Chapter IX: The Battle of Inkerman (2)

This manœuvre appears to have changed the principle on which the Brigade had been resisting the hostile columns, and many who hitherto never pursued the beaten bodies of the enemy beyond the crest, now rushed after them down the slopes into the hollows beneath. In this way the group near Captain Wilson got out of hand, and pursued far down into the valley of the Tchernaya, where they were met by shots from Gortchakoff’s riflemen, “who sprang up among the bushes, and blazed full in our faces.” Meeting some stray groups of Cathcart’s submerged detachment, the whole party reascended the heights, and lost heavily as they climbed up. Here they found themselves between two fires, and ascertained that the enemy was really above them, for at first they thought they were mistaken for Russians, and were being shot at by English soldiers. Avoiding this danger, by taking an upwards direction to the left, they stumbled upon a dead ammunition mule, and eagerly replenished their pouches, as for some time they had not had a round among them. Having at last reached the top, they found that the fog had lifted, that the Brigade was not where they had left it, and that Zouaves and Algerines (the _Indigènes_) were approaching the ground, and were driving the enemy back, as Colonel Tower has already told us. Wilson and the last of his men joined this attack, and many fell; he finally attached himself to the French 50th of the Line as they advanced, and then finding he could do nothing more, he sought the Coldstream, eventually falling in with them near Home Ridge, which he reached before the shattered remains of the Battalion got there.

From the moment our men began to descend the slopes their means of maintaining their post on the Kitspur seemed to diminish. Under any circumstances, the struggle of the few against the many was gradually exhausting the power of the former, and reinforcements were urgently required. It was fortunate, therefore, that our allies now appeared upon the scene. Bosquet, who for some time in the early morning had been observing Gortchakoff, came speedily to the conclusion that that General meant to remain quiescent; he therefore sent forward some of his troops without delay, to Home Ridge, where the danger was most pressing. Two Battalions, 1600 strong, arrived first; and one, the French 6th of the Line, pushing towards the Kitspur, struck in flank the Russians, who, advancing through the gap, which was ever getting wider, were endeavouring to operate against our rear. This French battalion, however, soon got into difficulties, and the other, the 7me Léger, was sent to its support. But before this was effected another crisis occurred; for, the enemy, urging forward his numerous forces up the ravines which he occupied, brushed past the Anglo-French then on the Kitspur, and made a very determined onslaught on Home Ridge itself. This serious manœuvre was repulsed by the gallantry of a few British detachments present on the spot, and of the 7me Léger; the defeated column was driven back, so that the two French battalions were brought together. It was now 10 a.m., and another French force, a brigade with some artillery, led by Bosquet in person, reached the battle in two columns: in the first, some rifles, a battalion of Algerines, and one of Zouaves (1900); in the other, more Zouaves, and the French 50th of the Line (2200). There was still a good deal of difficulty in forcing the enemy to recede; for as the first column pursued him, they advanced too far, and fresh hostile forces were able to move up the ravines leading to the main spur, thereby threatening our allies in rear. But on the arrival of the second column, the Russians, now thoroughly broken by their losses and by the stubborn resistance which held them in check, gave up the contest. They were finally driven off the Kitspur and out of the ravines which had been so useful to them during the struggle, by enabling them to re-organize after so many repulses inflicted by our slender forces. Kinglake thus speaks of a band of the Coldstream during this phase of the fight:—

“The Zouave battalion was advancing ... when the bearskin all at once
reappeared. It was from the wooded steeps of the hillsides that the
spectre uprose. Since the time when last we observed it, the small
band of Coldstream men collected by Wilson had remained in the
brushwood below, watching always for some such occasion as the one
that now offered. Amid a roar of joy and welcome—for the Zouaves and
the Guards were close friends—these Coldstream men joined the advance,
aligning on the right of the French.... What followed was
slaughter.”[282]

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Footnote 282:

Kinglake, v. 402.

