Chapter VIII: The Nyâya-Vais'e@sika Philosophy (5)

and his followers, whose philosophy we shall deal with in the next chapter, hold that negation (_abhâva_) appears as an intuition (_mânam_) with reference to the object negated where there are no means of ordinary cognition (_pramâ@na_) leading to prove the existence (_satparicchedakam_) of that thing. They held that the notion "it is not existent" cannot be due to perception, for there is no contact here with sense and object. It is true indeed that when we turn our eyes (e.g. in the case of the perception of the non-existence of a jug) to the ground, we see both the ground and the non-existence of a jug, and when we shut them we can see neither the jug nor the ground, and therefore it could be urged that if we called the ground visually perceptible, we could say the same with regard to the non-existence of the jug. But even then since in the case of the perception of the jug there is sense-contact, which is absent in the other case, we could never say that both are grasped by perception. We see the ground and remember the jug (which is absent) and thus in the mind rises the notion of non-existence which has no reference at all to visual perception. A man may be sitting in a place where there were no tigers, but he might not then be aware of their non-existence at the time, since he did not think of them, but when later on he is asked in the evening if there were any tigers at the place where he was sitting in the morning, he then thinks and becomes aware of the non-existence of tigers there in the morning, even without perceiving the place and without any operation of the memory of the non-existence of tigers. There is no question of there being any inference in the rise of our notion of non-existence, for it is not preceded by any notion of concomitance of any kind, and neither the ground nor the non-perception of the jug could be regarded as a reason (_li@nga_), for the non-perception of the jug is related to the jug and not to the negation of the jug, and no concomitance is known between the non-perception of the jug and its non-existence, and when the question of the concomitance of non-perception with non-existence is brought in, the same difficulty about the notion of non-existence (_abhâva_) which was sought to be explained will recur again. Negation is therefore to be admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process of knowledge. Nyâya however says that the perception of non-existence (e.g. there is no jug here) is a unitary perception of one whole, just as any perception of positive existence (e.g.

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there is a jug on the ground) is. Both the knowledge of the ground as well as the knowledge of the non-existence of the jug arise there by the same kind of action of the visual organ, and there is therefore no reason why the knowledge of the ground should be said to be due to perception, whereas the knowledge of the negation of the jug on the ground should be said to be due to a separate process of knowledge. The non-existence of the jug is taken in the same act as the ground is perceived. The principle that in order to perceive a thing one should have sense-contact with it, applies only to positive existents and not to negation or non-existence. Negation or non-existence can be cognized even without any sense-contact. Non-existence is not a positive substance, and hence there cannot be any question here of sense-contact. It may be urged that if no sense-contact is required in apprehending negation, one could as well apprehend negation or non-existence of other places which are far away from him. To this the reply is that to apprehend negation it is necessary that the place where it exists must be perceived. We know a thing and its quality to be different, and yet the quality can only be taken in association with the thing and it is so in this case as well. We can apprehend non-existence only through the apprehension of its locus. In the case when non-existence is said to be apprehended later on it is really no later apprehension of non-existence but a memory of non-existence (e.g. of jug) perceived before along with the perception of the locus of non-existence (e.g. ground). Negation or non-existence (_abhâva_) can thus, according to Nyâya, generate its cognition just as any positive existence can do. Negation is not mere negativity or mere vacuous absence, but is what generates the cognition "is not," as position (_bhâva_) is what generates the cognition "it is."

The Buddhists deny the existence of negation. They hold that when a negation is apprehended, it is apprehended with specific time and space conditions (e.g. this is not here now); but in spite of such an apprehension, we could never think that negation could thus be associated with them in any relation. There is also no relation between the negation and its _pratiyogi_ (thing negated--e.g. jug in the negation of jug), for when there is the pratiyogi there is no negation, and when there is the negation there is no pratiyogi. There is not even the relation of opposition (_virodha_), for we could have admitted it, if

