent evidences of a great number of journals, verified, in some particulars, by astronomical observations. For instance, Sir John Narborough places Cape Virgin Mary in long. 65° 42' W. from the Lizard, or about 71° 20' from London. The ships of our squadron, taking their departure from St Catharines, where the longitude was rectified by an observation of an eclipse of the moon, found Cape Virgin Mary to be from 70° 15' to 72° 30' W. from London, according to their different reckonings; and, as there were no circumstances in our run that could Tender it considerably erroneous, it cannot be estimated in less than 71° W. from London;[4] whereas Frezier makes it only 66° W. from Paris, which is little more than 63° from London. Again, our squadron found the difference of longitude between Cape Virgin Mary and the Straits of Le Maire to be not more than 2° 30', while Frezier makes the difference nearly 4°,[5] by which he enlarged the coast, from the Straits of Magellan to the Straits of Le Maire, to near double its real extent.[6]

[Footnote 4: Only 67° 40' W. from Greenwich.--E.]

[Footnote 5: The Straits of Le Maire are in long. 65° 30' W. so that the difference is 2° 10'.]

[Footnote 6: Some farther critical observations on the geographical positions, as laid down by Frezier, Sir John Narborough, and Dr Halley, are here omitted, as tending to no use or information; these things having been since ascertained with much more accuracy.--E.]