Chapter XXXIV: Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Ieyasu (1)

ODA NOBUNAGA

WHEN the Taira sept was shattered finally at Dan-no-ura, a baby grandson of Kiyomori was carried by its mother to the hamlet of Tsuda, in Omi province. Subsequently this child, Chikazane, was adopted by a Shinto official of Oda, in Echizen, and thus acquired the name of Oda. For generations the family served uneventfully at the shrine in Omi, but in the disturbed days of the Ashikaga shoguns, the representative of the eighth generation from Chikazane emerged from the obscurity of Shinto services and was appointed steward (karo) of the Shiba family, which appointment involved removal of his residence to Owari. From that time the fortunes of the family became brighter. Nobuhide, its representative at the beginning of the sixteenth century, acquired sufficient power to dispute the Imagawa's sway over the province of Mikawa, and sufficient wealth to contribute funds to the exhausted coffers of the Court in Kyoto.

This man's son was Nobunaga. Born in 1534, and destined to bequeath to his country a name that will never die, Nobunaga, as a boy, showed much of the eccentricity of genius. He totally despised the canons of the time as to costume and etiquette. One of his peculiarities was a love of long swords, and it is related that on a visit to Kyoto in his youth he carried in his girdle a sword which trailed on the ground as he walked. Rough and careless, without any apparent dignity, he caused so much solicitude to his tutor and guardian, Hirate Masahide, and showed so much indifference to the latter's remonstrances, that finally Masahide had recourse to the faithful vassal's last expedient--he committed suicide, leaving a letter in which the explanation of his act was accompanied by a stirring appeal to the better instincts of his pupil and ward. This proved the turning-point in Nobunaga's career. He became as circumspect as he had previously been careless, and he subsequently erected to the memory of his brave monitor a temple which may be seen to this day by visitors to Nagoya.

It is frequently said of Nobunaga that his indifference to detail and his lack of patience were glaring defects in his moral endowment. But that accusation can scarcely be reconciled with facts. Thus, when still a young man, it is related of him that he summoned one of his vassals to his presence but, giving no order, allowed the man to retire. This was repeated with two others, when the third, believing that there must be something in need of care, looked about attentively before retiring, and observing a piece of torn paper on the mats, took it up and carried it away. Nobunaga recalled him, eulogized his intelligence, and declared that men who waited scrupulously for instructions would never accomplish much. The faculties of observation and initiation were not more valued by Nobunaga than those of honesty and modesty. It is recorded that on one occasion he summoned all the officers of his staff, and showing them a sword by a famous maker, promised to bestow it upon the man who should guess most correctly the number of threads in the silk frapping of the hilt. All the officers wrote down their guesses with one exception, that of Mori Rammaru. Asked for the reason of his abstention, Mori replied that he happened to know the exact number of threads, having counted them on a previous occasion when admiring the sword. Nubunaga at once placed the weapon in his hands, thus recognizing his honesty. Again, after the construction of the famous castle at Azuchi, to which reference will be made hereafter, Nobunaga, desiring to have a record compiled in commemoration of the event, asked a celebrated priest, Sakugen, to undertake the composition and penning of the document. Sakugen declared the task to be beyond his literary ability, and recommended that it should be entrusted to his rival, Nankwa. Nobunaga had no recourse but to adopt this counsel, and Nankwa performed the task admirably, as the document, which is still in existence, shows. In recognition of this success, Nobunaga gave the compiler one hundred pieces of silver, but at the same time bestowed two hundred on Sakugen for his magnanimity in recommending a rival.

Nobunaga unquestionably had the gift of endearing himself to his retainers, though there are records which show that he was subject to outbursts of fierce anger. Even his most trusted generals were not exempt from bitter words or even blows, and we shall presently see that to this fault in his character was approximately due his tragic end. Nevertheless, he did not lack the faculty of pity. On the occasion of a dispute between two of his vassals about the boundaries of a manor, the defeated litigant bribed one of Nobunaga's principal staff-officers to appeal for reversal of the judgment. This officer adduced reasons of a sufficiently specious character, but Nobunaga detected their fallacy, and appeared about to take some precipitate action when he happened to observe the wrinkles which time had written on the suppliant's face. He recovered his sang-froid and contented himself with sending the officer from his presence and subsequently causing to be handed to him a couplet setting forth the evils of bribery and corruption. He forgave the guilty man in consideration of his advanced age, and the incident is said to have closed with the suicide of the old officer. Frugality was another trait of Nobunaga's character. But he did not save money for money's sake. He spent with lavish hand when the occasion called for munificence; as when he contributed a great sum for the rebuilding of the Ise shrines. Perhaps nothing constitutes a better clue to his disposition than the verses he habitually quoted:

Life is short; the world is a mere dream to the idle.
Only the fool fears death, for what is there of life that does
Not die once, sooner or later?
Man has to die once and once only;
He should make his death glorious.

It is recorded that Nobunaga's demeanour in battle truly reflected the spirit of these verses.

ENGRAVING: TOYOTOMI HIDEYOSHI

HIDEYOSHI

Nobunaga certainly deserved the success he achieved, but that he achieved it must be attributed in part to accident. That accident was his association with Hideyoshi.* It has been sometimes said that circumstances beget the men to deal with them. Fallacious as such a doctrine is, it almost compels belief when we observe that the second half of the sixteenth century in Japan produced three of the greatest men the world has ever seen, and that they joined hands to accomplish the stupendous task of restoring peace and order to an empire which had been almost continuously torn by war throughout five consecutive centuries. These three men were born within an interval of eight years: Nobunaga, in 1534; Hideyoshi, in 1536, and Ieyasu, in 1542.

