Chapter I: Introduction

For a complete list of scholars who have devoted more or less attention to the economic ideas of Greek thinkers, the reader is referred to the bibliography at the conclusion of this work. On the surface, the list appears to be reasonably extensive. It will be observed, however, that the majority of the works are not of recent date; that many of them deal largely with the practical phase of economics; that most of the larger works on economic history treat Greek economic and social theory in a merely incidental manner, and that nearly all are written from the general standpoint of the economist rather than with the more detailed analysis of the classicist. The work of Souchon, the most extensive, careful, and satisfactory discussion of the subject, is no exception to this latter rule, and since his standpoint is too exclusively that of the older English economists, his criticism of the Greek theories is not always sufficiently sympathetic. The monumental volumes of Poehlmann have treated Greek social theories thoroughly, but the chief interest of the author is rather in the actual social conditions, and his work is marred by a constant overemphasis of the analogy between ancient and modern capitalism and socialistic agitation. Moreover, there is no book in the English language, on Greek economic thought, that treats the subject in anything more than the cursory manner of Haney and Ingram.[1] There is, thus, still a place for a work of this type in the English language, written from the standpoint of the classicist, but with a view also to the needs of twentieth-century students of economics.

The present work aims to fulfil such a need. Its scope differs quite essentially from all other accounts of Greek theory previously published, in that our purpose is not merely to consider the extent to which the Greek thinkers grasped the principles of the orthodox economy of Ricardo and Mill. We shall also endeavor to ascertain how far they, by the humanitarian and ethical tone of their thinking, anticipated the modern, post-Ruskin economy, which makes man, not property, the supreme goal, and recognizes the multiplicity of human interests and strivings that belie the old theory of the “economic man.” Our verdict as to the importance of the Greek contribution to economic thought is thus likely to be somewhat more favorable than that which is usually rendered.

We purpose also to emphasize more than is often done the important fact that Greek theory is essentially a reflection of Greek economic conditions, and that a true interpretation of the thought depends upon a clear understanding of the economic history of Greece. However, as we shall see, this by no means implies that the anti-capitalistic theories of the Socratics are evidence of an undeveloped state of commerce and industry in fifth- and fourth-century Athens.

The method of presentation is primarily chronological. Thus the ideas of each thinker can be discussed in a more thorough and unitary manner, and more in relation to the contemporary economic conditions that gave rise to them. Moreover, despite some practical advantages of the topical method, it savors too much of an artificial attempt to force the Greek thinkers on the procrustean rack of the concepts of modern economy.

The general characteristics of Greek economic thought have often been enumerated. They may be restated with advantage, at this point, together with some additions and needed criticisms.

1. _Simplicity._—The theory of economics as a separate science never developed in Greece. The consideration of economic problems was incidental to the pursuit of politics and ethics. In so far as Greek thinkers treated such subjects, their theories reflect the comparative simplicity of their economic environment. Without prejudging the issue as to the actual extent of capitalism in ancient Athens, we need only to think away the vast international scope of our modern commercial problems, our giant manufacturing plants with their steam and electric power, our enormous wealth and its extreme concentration, the untold complexity of modern business and finance, the vast territorial expanse of modern nations, almost all our luxuries and commonplace comforts, to begin to appreciate something of this ancient simplicity.[2] However, as a direct result of this limitation, the Greeks were led to deal with their problems more in terms of men than in terms of things, and thus their economic vision was sometimes clearer and truer than our own. Aristotle struck the keynote in Greek economic thought in stating that the primary interest of economy is human beings rather than inanimate property.[3]

2. _Confusion of private and public economy._—As a result of this simplicity, the terms οἰκονομία and οἰκονομική were, both in derivation and largely in usage, referred to household management rather than to public economy.[4] Domestic and public economy were regularly defined as differing merely in extent.[5] Aristotle, however, distinctly criticizes the confusion of the two.[6] Moreover, there is no warrant for the frequent assertion that Greek thinkers never rose above the conception of domestic economy. Xenophon’s treatise on the _Revenues of Athens_, and Aristotle’s entire philosophy of the state are a sufficient answer to such generalizations. The statement of Professor Barker that “political economy,” to Aristotle, would be a “contradiction in terms,” is extreme.[7] There is also a certain important truth in the Greek confusion, which has been too generally missed by modern critics and statesmen—that the public is a great property-holder, and that politics should be a business which requires the application of the same economic and ethical laws as are admitted to govern in private affairs.

