Chapter VII (1)

THE KAPILA AND THE PÂTAÑJALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1].

A Review.

The examination of the two ancient Nâstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nâstika schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nâstika schools appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with the K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical power of producing the desired effect--a shower of rain, the birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

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[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my _Study of Patanjali_, published by the Calcutta University, and my _Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought_, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]

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objects. Truth cannot be determined _a priori_ but depends upon the test of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2]. Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere _a priori_ abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner _a priori_ demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism

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[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mîmâ@msâ of Kumârila and Prabhâkara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined _a priori_ while error is determined by experience.]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva._ But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of _arthakriyâkâritva_.]

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would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of karma (_karmaphala_) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads

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which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Sâ@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upani@sads.

The Germs of Sâ@mkhya in the Upani@sads.

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, _mantra_, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result [Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara and particularly in Maitrâya@nî from which it appears that the Sâmkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the date of Maitrâya@nî has not yet been definitely settled, and the details

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[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (_E. R.E._).]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought_, in the first chapter.]

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found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Sâ@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.

Sâ@mkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sâ@mkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_, the _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_, and the _Yoga sûtras_ of Patañjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ (about 200 A.D.) was written by Îs'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sâ@mkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vâcaspati Mis'ra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as _Tattvakaumudî_. But before him Gaudapâda and Râjâ wrote commentaries on the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ [Footnote ref 1]. Nârâyanatîrtha wrote his _Candrikâ_ on Gaudapâda's commentary. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ which have been commented on by Vijñâna Bhik@su (called _Pravacanabhâ@sya_) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_. Vijñâna Bhiksu wrote also another elementary work on Sâ@mkhya known as _Sâ@mkhyasâra_. Another short work of late origin is _Tattvasamâsa_ (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Sâm@khya, viz Sîmânanda's _Sâmkhyatattvavivecana_ and Bhâvâga@nes'a's _Sâ@mkhyatattvayâthârthyadîpana_ (both later than Vijñânabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patañjali's _Yoga sûtra_ (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vâysa (400 A.D.) and Vyâsa's bhâsya commented on by Vâcaspati Mis'ra is called _Tattvavais'âradî_, by Vijñâna Bhik@su _Yogavârttika_, by Bhoja in the tenth century _Bhojav@rtti_, and by Nâges'a (seventeenth century) _Châyâvyâkhyâ_.

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[Footnote 1: I suppose that Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_ was the same as _Râjavârttika_ quoted by Vâcaspati. Râjâ's commentary on the _Kârikâ_ has been referred to by Jayanta in his _Nyâyamañjarî_, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.]

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Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises _Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus_ by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga _Study of Patanjali_ published by the Calcutta University, and _Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought_ which is shortly to be published, and my _Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus_, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sâ@mkhya works, viz. _Mâ@tharabhâ@sya_ and _Âtreyatantra_. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sâ@mkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it was called Âtreyasa@mhitâ or Âtreyatantra. Nothing is known of the Mâtharabhâsya [Footnote ref 1].

An Early School of Sâ@mkhya.

It is important for the history of Sâ@mkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sâ@mkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (_dhâtus_), viz. the five elements such as âkâs'a, vâyu etc. and cetanâ, called also puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkâra and the five elements)[Footnote ref 2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing (_ûha_) and conceiving (_vicâra_) before definite understanding (_buddhi_) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance

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[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sâ@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapâ@ni, the commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. _Prak@rtivyatiriktañcodâsîna@m puru@samavyaktatvasâdharmyât avyaktâyâm prak@rtâveva prak@sipya avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nâti._ Harinâtha Vis'ârada's edition of _Caraka, S'ârîra_, p. 4.]

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of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmâtras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (_indriyârtha_) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhûtas and prak@rti, mahat and aha@mkâra taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the âtman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also _paramâtman_, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikâra or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajña (_avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajñam@r@sayo viduh_). This avyakta and cetanâ are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested prak@rti or cetanâ is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego (_aha@mkâra_) and from the aha@mkâra the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (_avyakta_), all the manifested forms--the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkâra,

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[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of _prak@rti_ which is regarded as having eight elements in it _prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhâtuki_), viz. avyakta, mahat, aha@mkâra, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyârthâ, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]

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etc.--appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (_râs'i_), and not by the âtman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (_t@r@s@nâ_) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sâ@mkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,

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[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapâ@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prak@rti--the puru@sa--and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapâ@ni on s'ârîra, I. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhûta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedânta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (_alak@sa@nam_), resembling Nâgârjuna's Nirvâ@na. Thus Caraka writes:--_tasmi@ms'caramasannyâse samûlâh@hsarvavedanâ@h asa@mjñâjñânavijñânâ niv@rtti@m yântyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m brahmabhûto bhûtâtmâ nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhâvebhya@h cihna@m yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavidâ@m brahma taccâk@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S'ârîra_ 1. 98-100.]