*To avoid needless difficulty the name "Hideyoshi" is used solely throughout this history. But, as a matter of fact, the great statesman and general was called in his childhood Nakamura Hiyoshi; his adult name was Tokichi; afterwards he changed this to Hashiba and ultimately, he was known as Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

There are many stories about Hideyoshi's early days, but the details are obscured by a record called the Taikoki, which undoubtedly makes many excursions into the region of romance. The plain facts appear to be that Hideyoshi was the son of a humble farmer named Kinoshita Yaemon, who lived in the Aichi district of Owari province, and who preferred the life of a foot-soldier (ashigaru) to the pursuit of agriculture. Yaemon served the Oda family, and died when Hideyoshi was still a youth. In Owari province, at a homestead called Icho-mura from the name of the tree (maiden-hair tree) that flourishes there in abundance, there stands a temple built in the year 1616 on the site of the house where Hideyoshi was born. This temple is known as Taiko-zan--"Taiko" having been the title of Hideyoshi in the latter years of his life--and in the grounds of the temple may be seen the well from which water was drawn to wash the newly born baby. The child grew up to be a youth of dimunitive stature, monkey-like face, extraordinary precocity, and boundless ambition. Everything was against him--personal appearance, obscurity of lineage, and absence of scholarship. Yet he never seems to have doubted that a great future lay before him.

Many curious legends are grouped about his childhood. They are for the most part clumsily constructed and unconvincing, though probably we shall be justified in accepting the evidence they bear of a mind singularly well ordered and resourceful. At the age of sixteen he was employed by a Buddhist priest to assist in distributing amulets, and by the agency of this priest he obtained an introduction to Matsushita Yukitsuna, commandant of the castle of Kuno at Hamamatsu, in Totomi province. This Matsushita was a vassal of Imagawa Yoshimoto. He controlled the provinces of Mikawa, Totomi, and Suruga, which lie along the coast eastward of Owari, and he represented one of the most powerful families in the country. Hideyoshi served in the castle of Kuno for a period variously reckoned at from one year to five. Tradition says that he abused the trust placed in him by his employer, and absconded with the sum of six ryo wherewith he had been commissioned to purchase a new kind of armour which had recently come into vogue in Owari province. But though this alleged theft becomes in certain annals the basis of a picturesque story as to Hideyoshi repaying Matsushita a thousandfold in later years, the unadorned truth seems to be that Hideyoshi was obliged to leave Kuno on account of the jealousy of his fellow retainers, who slandered him to Yukitsuna and procured his dismissal.

Returning to Owari, he obtained admission to the ranks of Oda Nobunaga in the humble capacity of sandal-bearer. He deliberately chose Nobunaga through faith in the greatness of his destiny, and again the reader of Japanese history is confronted by ingenious tales as to Hideyoshi's devices for obtaining admission to Nobunaga's house. But the most credible explanation is, at the same time, the simplest, namely, that Hideyoshi's father, having been borne on the military roll of Nobunaga's father, little difficulty offered in obtaining a similar favour for Hideyoshi.

Nobunaga was then on the threshold of his brilliant career. In those days of perpetual war and tumult, the supreme ambition of each great territorial baron in Japan was to fight his way to the capital, there to obtain from the sovereign and the Muromachi Bakufu a commission to subdue the whole country and to administer it as their lieutenant. Nobunaga seems to have cherished that hope from his early years, though several much more powerful military magnates would surely oppose anything like his pre-eminence. Moreover, in addition to comparative weakness, he was hampered by local inconvenience. The province of Owari was guarded on the south by sea, but on the east it was menaced directly by the Imagawa family and indirectly by the celebrated Takeda Shingen, while on the north it was threatened by the Saito and on the west by the Asai, the Sasaki, and the Kitabatake. Any one of these puissant feudatories would have been more than a match for the Owari chieftain, and that Imagawa Yoshimoto harboured designs against Owari was well known to Nobunaga, for in those days spying, slander, forgery, and deceit of every kind had the approval of the Chinese writers on military ethics whose books were regarded as classics by the Japanese. Hideyoshi himself figures at this very time as the instigator and director of a series of acts of extreme treachery, by which the death of one of the principal Imagawa vassals was compassed; and the same Hideyoshi was the means of discovering a plot by Imagawa emissaries to delay the repair of the castle of Kiyosu, Nobunaga's headquarters, where a heavy fall of rain had caused a landslide. Nobunaga did not venture to assume the offensive against the Imagawa chief. He chose as a matter of necessity to stand on the defensive, and when it became certain that Imagawa Yoshimoto had taken the field, a general impression prevailed that the destruction of the Oda family was unavoidable.

BATTLE OF OKEHAZAMA

In the month of June, 1560, Imagawa Yoshimoto crossed the border into Owari at the head of a force stated by the annals to have been forty-six thousand strong. Just two years had elapsed since Hideyoshi's admission to the service of the Owari baron in the office of sandal-bearer. Nevertheless, some generally credible records do not hesitate to represent Hideyoshi as taking a prominent part in the great battle against the Imagawa, and as openly advising Nobunaga with regard to the strategy best adapted to the situation. It is incredible that a private soldier, and a mere youth of twenty-two at that, should have risen in such a short time to occupy a place of equality with the great generals of Nobunaga's army. But that Hideyoshi contributed more or less to the result of the fight may be confidently asserted.

The battle itself, though the forces engaged were not large, must be counted one of the great combats of the world, for had not Nobunaga emerged victorious the whole course of Japanese history might have been changed. At the outset, no definite programme seems to have been conceived on Nobunaga's side. He had no allies, and the numerical inferiority of his troops was overwhelming. The latter defect was remedied in a very partial degree by the resourcefulness of Hideyoshi. In his boyhood he had served for some time under a celebrated chief of freebooters, by name Hachisuka Koroku,* and he persuaded that chieftain with his fifteen hundred followers to march to the aid of the Owari army, armour and weapons having been furnished by Sasaki Shotei, of Omi province. Sasaki regarded Nobunaga's plight as too hopeless to warrant direct aid, but he was willing to equip Hachisuka's men for the purpose, although the addition of fifteen hundred soldiers could make very little difference in the face of such a disparity as existed between the combatants.

