Chapter LX: Conclusion: Of Peace (1)

Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Pehchili, whose troops had been chiefly engaged during the war, and who had been mainly responsible for the diplomacy that had led up to it, was sent by China as plenipotentiary to discuss terms of peace. The conference took place at Shimonoseki, Japan being represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince) Ito, and on the 17th of April, 1895, the treaty was signed. It recognized the independence of Korea; ceded to Japan the littoral of Manchuria lying south of a line drawn from the mouth of the river Anping to the estuary of the Liao, together with the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores; pledged China to pay an indemnity of two hundred million taels; provided for the occupation of Weihaiwei by Japan pending payment of that sum; secured the opening of four new places to foreign trade and the right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing enterprises in China, and provided for a treaty of commerce and amity between the two empires, based on the lines of China's treaty with Occidental powers.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Scarcely was the ink dry upon this agreement when Russia, Germany, and France presented a joint note to the Tokyo Government, urging that the permanent occupation of the Manchurian littoral by Japan would endanger peace. Japan had no choice but to bow to this mandate. The Chinese campaign had exhausted her treasury as well as her supplies of war material, and it would have been hopeless to oppose a coalition of three great European powers. She showed no sign of hesitation. On the very day of the ratified treaty's publication, the Emperor of Japan issued a rescript, in which, after avowing his devotion to the cause of peace, he "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three powers."

But although the Tokyo Government sought to soften the situation by the grace of speedy acquiescence, the effect produced upon the nation was profound. There was no difficulty in appreciating the motives of Russia and France. It was natural that the former should object to the propinquity of a warlike people like the Japanese, and it was natural that France should remain true to her ally. But Germany's case defied interpretation. She had no interest in the ownership of Manchuria, and she professed herself a warm friend of Japan. It seemed, therefore, that she had joined in snatching from the lips of the Japanese the fruits of their victory simply for the sake of establishing some shadowy title to Russia's good-will.

THE CHINESE CRISIS OF 1900

In the second half of the year 1900 an anti-foreign outbreak, known as the "Boxer Rebellion," broke out in the province of Shantung, and, spreading thence to Pehchili, produced a situation of imminent peril for the foreign communities of Peking and Tientsin. No Western power could intervene with sufficient promptness. Japan alone was within easy reach of the commotion. But Japan held back. She had fully fathomed the distrust with which the growth of her military strength had inspired some European nations, and she appreciated the wisdom of not seeming to grasp at an opportunity for armed display. In fact, she awaited a clear mandate from Europe and America, and, on receiving it, she rapidly sent a division (20,000 men) to Pehchili. Tientsin was relieved first, and then a column of troops provided by several powers, the Japanese in the van, marched to the succour of Peking. In this campaign the Japanese greatly enhanced their belligerent reputation as they fought under the eyes of competent military critics. Moreover, after the relief of the legations in Peking, they withdrew one-half of their forces, and they subsequently cooperated heartily with Western powers in negotiating peace terms, thus disarming the suspicions with which they had been regarded at first.

WAR WITH RUSSIA

From the time (1895) when the three-power mandate dictated to Japan a cardinal alteration of the Shimonoseki treaty, Japanese statesmen concluded that their country must one day cross swords with Russia. Not a few Occidental publicists shared that view, but the great majority, arguing that the little Island Empire of the Far East would never risk annihilation by such an encounter, believed that forbearance sufficient to avert serious trouble would always be forthcoming on Japan's side. Yet neither geographical nor historical conditions warranted that confidence. The Sea of Japan, which, on the east, washes the shores of the Japanese islands and on the west those of Russia and Korea, has virtually only two routes communicating with the Pacific Ocean. One is in the north, namely, the Tsugaru Strait; the other is in the south, namely, the channel between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese island of Kyushu. Tsugaru Strait is practically under Japan's complete control; she can close it at any moment with mines. But the channel between the Korean peninsula and Kyushu has a width of 102 miles, and would therefore be a fine open seaway were it free from islands. Midway in this channel, however, lie the twin islands of Tsushima, and the space that separates them from Japan is narrowed by another island, Iki. Tsushima and Iki have belonged to Japan from time immemorial, and thus the avenues from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan are controlled by the Japanese empire. In other words, access to the Pacific from Korea's eastern and southern coasts, and access to the Pacific from Russia's Maritime Province depend upon Japan's good-will.

