Chapter VI: The Jaina Philosophy (1)

The Origin of Jainism.

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nâtaputta Varddhamâna Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahâvîra the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahâvîra was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet (Tïrtha@nkara) of Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pârs'va, the last Tîrtha@nkara but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahâvîra, while Pârs'va's predecessor Ari@s@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahâvîra's Nirvâ@na. The story in _Uttarâdhyayanasûtra_ that a disciple of Pârs'va met a disciple of Mahâvîra and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahâvîra seems to suggest that this Pârs'va was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tirthankaras. In the present period the first Tîrtha@nkara was @R@sabha and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamâna Mahâvîra. All

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

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Tîrtha@nkaras have reached mok@sa at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "Gods" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref 1].

Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetâmbaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the Tîrtha@nkaras live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahâvîra was not removed from the womb of Devanandâ to that of Tris'alâ as the S'vetâmbaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach Mok@sa, fourthly that no woman can reach Mok@sa [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the S'vetâmbaras and assert that these had been lost immediately after Mahâvîra. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhûti (A.D. 83) by the S'vetâmbaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetâmbara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabâhu, the eighth sage after Mahâvîra, the last Tîrtha@nkara, there rose the sect of Ardhaphâlakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetâmbaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the S'vetâmbaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed. It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the S'vetâmbaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called _gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

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[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, xxxii [1903] p. 459" of J. Burgess, and Bûhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathurâ," in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 3: See Gu@naratna's commentary on Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

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preserved a list of the succession of their teachers from Mahâvîra (_sthavirâvali, pa@t@tâvali, gurvâvali_) and also many legends about them such as those in the _Kalpasûtra_, the _Paris'i@s@ta-parvan_ of Hemacandra, etc.

The Canonical and other Literature of the Jains.

According to the Jains there were originally two kinds of sacred books, the fourteen Pûrvas and the eleven A@ngas. The Pûrvas continued to be transmitted for some time but were gradually lost. The works known as the eleven A@ngas are now the oldest parts of the existing Jain canon. The names of these are _Âcâra, Sûtrak@rta, Sthâna, Samavâya Bhagavatî, Jñâtadharmakathâs, Upâsakadas'âs, Antak@rtadas'âs Anuttaraupapâtikadas'âs, Pras'navyâkara@na, Vipâka_. In addition to these there are the twelve _Upâ@ngas_ [Footnote ref 1], the ten _Prakîr@nas_ [Footnote ref 2], six _Chedasûtras_ [Footnote ref 3], _Nândî_ and _Anuyogadvâra_ and four _Mûlasûtras_ (_Uttarâdhyayana, Âvas'yaka, Das'avaikâlika_, and _Pi@n@daniryukti_). The Digambaras however assert that these original works have all been lost, and that the present works which pass by the old names are spurious. The original language of these according to the Jains was Ardhamâgadhî, but these suffered attempts at modernization and it is best to call the language of the sacred texts Jaina Prâkrit and that of the later works Jaina Mahârâ@s@trî. A large literature of glosses and commentaries has grown up round the sacred texts. And besides these, the Jains possess separate works, which contain systematic expositions of their faith in Prâkrit and Sanskrit. Many commentaries have also been written upon these independent treatises. One of the oldest of these treatises is Umâsvâti's _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_(1-85 A.D.). Some of the most important later Jaina works on which this chapter is based are _Vis'e@sâvas'yakabhâ@sya_, Jaina _Tarkavârttika_, with the commentary of S'ântyâcâryya, _Dravyasa@mgraha_ of Nemicandra (1150 A.D.), _Syâdvâdamañjarî_ of Malli@sena (1292 A.D.), _Nyâyâvatâra_ of Siddhasena Divâkara (533 A.D.), _Parîk@sâmukhasûtralaghuv@rtti_ of Anantavîryya (1039 A.D.), _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da_ of Prabhâcandra

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[Footnote 1: _Aupapâtika, Râjapras'nîya, Jîvâbhigama, Prajñâpanâ, Jambudvîpaprajñapti, Candraprajñapti, Sûryaprajñapti, Nirayâvali, Kalpâvata@msikâ, Pu@spikâ, Pu@spacûlikâ, V@r@s@nida@sâs_.]

[Footnote 2: _Catu@hs'ara@na, Sa@mstâra, Âturapratyâkhyâna, Bhaktâparijñâ, Ta@ndulavaiyâlî, Ca@n@dâvîja, Devendrastava, Ga@nivîja, Mahâpratyâkhyâna, Vîrastava_.]

[Footnote 3: _Nis'îtha, Mahânis'îtha, Vyavahâra, Das'as'rutaskandha, B@rhatkalpa, Pañcakalpa_.]

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(825 A.D.), _Yogas'âstra_ of Hemacandra (1088-1172 A.D.), and _Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra_ of Deva Sûri (1086-1169 A.D.). I am indebted for these dates to Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_.