*Ancestor of the present Marquis Hachisuka.

Shortly before these events, Owari had been invaded from the west by the Kitabatake baron, whose domain lay in Ise, and the invaders had been beaten back by a bold offensive movement on Nobunaga's part. The ultimate result had not been conclusive, as Nobunaga advisedly refrained from carrying the war into Ise and thus leaving his own territory unguarded. But the affair had taught the superiority of offensive tactics, and thus Nobunaga's impulse was to attack the army of Imagawa, instead of waiting to be crushed by preponderate force. His most trusted generals, Shibata Katsuiye, Sakuma Nobumori, and Hayashi Mitsukatsu, strenuously opposed this plan. They saw no prospect whatever of success in assuming the offensive against strength so superior, and they urged the advisability of yielding temporarily and awaiting an opportunity to recover independence. Here, Hideyoshi is reputed to have shown conspicuous wisdom at the council-table. He pointed out that there could be no such thing as temporary surrender. The Imagawa would certainly insist on hostages sufficiently valuable to insure permanent good faith, and he further declared that it was a mistake to credit the Imagawa with possessing the good-will of any of the other great feudatories, since they were all equally jealous of one another.

Finally, it was resolved that seven forts should be built and garrisoned, and that five of them should be allowed to fall into the enemy's hands if resistance proved hopeless. In the remaining two forts the garrisons were to be composed of the best troops in the Owari army, and over these strongholds were to be flown the flags of Nobunaga himself and of his chief general. It was hoped that by their success in five of the forts the Imagawa army would be at once physically wearied and morally encouraged to concentrate their entire strength and attention on the capture of the last two fortresses. Meanwhile, Nobunaga himself, with a select body of troops, was to march by mountain roads to the rear of the invading forces and deliver a furious attack when such a manoeuvre was least expected. The brave men who engaged in this perilous enterprise were strengthened by worshipping at the shrine of Hachiman in the village of Atsuta, and their prayers evoked appearances which were interpreted as manifestations of divine assistance. Most fortunately for the Owari troops, their movements were shrouded by a heavy rainfall, and they succeeded in inflicting serious loss on the invading army, driving it pele-mele across the border and killing its chief, Yoshimoto. No attempt was made to pursue the fugitives into Mikawa. Nobunaga was prudently content with his signal victory. It raised him at once to a level with the greatest provincial barons in the empire, and placed him in the foremost rank of the aspirants for an Imperial commission.

ENGRAVING: TOKUGAWA IEYASU

TOKUGAWA IEYASU

The battle of Okehazama led to another incident of prime importance in Japanese history. It brought about an alliance between Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu. Among the small barons subject to the Imagawa there was one called Matsudaira Motoyasu. He had taken the name, Motoyasu, by adopting one of the ideographs of Yoshimoto's appellation. His family, long in alliance with the Imagawa, were at a variance with the Oda, and in the battle of Okehazama this Motoyasu had captured one of the Owari forts. But on the defeat and death of Yoshimoto, the Matsudaira chieftain retired at once to his own castle of Okazaki, in the province of Mikawa. He had then to consider his position, for by the death of Yoshimoto, the headship of the Imagawa family had fallen to his eldest son, Ujizane, a man altogether inferior in intellect to his gifted father. Nobunaga himself appreciated the character of the new ruler, and saw that the wisest plan would be to cement a union with Matsudaira Motoyasu. Accordingly he despatched an envoy to Okazaki Castle to consult the wishes of Motoyasu. The latter agreed to the Owari chief's proposals, and in February, 1562, proceeded to the castle of Kiyosu, where he contracted with Oda Nobunaga an alliance which endured throughout the latter's lifetime. In the following year, Motoyasu changed his name to Ieyasu, and subsequently he took the uji of Tokugawa. The alliance was strengthened by intermarriage, Nobuyasu, the eldest son of Ieyasu, being betrothed to a daughter of Nobunaga.

NOBUNAGA'S POSITION

It was at this time, according to Japanese annalists, that Nobunaga seriously conceived the ambition of making Kyoto his goal. The situation offered inducements. In the presence of a practically acknowledged conviction that no territorial baron of that era might venture to engage in an enterprise which denuded his territory of a protecting army, it was necessary to look around carefully before embarking upon the Kyoto project. Nobunaga had crushed the Imagawa, for though his victory had not been conclusive from a military point of view, it had placed the Imagawa under incompetent leadership and had thus freed Owari from all menace from the littoral provinces on the east. Again, in the direction of Echigo and Shinano, the great captain, Uesugi Kenshin, dared not strike at Nobunaga's province without exposing himself to attack from Takeda Shingen. But Shingen was not reciprocally hampered. His potentialities were always an unknown quality. He was universally recognized as the greatest strategist of his time, and if Nobunaga ventured to move westward, the Kai baron would probably seize the occasion to lay hands upon Owari. It is true that the alliance with Tokugawa Ieyasu constituted some protection. But Ieyasu was no match for Shingen in the field. Some other check must be devised, and Nobunaga found it in the marriage of his adopted daughter to Shingen's son, Katsuyori.