These geographical conditions had no great concern for Korea in former days. But with Russia the case was different. Vladivostok, the principal port in the Far East, lay at the southern extremity of the Maritime Province. Freedom of passage by the Tsushima Strait was therefore a matter of vital importance, and to secure it one of two things was essential, namely, that she herself should possess a fortified port on the Korean side, or that Japan should be restrained from acquiring such a port. Here, then, was a strong inducement for Russian aggression in Korea. When the eastward movement of the great northern power brought it to the mouth of the Amur, the acquisition of Nikolaievsk for a naval basis was the immediate reward. But Nikolaievsk, lying in an inhospitable region, far away from all the main routes of the world's commerce, offered itself only as a stepping-stone to further acquisitions. To push southward from this new port became an immediate object.

There lay an obstacle in the way. The long strip of seacoast from the mouth of the Amur to the Korean frontier--an area then called the Usuri region because that river forms part of its western boundary--belonged to China, and she, having conceded much to Russia in the way of the Amur, showed no inclination to make further concessions in the matter of the Usuri. She was persuaded to agree, however, that the region should be regarded as common property, pending a convenient opportunity for clear delimitation. That opportunity soon came. Seizing the moment (1860) when China had been beaten to her knees by England and France, Russia secured the final cession of the Usuri region, which then became the Maritime Province of Siberia. Then Russia shifted her naval basis in the Pacific to a point ten degrees south from Nikolaievsk, namely, Vladivostok. Immediately after this transfer an attempt was made to obtain possession of Tsushima. A Russian man-of-war proceeded thither, and quietly began to establish a settlement which would soon have constituted a title of ownership had not Great Britain interfered. The same instinct that led Russia from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostok prompted the acquisition of Saghalien also, which, as already related, was accomplished in 1875.

But all this effort did not procure for Russia an unobstructed avenue from Vladivostok to the Pacific or an ice-free port in the Far East. In Korea seemed to lie a facile hope of saving the maritime results of Russia's great trans-Asian march from Lake Baikal to the Maritime Province and to Saghalien. Korea seemed to offer every facility for such an enterprise. Her people were unprogressive; her resources undeveloped; her self-defensive capacities insignificant; her government corrupt. On the other hand, it could not be expected that Japan and China would acquiesce in any aggressions against their neighbour, Korea, and it became necessary that Russia should seek some other line of communication supplementing the Amur waterway and the long ocean route. Therefore she set about the construction of a railway across Asia. This railway had to be carried along the northern bank of the Amur where engineering and economic difficulties abound. Moreover, the river makes a huge semicircular sweep northward, and a railway following its northern bank to Vladivostok must make the same detour. If, on the contrary, the road could be carried south of the river along the diameter of the semicircle, it would be a straight, and therefore a shorter, line, technically easier and economically better. To follow this diameter, however, would involve passing through Chinese territory, namely, Manchuria, and an excuse for soliciting China's permission was not in sight. In 1894, however, war broke out between Japan and China, and in its sequel Japan passed into possession of the southern littoral of Manchuria, which meant that Russia could never get nearer to the Pacific than Vladivostok, unless she swept Japan from her path. It is here, doubtless, that we must find Russia's true motive in inducing Germany and France to unite with her for the purpose of ousting Japan from Manchuria. The "notice to quit" gave for reasons that the tenure of the Manchurian littoral by Japan would menace the security of the Chinese capital, would render the independence of Korea illusory, and would constitute an obstacle to the peace of the Orient. Only one saving clause offered for Japan--to obtain from China a guarantee that no portion of Manchuria should thereafter be leased or ceded to a foreign State. But France warned the Tokyo Government that to press for such a guarantee would offend Russia, and Russia declared that, for her part, she entertained no design of trespassing in Manchuria. Thus, Japan had no choice but to surrender quietly the main fruits of her victory. She did so, and proceeded to double her army and treble her navy.