It may here be mentioned that the Jains also possess a secular literature of their own in poetry and prose, both Sanskrit and Prâkrit. There are also many moral tales (e.g. _Samarâicca-kahâ, Upamitabhavaprapañca-kathâ_ in Prâkrit, and the _Yas'astilaka_ of Somadeva and Dhanapâla's _Tilakamañjarî_); Jaina Sanskrit poems both in the Purâ@na and Kâvya style and hymns in Prâkrit and Sanskrit are also very numerous. There are also many Jaina dramas. The Jaina authors have also contributed many works, original treatises as well as commentaries, to the scientific literature of India in its various branches: grammar, biography, metrics, poetics, philosophy, etc. The contributions of the Jains to logic deserve special notice [Footnote ref 1].

Some General Characteristics of the Jains.

The Jains exist only in India and their number is a little less than a million and a half. The Digambaras are found chiefly in Southern India but also in the North, in the North-western provinces, Eastern Râjputâna and the Punjab. The head-quarters of the S'vetâmbaras are in Gujarat and Western Râjputâna, but they are to be found also all over Northern and Central India.

The outfit of a monk, as Jacobi describes it, is restricted to bare necessaries, and these he must beg--clothes, a blanket, an alms-bowl, a stick, a broom to sweep the ground, a piece of cloth to cover his mouth when speaking lest insects should enter it [Footnote ref 2]. The outfit of nuns is the same except that they have additional clothes. The Digambaras have a similar outfit, but keep no clothes, use brooms of peacock's feathers or hairs of the tail of a cow (_câmara_) [Footnote ref 3]. The monks shave the head or remove the hair by plucking it out. The latter method of getting rid of the hair is to be preferred, and is regarded sometimes as an essential rite. The duties of monks are very hard. They should sleep only three hours and spend the rest of the time in repenting of and expiating sins, meditating, studying, begging alms (in the afternoon), and careful inspection of their clothes and other things for the removal of insects. The laymen should try to approach the ideal of conduct of the monks

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism. _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi, _loc. cat._]

[Footnote 3: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, chapter IV.]

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by taking upon themselves particular vows, and the monks are required to deliver sermons and explain the sacred texts in the upâs'rayas (separate buildings for monks like the Buddhist vihâras). The principle of extreme carefulness not to destroy any living being has been in monastic life carried out to its very last consequences, and has shaped the conduct of the laity in a great measure. No layman will intentionally kill any living being, not even an insect, however troublesome. He will remove it carefully without hurting it. The principle of not hurting any living being thus bars them from many professions such as agriculture, etc., and has thrust them into commerce [Footnote ref 1].

Life of Mahâvîra.

Mahâvîra, the last prophet of the Jains, was a K@sattriya of the Jñâta clan and a native of Vais'âli (modern Besarh, 27 miles north of Patna). He was the second son of Siddhârtha and Trîs'alâ. The S'vetâmbaras maintain that the embryo of the Tîrtha@nkara which first entered the womb of the Brahmin lady Devanandâ was then transferred to the womb of Trîs'alâ. This story the Digambaras do not believe as we have already seen. His parents were the worshippers of Pârs'va and gave him the name Varddhamâna (Vîra or Mahâvîra). He married Yas'odâ and had a daughter by her. In his thirtieth year his parents died and with the permission of his brother Nandivardhana he became a monk. After twelve years of self-mortification and meditation he attained omniscience (_kevala_, cf. _bodhi_ of the Buddhists). He lived to preach for forty-two years more, and attained mok@sa (emancipation) some years before Buddha in about 480 B.C. [Footnote ref 2].

The Fundamental Ideas of Jaina Ontology.

A thing (such as clay) is seen to assume various shapes and to undergo diverse changes (such as the form of a jug, or pan, etc.), and we have seen that the Chândogya Upani@sad held that since in all changes the clay-matter remained permanent, that alone was true, whereas the changes of form and state were but appearances, the nature of which cannot be rationally

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Hoernlé's translation of _Uvâsagadasâo_, Jacobi, _loc. cit_., and Hoernlé's article on the Âjîvakas, _E. R.E._ The S'vetâmbaras, however, say that this date was 527 B.C. and the Digambaras place it eighteen years later.]

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demonstrated or explained. The unchangeable substance (e.g. the clay-matter) alone is true, and the changing forms are mere illusions of the senses, mere objects of name (_nâma-rûpa_) [Footnote ref 1]. What we call tangibility, visibility, or other sense-qualities, have no real existence, for they are always changing, and are like mere phantoms of which no conception can be made by the light of reason.