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the negation of the jug existed before and opposed the jug, for how can the negation of the jug oppose the jug, without effecting anything at all? Again, it may be asked whether negation is to be regarded as a positive being or becoming or of the nature of not becoming or non-being. In the first alternative it will be like any other positive existents, and in the second case it will be permanent and eternal, and it cannot be related to this or that particular negation. There are however many kinds of non-perception, e.g. (1) svabhâvânupalabdhi (natural non-perception--there is no jug because none is perceived); (2) kâra@nânupalabdhi (non-perception of cause--there is no smoke here, since there is no fire); (3) vyâpakânupalabdhi (non-perception of the species--there is no pine here, since there is no tree); (4) kâryânupalabdhi (non-perception of effects--there are not the causes of smoke here, since there is no smoke); (5) svabhâvaviruddhopalabdhi (perception of contradictory natures--there is no cold touch here because of fire); (6) viruddhakâryopalabdhi (perception of contradictory effects--there is no cold touch here because of smoke); (7) virudhavyâptopalabdhi (opposite concomitance--past is not of necessity destructible, since it depends on other causes); (8) kâryyaviruddhopalabdhi (opposition of effects--there is not here the causes which can give cold since there is fire); (9) vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi (opposite concomitants--there is no touch of snow here, because of fire); (10) kâra@naviruddhopalabdhi (opposite causes--there is no shivering through cold here, since he is near the fire); (11) kâra@naviruddhakâryyopalabdhi (effects of opposite causes--this place is not occupied by men of shivering sensations for it is full of smoke [Footnote ref 1]).

There is no doubt that in the above ways we speak of negation, but that does not prove that there is any reason for the cognition of negation (_heturnâbhâvasamvida@h_). All that we can say is this that there are certain situations which justify the use (_yogyatâ_) of negative appellations. But this situation or yogyatâ is positive in character. What we all speak of in ordinary usage as non-perception is of the nature of perception of some sort. Perception of negation thus does not prove the existence of negation, but only shows that there are certain positive perceptions which are only interpreted in that way. It is the positive perception of the ground where the visible jug is absent that

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu_, p. 11, and _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 53-7.]

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leads us to speak of having perceived the negation of the jug (_anupalambha@h abhâva@m vyavahârayati_) [Footnote ref 1].

The Nyâya reply against this is that the perception of positive existents is as much a fact as the perception of negation, and we have no right to say that the former alone is valid. It is said that the non-perception of jug on the ground is but the perception of the ground without the jug. But is this being without the jug identical with the ground or different? If identical then it is the same as the ground, and we shall expect to have it even when the jug is there. If different then the quarrel is only over the name, for whatever you may call it, it is admitted to be a distinct category. If some difference is noted between the ground with the jug, and the ground without it, then call it "ground, without the jugness" or "the negation of jug," it does not matter much, for a distinct category has anyhow been admitted. Negation is apprehended by perception as much as any positive existent is; the nature of the objects of perception only are different; just as even in the perception of positive sense-objects there are such diversities as colour, taste, etc. The relation of negation with space and time with which it appears associated is the relation that subsists between the qualified and the quality (_vis'e@sya vis'e@sa@na_). The relation between the negation and its pratiyogi is one of opposition, in the sense that where the one is the other is not. The _Vais'e@sika sûtra_ (IX. i. 6) seems to take abhâva in a similar way as Kumârila the Mima@msist does, though the commentators have tried to explain it away [Footnote ref 2]. In Vais'e@sika the four kinds of negation are enumerated as (1) _prâgabhâva_ (the negation preceding the production of an object--e.g. of the jug before it is made by the potter); (2) _dhva@msâbhâva_ (the negation following the destruction of an object--as of the jug after it is destroyed by the stroke of a stick); (3) _anyonyâbhâva_ (mutual negation--e.g. in the cow there is the negation of the horse and

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyabindu@tîkâ_, pp. 34 ff., and also _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 48-63.]

[Footnote 2 Pras'astapâda says that as the production of an effect is the sign of the existence of the cause, so the non-production of it is the sign of its non-existence, S'rîdbara in commenting upon it says that the non-preception of a sensible object is the sign (_li@nga_) of its non-existence. But evidently he is not satisfied with the view for he says that non-existence is also directly perceived by the senses (_bhâvavad abhâvo'pîndriyagraha@nayogyah_) and that there is an actual sense-contact with non-existence which is the collocating cause of the preception of non-existence (_abhâvendriyasannikar@so'pi abhâvagraha@nasâmagrî_), Nyâyakandalî_, pp. 225-30.]

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in the horse that of the cow); (4) _atyantâbhâva_ (a negation which always exists--e.g. even when there is a jug here, its negation in other places is not destroyed) [Footnote ref 1].