THE COURT APPEALS TO NOBUNAGA

In Kyoto, at this time, a state of great confusion existed. The Emperor Okimachi had ascended the throne in 1557. But in the presence of the violent usurpations of the Miyoshi and others, neither the sovereign nor the shogun could exercise any authority, and, as has been shown already, the Throne was constantly in pecuniarily embarassed circumstances. Nobunaga's father, Nobuhide, had distinguished himself by subscribing liberally to aid the Court financially, and this fact being now recalled in the context of Nobunaga's rapidly rising power, the Emperor, in the year 1562, despatched Tachiri Munetsugu nominally to worship at the shrine of Atsuta, but in reality to convey to Nobunaga an Imperial message directing him to restore order in the capital. The Owari baron received this envoy with marked respect. It is recorded that he solemnly performed the ceremony of lustration and clothed himself in hitherto unworn garments on the occasion of his interview with the envoy. It was not in his power, however, to make any definite arrangement as to time. He could only profess his humble determination to obey the Imperial behest, and promise the utmost expedition. But there can be no doubt that the arrival of this envoy decided the question of a march to Kyoto, though some years were destined to elapse before the project could be carried out.

Two things were necessary, however, namely, a feasible route and a plausible pretext. Even in those times, when wars were often undertaken merely for the purpose of deciding personal supremacy, there remained sufficient public morality to condemn any baron who suffered himself to be guided openly by ambition alone. Some reasonably decent cause had to be found. Now the Emperor, though, as above stated, communicating his will verbally to Nobunaga, had not sent him any written commission. The necessary pretext was furnished, however, by the relations between the members of the Saito family of Mino province, which lay upon the immediate north of Owari, and constituted the most convenient road to Kyoto. Hidetatsu, the head of that family, had fought against Nobunaga's father, Nobuhide, and one of the conditions of peace had been that the daughter of Hidetatsu should become the wife of Nobunaga.

Subsequently, the Saito household was disturbed by one of the family feuds so common during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Japan. Hidetatsu, desiring to disinherit his eldest son, Yoshitatsu, had been attacked and killed by the latter, and Nobunaga announced his intention of avenging the death of his father-in-law. But before this intention could be carried out, Yoshitatsu died (1561), and his son, Tatsuoki, a man of little resource or ability, had to bear the onset from Owari. Nobunaga, at the head of a large force, crossed the Kiso River into Mino. But he found that, even under the leadership of Tatsuoki, the Mino men were too strong for him, and he was ultimately compelled to adopt the device of erecting on the Mino side of the river a fortress which should serve at once as a basis of military operations and as a place for establishing relations with the minor families in the province. The building of this fort proved a very difficult task, but it was finally accomplished by a clever device on the part of Hideyoshi, who, a master of intrigue as well as of military strategy, subsequently won over to Nobunaga's cause many of the principal vassals of the Saito family, among them being Takenaka Shigeharu, who afterwards proved a most capable lieutenant to Hideyoshi.

These preliminaries arranged, Nobunaga once more crossed the Kiso (1564) at the head of a large army, and after many days of severe fighting, captured the castle of Inaba-yama, which had been strongly fortified by Yoshitatsu, and was deemed impregnable. Nobunaga established his headquarters at this castle, changing its name to Gifu, and thus extending his dominion over the province of Mino as well as Owari. He had now to consider whether he would push on at once into the province of Omi, which alone lay between him and Kyoto, or whether he would first provide against the danger of a possible attack on the western littoral of Owari from the direction of Ise. He chose the latter course, and invaded Ise at the head of a considerable force. But he here met with a repulse at the hands of Kusunoki Masatomo, who to the courage and loyalty of his immortal ancestor, Masashige, added no small measure of strategical ability. He succeeded in defending his castle of Yada against Nobunaga's attacks, and finally the Owari general, deceived by a rumour to the effect that Takeda Shingen had reached the neighbourhood of Gifu with a strong army, retired hurriedly from Ise.

It may here be mentioned that three years later, in 1568, Hideyoshi succeeded in inducing all the territorial nobles of northern Ise, except Kusunoki Masatomo, to place themselves peacefully under Nobunaga's sway. Hideyoshi's history shows him to have been a constant believer in the theory that a conquered foe generally remains an enemy, whereas a conciliated enemy often becomes a friend. Acting on this conviction and aided by an extraordinary gift of persuasive eloquence, he often won great victories without any bloodshed. Thus he succeeded in convincing the Ise barons that Nobunaga was not swayed by personal ambition, but that his ruling desire was to put an end to the wars which had devastated Japan continuously for more than a century. It is right to record that the failures made by Nobunaga himself in his Ise campaign were in the sequel of measures taken in opposition to Hideyoshi's advice, and indeed the annals show that this was true of nearly all the disasters that overtook Nobunaga throughout his career, whereas his many and brilliant successes were generally the outcome of Hideyoshi's counsels.

ANOTHER SUMMONS FROM THE EMPEROR

In November, 1567, the Emperor again sent Tachiri Munetsugu to invite Nobunaga's presence in Kyoto. His Majesty still refrained from the dangerous step of giving a written commission to Nobunaga, but he instructed Munetsugu to carry to the Owari chieftain a suit of armour and a sword. Two years previously to this event, the tumult in Kyoto had culminated in an attack on the palace of the shogun Yoshiteru, the conflagration of the building, and the suicide of the shogun amid the blazing ruins. Yoshiteru's younger brother, Yoshiaki, effected his escape from the capital, and wandered about the country during three years, supplicating one baron after another to take up his cause. This was in 1568, just nine months after the Emperor's second message to Nobunaga, and the latter, acting upon Hideyoshi's advice, determined to become Yoshiaki's champion, since by so doing he would represent not only the sovereign but also the shogun in the eyes of the nation. Meanwhile--and this step also was undertaken under Hideyoshi's advice--a friendly contract had been concluded with Asai Nagamasa, the most powerful baron in Omi, and the agreement had been cemented by the marriage of Nobunaga's sister to Nagamasa.