The Buddhists hold that changing qualities can alone be perceived and that there is no unchanging substance behind them. What we perceive as clay is but some specific quality, what we perceive as jug is also some quality. Apart from these qualities we do not perceive any qualitiless substance, which the Upani@sads regard as permanent and unchangeable. The permanent and unchangeable substance is thus a mere fiction of ignorance, as there are only the passing collocations of qualities. Qualities do not imply that there are substances to which they adhere, for the so-called pure substance does not exist, as it can neither be perceived by the senses nor inferred. There are only the momentary passing qualities. We should regard each change of quality as a new existence.

The Jains we know were the contemporaries of Buddha and possibly of some of the Upani@sads too, and they had also a solution to offer. They held that it was not true that substance alone was true and qualities were mere false and illusory appearances. Further it was not true as the Buddhists said that there was no permanent substance but merely the change of passing qualities, for both these represent two extreme views and are contrary to experience. Both of them, however, contain some elements of truth but not the whole truth as given in experience. Experience shows that in all changes there are three elements: (1) that some collocations of qualities appear to remain unchanged; (2) that some new qualities are generated; (3) that some old qualities are destroyed. It is true that qualities of things are changing every minute, but all qualities are not changing. Thus when a jug is made, it means that the clay-lump has been destroyed, a jug has been generated and the clay is permanent, i.e. all production means that some old qualities have been lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent The clay has become lost in some form, has generated itself in another, and remained permanent in still

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[Footnote 1: See Chândogya, VI. 1.]

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another form. It is by virtue of these unchanged qualities that a thing is said to be permanent though undergoing change. Thus when a lump of gold is turned into a rod or a ring, all the specific qualities which come under the connotation of the word "gold" are seen to continue, though the forms are successively changed, and with each such change some of its qualities are lost and some new ones are acquired. Such being the case, the truth comes to this, that there is always a permanent entity as represented by the permanence of such qualities as lead us to call it a substance in spite of all its diverse changes. The nature of being (_sat_) then is neither the absolutely unchangeable, nor the momentary changing qualities or existences, but involves them both. Being then, as is testified by experience, is that which involves a permanent unit, which is incessantly every moment losing some qualities and gaining new ones. The notion of being involves a permanent (_dhruva_) accession of some new qualities (_utpâda_) and loss of some old qualities (_vyaya_) [Footnote ref.1]. The solution of Jainism is thus a reconciliation of the two extremes of Vedantism and Buddhism on grounds of common-sense experience.

The Doctrine of Relative Pluralism (anekântavâda).

This conception of being as the union of the permanent and change brings us naturally to the doctrine of Anekântavâda or what we may call relative pluralism as against the extreme absolutism of the Upani@sads and the pluralism of the Buddhists. The Jains regarded all things as _anekânta_ (_na-ekânta_), or in other words they held that nothing could be affirmed absolutely, as all affirmations were true only under certain conditions and limitations. Thus speaking of a gold jug, we see that its existence as a substance (_dravya_) is of the nature of a collocation of atoms and not as any other substance such as space (_âkâs'a_), i.e. a gold jug is a _dravya_ only in one sense of the term and not in every sense; so it is a _dravya_ in the sense that it is a collocation of atoms and not a _dravya_ in the sense of space or time (_kâla_). It is thus both a dravya and not a dravya at one and the same time. Again it is atomic in the sense that it is a composite of earth-atoms and not atomic in the sense that it is

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[Footnote: 1: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and Gu@naratna's treatment of Jainism in _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_.]

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not a composite of water-atoms. Again it is a composite of earth-atoms only in the sense that gold is a metallic modification of earth, and not any other modification of earth as clay or stone. Its being constituted of metal-atoms is again true in the sense that it is made up of gold-atoms and not of iron-atoms. It is made up again of gold-atoms in the sense of melted and unsullied gold and not as gold in the natural condition. It is again made up of such unsullied and melted gold as has been hammered and shaped by the goldsmith Devadatta and not by Yajñadatta. Its being made up of atoms conditioned as above is again only true in the sense that the collocation has been shaped as a jug and not as a pot and so on. Thus proceeding in a similar manner the Jains say that all affirmations are true of a thing only in a certain limited sense. All things (_vastu_) thus possess an infinite number of qualities (_anantadharmâtmaka@m vastu_), each of which can only be affirmed in a particular sense. Such an ordinary thing as a jug will be found to be the object of an infinite number of affirmations and the possessor of an infinite number of qualities from infinite points of view, which are all true in certain restricted senses and not absolutely [Footnote ref l]. Thus in the positive relation riches cannot be affirmed of poverty but in the negative relation such an affirmation is possible as when we say "the poor man has no riches." The poor man possesses riches not in a positive but in a negative way. Thus in some relation or other anything may be affirmed of any other thing, and again in other relations the very same thing cannot be affirmed of it. The different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that, are technically called _naya_ [Footnote ref 2].

The Doctrine of Nayas.