The necessity of the Acquirement of debating devices for the seeker of Salvation.

It is probable that the Nyâya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are _tarka_, _nir@naya_, _vâda_, _jalpa_, _vita@n@dâ_, _hetvâbhâsa_, _chala_, _jâti_ and _nigrahasthâna_.

Tarka means deliberation on an unknown thing to discern its real nature; it thus consists of seeking reasons in favour of some supposition to the exclusion of other suppositions; it is not inference, but merely an oscillation of the mind to come to a right conclusion. When there is doubt (_sa@ms'aya_) about the specific nature of anything we have to take to tarka. Nir@naya means the conclusion to which we arrive as a result of tarka. When two opposite parties dispute over their respective theses, such as the doctrines that there is or is not an âtman, in which each of them tries to prove his own thesis with reasons, each of the theses is called a _vâda_. Jalpa means a dispute in which the disputants give wrangling rejoinders in order to defeat their respective opponents. A jalpa is called a _vita@n@dâ_ when it is only a destructive criticism which seeks to refute the opponent's doctrine without seeking to establish or formulate any new doctrine. Hetvâbhâsas are those which appear as hetus but are really not so. _Nyâya_ sûtras enumerate five fallacies (_hetvâbhâsas_) of the middle (hetu): _savyabhicâra_ (erratic), _viruddha_ (contradictory), _prakara@nasama_ (tautology), _sâddhyasama_ (unproved reason) and _kâlâtîta _(inopportune). Savyabhicâra is that where the same reason may prove opposite conclusions (e.g. sound is eternal because it is intangible like the atoms which are eternal, and sound is non-eternal because it is intangible like cognitions which are non-eternal); viruddha is that where the reason opposes the premiss to be proved (e.g. a jug is eternal, because it is produced); prakara@nasama is that

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of negation, its function and value with reference to diverse logical problems, have many diverse aspects, and it is impossible to do them justice in a small section like this.]

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where the reason repeats the thesis to be proved in another form (e.g. sound is non-eternal because it has not the quality of eternality); sâdhyasama is that where the reason itself requires to be proved (e.g. shadow is a substance because it has motion, but it remains to be proved whether shadows have motion or not); kâlâtîta is a false analogy where the reason fails because it does not tally with the example in point of time. Thus one may argue that sound is eternal because it is the result of contact (stick and the drum) like colour which is also a result of contact of light and the object and is eternal. Here the fallacy lies in this, that colour is simultaneous with the contact of light which shows what was already there and only manifested by the light, whereas in the case of sound it is produced immediately after the contact of the stick and drum and is hence a product and hence non-eternal. The later Nyâya works divide savyabhicâra into three classes, (1) sâdhâra@na or common (e.g. the mountain is fiery because it is an object of knowledge, but even a lake which is opposed to fire is also an object of knowledge), (2) asâdhâra@na or too restricted (e.g. sound is eternal because it has the nature of sound; this cannot be a reason for the nature of sound exists only in the sound and nowhere else), and (3) anupasa@mhârin or unsubsuming (e.g. everything is non-eternal, because they are all objects of knowledge; here the fallacy lies in this, that no instance can be found which is not an object of knowledge and an opposite conclusion may also be drawn). The fallacy _satpratipak@sa_ is that in which there is a contrary reason which may prove the opposite conclusion (e.g. sound is eternal because it is audible, sound is non-eternal because it is an effect). The fallacy _asiddha_ (unreal) is of three kinds (i) _âs'rayâsiddha_ (the lotus of the sky is fragrant because it is like other lotuses; now there cannot be any lotus in the sky), (2) _svarûpâsiddha_ (sound is a quality because it is visible; but sound has no visibility), (3) _vyâpyatvâsiddha_ is that where the concomitance between the middle and the consequence is not invariable and inevitable; there is smoke in the hill because there is fire; but there may be fire without the smoke as in a red hot iron ball, it is only green-wood fire that is invariably associated with smoke. The fallacy _bâdhita_ is that which pretends to prove a thesis which is against direct experience, e.g. fire is not hot because it is a substance. We have already enumerated the fallacies counted by Vais'e@sika. Contrary to Nyâya practice