RUSSIA'S AND GERMANY'S REWARDS

As a recompense for the assistance nominally rendered to China in the above matter, Russia obtained permission in Peking to divert her trans-Asian railway from the huge bend of the Amur to the straight line through Manchuria. Neither Germany nor France received any immediate compensation. But three years later, by way of indemnity for the murder of two missionaries by a Chinese mob, Germany seized a portion of the province of Shantung, and forthwith Russia obtained a lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which she had driven Japan in 1895. This act she followed by extorting from China permission to construct a branch of the trans-Asian railway from north to south, that is to say from Harbin through Mukden to Talien and Port Arthur. Russia's maritime aspirations had now assumed a radically altered phase. Hitherto her programme had been to push southward from Vladivostok along the coast of Korea, but she had now suddenly leaped Korea and found access to the Pacific by the Liaotung peninsula. Nothing was wanting to establish her as practical mistress of Manchuria except a plausible excuse for garrisoning the place. Such an excuse was furnished by the Boxer rising, in 1900. The conclusion of that complication found her in practical occupation of the whole region. But here her diplomacy fell somewhat from its usually high standard. Imagining that the Chinese could be persuaded, or intimidated, to any concession, she proposed a convention virtually recognizing her title to Manchuria.

JAPAN'S ATTITUDE

Japan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there were any reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany, and France had declared to be incidental to Japanese occupation of a part of Manchuria, the same dangers must be doubly incidental to Russian occupation of the whole of Manchuria. There were other considerations, also. The reasons already adduced show that the independence of Korea was an object of supreme solicitude to Japan. It was to establish that independence that she fought with China, in 1894, and the same motive led her after the war to annex the Manchurian littoral adjacent to Korea's northern frontier. If Russia came into possession of all Manchuria, her subsequent absorption of Korea would be almost inevitable. Manchuria is larger than France and the United Kingdom put together. The addition of such an immense area to Russia's East Asiatic dominions, together with its littoral on the Gulf of Pehchili and the Yellow Sea, would necessitate a corresponding expansion of her naval force in the Far East. With the exception of Port Arthur and Talien, however, the Manchurian coast does not offer any convenient naval base. It is only in the harbours of southern Korea that such bases can be found. In short, without Korea, Russia's East Asian extension would have been economically incomplete and strategically defective.

If it be asked why, apart from history and national sentiment, Japan should object to Russia in Korea, the answer is, first, because there would thus be planted almost within cannon-shot of her shores a power of enormous strength and traditional ambition; secondly, because whatever voice in Manchuria's destiny Russia derived from her railway, the same voice in Korea's destiny was possessed by Japan, as the sole owner of the railways in the Korean peninsula; thirdly, that whereas Russia had an altogether insignificant share in the foreign commerce of Korea and scarcely ten bona fide settlers, Japan did the greater part of the oversea trade and had tens of thousands of settlers; fourthly, that if Russia's dominions stretched uninterruptedly from the sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Pehchili, her ultimate absorption of northern China would be inevitable, and fifthly, that such domination and such absorption would involve the practical closure of all that immense region to the commerce and industry of every Western nation except Russia.

This last proposition did not rest solely on the fact that in opposing artificial barriers to free competition lies Russia's sole hope of utilizing, to her own benefit, any commercial opportunities brought within her reach. It rested, also, on the fact that Russia had objected to foreign settlement at the Manchurian marts recently opened, by Japan's treaty with China, to American and Japanese subjects. Without settlements, trade at those marts would be impossible, and thus Russia had constructively announced that there should be no trade but the Russian, if she could prevent it. Against such dangers Japan would have been justified in adopting any measure of self-protection. She had foreseen them for six years and had been strengthening herself to avert them. But she wanted peace. She wanted to develop her material resources and to accumulate some measure of wealth without which she must remain insignificant among the nations.

Two pacific programmes offered and she adopted them both. Russia, instead of trusting time to consolidate her tenure of Manchuria, had made the mistake of pragmatically importuning China for a conventional title. If, then, Peking could be strengthened to resist this demand, some arrangement of a distinctly terminable nature might be made. The United States, Great Britain, and Japan, joining hands for that purpose, did succeed in so far stiffening China's backbone that her show of resolution finally induced Russia to sign a treaty pledging herself to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three installments, each step of evacuation to be accomplished by a fixed date. That was one of the pacific programmes. The other suggested itself in connexion with the new commercial treaties which China had agreed to negotiate in the sequel of the Boxer troubles. These documents contained clauses providing for the opening of three places in Manchuria to foreign trade. It seemed a reasonable hope that the powers, having secured commercial access to Manchuria by covenant with its sovereign, would not allow Russia to restrict arbitrarily their privileges. Both of these hopes were disappointed. When the time came for evacuation, Russia behaved as though no promise had been given. She proposed new conditions which would have strengthened her grasp of Manchuria instead of loosening it.

NEGOTIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN

China being powerless to offer any practical protest, and Japan's interest ranking next in order of importance, the Tokyo Government approached Russia direct. They did not ask for anything that could hurt her pride or impair her position. Appreciating fully the economical status she had acquired in Manchuria by large outlays of capital, they offered to recognize that status, provided that Russia would extend similar recognition to Japan's status in Korea; would promise, in common with Japan, to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and would be a party to a mutual engagement that all nations should have equal commercial and industrial opportunities in Manchuria and in the Korean peninsula. In a word, they invited Russia to subscribe the policy originally enunciated by the United States and Great Britain, the policy of the open door and of the integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.

Thus commenced negotiations which lasted five and a half months. Japan gradually reduced her demands to a minimum. Russia never made any appreciable reduction of hers. She refused to listen to Japan for one moment about Manchuria. Eight years previously, Japan had been in military possession of the littoral of Manchuria when Russia, with the assistance of Germany and France, had expelled her for reasons which concerned Japan much more than they concerned any of these three powers. Now, Russia had the assurance to declare that none of these things concerned Japan at all. The utmost she would admit was Japan's partial right to be heard about Korea. At the same time, she herself commenced a series of aggressions in northern Korea. That was not all. While she studiously deferred her answers to Japan's proposals, and while she protracted the negotiations to an extent visibly contemptuous, she hastened to make substantial additions to her fleet and her army in far-eastern Asia. It was impossible to mistake her purpose. She intended to yield nothing, but to prepare such a parade of force that her obduracy would command submission. The only alternatives for Japan were war or permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war.

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Before passing to the story of this war, it is necessary to refer to two incidents of Japan's foreign relations, both of which preceded her struggle with Russia. The first was the restoration of her judicial autonomy. It has always been regarded as axiomatic that the subjects or citizens of Western countries, when they travel or reside in Oriental territories, should be exempted from the penalties and processes of the latter's criminal laws. In other words, there is reserved to a Christian the privilege, when within the territories of a pagan State, of being tried for penal offences by Christian judges. In civil cases the jurisdiction is divided, the question at issue being adjudicated by a tribunal of the defendant's nationality; but in criminal cases jurisdiction is wholly reserved. Therefore powers making treaties with Oriental nations establish within the latter's borders consular courts which exercise what is called "extraterritorial jurisdiction." This system was, of course, pursued in Japan's case. It involved the confinement of the foreign residents to settlements grouped around the sites of their consular courts; for it would plainly have been imprudent that such residents should have free access to provincial districts remote from the only tribunals competent to control them.

This provision, though inserted without difficulty in the early treaties with Japan, provoked much indignation among the conservative statesmen in Kyoto. Accordingly, no sooner had the Meiji Restoration been effected than an embassy was despatched to the Occident to negotiate for a revision of the treaties so as to remove the clause about consular jurisdiction, and to restore the customs tariff to the figure at which it had stood prior to Sir Harry Parkes' naval demonstration at Hyogo. The Japanese Government was entitled to raise this question in 1871, for the treaties were textually subject to revision in that year. No time was lost in despatching the embassy. But its failure was a foregone conclusion. The conditions originally necessitating extraterritorial jurisdiction had not, by 1871 undergone any change justifying its abolition. It is not to be denied, on the other hand, that the consular courts themselves invited criticism. Some of the great Western powers had organized competent tribunals with expert judicial officials, but others, whose trade with Japan was comparatively insignificant, were content to entrust consular duties to merchants, who not only lacked legal training but were also themselves engaged in the commercial transactions upon which they might, at any moment, be required to adjudicate magisterially.