In framing judgments about things there are two ways open to us, firstly we may notice the manifold qualities and characteristics of anything but view them as unified in the thing; thus when we say "this is a book" we do not look at its characteristic qualities as being different from it, but rather the qualities or characteristics are perceived as having no separate existence from

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[Footnote 1: See Gu@naratna on Jainamata in _@Sa@ddarsanasamuccaya_, pp. 211. etc., and also _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_.]

[Footnote 2: See _Tattvârthâdhigamasûtra_, and _Vis'e@sâvalyaka bhâ@sya_, pp. 895-923.]

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the thing. Secondly we may notice the qualities separately and regard the thing as a mere non-existent fiction (cf. the Buddhist view); thus I may speak of the different qualities of the book separately and hold that the qualities of things are alone perceptible and the book apart from these cannot be found. These two points of view are respectively called _dravyanaya_ and _paryâyanaya_ [Footnote ref 1]. The dravyanaya again shows itself in three forms, and paryayanaya in four forms, of which the first form only is important for our purposes, the other three being important rather from the point of view of grammar and language had better be omitted here. The three nayas under dravyanaya are called naigama-naya, sa@mgraha-naya and vyavahâra-naya.

When we speak of a thing from a purely common sense point of view, we do not make our ideas clear or precise. Thus I may hold a book in my hand and when asked whether my hands are empty, I may say, no, I have something in my hand, or I may say, I have a book in my hand. It is evident that in the first answer I looked at the book from the widest and most general point of view as a "thing," whereas in the second I looked at it in its special existence as a book. Again I may be reading a page of a book, and I may say I am reading a book, but in reality I was reading only one of the pages of the book. I may be scribbling on loose sheets, and may say this is my book on Jaina philosophy, whereas in reality there were no books but merely some loose sheets. This looking at things from the loose common sense view, in which we do not consider them from the point of view of their most general characteristic as "being" or as any of their special characteristics, but simply as they appear at first sight, is technically called the naigama standpoint. This empirical view probably proceeds on the assumption that a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special qualities, and hence we may lay stress on any one of these at any time and ignore the other ones. This is the point of view from which according to the Jains the Nyâya and Vais'e@sika schools interpret experience.

Sa@mgraha-naya is the looking at things merely from the most general point of view. Thus we may speak of all individual things from their most general and fundamental aspect as "being." This according to the Jains is the Vedânta way of looking at things.

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[Footnote 1: _Syâdvâdama@njarî_, pp. 171-173.]

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The vyavahâra-naya standpoint holds that the real essence of things is to be regarded from the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits, which has been existing from past times and remain in the future, but yet suffer trifling changes all the while, changes which are serviceable to us in a thousand ways. Thus a "book" has no doubt some general traits, shared by all books, but it has some special traits as well. Its atoms are continually suffering some displacement and rearrangement, but yet it has been existing as a book for some time past and will exist for some time in the future as well. All these characteristics, go to make up the essence of the "book" of our everyday experience, and none of these can be separated and held up as being the concept of a "book." This according to the Jains is the Sâ@mkhya way of looking at things.

The first view of paryâya-naya called _@rjusûtra_ is the Buddhist view which does not believe in the existence of the thing in the past or in the future, but holds that a thing is a mere conglomeration of characteristics which may be said to produce effects at any given moment. At each new moment there are new collocations of new qualities and it is these which may be regarded as the true essence of our notion of things [Footnote ref 1].

The nayas as we have already said are but points of view, or aspects of looking at things, and as such are infinite in number. The above four represent only a broad classification of these. The Jains hold that the Nyâya-Vais'e@sika, the Vedânta, the Sâ@mkhya, and the Buddhist, have each tried to interpret and systematize experience from one of the above four points of view, and each regards the interpretation from his point of view as being absolutely true to the exclusion of all other points of view. This is their error (_nayâbhâsa_), for each standpoint represents only one of the many points of view from which a thing can be looked at. The affirmations from any point of view are thus true in a limited sense and under limited conditions. Infinite numbers of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view. Affirmations or judgments according to any naya or standpoint cannot therefore be absolute, for even contrary affirmations of the very selfsame

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[Footnote 1: The other standpoints of paryâya-naya, which represent grammatical and linguistic points of view, are _s'abda-naya, samabhirû@dha-naya_, and _evambhûla-naya_. See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka bhâ@sya_, pp. 895-923.]

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things may be held to be true from other points of view. The truth of each affirmation is thus only conditional, and inconceivable from the absolute point of view. To guarantee correctness therefore each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase _syât_ (may be). This will indicate that the affirmation is only relative, made somehow, from some point of view and under some reservations and not in any sense absolute. There is no judgment which is absolutely true, and no judgment which is absolutely false. All judgments are true in some sense and false in another. This brings us to the famous Jaina doctrine of Syâdvâda [Footnote ref 1].

The Doctrine of Syâdvâda.