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Meanwhile we had already gained an immense superiority over the enemy’s artillery. As early as about 9.30, two 18-pounder guns of position had been brought on Home Ridge, and after a short space of time the power of the hostile batteries began to wane. The French guns, coming up, posted themselves on our right, and the bombardment continued with increasing advantage on our side, though the number of our pieces was not half that of our opponents. Some of our men on the left and centre of our line also advanced, and added to the misfortune of the gunners on Shell Hill. The battle was really decided at eleven, though the artillery continued to fire till much later. As soon as the bulk of the Household Brigade returned to Home Ridge, and after ammunition had been served out, the men were reformed, and were moved up to protect the guns against any sudden assault. This duty was “worse than fighting the infantry, for we got no revenge for the men we lost,” and we incurred casualties not a few.[283]

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Footnote 283:

Letter of Mr. Taylor, late Quartermaster Somersetshire Militia, then
in the Coldstream; one shell killed and wounded eight men. Colonel
Upton was wounded at this period. See, also, _Our Veterans, etc._ , p.
299.

The action of the Guards at Inkerman seems to be imperfectly described
in Kinglake. According to that writer, the bulk of the Brigade came
out of action at 8.30; though he notes that the force under Wilson
joined the last attack undertaken by the French about 11 o’clock, and
allows that the companies which followed Upton were in the field as
late as 10. Giving Bosquet’s impressions of the scene presented to his
observation at that hour, he says, “High above on the right, where
there sauntered a red-coated Officer with the _bonnet de poil_ and a
singularly unconcerned air (Colonel Upton), some men of the Guards
could be seen lying down among the brushwood” (Kinglake, v. 382). Yet
Tower and Wilden, whose accounts have been given, state that they were
relieved on the Kitspur by the Algerines and Zouaves—that is, after 10
o’clock; and Wilson who, according to Mr. Kinglake, was on that
portion of the battle-field later than any other Guardsman, tells us
himself that he got back to Home Ridge _before_ the bulk of the
Brigade reached it. Some isolated groups, separated during the fierce
struggle in the fog and brushwood from the main body, possibly found
themselves on Home Ridge before; Taylor says he helped to pull up the
two 18-pounders, which, as we know, took place about 9.30.

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The retreat of the Russians commenced about one o’clock, and was covered by a column of their reserve; which, attempting to advance, was quickly dispersed by a few rounds of the 18-pounders. There was no pursuit. The enemy slipped away, and “seemed to melt from the lost field; the English were too few and too exhausted, and the French too little confident in the advantage gained, to convert the repulse into a rout.” Our allies, deducting losses, numbered at the end of the engagement some 7000 infantry, for, besides the troops already mentioned, three battalions (2400) arrived on the ground at eleven; they also had 700 cavalry and 24 guns present. Lord Raglan was anxious to complete the victory by falling on the rear of the flying Russians, but his cautious colleague would not consent; for he still feared an attack from Gortchakoff’s untouched forces, and was unwilling to expose his men to the fire of the ships that were moored in the roadstead.[284]

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Footnote 284:

Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 157.

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While the battle was going on, the garrison of Sevastopol kept up so poor a demonstration, that we were able to denude our camps of men, and push them to Inkerman. Besides the men on duty in the trenches, the greater part of the Third Division watched the fortress, and they were subjected to no further inconvenience than that which the fire from the place, intensified on this day, entailed. About 9.30, however, the enemy made a sortie against Forey’s siege corps, under General Timofeyeff, with 5000 men and 12 guns. The blow, though it met with some success at first, failed, and the Russians were pursued by our gallant allies back under the shelter of the fortress. Thus little was done by the garrison to assist Dannenberg, and that little was of trifling value. Gortchakoff’s operations during the day were still less effective. He made a few feints, fired upon the Sapuné Ridge, and, it is said, did lose 15 men. He thereby gave the companies on piquet (among them, Nos. 6 and 7 companies of the Coldstream) the opportunity of engaging him with distant volleys, without apparently causing much, if any, loss to our side. In short, he did nothing, when by attacking Bosquet, he would have prevented that General from advancing to our assistance at Inkerman. His orders were “to support the general attack, to draw the Allied forces upon himself, and to try and seize one of the ascents to the Sapuné Ridge.” Mr. Kinglake, however, tells us that these written orders were explained away by “oral communications” into something different,[285] and makes us believe that there is a mystery which has never been explained, hanging over the operations of this Russian Commander, who held so much power in his hands on that day. What we do know is that Dannenberg, in spite of his overwhelming numbers, was unable to secure a footing on the Kitspur, that this was due to the manner in which it was defended by our scanty forces, and that in this defence the Household Brigade played a glorious part, and suffered much in consequence.