ENGRAVING: DANJURO, A FAMOUS ACTOR, AS BENKEI IN KANJINCHO (A PLAY)

It cannot be contended that this obviously imperfect system was disfigured by many abuses. On the whole, it worked passably well, and if its organic faults helped to discredit it, there is no denying that it saved the Japanese from complications which would inevitably have arisen had they been entrusted with jurisdiction which they were not prepared to exercise satisfactorily. Moreover, the system had vicarious usefulness; for the ardent desire of Japanese patriots to recover the judicial autonomy, which is a fundamental attribute of every sovereign State, impelled them to recast their laws and reorganize their law courts with a degree of diligence which would otherwise have probably been less conspicuous. Twelve years of this work, carried on with the aid of thoroughly competent foreign jurists, placed Japan in possession of codes of criminal and civil law in which the best features of European jurisprudence were applied to the conditions and usages of Japan. Then, in 1883, Japan renewed her proposal for the abolition of consular jurisdiction, and by way of compensation she promised to throw the country completely open and to remove all restrictions hitherto imposed on foreign trade, travel, and residence within her realm.

But this was a problem against whose liberal solution the international prejudice of the West was strongly enlisted. No Oriental State had ever previously sought such recognition, and the Occident, without exception, was extremely reluctant to entrust the lives and properties of its subjects and citizens to the keeping of a "pagan" people. Not unnaturally the foreigners resident in Japan, who would have been directly affected by the change, protested against it with great vehemence. Many of them, though not averse to trusting Japan, saw that her reforms had been consummated with celerity amounting to haste, and a great majority fought simply for consular jurisdiction as a privilege of inestimable value, not to be surrendered without the utmost deliberation. The struggle that ensued between foreign distrust and Japanese aspirations often developed painful phases, and did much to intensify the feeling of antagonism which had existed between the Japanese and the foreign residents at the outset and which even to-day has not wholly disappeared. The Government and citizens of the United States of America never failed to show sympathy with Japanese aspirations in this matter, and, as a general rule, "foreign tourists and publicists discussed the problem liberally and fairly, perhaps because, unlike the foreign communities resident in Japan, they had no direct interest in its solution."

The end was not reached until 1894. Then Great Britain agreed that from July, 1899, jurisdiction over all British subjects within the confines of Japan should be entrusted to Japanese tribunals, provided that the new Japanese codes of law should have been in operation during at least one year before the surrender of jurisdiction. Japan, on her side, promised to throw the whole country open from the same date, removing all limitations upon trade, travel, and residence of foreigners.

Tariff autonomy had been an almost equal object of Japanese ambition, and it was arranged that she should recover it after a period of twelve years, an increased scale of import duties being applied in the interval. It will be observed that Great Britain took the lead in abandoning the old system. It was meet that she should do so; for, in consequence of her preponderating commercial interests, she had stood at the head of the combination of powers by which the irksome conditions were originally imposed upon Japan. The other Occidental States followed her example with more or less celerity, and the foreign residents, now that nothing was to be gained by continuing the struggle, showed clearly that they intended to bow gracefully to the inevitable. The Japanese also took some conspicuous steps.

"An Imperial rescript declared in unequivocal terms that it was the sovereign's policy and desire to abolish all distinctions between natives and foreigners, and that, by fully carrying out the friendly purpose of the treaties, his people would best consult his wishes, maintain the character of the nation, and promote its prestige. The premier and other ministers of State issued instructions to the effect that the responsibility now devolved on the Government, and the duty on the people, of enabling foreigners to reside confidently and contentedly in every part of the country. Even the chief Buddhist prelates addressed to the priests and parishioners of their dioceses injunctions pointing out that freedom of conscience being now guaranteed by the Constitution, men professing alien creeds must be treated as courteously as the disciples of Buddhism and must enjoy the same privileges."*

*Brinkley, article "Japan," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition.

It may here be stated once for all that Japan's recovery of her judicial autonomy has not been attended by any of the disastrous results freely predicted at one time. Her laws are excellent, and her judiciary is competent and just.