The doctrine of Syâdvâda holds that since the most contrary characteristics of infinite variety may be associated with a thing, affirmation made from whatever standpoint (_naya_) cannot be regarded as absolute. All affirmations are true (in some _syâdasti_ or "may be it is" sense); all affirmations are false in some sense; all affirmations are indefinite or inconceivable in some sense (_syâdavaktavya_); all affirmations are true as well as false in some sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti_); all affirmations are true as well as indefinite (_syâdasti câvaktavyas'ca_); all affirmations are false as well as indefinite; all affirmations are true and false and indefinite in some sense (_syâdasti syânnâsti syâdavaktavyas'ca_). Thus we may say "the jug is" or the jug has being, but it is more correct to say explicitly that "may be (syât) that the jug is," otherwise if "being" here is taken absolutely of any and every kind of being, it might also mean that there is a lump of clay or a pillar, or a cloth or any other thing. The existence here is limited and defined by the form of the jug. "The jug is" does not mean absolute existence but a limited kind of existence as determined by the form of the jug, "The jug is" thus means that a limited kind of existence, namely the jug-existence is affirmed and not existence in general in the absolute or unlimited sense, for then the sentence "the jug is" might as well mean "the clay is," "the tree is," "the cloth is," etc. Again the existence of the jug is determined by the negation of all other things in the world; each quality or characteristic (such as red colour) of the jug is apprehended and defined by the negation of all the infinite varieties (such as black, blue, golden), etc., of its class, and it is by the combined negation of all

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[Footnote 1: See _Vis'e@sâvas'yaka bhâ@sya_, pp. 895, etc., and _Syâdvâdamañjarî_, pp. 170, etc.]

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the infinite number of characteristics or qualities other than those constituting the jug that a jug may be apprehended or defined. What we call the being of the jug is thus the non-being of all the rest except itself. Thus though looked at from one point of view the judgment "the jug is" may mean affirmation of being, looked at from another point of view it means an affirmation of non-being (of all other objects). Thus of the judgment "the jug is" one may say, may be it is an affirmation of being (_syâdasti_), may be it is a negation of being (_syânnâsti_); or I may proceed in quite another way and say that "the jug is" means "this jug is here," which naturally indicates that "this jug is not there" and thus the judgment "the jug is" (i.e. is here) also means that "the jug is not there," and so we see that the affirmation of the being of the jug is true only of this place and false of another, and this justifies us in saying that "may be that in some sense the jug is," and "may be in some sense that the jug is not." Combining these two aspects we may say that in some sense "may be that the jug is," and in some sense "may be that the jug is not." We understood here that if we put emphasis on the side of the characteristics constituting being, we may say "the jug is," but if we put emphasis on the other side, we may as well say "the jug is not." Both the affirmations hold good of the jug according as the emphasis is put on either side. But if without emphasis on either side we try to comprehend the two opposite and contradictory judgments regarding the jug, we see that the nature of the jug or of the existence of the jug is indefinite, unspeakable and inconceivable--_avaktavya,_ for how can we affirm both being and non-being of the same thing, and yet such is the nature of things that we cannot but do it. Thus all affirmations are true, are not true, are both true and untrue, and are thus unspeakable, inconceivable, and indefinite. Combining these four again we derive another three, (1) that in some sense it may be that the jug is, and (2) is yet unspeakable, or (3) that the jug is not and is unspeakable, or finally that the jug is, is not, and is unspeakable. Thus the Jains hold that no affirmation, or judgment, is absolute in its nature, each is true in its own limited sense only, and for each one of them any of the above seven alternatives (technically called _saptabha@ngî_ holds good [Footnote ref 1]. The Jains say that other Indian systems each from its own point of view asserts itself to be the absolute and the only

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[Footnote 1: See _Syâdvâdamañjarî_, with Hemacandra's commentary, pp. 166, etc.]

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point of view. They do not perceive that the nature of reality is such that the truth of any assertion is merely conditional, and holds good only in certain conditions, circumstances, or senses (_upâdhi_). It is thus impossible to make any affirmation which is universally and absolutely valid. For a contrary or contradictory affirmation will always be found to hold good of any judgment in some sense or other. As all reality is partly permanent and partly exposed to change of the form of losing and gaining old and new qualities, and is thus relatively permanent and changeful, so all our affirmations regarding truth are also only relatively valid and invalid. Being, non-being and indefinite, the three categories of logic, are all equally available in some sense or other in all their permutations for any and every kind of judgment. There is no universal and absolute position or negation, and all judgments are valid only conditionally. The relation of the naya doctrine with the syâdvâda doctrine is therefore this, that for any judgment according to any and every naya there are as many alternatives as are indicated by syâdvâda. The validity of such a judgment is therefore only conditional. If this is borne in mind when making any judgment according to any naya, the naya is rightly used. If, however, the judgments are made absolutely according to any particular naya without any reference to other nayas as required by the syâdvâda doctrine the nayas are wrongly used as in the case of other systems, and then such judgments are false and should therefore be called false nayas (_nayâbhâsa_) [Footnote ref 1].