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Footnote 285:

Kinglake, v. 59 (note), 69.

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The losses were very great on both sides: those of the enemy, who moved in heavy columns, being more than those of the Allies, though relatively, in proportion to numbers at the seat of war, he suffered less than we did. The Russians had 10,729 killed, wounded, and prisoners, including 256 Officers. The English 2357 of all ranks, of whom 130 were Officers (or 39 Officers, and 558 men killed, and 91 Officers and 1669 men wounded). The French 929, among them 49 Officers (or 13 Officers and 130 men killed, and 36 Officers and 750 men wounded).[286] The Brigade lost nearly half its effective strength, viz., out of a total of 1334:—

Killed 12 Officers, 9 Sergts., 1 Drumrs., 177 Rank & file, Total 199 Wounded 20[287] ” 20 ” 4 ” 357 ” ” 401 Missing — ” — ” — ” 4 ” ” 4 Total 32 ” 29 ” 5 ” 538 ” ” 604

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Footnote 286:

The above were the losses on the field of Inkerman. The total
casualties on the 5th of November amounted to: Russians, 11,959;
English, 2573; and French 1800 of all ranks (Kinglake, v. 443, 457).

Footnote 287:

Counting Major-General Bentinck, who was severely wounded. Of the
Coldstream Officers serving on the Staff on that day, none were
wounded; Colonel Somerset, however, had a horse shot under him.

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The Coldstream suffered in like proportion, but the casualties among the Officers far exceeded those that occurred in the other Regiments. In fact, almost all the Officers were swept away. Out of seventeen present, four only escaped uninjured, viz. Captains Strong, Wilson, Crawley, and Tower. Of the rest, eight were killed or died soon after of their wounds, viz. Lieut.-Colonels Dawson, and Cowell, Captains MacKinnon, Bouverie, Eliot, and Ramsden, and Lieutenants Greville, and Disbrowe. The remainder were wounded; viz. Colonel Upton (slightly), Lieut.-Colonels Halkett, and Lord C. FitzRoy, Captain P. Feilding, and Lieutenant Amherst (all severely). The losses of the Battalion amounted to—

Killed 8 Officers, 3 Sergeants, 73 Rank & Total 84
File,

Wounded 5 ” 11 ” 107 ” ” 123

Total 13 ” 14 ” 180 ” ” 207

The principal casualties were in the flank companies. No. 1 entered the action with 50 to 60 men, and No. 8 was slightly stronger. The former lost one sergeant and 43 rank and file, and the latter two sergeants and 41 men. No. 2 came next, losing 37 men. Where a Battalion has so freely shed its life-blood in the stubborn defence of the position assigned to it, it may seem strange that no official notice should be taken of the death of the Officer who led it into action, and who directed its movements until he fell, and more especially when in the Brigade to which the Battalion belonged, no other Commanding Officer lost his life. Yet this is what occurred with respect to the memory of the gallant Colonel Dawson, and the feelings of his brothers in arms were not inadequately expressed in the following lines, written by Colonel Wilson:—

“The despatch which informed England of this dearly bought victory,
commended the services of many of the living and blazoned the merits
of many of the dead; but from that encomiastic scroll there was at
least one remarkable omission. To the memory of Colonel Vesey Dawson,
shot through the heart while in command of the Coldstream Guards, was
conceded not a passing word of eulogy or of regret. It is melancholy
to reflect that on this humble page should stand the only record of
how as brave a soldier as ever drew a sword, as noble a gentleman as
ever earned the respect of his fellow-men, fought and died.”[288]

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Footnote 288:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 306.

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We are told that this great victory caused no outward elation among our troops. A reaction succeeded the excitement of the struggle; the danger now past began to be realized for the first time; and the men, though hardened to the miserable scenes which war creates, were almost awed by the terrible carnage and devastation that met their eyes on the hard-fought field. The Second Division camp was laid flat, the tents uprooted and scattered, canvas saturated with blood carpeted the ground. Our own camp swarmed with the wounded and the dying, and the sight sent a chill of depression through the few survivors as they returned to their bivouacs. Everywhere on the narrow space of the battleground the victims lay thick, some killed, others groaning in agony, and nowhere thicker than in and around the Sandbag battery, where the contest raged the fiercest. Here the dead were literally piled up on one another as they fell.