NOBUNAGA PROCEEDS TO KYOTO

In October, 1568, Nobunaga set out for Kyoto at the head of an army said to have numbered thirty thousand. He did not encounter any serious resistance on the way, but the coming of his troops threw the city into consternation, the general apprehension being that the advent of these provincial warriors would preface a series of depredations such as the people were only too well accustomed to. But Nobunaga lost no time in issuing reassuring proclamations, which, in the sequel, his officers proved themselves thoroughly capable of enforcing, and before the year closed peace and order were restored in the capital, Yoshiaki being nominated shogun and all the ceremonies of Court life being restored. Subsequently, the forces of the Miyoshi sept made armed attempts to recover the control of the city, and the shogun asked Nobunaga to appoint one of his most trusted generals and ablest administrators to maintain peace. It was fully expected that Nobunaga would respond to this appeal by nominating Shibata, Sakuma, or Niwa, who had served under his banners from the outset, and in whose eyes Hideyoshi was a mere upstart. But Nobunaga selected Hideyoshi, and the result justified his choice, for during Hideyoshi's sway Kyoto enjoyed such tranquillity as it had not known for a century.

Nobunaga omitted nothing that could make for the dignity and comfort of the new shogun. He caused a palace to be erected for him on the site of the former Nijo Castle, contributions being levied for the purpose on the five provinces of the Kinai as well as on six others; and Nobunaga himself personally supervised the work, which was completed in May, 1569. But it may fairly be doubted whether Nobunaga acted in all this matter with sincerity. At the outset his attitude towards the shogun was so respectful and so considerate that Yoshiaki learned to regard and speak of him as a father. But presently Nobunaga presented a memorial, charging the shogun with faults which were set forth in seventeen articles. In this impeachment, Yoshiaki was accused of neglecting his duties at Court; of failing to propitiate the territorial nobles; of partiality in meting out rewards and punishments; of arbitrarily confiscating private property; of squandering money on needless enterprises; of listening to flatterers; of going abroad in the disguise of a private person, and so forth. It is claimed by some of Nobunaga's biographers that he was perfectly honest in presenting this memorial, but others, whose judgment appears to be more perspicacious, consider that his chief object was to discredit Yoshiaki and thus make room for his own subsequent succession to the shogunate.

At all events Yoshiaki interpreted the memorial in that sense. He became openly hostile to Nobunaga, and ultimately took up arms. Nobunaga made many attempts to conciliate him. He even sent Hideyoshi to solicit Yoshiaki's return to Kyoto from Kawachi whither the shogun had fled. But Yoshiaki, declining to be placated, placed himself under the protection of the Mori family, and thus from the year 1573, Nobunaga became actual wielder of the shogun's authority. Ten years later, Yoshiaki returned to the capital, took the tonsure and changed his name to Shozan. At the suggestion of Hideyoshi a title and a yearly income of ten thousand koku were conferred on him. He died in Osaka and thus ended the Ashikaga shogunate.

SAKAI

One of the incidents connected with Hideyoshi's administration in Kyoto illustrates the customs of his time. Within eight miles of the city of Osaka lies Sakai, a great manufacturing mart. This latter town, though originally forming part of the Ashikaga domain, nevertheless assisted the Miyoshi in their attack upon the shogunate. Nobunaga, much enraged at such action, proposed to sack the town, but Hideyoshi asked to have the matter left in his hands. This request being granted, he sent messengers to Sakai, who informed the citizens that Nobunaga contemplated the destruction of the town by fire. Thereupon the citizens, preferring to die sword in hand rather than to be cremated, built forts and made preparations for resistance.

This was just what Hideyoshi designed. Disguising himself, he repaired to Sakai and asked to be informed as to the object of these military preparations. Learning the apprehensions of the people, he ridiculed their fears; declared that Nobunaga had for prime object the safety and peace of the realm, and that by giving ear to such wild rumours and assuming a defiant attitude, they had committed a fault not to be lightly condoned. Delegates were then sent from Sakai at Hideyoshi's suggestion to explain the facts to Nobunaga, who acted his part in the drama by ordering the deputies to be thrown into prison and promising to execute them as well as their fellow townsmen. In this strait the people of Sakai appealed to a celebrated Buddhist priest named Kennyo, and through his intercession Hideyoshi agreed to ransom the town for a payment of twenty thousand ryo. The funds thus obtained were devoted to the repair of the palaces of the Emperor and the shogun, a measure which won for Nobunaga the applause of the whole of Kyoto.

NOBUNAGA'S SITUATION

Oda Nobunaga was now in fact shogun. So far as concerned legalized power he had no equal in the empire, but his military strength was by no means proportionate. In the north, in the east, in the west, and in the south, there were great territorial nobles who could put into the field armies much larger than all the Owari chief's troops. Takeda Shingen, in the Kwanto, was the most formidable of these opponents. In the year 1570, when the events now to be related occurred, the Hojo sept was under the rule of Ujimasa, and with him Shingen had concluded an alliance which rendered the latter secure against attack on the rear in the event of movement against Kyoto. The better to ensure himself against Hojo designs, Shingen joined hands with the Satomi family in Awa, and the Satake family in Hitachi; while to provide against irruptions by the Uesugi family he enlisted the co-operation of the priests in Kaga, Echizen, and Noto. Shingen further established relations of friendship with Matsunaga Hisahide in the far west. It was this baron that had attacked the palace of Nijo when Yoshiteru, the shogun, had to commit suicide, and Shingen's object in approaching him was to sow seeds of discord between the shogunate and Nobunaga. Most imminent of all perils, however, was the menace of the Asai family in Omi, and the Asakura family in Echizen. A glance at the map shows that the Asai were in a position to sever Nobunaga's communications with his base in Mino, and that the Asakura were in a position to cut off his communications with Kyoto. In this perilous situation Nobunaga's sole resource lay in Tokugawa Ieyasu and in the latter's alliance with the Uesugi, which compact the Owari chief spared no pains to solidify. But from a military point of view Ieyasu was incomparably weaker than Shingen.