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Pras'astapâda counts the fallacies of the example. Di@nnâga also counted fallacies of example (e.g. sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal, that which is incorporeal is eternal as the atoms; but atoms are not incorporeal) and Dharmakîrtti counted also the fallacies of the pak@sa (minor); but Nyâya rightly considers that the fallacies of the middle if avoided will completely safeguard inference and that these are mere repetitions. Chala means the intentional misinterpretation of the opponent's arguments for the purpose of defeating him. Jâti consists in the drawing of contradictory conclusions, the raising of false issues or the like with the deliberate intention of defeating an opponent. Nigrahasthâna means the exposure of the opponent's argument as involving self-contradiction, inconsistency or the like, by which his defeat is conclusively proved before the people to the glory of the victorious opponent. As to the utility of the description of so many debating tricks by which an opponent might be defeated in a metaphysical work, the aim of which ought to be to direct the ways that lead to emancipation, it is said by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_ that these had to be resorted to as a protective measure against arrogant disputants who often tried to humiliate a teacher before his pupils. If the teacher could not silence the opponent, the faith of the pupils in him would be shaken and great disorder would follow, and it was therefore deemed necessary that he who was plodding onward for the attainment of mok@sa should acquire these devices for the protection of his own faith and that of his pupils. A knowledge of these has therefore been enjoined in the Nyâya sûtra as being necessary for the attainment of salvation [Footnote ref l].

The doctrine of Soul.

Dhûrtta Cârvâkas denied the existence of soul and regarded consciousness and life as products of bodily changes; there were other Cârvâkas called Sus'ik@sita Cârvâkas who admitted the existence of soul but thought that it was destroyed at death. The Buddhists also denied the existence of any permanent self. The naiyâyikas ascertained all the categories of metaphysics mainly by such inference as was corroborated by experience. They argued that since consciousness, pleasures, pains, willing, etc. could not belong to our body or the senses, there must be

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 586-659, and _Târkikarak@sâ_ of Varadarâja and _Niska@n@taka_ of Mallinâtha, pp. 185 ff.]

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some entity to which they belonged; the existence of the self is not proved according to Nyâya merely by the notion of our self-consciousness, as in the case of Mîmâ@msâ, for Nyâya holds that we cannot depend upon such a perception, for it may be erroneous. It often happens that I say that I am white or I am black, but it is evident that such a perception cannot be relied upon, for the self cannot have any colour. So we cannot safely depend on our self-consciousness as upon the inference that the self has to be admitted as that entity to which consciousness, emotion, etc. adhere when they are produced as a result of collocations. Never has the production of âtman been experienced, nor has it been found to suffer any destruction like the body, so the soul must be eternal. It is not located in any part of the body, but is all-pervading, i.e. exists at the same time in all places (_vibhu_), and does not travel with the body but exists everywhere at the same time. But though âtman is thus disconnected from the body, yet its actions are seen in the body because it is with the help of the collocation of bodily limbs, etc. that action in the self can be manifested or produced. It is unconscious in itself and acquires consciousness as a result of suitable collocations [Footnote ref l].

Even at birth children show signs of pleasure by their different facial features, and this could not be due to anything else than the memory of the past experiences in past lives of pleasures and pains. Moreover the inequalities in the distribution of pleasures and pains and of successes and failures prove that these must be due to the different kinds of good and bad action that men performed in their past lives. Since the inequality of the world must have some reasons behind it, it is better to admit karma as the determining factor than to leave it to irresponsible chance.

Îs'vara and Salvation.

Nyâya seeks to establish the existence of Îs'vara on the basis of inference. We know that the Jains, the Sâ@mkhya and the Buddhists did not believe in the existence of Îs'vara and offered many antitheistic arguments. Nyâya wanted to refute these and prove the existence of Is'vara by an inference of the sâmânyato-d@r@s@ta type.

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[Footnote 1:_Jñânasamavâyanibandhanamevâtmanas'cetayit@rtvam_, &c. See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 432 ff.]

