Chapter VII: The Invasion of the Crimea (3)

During the first few days of the operations against Sevastopol there were several casualties among the Officers of the Grenadier Guards. On the 16th, Captain Rowley was killed, and, two days later, the same fate overtook Colonel Hood, the gallant Commanding Officer who had greatly distinguished himself by his coolness and intrepidity at the Alma. The losses of the Coldstream at this moment were happily less. It was not till the 20th, that the first man was wounded in the trenches; but next day, Lord Dunkellin was unfortunately captured. Commanding a working party without arms—for at that time the men told off to dig were sent to the front unarmed,—he lost his way in the darkness, and, stumbling upon a piquet which he thought was English, he went forward by himself to ask where he was. As it happened, he found himself within the enemy’s lines, and was taken; his men, however, luckily escaped under cover of the night.[254]

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Footnote 254:

This incident does not appear to have modified the rule by which
working parties were sent to the trenches at night, across an unknown
and intersected country, without arms or an escort, if we may judge
from the following General After Order of the 22nd: “The Commander of
the Forces directs that all parties, whether armed or on fatigue,
which may be ordered to the front, may be accompanied by a Staff
Officer competent to guide them.” On the 11th of November, however, it
was ordered that all working parties were to take their arms with them
(_First Divisional Pass Order_ ).

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Prince Menshikoff so far recovered from his defeat on the 20th of September, that he occupied the hills in the neighbourhood of Mackenzie Farm, and took possession of the roads leading therefrom into the valley of the Tchernaya on the 7th of October. He had good reason to be proud of the achievements of the garrison of Sevastopol, and to rejoice at his own singular good fortune. The town was fast growing into a powerful fortress, sufficiently strong to resist any sudden assault, and likely for months to occupy the energies of a far more numerous force than stood before it at that time. He himself was placed in an unassailable position. Secure as regards his communications with the interior of Russia and with Sevastopol, he not only received without difficulty the fresh forces that were hurrying to his assistance; but he also hemmed the invaders into a small corner of an exceedingly inhospitable country, restricted their enterprise, and threatened them with destruction in case a reverse were to happen to them. History, indeed, fails to record any great genius in this Russian General, nor were his troops of that high order to account for the immense advantages he gained at this moment. He was simply fortunate in the Governments and in the leaders of his antagonists, who, unable to combine to carry out any single plan, continually changed their intentions, until a surprise on the north side was converted into a lengthy siege (without investment) of the south side.

The Bessarabian reinforcements began to reach Simferopol early in October, and on the 15th, General Liprandi arrived there. A few days later it was determined to make an attack on our base at Balaklava, with some 25,000 troops (22,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 78 guns) commanded by that Officer. The attack took place on the 25th, a day immortalized in our military history by the bravery of the British cavalry, particularly by the charge of the Light brigade, “one of the most brilliant ever remembered in the annals of war,” though it resulted in the destruction of that corps.[255]

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Footnote 255:

General G. Klapka, _The War in the East, from the year 1853 till July,
1855_ (translated by Lieut.-Colonel A. Mednyansky), p. 96 (London,
1855).

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Balaklava was covered by two defensive lines, the outer and the inner. The outer line, more than two miles in length, running along the Causeway Heights and near the Woronzoff road, had the support of a few small earthworks, “mere scratches with the spade, a donkey might have been ridden into some of them,” armed with only nine 12-pounder guns in all, and occupied by about two battalions of Turks. The inner line, near Kadikeui, was 3000 yards in rear, and was held by the 93rd Regiment, a few invalids, the Marines, and the rest of the Turks. The Russians, advancing in force at dawn on the 25th, brought 30 guns (some of them of heavy calibre) against the earthworks on the Causeway Heights,—which were isolated, entirely unsupported, and commanded by neighbouring ground,—and captured two of them on the right of the line, after a stubborn resistance; a third soon after fell into their hands. They then pushed forward their cavalry, of which four squadrons reconnoitred towards Kadikeui; the latter came within range of the 93rd, drawn up in line, who received them with a volley, and with such determination that they quickly wheeled about and fled to the rear. The rest, a solid column, nearly 3000 strong, supported by 32 guns, moving in somewhat the same direction, came suddenly close to the British Heavy cavalry brigade, who, without the slightest hesitation, charged, and in a few moments routed them, and sent them back in confusion, past the front of the Light brigade. Unfortunately Lord Cardigan did not fall upon the flying mass and complete their discomfiture; so they got away down the valley that lay between the Fediukhine and Causeway heights, both of which were held by the enemy’s infantry and artillery, and took up a position about a mile and a quarter away, behind some Russian guns. And now “some one blundered,” and the Light brigade made their famous charge, over this dangerous ground, flanked on each side by well-posted artillery, straight into the guns and the cavalry at the end of the valley. The story of this gallant deed is well known. The Russian gunners and cavalry were swept away, and forced to retreat before the impetuous onslaught of our weak squadrons, but the brigade was broken, and indeed destroyed. It numbered 670 sabres at the commencement of the action, and at the conclusion its mounted strength was only 195. The enemy was quite unable to cut off the retreat of the remnants of our light horse, as they rode back after their desperate expedition, very few prisoners were taken, and the French, making a spirited and successful charge upon the Fediukhine Heights, prevented the Russians from harassing our men from that quarter, as they emerged from the deadly and unequal conflict.