THE STRUGGLE WITH THE ASAKURA AND THE ASAI

In 1570, Nobunaga determined to put his fortunes to a final test. Having concentrated a large body of troops in Kyoto, he declared war against Asakura Yoshikage, who had refused to recognize the new shogun. Success crowned the early efforts of the Owari forces in this war, but the whole situation was changed by Asai Nagamasa, who suddenly marched out of Omi and threatened to attack Nobunaga's rear. It is true that before setting out for Kyoto originally, Nobunaga had given his sister in marriage to Nagamasa, and had thus invited the latter's friendship. But Nagamasa had always been on terms of close amity with Yoshikage, and, indeed, had stipulated from the outset that Nobunaga should not make war against the latter. It cannot be said, therefore, that Nagamasa's move constituted a surprise. Nobunaga should have been well prepared for such contingencies. He was not prepared, however, and the result was that he found himself menaced by Yoshikage's army in front and by Nagamasa's in rear. Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had associated himself by invitation with this expedition into Echizen, advised Nobunaga to countermarch with all rapidity for Kyoto, and it was so determined. Hideyoshi was left with three thousand men to hold Yoshikage's forces in some degree of check.

The situation at that moment was well-nigh desperate. There seemed to be no hope for either Nobunaga or Hideyoshi. But Nobunaga was saved by the slowness of Nagamasa, who, had he moved with any rapidity, must have reached Kyoto in advance of Nobunaga's forces; and Hideyoshi was saved by an exercise of the wonderful resourcefulness which peril always awoke in this great man. Calculating that Yoshikage's army would reach Kanagasaki Castle at nightfall, Hideyoshi, by means of thousands of lanterns and banners gave to a few scores of men a semblance of a numerous army. Yoshikage, who believed that Nobunaga had retired, was visited by doubts at the aspect of this great array, and instead of advancing to attack at once, he decided to await the morning. Meanwhile, Hideyoshi with his little band of troops, moved round Yoshikage's flank, and delivering a fierce attack at midnight, completely defeated the Echizen forces.*

*See A New Life of Toyolomi Hideyoshi, by W. Dening.

This episode was, of course, not conclusive. It merely showed that so long as Nagamasa and Yoshikage worked in combination, Nobunaga's position in Kyoto and his communications with his base in Mino must remain insecure. He himself would have directed his forces at once against Nagamasa, but Hideyoshi contended that the wiser plan would be to endeavour to win over some of the minor barons whose strongholds lay on the confines of Omi and Mino. This was gradually accomplished, and after an unsuccessful attempt upon the part of Sasaki Shotei of Omi to capture a castle (Choko-ji) which was under the command of Nobunaga's chief general, Katsuiye, the Owari forces were put in motion against Nagamasa's principal strongholds, Otani and Yoko-yama. The former was attacked first, Nobunaga being assisted by a contingent of five thousand men under the command of Ieyasu. Three days of repeated assaults failed to reduce the castle, and during that interval Nagamasa and Yoshikage were able to enter the field at the head of a force which greatly outnumbered the Owari army.

In midsummer, 1570, there was fought, on the banks of the Ane-gawa, one of the great battles of Japanese history. It resulted in the complete discomfiture of the Echizen chieftains. The records say that three thousand of their followers were killed and that among them were ten general officers. The castle of Otani, however, remained in Nagamasa's hands. Nobunaga now retired to his headquarters in Gifu to rest his forces.

But he was quickly summoned again to the field by a revolt on the part of the Buddhist priests in the province of Settsu, under the banner of Miyoshi Yoshitsugu and Saito Tatsuoki. Nobunaga's attempt to quell this insurrection was unsuccessful, and immediately Nagamasa and Yoshikage seized the occasion to march upon Kyoto. The priests of Hiei-zan received them with open arms, and they occupied on the monastery's commanding site, a position well-nigh impregnable, from which they constantly menaced the capital. It was now the commencement of winter. For the invading troops to hold their own upon Hiei-zan throughout the winter would have been even more difficult than for Nobunaga's army to cut off their avenues of retreat and supply.

In these circumstances peace presented itself to both sides as the most feasible plan, and the forces of Nagamasa and Yoshikage were allowed to march away unmolested to Omi and Echizen, respectively. This result was intensely mortifying to Hideyoshi, who had devoted his whole energies to the destruction of these dangerous enemies. But the final issue was only postponed. By contrivances, which need not be related in detail, Nagamasa was again induced to take the field, and, in 1573, the Owari forces found themselves once more confronted by the allied armies of Echizen and Omi. By clever strategy the Echizen baron was induced to take the fatal step of separating himself from his Omi colleague, and at Tone-yama he sustained a crushing defeat, leaving two thousand of his men and twenty-three of his captains dead upon the field. He himself fled and for a time remained concealed, but ultimately, being closely menaced with capture, he committed suicide. Meanwhile, Nagamasa had withdrawn to his stronghold of Otani, where he was besieged by Nobunaga. The castle ultimately fell, Nagamasa and his son dying by their own hands.

This year witnessed also the death of Takeda Shingen, and thus Nobunaga not only established his sway over the whole of the provinces of Omi and Echizen but also was relieved from the constant menace of a formidable attack by a captain to whom public opinion justly attributed the leading place among Japanese strategists. The whole of Nagamasa's estates, yielding an annual return of 180,000 koku, was given to Hideyoshi, and he was ordered to assume the command of Otani Castle, whence, however, he moved shortly afterwards to Nagahama.