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the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (_mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sâ_).

The main features of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmâtras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkâra etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (_bhautika_).

This account of Sâ@mkhya agrees with the system of Sâ@mkhya propounded by Pañcas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of Âsuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahâbhârata XII. 219. Pañcas'ikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sâ@mkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pañcas'ikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Sâ@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa (_purusâvasthamavyaktam_). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pañcas'ikha also, and the proofs

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[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.]

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pañcas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sâ@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sâ@mkhya doctrines sketched in _Caraka_ did not attract their notice.]

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for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pañcas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,--and the element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pañcas'ikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any characteristic)--a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sâ@mkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (_samyagbadha_).

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_, mentions two schools of Sâ@mkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Sâ@mkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhâna for each âtman (_maulikyasâ@mkhyâ hyâtmânamâtmânam prati p@rthak pradhânam vadanti_). This seems to be a reference to the Sâ@mkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sâ@mkhya.

In _Mahâbhârata_ XII. 318 three schools of Sâ@mkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Sâ@mkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Sâ@mkhya advocated in the _Mahâbhârata_. The schools of Sâ@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Sâ@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the

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[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 99.]

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other chapters of the _Mahâbhârata_ (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Râhu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (_s'arîri@na@h_) are spoken of as manifesting from prak@rti.

We do not know anything about Âsuri the direct disciple of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of Sâ@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the _Mahâbhârata_ and has been attributed there to Pañcas'ikha is probably the earliest form of Sâ@mkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the school of Maulikya Sâ@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sâ@mkhya as described by Îs'varak@r@s@na and referred to in other parts of _Mahâbhârata_ is a definite proof that Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Sâ@mkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavâsin altered the Sâ@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavâsin was a title of Îs'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe holds that the date of Îs'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Îs'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his kârikâs to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his _Kârikâ_ seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the

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[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Âsuri is quoted by Gu@naratna (_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_ p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's _Buddhismus,_ p. 240.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramârtha's life of Vasubandhu," _J. R.A.S._, 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Îs'varak@r@s@na and Vindhyavâsin as two different authorities (_Tarkarahasyadîpikâ,_ pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavâsin (p. 104) in anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Îs'varak@r@s@nâ. It appears that Îs'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ and another an independent work on Sâ@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

"_Pratiniyatâdhyavasâya@h s'rotrâdisamuttha adhyak@sam_" (p. 108).

If Vâcaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumâna in his _Tattvakaumudî_ be considered to be a correct explanation of _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ then Îs'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavâsin whose views on anumâna as referred to in _S'lokavârttika,_ p. 393, are altogether different. But Vâcaspati's own statement in the _Tâtparyya@tîkâ_ (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.]

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_Mahâbhâsya_ of Patañjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1]. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Sâ@mkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patañjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Âryâ metre by Îs'varak@r@s@na was not a Sâ@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sâ@mkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Sâ@mkhya doctrine of prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Sâ@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Îs'varak@r@s@na.

The earliest descriptions of a Sâ@mkhya which agrees with Îs'varak@r@s@na's Sâ@mkhya (but with an addition of Îs'vara) are to be found in Patañjali's _Yoga sûtras_ and in the _Mahâbhârata;_ but we are pretty certain that the Sâ@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patañjali, for in _Yoga sûtra_ I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Sâ@mkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sâ@mkhya of Caraka and Pañcas'ikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and the orthodox Sâ@mkhya doctrine as represented by Îs'varak@r@s@na. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that the puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyâya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer than the orthodox Sâ@mkhya.