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The Jains and other atheists held that though things in the world have production and decay, the world as a whole was never produced, and it was never therefore an effect. In contrast to this view the Nyâya holds that the world as a whole is also an effect like any other effect. Many geological changes and landslips occur, and from these destructive operations proceeding in nature it may be assumed that this world is not eternal but a result of production. But even if this is not admitted by the atheists they can in no way deny the arrangement and order of the universe. But they would argue that there was certainly a difference between the order and arrangement of human productions (e.g. a jug) and the order and arrangement of the universe; and therefore from the order and arrangement(_sannives'a-vis'i@s@tatâ_) of the universe it could not be argued that the universe was produced by a creator; for, it is from the sort of order and arrangement that is found in human productions that a creator or producer could be inferred. To this, Nyâya answers that the concomitance is to be taken between the "order and arrangement" in a general sense and "the existence of a creator" and not with specific cases of "order and arrangement," for each specific case may have some such peculiarity in which it differs from similar other specific cases; thus the fire in the kitchen is not the same kind of fire as we find in a forest fire, but yet we are to disregard the specific individual peculiarities of fire in each case and consider the concomitance of fire in general with smoke in general. So here, we have to consider the concomitance of "order and arrangement" in general with "the existence of a creator," and thus though the order and arrangement of the world may be different from the order and arrangement of things produced by man, yet an inference from it for the existence of a creator would not be inadmissible. The objection that even now we see many effects (e.g. trees) which are daily shooting forth from the ground without any creator being found to produce them, does not hold, for it can never be proved that the plants are not actually created by a creator. The inference therefore stands that the world has a creator, since it is an effect and has order and arrangement in its construction. Everything that is an effect and has an order and arrangement has a creator, like the jug. The world is an effect and has order and arrangement and has therefore a creator. Just as the potter knows all the purposes of the jug that he makes,

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so Îs'vara knows all the purposes of this wide universe and is thus omniscient. He knows all things always and therefore does not require memory; all things are perceived by him directly without any intervention of any internal sense such as manas, etc. He is always happy. His will is eternal, and in accordance with the karma of men the same will produces dissolution, creates, or protects the world, in the order by which each man reaps the results of his own deeds. As our self which is in itself bodiless can by its will produce changes in our body and through it in the external world, so Îs'vara also can by his will create the universe though he has no body. Some, however, say that if any association of body with Îs'vara is indispensable for our conception of him, the atoms may as well be regarded as his body, so that just as by the will of our self changes and movement of our body take place, so also by his will changes and movements are produced in the atoms [Footnote ref l].

The naiyâyikas in common with most other systems of Indian philosophy believed that the world was full of sorrow and that the small bits of pleasure only served to intensify the force of sorrow. To a wise person therefore everything is sorrow (_sarva@m du@hkha@m vivekina@h_); the wise therefore is never attached to the so-called pleasures of life which only lead us to further sorrows.

The bondage of the world is due to false knowledge (_mithyâjñâna_) which consists in thinking as my own self that which is not my self, namely body, senses, manas, feelings and knowledge; when once the true knowledge of the six padârthas and as Nyâya says, of the proofs (_pramâ@na_), the objects of knowledge (_prameya_), and of the other logical categories of inference is attained, false knowledge is destroyed. False knowledge can be removed by constant thinking of its opposite (_pratipak@sabhâvanâ_), namely the true estimates of things. Thus when any pleasure attracts us, we are to think that this is in reality but pain, and thus the right knowledge about it will dawn and it will never attract us again. Thus it is that with the destruction of false knowledge our attachment or antipathy to things and ignorance about them (collectively called do@sa, cf. the kles'a of Patañjali) are also destroyed.

With the destruction of attachment actions (_prav@rtti_) for the

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[Footnote:1: See _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 190-204,_ Îs'varânumâna_ of Raghunâtha S'iro@ma@ni and Udayana's _Kusumâñjalî_.]

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fulfilment of desires cease and with it rebirth ceases and with it sorrow ceases. Without false knowledge and attachment, actions cannot produce the bondage of karma that leads to the production of body and its experiences. With the cessation of sorrow there is emancipation in which the self is divested of all its qualities (consciousness, feeling, willing, etc.) and remains in its own inert state. The state of mukti according to Nyâya-Vais'e@sika is neither a state of pure knowledge nor of bliss but a state of perfect qualitilessness, in which the self remains in itself in its own purity. It is the negative state of absolute painlessness in mukti that is sometimes spoken of as being a state of absolute happiness (_ânanda_), though really speaking the state of mukti can never be a state of happiness. It is a passive state of self in its original and natural purity unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge, willing, etc. [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: _Nyâyamañjarî_, pp. 499-533.]