FIRST ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE

The second of the two incidents alluded to above was an alliance between England and Japan, signed on January 30, 1902. The preamble of this agreement--the first of its kind ever concluded between England and an Oriental power--affirmed that the contracting parties were solely actuated by a desire to preserve the status quo and the general peace of the Far East; that they were both specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the empires of China and Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for all nations; that they mutually recognized it as admissible for either of the contracting parties to take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard these interests against a threat of aggressive action by any other power, or against disturbances in China or Korea, and that, if one of the contracting parties became involved in war in defence of these interests, the other should maintain strict neutrality and endeavour to prevent any third power from joining in hostilities against its ally. Finally, should a third power join in such hostilities, then the other contracting party promised to come to the assistance of its ally, to conduct the war in common, and to make peace by mutual agreement only. The alliance was to hold good for five years from the date of signature, but if either ally was engaged in war at such time, the alliance was to continue until the conclusion of peace.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the influence exerted by this compact on the Russo-Japanese war. It kept the field clear for Japan and guaranteed her against a repetition of such a combination as that which must be regarded as the remote cause of the struggle.

THE EARLY PHASES OF THE WAR

Japan's great problem in crossing swords with Russia was to obtain a safe avenue for her troops over the sea. Russia might at once have gained an overwhelming advantage had she seized and controlled the lines of communication between the Japanese islands and the continent of Asia. Her strategists can scarcely have failed to appreciate that fact, and would doubtless have acted accordingly had they obtained a few months' leisure to mass an overwhelmingly strong fleet in the seas of China and Japan. They had such a fleet actually in esse; for, at the moment when war broke out, the Russian squadrons assembled in the East, or en route thither, comprised no less than fifty-nine fighting ships, mounting 1350 guns and manned by 18,000 men. But these figures included the Mediterranean squadron which, surprised by the outbreak of hostilities, abandoned its journey to the Pacific. Obviously, Japan's wisest course was to anticipate the combination of Russia's sea forces, and consciousness of that fact operated to hasten the current of events.

Port Arthur, where the bulk of the Russian Pacific squadron lay, is somewhat difficult of ingress and egress. On January 31, 1904, the operation of extracting the ships and parading them outside was commenced, being brought to a conclusion on February 3rd, whereafter the squadron steamed out to sea, and, having made a short cruise off the coast of the Shantung promontory, returned to its position on the following day. The fleet taking part in this manoeuvre consisted of twenty-six ships, and the whole Russian naval force then in eastern Asia comprised seven battle-ships, four armoured cruisers, seven protected cruisers, four gunboats, six sloops, twenty-five destroyers, two mining transports, and fourteen first-class torpedo-boats.

The Japanese, on their side, had six battle-ships, eight armoured cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, fourteen small cruisers, nineteen destroyers, and eighty-five torpedo-boats. This enumeration shows a numerical superiority on the Japanese side, but in fighting capacity the two fleets were nearly equal. For, though the Russians possessed seven battle-ships to six Japanese, the latter had better gun-protection and greater weight of broadside fire than the former; and though Japan could muster eight armoured cruisers against Russia's four, the latter were supplemented by five protected cruisers which ranked far above anything of the same class on the Japanese side.

THE FIRST NAVAL OPERATION

When the Russian ships returned on the 4th of February from their cruise off the Shantung promontory, they took up their stations outside Port Arthur, all the harbour lights and beacons being left in position, and no special precaution being taken except that a patrol of three torpedo-boats was sent out. Yet the Russians should have appreciated the presence of danger. For, on the 6th of February, Japan had broken off the negotiations in St. Petersburg, and had given official information of her intention to take measures for protecting her menaced interests. That signified war and nothing but war, and the "Official Messenger" of the same evening published the intimation, which was immediately communicated to Admiral Alexieff at Port Arthur.

The Russian fleet was then divided into three squadrons. The largest body lay off Port Arthur, and two very much smaller squadrons were posted, one at Chemulpo on the west coast of Korea, and another at Vladivostok. It is obvious that such division of the fleet on the eve of hostilities should have been carefully avoided. The ships should all have been held together with an extensive network of scouts so as to enable them swiftly and strongly to fall upon any Japanese transports carrying troops to the mainland, or to meet effectually and crush any attempt of the Japanese squadrons to obtain command of the sea.