We hear of a _Sa@s@titantras'âstra_ as being one of the oldest Sâ@mkhya works. This is described in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ as containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote ref 2]. A quotation from _Râjavârttika_ (a work about which there is no definite information) in Vâcaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sâ@mkhya kârika_(72) says that it was called the _@Sa@s@titantra because it dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference from puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of puru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of

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[Footnote 1: Patañjali's Mahâbhâ@sya, IV. I. 3. _Atisannikar@sâdativiprakar@sât mûrttyantaravyavadhânât tamasâv@rtatvât indriyadaurvalyâdatipramâdât,_ etc. (Benares edition.)]

[Footnote 2: _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ,_ pp. 108, 110.]

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the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five _viparyyayas_, nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].

But the content of the _Sa@s@titantra_ as given in _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sâ@mkhya of the _Sa@s@titantra_ referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ was of a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pañcarâtra Vai@snavas and the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ says that Kapila's theory of Sâ@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijñâna Bhiksu, the greatest expounder of Sâ@mkhya, says in many places of his work _Vijñânâm@rta Bhâ@sya_ that Sâ@mkhya was originally theistic, and that the atheistic Sâ@mkhya is only a _prau@dhivâda_ (an exaggerated attempt to show that no supposition of Îs'vara is necessary to explain the world process) though the _Mahâbhârata_ points out that the difference between Sâ@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy between the two accounts of _@Sa@s@titantra_ suggests that the original _Sa@s@titantra_ as referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ was subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among the important Sâ@mkhya works _@Sa@s@titantra_ but _@Sa@s@titantroddhâra_

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[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the _viparyyaya, tusti_, defects of organs, and the _siddhi_ are mentioned in the _Karikâ_ of Is'varakr@sna, but I have omitted them in my account of Sâmkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. avidyâ (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called _tamo, moha, mahâmoha, tamisrâ_, and _andhatâmisra_. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti will herself bring our salvation (_ambhas_), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's life (_salila_), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (_megha_), that salvation will be worked out by fate (_bhâgya_), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (_para_), the troubles of protecting the earned money (_supara_), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (_parâpara_), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (_anuttamâmbhas_), all gain leads to the injury of others (_uttamâmbhas_). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of scriptures (_târa_), (2) enquiry into their meaning (_sutâra_), (3) proper reasoning (_târatâra_), (4) corroborating one's own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (_ramyaka_), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (_sadâmudita_). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamâna lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Sâ@mkhya goal.]

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(revised edition of _@Sa@s@titantra_) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the earlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vâcaspati's time.

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the _Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhitâ_ to be in all essential parts the same work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila's Sâ@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It seems probable that his disciple Âsuri tried to popularise it. But it seems that a great change occurred when Pañcas'ikha the disciple of Âsuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ (70) that the literature was divided by him into many parts (_tena bahudhâk@rtam tantram_). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that the original _@Sa@s@titantra_ was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential parts as the Sâ@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Pâtañjala Sâ@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may be ventured is that Pañcas'ikha probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of Sâ@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Pâtañjala school of Sâ@mkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pañcas'ikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sâ@mkhya system. An important change in the Sâ@mkhya doctrine seems to have been introduced by Vijñâna Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his treatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this interpretation of Sâ@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system of the accepted Kapila and the Pâtañjala school of Sâ@mkhya. But it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the

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[Footnote 1: _Tarkarahasyadîpikâ_, p. 109.]

[Footnote 2: _eva@m sa@dvims'akam prâhah s'arîramth mânavâh sâ@mkhyam sa@mkhyâtmakatvâcca kapilâdibhirucyate. Matsyapurâna_, IV. 28.]

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totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijñâna Bhik@su and the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga philosophy compiled by Patañjali and commented on by Vyâsa, Vâcaspati and Vijñ@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as explained by Vâcaspati and Vijñana Bhik@su in most points I have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Pâtañjala schools of Sâ@mkhya and have treated them together--a principle which was followed by Haribhadra in his _@Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya_.

The other important Sâ@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapâda are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanâtana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is known about their historicity or doctrines.

Sâ@mkhya kârikâ, Sâ@mkhya sûtra, Vâcaspati Mis'ra and Vijñâna Bhik@su.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Sâ@mkhya-Yoga system. The _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ is the oldest Sâ@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_ was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth century A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who made allusions to a number of Sâ@mkhya works, did not make any reference to the _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_, and no other writer who is known to have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any reference to the _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_. The natural conclusion therefore is that these sûtras were probably written some time after the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is said at the end of the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ of Îs'varak@r@s@na that the kârikâs give an exposition of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sâ@mkhya works--the _@Sa@s@titantras'âstra_. The _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sâ@mkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the _@Sa@s@titantras'âstra_ (_@Sa@s@titantroddhâra_ as mentioned by

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[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.]