Knowledge, its value for us.

The Buddhist Dharmottara in his commentary on _Nyâyabindu_ says that people who are anxious to fulfil some purpose or end in which they are interested, value the knowledge which helps them to attain that purpose. It is because knowledge is thus found to be useful and sought by men that philosophy takes upon it the task of examining the nature of true knowledge (_samyagjñâna_ or _pramâ@na_). The main test of true knowledge is that it helps us to attain our purpose. The Jains also are in general agreement with the above view of knowledge of the Buddhists [Footnote ref 2]. They also

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[Footnote 1: The earliest mention of the doctrine of syâdvâda and saptabha@ngî probably occurs in Bhadrabâhu's (433-357 B.C.) commentary _Sûtrak@rtânganiryukti_.

[Footnote 2: See _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra_ (Benares), p. 16; also _Parîk@sâ-mukha-sûira-v@rtti_ (Asiatic Society), ch. I.]

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say that knowledge is not to be valued for its own sake. The validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of anything consists in this, that it directly helps us to get what is good for us and to avoid what is bad for us. Knowledge alone has this capacity, for by it we can adapt ourselves to our environments and try to acquire what is good for us and avoid what is bad [Footnote ref 1]. The conditions that lead to the production of such knowledge (such as the presence of full light and proximity to the eye in the case of seeing an object by visual perception) have but little relevancy in this connection. For we are not concerned with how a cognition is produced, as it can be of no help to us in serving our purposes. It is enough for us to know that external objects under certain conditions assume such a special fitness (_yogyatâ_) that we can have knowledge of them. We have no guarantee that they generate knowledge in us, for we are only aware that under certain conditions we know a thing, whereas under other conditions we do not know it [Footnote ref 2]. The enquiry as to the nature of the special fitness of things which makes knowledge of them possible does not concern us. Those conditions which confer such a special fitness on things as to render them perceivable have but little to do with us; for our purposes which consist only in the acquirement of good and avoidance of evil, can only be served by knowledge and not by those conditions of external objects.

Knowledge reveals our own self as a knowing subject as well as the objects that are known by us. We have no reason to suppose (like the Buddhists) that all knowledge by perception of external objects is in the first instance indefinite and indeterminate, and that all our determinate notions of form, colour, size and other characteristics of the thing are not directly given in our perceptual experience, but are derived only by imagination (_utprek@sâ_), and that therefore true perceptual knowledge only certifies the validity of the indefinite and indeterminate crude sense data (_nirvikalpa jñâna_). Experience shows that true knowledge on the one hand reveals us as subjects or knowers, and on the other hand gives a correct sketch of the external objects in all the diversity of their characteristics. It is for this reason that knowledge is our immediate and most prominent means of serving our purposes.

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[Footnote 1: _Pramâ@na-naya-tattvâlokâla@mkâra,_ p. 26.]

[Footnote 2: See _Parî@sa-mukha-sûtra,_ II. 9, and its v@rtti, and also the concluding v@rtti of ch. II.]

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Of course knowledge cannot directly and immediately bring to us the good we want, but since it faithfully communicates to us the nature of the objects around us, it renders our actions for the attainment of good and the avoidance of evil, possible; for if knowledge did not possess these functions, this would have been impossible. The validity of knowledge thus consists in this, that it is the most direct, immediate, and indispensable means for serving our purposes. So long as any knowledge is uncontradicted it should be held as true. False knowledge is that which represents things in relations in which they do not exist. When a rope in a badly lighted place gives rise to the illusion of a snake, the illusion consists in taking the rope to be a snake, i.e. perceiving a snake where it does not exist. Snakes exist and ropes also exist, there is no untruth in that [Footnote ref 1]. The error thus consists in this, that the snake is perceived where the rope exists. The perception of a snake under relations and environments in which it was not then existing is what is meant by error here. What was at first perceived as a snake was later on contradicted and thus found false. Falsehood therefore consists in the misrepresentation of objective facts in experience. True knowledge therefore is that which gives such a correct and faithful representation of its object as is never afterwards found to be contradicted. Thus knowledge when imparted directly in association with the organs in sense-perception is very clear, vivid, and distinct, and is called perceptional (_pratyak@sa_); when attained otherwise the knowledge is not so clear and vivid and is then called non-perceptional (_parok@sa_ [Footnote ref 2]).

Theory of Perception.

The main difference of the Jains from the Buddhists in the theory of perception lies, as we have already seen, in this, that the Jains think that perception (_pratyak@sa_) reveals to us the external objects just as they are with most of their diverse characteristics of colour, form, etc., and also in this, that knowledge arises in the soul

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[Footnote 1: Illusion consists in attributing such spatial, temporal or other kinds of relations to the objects of our judgment as do not actually exist, but the objects themselves actually exist in other relations. When I mistake the rope for the snake, the snake actually exists though its relationing with the "this" as "this is a snake" does not exist, for the snake is not the rope. This illusion is thus called _satkhyâti_ or misrelationing of existents (_sat_)].