On the night of February 8th-9th, three Japanese squadrons of destroyers, aggregating ten vessels, steamed across a calm, moonlit sea and delivered a torpedo attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur, the result being that the battle-ships Retvisan and Tsarevitch together with the cruiser Pallada were holed. These battle-ships were the most powerful vessels in the Russian squadron, and the Pallada was a first-class protected cruiser of 6630 tons' displacement. The Japanese destroyers had left Sasebo on the 6th of February and they returned thither uninjured, having materially weakened the Russian fleet. On the day following this surprise, Admiral Togo, the Japanese commander-in-chief, engaged the remains of the Russian squadron with the heavy guns of his battle-ships at a range of eight thousand yards, and succeeded in inflicting some injury on the battle-ship Poltava, the protected cruisers Diana and Askold, and a second-class cruiser Novik. The Russians ultimately retreated towards the harbour with the intention of drawing the Japanese under closer fire of the land batteries, but the Japanese fleet declined to follow after them, and, instead, steamed away. Three days later (February 11th) another disaster overtook the Russians. The Yenisei, one of the two mining-transports included in their fleet, struck a mine and sank so rapidly in Talien Bay that ninety-six of her crew perished. The Japanese had no part at all in this catastrophe. It was purely accidental.

THE CHEMULPO AFFAIR

While these things were happening at Port Arthur, a squadron of the Japanese navy, under Admiral Uryu, escorted a number of transports to Chemulpo, the port of the Korean capital, Seoul. There the Russian protected cruiser Variag (6500 tons) together with the gunboat Korietz and the transport Sungari were lying. It does not appear that Admiral Uryu's prime object was to engage these Russian ships. But Chemulpo having been chosen as the principal landing-place of the Japanese army corps which was to operate in Korea, it was, of course, imperative that the harbour should be cleared of Russian war-vessels. On February 8th, the Russians at Chemulpo were surprised by a summons from Admiral Uryu to leave the port or undergo bombardment at their anchorage. The vessels stood out bravely to sea, and after an engagement lasting thirty-five minutes at ranges varying from five to ten thousand yards, they were so badly injured that they returned to the port and were sunk by their own crews, together with the transport Sungari. The moral effect of the destruction of these vessels was incalculable.

DECLARATION OF WAR

On the 10th of February, the Czar and the Mikado respectively issued declarations of war. The former laid stress upon Russia's pacific intentions in proposing revision of the agreements already existing between the two empires with regard to Korean affairs, and accused the Japanese of making a sudden attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur "without previously notifying that the rupture of diplomatic relations implied the beginning of warlike action." The Japanese declaration insisted that the integrity of Korea was a matter of the gravest concern to Japan, inasmuch as the separate existence of the former was essential to the safety of the latter, and charged that "Russia, in disrespect of her solemn treaty pledges to China and of her repeated assurances to other powers, was still in occupation of Manchuria, had consolidated and strengthened her hold upon those provinces, and was bent upon their final annexation." With regard to Russia's accusation against Japan of drawing the sword without due notice, a distinguished British publicist made the following comment in the columns of The Times (London):

"Far from thinking the Japanese attack on the night of February 8th, two full days after the announcement of the intention to take action, was an exception to, or a deviation from, tradition and precedent, we should rather count ourselves fortunate if our enemy, in the next naval war we have to wage, does not strike two days before blazoning forth his intention, instead of two days after. The tremendous and decisive results of success for the national cause are enough to break down all the restraining influences of the code of international law and Christian morality."

THE FIRST MILITARY OPERATIONS

From the moment when war became inevitable, the problem of absorbing interest was to determine Russia's strategy, and it was ultimately seen that the two main groups of her forces were to be posted at Port Arthur and on the Yalu; the latter to resist an advance from Korea, and the former to defend the Liaotung peninsula, which constituted the key of the Russian position. Between the mouth of the Yalu and the Liaotung peninsula, a distance of 120 miles, there were many points where raiding parties might have been landed to cut the Russian railway. Against this danger, flying squadrons of Cossacks were employed. After the destruction of the three Russian vessels in Chemulpo and the crippling of the Port Arthur squadron, Japanese transports entered the former port and quietly landed some three thousand troops, which advanced immediately upon Seoul and took possession of it.