HIEI-ZAN

It was now possible for Nobunaga to devote his entire attention to the soldier-priests who had allied themselves with his enemies. It has been shown that the monastery of Hiei-zan had afforded shelter and sustenance to the forces of Echizen and Omi during the winter of 1570-1571, and it has been shown also that Nobunaga, underrating the strength of the priests in the province of Settsu, sustained defeat at their hands. He now (1574) sent an army to hold the soldier-monks of Settsu in check while he himself dealt with Hiei-zan. This great monastery, as already shown, was erected in the ninth century in obedience to the Buddhist superstition that the northeastern quarter of the heavens is the "Demon's Gate," and that a temple must be erected there to afford security against evil influences. The temple on Hiei-zan had received the munificent patronage of monarch after monarch, and had grown to be a huge monastery, containing some three thousand priests. This miniature city completely commanded Kyoto, and was guarded in front by a great lake. But, above all, it was sanctified by the superstition of the people, and when Nobunaga invested it, he found the greatest reluctance on the part of his generals to proceed to extremities. Nevertheless, he overcame these scruples, and drawing a cordon of troops round the great monastery, he applied the torch to the buildings, burnt to death nearly all its inmates, including women, confiscated its estates, and built, for purposes of future prevention, a castle at Sakamoto, which was placed under the command of Akechi Mitsuhide. When, in after years, this same Mitsuhide treacherously compassed Nobunaga's death, men said that the opening of the Demon's Gate had entailed its due penalty.

OTHER PRIESTLY DISTURBANCES

It was not in Settsu and at Hiei-zan only that the Buddhist soldiers turned their weapons against Nobunaga. The Asai sept received assistance from no less than ten temples in Omi; the Asakura family had the ranks of its soldiers recruited from monasteries in Echizen and Kaga; the Saito clan received aid from the bonzes in Izumi and Iga, and the priests of the great temple Hongwan-ji in Osaka were in friendly communication with the Mori sept in the west, with the Takeda in Kai, and with the Hojo in Sagami. In fact, the difficulties encountered by Nobunaga in his attempts to bring the whole empire under the affective sway of the Throne were incalculably accentuated by the hostility of the great Shin sect of Buddhism. He dealt effectually with all except the monastery at Ishi-yama in Osaka. The immense natural strength of the position and the strategical ability of its lord-abbot, Kosa, enabled it to defy all the assaults of the Owari chief, and it was not until 1588--six years after Nobunaga's death--that, through the intervention of the Emperor, peace was finally restored. After eleven years of almost incessant struggle, his Majesty's envoy, Konoe Sakihisa, succeeded in inducing the Ikko priests to lay down their arms. It will be presently seen that the inveterate hostility shown by the Buddhists to Nobunaga was largely responsible for his favourable attitude towards Christianity.

THE CASTLE OF AZUCHI

The lightness and flimsiness of construction in Japanese houses has been noted already several times. Even though there was continual warfare in the provinces of family against family, the character of the fighting and of the weapons used was such that there was little need for the building of elaborate defenses, and there was practically nothing worthy the name of a castle. Watch-towers had been built and roofs and walls were sometimes protected by putting nails in the building points outward,--a sort of chevaux de frise. But a system of outlying defenses, ditch, earthen wall and wooden palisade, was all that was used so long as fighting was either hand-to-hand or with missiles no more penetrating than arrows. But when fire-arms were introduced in 1542, massively constructed castles began to be built. These were in general patterned after Western models, but with many minor modifications.

The first of these fortresses was built at Azuchi, in Omi, under the auspices of Oda Nobunaga. Commenced in 1576, the work was completed in 1579. In the centre of the castle rose a tower ninety feet high, standing on a massive stone basement seventy-two feet in height, the whole forming a structure absolutely without precedent in Japan. The tower was of wood, and had, therefore, no capacity for resisting cannon. But, as a matter of fact, artillery can scarcely be said to have been used in Japan until modern days. Nobunaga's castle is stated by some historians to have been partially attributable to Christianity, but this theory seems to rest solely upon the fact that the central tower was known as Tenshu-kaku, or the "tower of the lord of Heaven." There were more numerous indications that the spirit of Buddhism influenced the architect, for in one of the highest storeys of the tower, the four "guardian kings" were placed, and in the lower chamber stood an effigy of Tamon (Ananda). The cost of constructing this colossal edifice was very heavy, and funds had to be collected from the whole of the eleven provinces then under Nobunaga's sway.

NOBUNAGA AND IEYASU

It has already been noted that Ieyasu was Nobunaga's sole ally in the east of Japan at the time of the fall of the Imagawa clan. It has also been noted that Ujizane, the son of Imagawa Yoshimoto, was a negligible quantity. During many years, however, Ieyasu had to stand constantly on the defensive against Takeda Shingen. But, in 1572, Shingen and Ieyasu made a compact against the Imagawa, and this was followed by a successful campaign on the part of the Tokugawa leader against Ujizane. The agreement between Shingen and Ieyasu lasted only a short time. In November, 1572, Shingen led a large force and seized two of the Tokugawa castles, menacing the third and most important at Hamamatsu, where Ieyasu himself was in command. Nobunaga thereupon despatched an army to succour his ally, and in January, 1573, a series of bloody engagements took place outside Hamamatsu. One of Nobunaga's generals fled; another died in battle, and Ieyasu barely escaped into the castle, which he saved by a desperate device--leaving the gates open and thus suggesting to the enemy that they would be ambushed if they entered. This battle, known in history as the War of Mikata-ga-hara, was the greatest calamity that ever befell Ieyasu, and that he would have suffered worse things at the hands of Takeda Shingen cannot be doubted, had not Shingen's death taken place in May, 1573.