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Gû@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the Sâ@mkhya doctrine found in the sûtras differs in any important way from the Sâ@mkhya doctrine as found in the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_. The only point of importance is this, that the _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_ hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved in the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of the gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_. This is, however, a case of omission and not of difference. Vijñâna Bhik@su, the commentator of the _Sâ@mkhya sûtra_, was more inclined to theistic Sâ@mkhya or Yoga than to atheistic Sâ@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his _Sâmkhyapravacanabhâ@sya, Yogavârttika_, and _Vijñânâm@rtabhasya_ (an independent commentary on the Brahmasûtras of Bâdarâyana on theistic Sâ@mkhya lines). Vijñâna Bhiksu's own view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he agreed more with the views of the Sâ@mkhya doctrine of the Pura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said to be merged in the end in Îs'vara, by whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the _Sâ@mkhya sûtras_, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sâ@mkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Îs'vara it could explain all facts. Vijñâna Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sâ@mkhya differed on many points from those of Vâcaspati, and it is difficult to say who is right. Vijñâna Bhik@su has this advantage that he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points on which Vâcaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the nature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most important thing in Sâ@mkhya. Vijñâna Bhik@su described the gu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vâcaspati and Gau@dapâda (the other commentator of the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_) remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of Vijñâna Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely

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came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any other work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the _Mahâbhârata_ explains the nature of the gu@nas. But Bhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su in giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The _Kârikâ_ speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness (_sattva, rajas_ and _tamas_). It also describes sattva as being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vâcaspati merely paraphrases this statement of the _Kârikâ_ but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Sâ@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness as to the conception of the gu@nas.

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation differs from that of Vâcaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vâcaspati holds that there is no contact (_sa@myoga_) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (_bhoga_) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of Vâcaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (_sannidhi_) means only a specific kind of fitness (_yogyatâ_) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijñâna Bhik@su differs from Vâcaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

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reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijñana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vâcaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vâcaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vâcaspati's commentary on the _Sâ@mkhya kârikâ_ which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (_aha@mkâra_) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmâtras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of _Vyâsabhâ@sya_ and Vijñâna Bhik@su etc. Vâcaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkâra and

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from aha@mkâra the tanmâtras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijñâna Bhik@su however holds that both the separation of aha@mkâra and the evolution of the tanmâtras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vâcaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patañjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the S'atapatha Brâhmana and the B@rhadâra@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2]. The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature [Footnote ref 3].

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the @Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses [Footnote ref 5].

In Pâ@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root "_yuj samâdhau_" (_yuj_ in the sense of concentration) from "_yujir yoge_" (root _yujir_ in the sense of connecting). _Yuj_ in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].

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[Footnote 1: See my _Study of Patanjali_, p. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114. 9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brâh, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129; S'atap. Brâh. XI. 5. 8. 1.]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, _indriyâ@ni hayânâhu@h vi@sayâte@sugocarân_. The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. _Karmendriyâ@nyasya hayâ@h_ the conative senses are its horses.]

[Footnote 6: _Yugya@h_ is used from the root of _yujir yoge_ and not from _yuja samâdhau_. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam," V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Pâ@nini as Goldstûcker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.]

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In the _Bhagavadgîtâ_, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root "_yuj-samâdhau_" but also with "_yujir yoge_" This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the _Bhagavadgîtâ._ "Yogin" in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the _Bhagavadgîtâ_ tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from _yujir yoge_) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kau@tilya in his _Arthas'âstra_ when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Sâ@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokâyata. The oldest Buddhist sûtras (e.g. the _Satipa@t@thâna sutta_) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sâ@mkhya, as we find it in the _Yoga sûtras_ of Patañjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of prâ@nâyâma (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to Maitrâya@nî that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetâs'vatara and the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Sâ@mkhya tenets, though the Sâ@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the Maitrâya@nî in the conversation between S'âkyâyana and B@rhad ratha where we find that the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics was offered

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in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Sâ@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patañjali. Thus S'âkyâyana says: "Here some say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief--this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'â@n@dilya, Yogatattva, Dhyânabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanâda, Varâha, Ma@n@dala Brâhma@na, Nâdabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalû, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sâ@mkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the

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