“The whole battle-field, which could all be seen at a glance, except
where concealed by brushwood, looked perfectly _covered_ with bodies;
between the Second Division hills and the crest of the Inkerman hill
is a very short distance, and the entire action having been fought on
that limited space, there was an awful scene of carnage upon it....
Before evening we got all our wounded off the field; the dead, of
course, remained there, and the poor wounded Ruskis who were a great
deal too numerous to take off.... From the heights I could see the
Russian army winding up the road; the whole country was covered with
troops straggling over the causeway over the Tchernaya marsh; they
were a long time crossing. Arabas full of wounded, guns, etc.,
lumbering up the way, but they had quite enough of it.... Our hospital
was a most piteous sight.... Our poor fellows were all dying or
dead.... The camp was miserable, and I could only thank God I was not
lying in the hospital tent with half my limbs smashed to pieces, or
lying on a stretcher ready to be buried.”[289]

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Footnote 289:

Tower, _Diary_ .

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Saddest of all, was the cruel thought surging in every mind that many of our brave wounded had been basely bayoneted as they lay helpless on the ground, by an uncivilized enemy, who, unable to drive off the few that held the plateau against him, wreaked his vengeance on the defenceless, as soon as they fell into his hands. We had ample evidence of this savagery—established, moreover, by a special inquiry—that cast so black a stain on the Russian army, for, when our men hurled the foe from a corner from which he had driven us, we found our wounded stabbed to death.

Thus was the battle of Inkerman fought and won by small bodies of the British and French armies, over an overpowering hostile force of more than 35,000 infantry, amply supported by artillery; who, having stolen in during the night up to our outposts, endeavoured to break through the Allied line round Sevastopol, at a point where we were weakest, and where we had absolutely no defences.[290] The result proved the immense superiority of our arms over those of Russia; so also does it give us some indication of what would have happened if we had boldly attacked Sevastopol at the end of September, before, or immediately after, the flank march, or even during the bombardment in October. The British fought with a valour and constancy that surpassed even the glorious traditions of the past. Led by Officers who hurled themselves like the old Knight Errants into the thick of every danger, they nobly followed on with that unflinching steadiness produced by constitutional bravery, by devotion to their leaders, and by the splendid discipline that was the predominant characteristic of our Crimean troops. Their bold extension and their courage in maintaining it, even without supports and when opposed to heavy columns, made the Russians think that the line of red-coats was but a fringe of our strength, and they hesitated when they ought to have acted boldly. We were, moreover, provided with a superior rifle, and so when the enemy, emerging from the ravines, found himself met by a heavy and shattering fire, his columns were brought to a standstill, and he lost the advantage which his solid formation might have given him. He was far from being imbued with the spirit that animated our men, and he lacked the determination to close with them.

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Footnote 290:

It cannot be insisted too often that the Sandbag battery was a battery
only in name; and that its importance consisted in the fact that it
served as a rallying-point, on account of its being a conspicuous
object, round which the main struggle on the Kitspur raged. Russian
exaggerations have given it a wholly fictitious value; even Todleben,
describing the fight a little after eight o’clock, says that the
Okhotsk regiment (3000 strong) attacked the Sandbag battery held by
their “worthy rivals—the intrepid Coldstream,” that they expelled the
latter, and that nine guns were the reward of this brilliant feat of
arms! (see Hamley, _War in the Crimea_ , p. 160).

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“Had he, at the commencement of the battle, pushed these columns
resolutely forward, it follows nearly as a matter of course that, by
sheer momentum of his heavy masses, the British lines would have been
broken through and trampled down utterly. It would have been a
question of weight alone. As it was, no devotion, no exertions on the
part of the Russian Officers, could at the outset spur their
battalions to one grand combined rush. Time was frittered away in a
series of persevering but desultory attacks, which were invariably
repulsed, thanks to English valour and English firearms.”[291]

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Footnote 291:

_Our Veterans, etc._ , p. 309. It is proper to add that the Russian
Rifle corps, 1800 strong, were armed with as good a weapon as our
Minié, also that some of the British battalions (the 20th Regiment,
for instance, who distinguished themselves greatly in the battle)
carried the old smooth-bore musket, known as “Brown Bess” (see
Kinglake, v. 475).

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