Various traditions have been handed down about the demise of this celebrated captain, undoubtedly one of the greatest strategists Japan ever possessed. Some say that he was shot by a soldier of Ieyasu; others that he was hit by a stray bullet, but the best authorities agree that he died of illness. His son, Katsuyori, inherited none of his father's great qualities except his bravery. Immediately on coming into power, he moved a large army against the castle of Nagashino in the province of Mikawa, one of Ieyasu's strongholds. This was in June, 1575, and on the news reaching Nobunaga, the latter lost no time in setting out to succour his ally. On the way a samurai named Torii Suneemon arrived from the garrison of Nagashino with news that unless succour were speedily given the fortress could not hold out. This message reached Ieyasu, who was awaiting the arrival of Nobunaga before marching to the relief of the beleagured fortress. Ieyasu assured the messenger that help would come on the morrow, and urged Suneemon not to essay to re-enter the fortress. But the man declared that he must carry the tidings to his hard-set comrades. He was taken prisoner by the enemy and led into the presence of Katsuyori, who assured him that his life would be spared if he informed the inmates of the castle that no aid could be hoped for. Suneemon simulated consent. Despatched under escort to the neighbourhood of the fort, he was permitted to address the garrison, and in a loud voice he shouted to his comrades that within a short time they might look for succour. He was immediately killed by his escort.

This dramatic episode became a household tradition in Japan. Side by side with it may be set the fact that Hideyoshi, who accompanied Nobunaga in this campaign, employed successfully against the enemy one of the devices recommended by the Chinese strategists, whose books on the method of conducting warfare were closely studied in those days by the Japanese. Sakuma Nobumori, one of Nobunaga's captains, was openly, and of set purpose, insulted and beaten by orders of his general, and thereafter he escaped to the camp of the Takeda army, pretending that the evil treatment he had undergone was too much for his loyalty. Katsuyori, the Takeda commander, received the fugitive with open arms, and acting in accordance with his advice, disposed his troops in such a manner as to forfeit all the advantages of the position. The battle that ensued is memorable as the first historical instance of the use of firearms on any considerable scale in a Japanese campaign. Nobunaga's men took shelter themselves behind palisades and fusilladed the enemy so hotly that the old-fashioned hand-to-hand fighting became almost impossible. The losses of the Takeda men were enormous, and it may be said that the tactics of the era underwent radical alteration from that time, so that the fight at Takinosawa is memorable in Japanese history. Hideyoshi urged the advisability of pushing on at once to Katsuyori's capital, but Nobunaga hesitated to make such a call upon the energies of his troops, and the final overthrow of the Takeda chief was postponed.

MILITARY TACTICS

The Mongol invasion should have taught to the Japanese the great advantages of co-operating military units, but individual prowess continued to be the guiding factor of field tactics in Japan down to the second half of the sixteenth century, when the introduction of firearms inspired new methods. Japanese historians have not much to say upon this subject. Indeed Rai Sanyo, in the Nihon-gwaishi, may almost be said to be the sole authority. He writes as follows: "The generalship of Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin was something quite new in the country at their time. Prior to their day the art of manoeuvring troops had been little studied. Armies met, but each individual that composed them relied on his personal prowess and strength for victory. These two barons, however, made a special study of strategy and military tactics, with the result that they became authorities on the various methods of handling troops. In reference to the employment of cavalry, the Genji warriors and the first of the Ashikaga shoguns made use of horses largely, but in later days the Ashikaga did not move away from Kyoto and had no use for horses. Nobunaga, being near Kyoto, and most of the wars in which he engaged involving no very long marches, relied almost solely on infantry. Both Takeda and Uesugi were well supplied with mounted troops, but owing to the hilly nature of their territories, they made no special study of cavalry exercises and, almost invariably, the soldiers employed their horses solely for rapid movement from one place to another; when a battle commenced they alighted and fought on foot. It is therefore correct to say that at this time cavalry had gone out of use. Bows and arrows were, of course, superseded when firearms came into use.

"Thenceforth, the gun and the long spear were the chief weapons relied on. Peasants did not rank as soldiers, but their services were variously utilized in time of war. They were trained in the use of muskets, and of bows and arrows on hunting expeditions, and thus, when hostilities broke out, they were able to render considerable assistance in the defense of their houses. Highwaymen were frequently employed as spies and scouts. Both Takeda and Uesugi sanctioned this practice. These two generals also agreed in approving the following tactical arrangement: the van-guard, consisting of musketeers, artillerymen, and archers, was followed by companies of infantry armed with long spears. Then came the cavalry, and after them the main body, attached to which were drummers and conch-blowers. The whole army was divided into right and left wings, and a body of men was kept in reserve. At the opening of the battle, the horsemen dismounted and advanced on foot. This order was occasionally modified to suit altered circumstances, but as a rule, it was strictly followed."*

*Quoted by W. Dening in A New Life of Hideyoshi.

The artillery mentioned in the above quotation must be taken in a strictly limited sense. Indeed, it would be more correct to speak of heavy muskets, for cannon, properly so called, may scarcely be said to have formed any part of the equipment of a Japanese army until modern times. When the Portuguese discovered Japan, in 1542, they introduced the musket to the Japanese, and the weapon was long known as Tanegashima, that being the name of the island where the Portuguese ship first touched. Thenceforth, the manufacture of firearms was carried on with more or less success at various places, especially Sakai in Izumi and Negoro in Kii. "Small guns" (kozutsu) and "large guns" (ozutsu) are mentioned in the annals of the time, but by ozutsuwe must understand muskets of large calibre rather than cannon.

INVASION OF CHUGOKU.