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina-tarka-vârttika_ of Siddhasena, ch. I., and v@rtti by S'antyâcârya, Pramâ@nanayatattvâlokâla@mkâra, ch. I., _Parîksâ-mukha-sûtra-v@rtti,_ ch. I.]

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from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vijñânavâdin Buddhist thinks) but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the Jains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the knowledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, and hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my knowledge of rose is removed. When visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self. Proceeding in a similar way the Jains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in experience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose [Footnote ref 1]. Perception of an object means

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[Footnote 1: _Tanna indriyam bhautikam kim tu âtmâ ca indriyam...anupahatacak@surâdides'e@su eva âtmana@h karmak@sayopas'amaslenâsthagitagavâk@satulyâni cak@surâdîni upakara@nâni. Jaina-Vâttika-V@rtti,_ II. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of senses they possess. (See _Pramâ@namîmâ@msâ._ See also _Tattvârthâ-dhigamasûtra_, ch. II. etc.) But this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which as observing it is removed.]

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that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the presence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the Jains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savikalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense-materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of indeterminate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part [Footnote ref 1].

Non-Perceptual Knowledge.

Non-perceptual knowledge (_parok@sa_) differs from pratyak@sa in this, that it does not give us so vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the Jains do not admit that the senses had any function in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw between perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Parok@sa thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception.

Regarding inference, the Jains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (1) "the hill is fiery," (2) "because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively _pratijñâ, hetu, drs@tânta, upanaya_ and _nigamana_, except for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (_Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 108, 109). When we make an

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[Footnote 1 _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 8-11.]

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inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (_sahabhâva_) or as invariable antecedence (_kramabhâva_) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference [Footnote ref 1].

As regards proof by testimony the Jains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the Jaina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance [Footnote ref 2].

Knowledge as Revelation.

The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that

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[Footnote 1: As regards concomitance (_vyâpti_) some of the Jaina logicians like the Buddhists prefer _antarvyâpti_ (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyâptî (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, svârthânumâna for one's own self and _parârthânumâna_ for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest Jaina view as maintained by Bhadrabâhu in his Das'avaikâlikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (1) _Pratijñâ_ (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) _Pratijñâvibhakti_ (non-injury to life is the greatest virtue according to Jaina scriptures), (3) _Hetu_ (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) _Hetu vibhakti_ (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) _Vipak@sa_ (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling Jaina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) _Vipak@sa prati@sedha_ (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptures should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) _D@r@s@ânta_ (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) _Âs'a@nkâ (but the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) _Âs'a@nkâprati@sedha_ (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) _Naigamana_ (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyâbhû@sa@na's _Indian Logic_). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vâtsyâyana in his _Nyâyasûtrabhâ@sya_, I. 1. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this Jaina view in his mind.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jainatarkavârttika_, and _Parîk@sâmukhasûtrav@rtti_, and _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_ with Gu@naratna on Jainism.]

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which could not non-existent. In fact production of effect was with them the only definition of existence (being). Theoretically each unit of effect being different from any other unit of effect they supposed that there was a succession of different units of effect or, what is the same thing, acknowledged a succession of new substances every moment. All things were thus momentary. The Jains urged that the reason why the production of effect may be regarded as the only proof of being is that we can assert only that thing the existence of which is indicated by a corresponding experience. When we have a unit of experience we suppose the existence of the object as its ground. This being so, the theoretical analysis of the Buddhists that each unit of effect produced in us is not exactly the same at each new point of time, and that therefore all things are momentary, is fallacious; for experience shows that not all of an object is found to be changing every moment; some part of it (e.g. gold in a gold ornament) is found to remain permanent while other parts (e.g. its form as earrings or bangles) are seen to undergo change. How in the face of such an experience can we assert that the whole thing vanishes every moment and that new things are being renewed at each succeeding moment? Hence leaving aside mere abstract and unfounded speculations, if we look to experience we find that the conception of being or existence involves a notion of permanence associated with change--_paryâya_ (acquirement of new qualities and the loss of old ones). The Jains hold that the defects of other systems lie in this, that they interpret experience only from one particular standpoint (_naya_) whereas they alone carefully weigh experience from all points of view and acquiesce in the truths indicated by it, not absolutely but under proper reservations and limitations. The Jains hold that in formulating the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_ the Buddhists at first showed signs of starting on their enquiry on the evidence of experience, but soon they became one-sided in their analysis and indulged in unwarrantable abstract speculations which went directly against experience. Thus if we go by experience we can neither reject the self nor the external world as some Buddhists did. Knowledge which reveals to us the clear-cut features of the external world certifies at the same time that such knowledge is part and parcel of myself as the subject. Knowledge is thus felt to be an expression of my own self. We do not perceive in experience that knowledge