Heavy firing had been heard in the British camps before Sevastopol at dawn, and, when the serious nature of the attack was perceived, orders were sent to the First and Fourth Divisions to march down to meet the danger. Two of Bosquet’s infantry brigades, as well as the French cavalry, which had by this time reached the seat of war, were also brought to the field of battle. When our troops got to the Sapuné Ridge, and looked on the plain beneath, they saw with breathless interest the first encounter between the contending horsemen.

“The Heavy cavalry charge,” says Colonel Tower, “was just going on as
we came in sight of the Turkish redoubts; we could indistinctly see
the grey horses and bearskin caps [the Scots Greys] swallowed up in a
dense mass of grey-coated Russians, their sabres flashing in the
sun.”[256]

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Footnote 256:

_Diary_ , Oct. 25th. Readers of the late Sir Edward Hamley’s _War in
the Crimea_ , p. 113, will remember the vivid description which he has
given of this brilliant cavalry charge, as it appeared to him and to
the troops (among them the Coldstream) standing on the heights above.

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The subsequent charge of the Light brigade was not so apparent to our infantry:—

“The threatened attack of Balaklava,” continues Colonel Tower, “turned
out to be nothing; and when it appeared to be all over, the Light
cavalry started on their suicidal expedition, we could see them over
the line of hills of the Turkish redoubts, and then they vanished to
be seen no more. When the remnants returned, I got leave to fall out,
and walked up to the Turkish redoubts, and almost the first thing I
saw was poor Nolan’s body, his chest knocked to pieces by a round
shot; the whole plain was dotted about with men and horses, some
struggling on the ground, some loose horses galloping about without
riders; a great many Russian cavalry were lying about where the Heavy
cavalry had driven them back,—our men had used their sabres with good
effect.”

Despite the glorious conduct of our troops upon this occasion, we lost a good deal and gained very little. The eastern portion of an unsupported advanced line of redoubts on the Causeway Heights was captured by the weight of numbers, and the outer defences of Balaklava were occupied by the enemy; but his further movements towards Kadikeni were crushed by a handful of our Heavy cavalry, and our Light brigade proved their superiority over him by a useless feat of daring which is unparalleled in warfare.

Thus, though Balaklava was still safe, we were deprived of the use of the Woronzoff road as a means of communication between our base of operations and the upland, and we had only the unmetalled path which led over the Col to rely on. We shall see that this result of the battle of the 25th was a serious one for the British army besieging Sevastopol. There was, indeed, some idea of turning Liprandi out of the Causeway Heights; but had it been definitely formed, the infantry would have descended from the ridge on which they stood by the Woronzoff road, whence the object would have been more easily accomplished. Instead of this, however, they were moved onwards to the Col, and remained during the day covering Balaklava. No forward operation was undertaken, and it was probably considered that we had not sufficient troops to hold the outer line efficiently. So the main road was placidly given up to the enemy, and at nightfall the Guards Brigade and the Fourth Division returned to camp, while the remaining two Highland regiments were left at Balaklava to strengthen the garrison at that important place.[257]

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Footnote 257:

The battle which deprived us of our principal road, cost the Allies—

English, 40 Officers; 386 sergeants, rank and file; 426 total French, 2 ” 50 ” ” 52 ” Turks, 9 ” 250 ” ” 259 ” ——— Total, 737 men,

and 409 horses. The Russians lost some 600 men, of whom the greater
number fell before the British Heavy cavalry. The latter suffered but
little in that superb charge, though they had many casualties when
shielding the recoil of the Light brigade (_Our Veterans, etc._, p.
255).

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The vulnerable point on the right flank of the British position has already been adverted to, also the position taken up by the French Corps of observation under General Bosquet. We have seen that this force could not help the Allies to retain possession of the Woronzoff road, nor could it, as we shall see, secure the right of their siege-works from serious attack. The first attempt to disturb this flank was made at noon on the 26th, when a force emerged from Sevastopol, of which 700 men advanced up the Careenage Ravine, while the remainder, 4300 men and four guns, crossed that obstacle, and directed themselves upon Shell Hill, in front of the camp of the Second Division. The former column was met by the sharpshooters of the Guards, under Captain Goodlake, who, drawing up his insignificant detachment behind a ditch that ran across the ravine, held the hostile column in check, and barred its further advance,—even capturing several prisoners,—until, a little later, some men of the Rifles appearing upon the scene, the enemy was driven back.[258]

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Footnote 258:

This was one of the acts of gallantry performed by Captain Goodlake
during the war, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