3. _Confusion of economics with ethics and politics._—The assertion that Greek economic theory was confounded with ethics and politics has become a commonplace. The economic ideas of Greek thinkers were not arrived at as a result of a purposeful study of the problems of material wealth. All economic relations were considered primarily from the standpoint of ethics and state welfare. “The citizen was not regarded as a producer, but only as a possessor of wealth.”[8] Such statements are too commonly accepted as a final criticism of Greek thinkers. Though the confusion was a source of error, and caused Greek economic thought to be one-sided and incomplete, yet some important considerations should be noted.

_a_) The Socratic philosophers are our chief source for the economic ideas of the Greeks. Too sweeping conclusions should not, therefore, be drawn from them as to the general attitude of the Greeks. Xenophon is much freer from the ethical emphasis than the other Socratics. Thucydides is entirely free from it, and very probably his standpoint came much nearer being that of the average Athenian citizen.

_b_) The confusion was not merely with individual ethics, for Greek moral philosophy always had the welfare of the state for its goal. Indeed, the basal reason for this close union of economics, ethics, and politics is the true idea that the state should rise above internal strife, and unite all in a care for the common interest.[9]

_c_) The standpoint of the Greek philosophers is certainly no more to be criticized than is that of the so-called orthodox political economy.[10] They represent two extremes. If the Greek theory did not give to wealth its full right, and was open to the charge of sentimentalism, the Ricardian doctrine, with its “economic man,” which eliminated all other ideals and impulses, was an unreal and pernicious abstraction. Of the two errors, the Greek is the less objectionable, and is more in accord with the trend of economic thought today. The best economists are now insisting more and more on the Greek idea that economic problems must be considered from the standpoint of the whole man as a citizen in society. Modern political economy “has placed man as man and not wealth in the foreground, and subordinated everything to his true welfare.” “Love, generosity, nobility of character, self-sacrifice, and all that is best and truest in our nature have their place in economic life.”[11] “The science which deals with wealth, so far from being a ‘gospel of Mammon,’ necessarily begins and ends in the study of man.”[12] “Es soll kein Widerspruch zwischen Ethik und Volkswirtschaft bestehen, es soll das Sittengesetz für die Wirtschaft gelten und in ihr ausgeführt werden.”[13] Such strong statements taken at random from modern economists should serve to temper our criticism of the Greek confusion. Plato’s definition of economics, as suggested by one of the most recent historians of economic thought,[14] could easily be accepted by many a modern scholar: “Economics is the science which deals with the satisfaction of human wants through exchange, seeking so to regulate the industries of the state as to make its citizens good and happy, and so to promote the highest well-being of the whole.” The contention of the Socratics, that all economic operations must finally root in the moral, that all economic problems are moral problems, and that the province of economics is human welfare, is thus a dominant twentieth-century idea. And just as the ethical interest of the Greek philosophers caused them to emphasize the problems of distribution and consumption, so these are the phases of economics that receive chief consideration today. To be sure, modern thought appreciates more fully the complementary truth that all our social and moral problems root essentially in economic conditions, though this too was by no means overlooked by Plato and Aristotle.

4. _Ascetic tendency._—It cannot be denied, however, that, as a result of the overemphasis on the ethical, Greek economic thought was hampered by a certain asceticism. But this was also an outgrowth of pessimistic tendencies in Greek philosophy itself. Moreover, the ascetic ideas of the philosophers cannot be accepted as the common attitude of Athenian citizens, any more than Thoreau can be recognized as a criterion of the economic thought of his day in New England.[15] Asceticism was certainly foreign to the mind of Pericles and Thucydides. In the course of our discussion, also, we shall find that it represents, after all, only one phase of the thought of the philosophers themselves.

5. _Socialistic tendency._—Since Greek economy was chiefly interested in the problems of distribution, it tended toward socialism, both in theory and in practice. This was also a natural outgrowth of the fact that individual interests were subordinated to public welfare. Though the latter half of the fifth century witnessed a great individualistic movement in Greece, and though individualism and independence are often named as prominent Greek characteristics, yet these terms did not constitute a basal political principle, even in the free Athenian democracy, in the same sense as they do with us today. The life of the Greek citizen was lived far more for the state, and was more absolutely at the disposal of the state, than is true in any modern democracy. In Greece, politics was thus the social science of first importance, and the supreme purpose of all human activity was to make good citizens. State interference or regulation was thus accepted as a matter of course, and the setting of prices, rigid regulation of grain commerce, exploitation of the rich in the interest of the poor, and public ownership of great material interests such as mines were not revolutionary ideas, but common facts in Greek life.[16] The tendency of the theorists was therefore naturally toward centralization of power in the hands of the state, and an exaggerated idea of the omnipotence of law.[17] Yet despite the error inherent in it, this socialistic tendency of Greek economic thought had its basal truth, which is becoming an axiom of modern economics and statesmanship—the belief that private property is not a natural right, but a gift of society, and hence that its activities should be controlled by society, and made to minister to public welfare. Indeed, we have by no means escaped the error of the Greek thinkers, for one of the most common mistakes of statesmen and political theorists today is an overestimate of the effectiveness of law.