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in us is generated by the external world, but there is in us the rise of knowledge and of certain objects made known to us by it. The rise of knowledge is thus only parallel to certain objective collocations of things which somehow have the special fitness that they and they alone are perceived at that particular moment. Looked at from this point of view all our experiences are centred in ourselves, for determined somehow, our experiences come to us as modifications of our own self. Knowledge being a character of the self, it shows itself as manifestations of the self independent of the senses. No distinction should be made between a conscious and an unconscious element in knowledge as Sâ@mkhya does. Nor should knowledge be regarded as a copy of the objects which it reveals, as the Sautrântikas think, for then by copying the materiality of the object, knowledge would itself become material. Knowledge should thus be regarded as a formless quality of the self revealing all objects by itself. But the Mîmâ@msâ view that the validity (_prâmâ@nya_) of all knowledge is proved by knowledge itself _svata@hprâmâ@nya_) is wrong. Both logically and psychologically the validity of knowledge depends upon outward correspondence (sa@mvâda) with facts. But in those cases where by previous knowledge of correspondence a right belief has been produced there may be a psychological ascertainment of validity without reference to objective facts (_prâmâ@nyamutpattau parata eva jñaptau svakârye ca svata@h paratas'ca. abhyâsânabhyâsâpek@sayâ_) [Footnote ref 1]. The objective world exists as it is certified by experience. But that it generates knowledge in us is an unwarrantable hypothesis, for knowledge appears as a revelation of our own self. This brings us to a consideration of Jaina metaphysics.

The Jîvas.

The Jains say that experience shows that all things may be divided into the living (_jîva_) and the non-living (_ajîva_). The principle of life is entirely distinct from the body, and it is most erroneous to think that life is either the product or the property of the body [Footnote ref 2] It is on account of this life-principle that the body appears to be living This principle is the soul. The soul is directly perceived (by introspection) just as the external things are. It is not a mere symbolical object indicated by a phrase or

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[Footnote 1: _Prameyakamalamârta@n@da,_ pp. 38-43.]

[Footnote 2: See _Jaina Vârttika,_ p. 60.]

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a description. This is directly against the view of the great Mîmâ@msa authority Prabhâkara [Footnote ref 1]. The soul in its pure state is possessed of infinite perception (_ananta-dars'ana_), infinite knowledge (_ananta-jñâna_), infinite bliss (_ananta-sukha_) and infinite power (_ananta-vîrya_) [Footnote ref 2]. It is all perfect. Ordinarily however, with the exception of a few released pure souls (_mukta-jîva_) all the other jîvas (_sa@msârin_) have all their purity and power covered with a thin veil of karma matter which has been accumulating in them from beginningless time. These souls are infinite in number. They are substances and are eternal. They in reality occupy innumerable space-points in our mundane world (_lokâkâs`a_), have a limited size (_madhyama-parimâ@na_) and are neither all-pervasive (_vibhu_) nor atomic (_anu_); it is on account of this that _jîva_ is called _Jivâstikâya_. The word _astikâya_ means anything that occupies space or has some pervasiveness; but these souls expand and contract themselves according to the dimensions of the body which they occupy at any time (bigger in the elephant and smaller in the ant life). It is well to remember that according to the Jains the soul occupies the whole of the body in which it lives, so that from the tip of the hair to the nail of the foot, wherever there may be any cause of sensation, it can at once feel it. The manner in which the soul occupies the body is often explained as being similar to the manner in which a lamp illumines the whole room though remaining in one corner of the room. The Jains divide the jîvas according to the number of sense-organs they possess. The lowest class consists of plants, which possess only the sense-organ of touch. The next higher class is that of worms, which possess two sense-organs of touch and taste. Next come the ants, etc., which possess touch, taste, and smell. The next higher one that of bees, etc., possessing vision in addition to touch, taste, and smell. The vertebrates possess all the five sense-organs. The higher animals among these, namely men, denizens of hell, and the gods possess in addition to these an inner sense-organ namely _manas_ by virtue of which they are

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[Footnote 1: See _Prameyakamalamârta@nda,_ p. 33.]

[Footnote 2: The Jains distinguish between _dars'ana_ and _jñâna_. Dars'ana is the knowledge of things without their details, e.g. I see a cloth. Jñâna means the knowledge of details, e.g. I not only see the cloth, but know to whom it belongs, of what quality it is, where it was prepared, etc. In all cognition we have first dars'ana and then jñâna. The pure souls possess infinite general perception of all things as well as infinite knowledge of all things in all their details.]

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called rational (_sa@mjñin_) while the lower animals have no reason and are called _asamjnin_.