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The main column, endeavouring to reach Shell Hill, met the outposts of the Second Division, some 250 strong, who, instead of retiring before so superior a force, stubbornly resisted it, and held it at bay, until, outflanked and pressed back by numbers, they retreated slowly and in good order. But the Russians gained nothing, for the divisional artillery, reinforced by a battery of the First Division, had time to come into action, and when the enemy appeared upon the crest of the hill, he was met by the fire of our guns, which speedily repulsed him, and made him retire precipitately to the fortress, pursued by the piquets, and under fire of the Lancaster battery. In this combat, where the Russians acknowledge the loss of 270 men and 80 prisoners, as against 12 killed and 77 wounded on our side, Lieutenant Conolly, of the 49th Regiment, greatly distinguished himself. He was promoted Brevet Major, obtained the Victoria Cross, and a commission in the Coldstream. The Brigade was not employed in this action; they stood in reserve out of musketry fire, and watched the fight, ready for emergencies, but their services were not required.[259]

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Footnote 259:

The Russians appear, upon this occasion, to have understated both
their strength and their losses.

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This sortie was intended, according to Todleben, to distract our attention from Balaklava; and it may well be that Liprandi, knowing its importance, was under grave apprehension lest the Woronzoff road might be wrested from him. It has also been thought that the Russians were endeavouring to effect a lodgment on Shell Hill, preparatory to the attack they meant soon to deliver on our right flank at Inkerman, and this is very likely. But, if so, they had an inadequate force to accomplish such a purpose, and by this time they had ample experience of the fighting qualities of the British troops, who, man for man, were immensely superior to their own. Indeed we had every need of the sterling bravery of our gallant soldiers, for a great crisis was at hand. The strength of our Crimean army was becoming alarmingly weakened, not only by the wear and tear of active service and losses incurred on the field, but through the unusual amount of sickness that prevailed, and the arduous nature of the campaign in which we had become engaged. In the Coldstream there were 190 more admissions into hospital in October than there had been in September.[260] On the other hand, the actions of the 25th and 26th increased the confidence of our men when opposed to the enemy. They felt themselves more than a match for him if they could only get leave to be at him; but they little knew how severe the trial would be that awaited them in a very few days.[261]

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Footnote 260:

Wyatt, p. 28.

Footnote 261:

Colonel Wilson, describing the excellent tone that prevailed among our
men at this time, notes the behaviour of the wounded on the 26th, as
they limped or were carried on stretchers past the Brigade. He says it
was “wonderful, the very reverse of what might have been looked for.
Far from drooping in spirits, most of them were in buoyant spirits.
Sometimes a fine youth with a badly fractured arm, hurraed lustily as
he passed; another, whose thigh a round shot had smashed, would—faint
as he was—raise himself up a little on his litter, and brandish his
rifle triumphantly. I observed that nearly every man, whether slightly
or sorely hurt, still clutched his musket.... A bullet through the
heart alone conquers such soldiers” (_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 266).

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On the night of the 28th, many of our camps were alarmed, and believed they were about to be attacked. The outposts watching the plain of Balaklava heard cavalry approaching, and a great deal of firing in the dark took place—the sentries blazing away whenever they saw, or fancied they saw, the phantom horsemen, “who seemed perpetually galloping, but never coming any nearer. Staff Officers kept arriving to know what the commotion was about. Of course I could give them no information.” A regiment of Zouaves and the guns in a French redoubt poured volleys into imaginary columns coming to storm our position. “The Russian drums all along the Fediukhine heights beat to arms; and I sat down quietly on a stone in advance of my sentries, and could hear nothing more, but made up my mind Liprandi intended to give us a benefit in the morning.” When the morning broke the mystery was cleared. It was found that a number of Russian horses had stampeded from their lines, and that no enemy was near. A hundred or more were caught, and served to mount a few of our cavalry, while the remainder scampered back across the plain to their legitimate owners.[262]

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Footnote 262:

Tower, _Diary_ , Oct. 28th.

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The weary monotony of the siege continued after the sortie of the 26th, the troops being largely employed in the trenches, constructing approaches or batteries, or acting as covering guards, generally under a heavy fire from the fortress in front of them.

“The enemy is barricading the streets, and we shall have to fight
every inch of ground. I fear we have a great many of our sorrows to
come, more especially wintering here; too horrible to contemplate! An
army of 30,000 men in our rear with a large force of cavalry, and
Sevastopol, which seems to be getting stronger every day, in our
front. Any number of general actions is better than a siege. In the
trenches for twenty-six hours at a time (we used to mount now at 2
a.m., with nothing but biscuit and salt pork to eat), shells
constantly troubling one’s life, and showers of dirt covering you
every time a shot strikes the parapet.”[263]

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Footnote 263:

_Ibid._ , Oct. 27th.

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The French were sapping up towards the Flagstaff Battery with the greatest energy. They were becoming strong enough to withstand the guns of the garrison, and to retrieve their failure of October 17th-25th. Another bombardment, to be followed by an assault, was contemplated, and the allied Commanders had full confidence that this time, at least, the effect would be decisive. They even agreed to meet on the 5th of November to arrange the details of their projected operation. But neglected opportunities too often rise in judgment against a General in the field. The 5th was the day of Inkerman, and all our plans were completely frustrated.