Footnote 1:

F. Wilhelm (_Rhein. Mus._, XVII, No. 2 [1915], 163, n. 2) says: “Eine
Geschichte der theoretischen Behandlung der Oekonomik bei den Griechen
ist noch zu schreiben.” The present work was undertaken in the year
1911.

Footnote 2:

Cf. Zimmern, _Greek Commonwealth_, pp. 211 ff.; but the statement on
p. 222 is extreme: “where competition and unemployment are unknown
terms, where hardly anyone is working precariously for money wages or
salary.”

Footnote 3:

Cf. Roscher, _Ansichten der Volkswirtschaft_ (1878), I, chap. i, p. 7;
Ar. _Pol._ 1259_b_18-21.

Footnote 4:

Cf. Plato _Rep._ 498A; Xen. _Econ._, a treatise on household
management; Ar. _Pol._ i. p. 3, on the divisions of οἰκονομία; chap.
8, on whether finance (χρηματιστική) is a part of οἰκονομική;
pseudo-Ar. _Economica_; cf. _infra_, p. 63, nn. 5 and 6; p. 82, n. 1;
p. 128, for fuller discussion.

Footnote 5:

Xen. _Mem._ iii. 4. 6 ff., especially 12; _Econ._ xx; Plato _Pol._ 259
B-C; cf., on this passage, Espinas, _Revue des Etudes Grecques_, XXVII
(1914), 105; cf. Ruskin: “Economy no more means saving money than it
means spending money. It means the administration of a house” (_A Joy
Forever_, I, 8, Allen ed., London, 1912, Vol. XVI, 19). We shall
frequently quote from this monumental edition of Ruskin.

Footnote 6:

_Pol._ i. 1. 2: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἵονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ
οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν.

Footnote 7:

_Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle_, p. 357; cf. Zmavc,
_Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswissenschaft_, 1902, pp. 59 f., and
his references to Boeckh, Meyer, and Beloch; Kautz, _Die Gesch. d.
Entwickelung der National Ökonomik_, p. 133, n. 5; for note on the
authorship of the _Revenues_, cf. _infra_, p. 63, n. 2.

Footnote 8:

Ingram, _History of Political Economy_, p. 12; cf. Souchon, _Les
Théories économiques dans la Grèce antique_, p. 34.

Footnote 9:

Cf. Souchon, _op. cit._, pp. 31 ff.

Footnote 10:

Cf. V. Brants, _Xenophon Economiste_, reprint from _Revue Catholique
de Louvain_, 1881, pp. 4 ff.

Footnote 11:

Ely, _Studies in Historical and Political Science_, 2d series, pp. 48
ff., especially p. 64, where he states that it is a return to the
Greek view.

Footnote 12:

Ely, _Outlines of Economics_, 1908, pp. 4 ff.; cf. Seligman,
_Principles of Economy_, (1905), pp. 4 ff., especially p. 14, where he
even quotes the sentences of Ruskin with approval: “There is no wealth
but life”; “Nor can anything be wealth except to a noble person”
(_Unto This Last_, IV, 77 [Vol. XVII, 105]). All citations will be
from the Allen library edition unless otherwise stated.

Footnote 13:

Schoenberg, _Handbuch der polit. Econ._ (1890), I, 56.

Footnote 14:

Haney, _History of Economic Thought_, p. 52; cf. Ely, _op. cit._, p.
48, n. 1, cited in n. 1, above, for a similar definition based on
Plato.

Footnote 15:

Kautz (_op. cit._, p. 57) goes to the extreme of saying that antiquity
represents “die Negation der ökonomischen Interessen und der
wirtschaftlichen Arbeit.”

Footnote 16:

Even abolition of debts and redivision of lands were not unknown in
Greek history. Grote (_History of Greece_, III, 105 f. and notes)
denies this, but the heliastic oath, which he cites (Dem. _Adv.
Timoc._ 746, and Dio Chrysost. Or. xxxi. 332), proves that such
measures were agitated, or there would be no reason for protective
measures. Cf. _infra_, Plato (_Laws_, 736E), who takes this for
granted. Cf. Solon’s Fragments; Isoc. (_Panath._ 259) says that it
would be hard to find a Greek state, except Sparta, that has not
fallen into “the accustomed accidents,” viz., στάσιν, σφαγάς, φυγὰς
ἀνόμους, ἁρπαγὰς χρημάτων, χρεῶν ἀποκοπάς, γῆς ἀναδασμόν, etc.

Footnote 17:

Cf. _infra._ for citations and qualifications.