From that time there could be no doubt that the intention of the Japanese was to make their first attack upon the enemy by marching up the Korean peninsula, and that the capital of Korea was chosen for a base of operations because of climatic considerations. Chemulpo, however, was not the only landing-place. Fusan also served for that purpose, as subsequently did also Chinnampo, an inlet on the west coast of the peninsula. The distance from the port of Fusan to the Yalu River is four hundred miles, in round numbers, and the roads are very bad throughout the whole country. Hence the advance of the Japanese, which was made in a leisurely manner with the utmost circumspection and attention to detail, involved so much time that April had drawn to its close before the troops deployed on the banks of the Yalu. They consisted of three divisions constituting an army corps, and each division had a ration-strength of 19,000 men with a combatant strength of 14,000 sabres and rifles and thirty-six field-guns. It may be assumed, therefore, that when the Japanese First Army under General (afterwards Count) Kuroki reached the Yalu, it had a fighting-strength of between forty and fifty thousand men. There had practically been no collision during the interval of the advance from the southern extremity of the peninsula to its northern boundary. It is true that, on March 28th, a squadron of Cossacks attempted to surprise the Japanese cavalry at Chong-ju, but the essay proved a failure, and the Cossacks were driven back upon Wiju, which they evacuated without any further struggle.

The Russian plan of operations did not originally contemplate a serious stand at the Yalu. The idea was to retire gradually, drawing the Japanese into Manchuria towards the railway, and engaging them in the exceedingly difficult country crowned by the Motien Mountains. But at the last moment General Kuropatkin, Russian commander-in-chief in Manchuria, issued orders to General Sassulitch, commander of the Second Siberian Army Corps, to hold the line of the Yalu with all his strength. Sassulitch could muster for this purpose only five regiments and one battalion of infantry; forty field-guns; eight machine-guns, and some Cossacks--twenty thousand combatants, approximately. Kuroki disposed his troops so that their front extended some twenty miles along the Yalu, the centre being at Kiuliencheng, a walled town standing about 180 feet above the river. From this point southward, the right, or Manchurian, bank has a considerable command over the left, and at Kiuliencheng a tributary stream, called the Ai, joins the main river, "which thenceforth widens from 4000 to 7000 yards and runs in three channels between the islands and the mainland. The central channel is navigable by small craft, and the other channels are fordable waist-deep. The Ai River is also fordable in many places during the spring." On the right bank of the Yalu, at the point of its junction with the Ai, the ground rises so as to command the position taken by the Russians.

The plan of the Japanese commander was to threaten an attack on the lower radius of the river; to throw two divisions against Kiuliencheng, and to use the remaining division in a wide flanking movement, crossing the river higher up. The battle took place on Sunday, the 1st of May. During the preceding nights, the Japanese placed a strong force of artillery in cleverly masked batteries, and under cover of these guns, threw seven bridges across the river, the highest upstream being thirteen miles above Kiuliencheng and the lower two being directed to the centre of the Russian position. General Kuroki then telegraphed to Tokyo that he proposed to attack at dawn on Sunday, his plan being to march one division across the fords of the Ai River, and to employ the other two, one in crumpling up the Russian left, the other in attacking Antung, where a large Russian force was in position. This programme was accurately carried out. The Japanese infantry forded the Ai breast-deep, and, swarming up the heights, drove the Russians from these strong positions. Meanwhile, the Japanese guards' division had crossed on the left and directed its march upon Antung, while the remaining division had completely turned the Russian left flank. The fiercest struggle occurred at Homutang, where a Russian regiment and a battery of artillery made a splendid stand to save their comrades at Antung from being cut off.

The casualties on the Japanese side were 318 killed, including five officers, and 783 wounded, including thirty-three officers. The Russian casualties numbered 1363 killed and 613 prisoners, but the detail of wounded was not published. The Japanese captured twenty-one quick-firing field-guns, eight machine-guns, 1021 rifles and a quantity of ammunition, etc. The moral result of this battle can hardly be overestimated. It had never been seriously believed in Europe that a Russian army could be conquered by a Japanese in a fair fight, and probably that incredulity influenced Kuropatkin when he ordered Sassulitch to defy strategical principles by attempting to hold a radically defective position against a greatly superior force. In a moment, the Japanese were crowned with military laurels and placed on a pedestal for the world to admire. But the Japanese themselves were not deceived. They saw clearly that the contest had been between six battalions of Russians and two divisions of Japanese, a disparity of strength amply sufficient to account for the result in any circumstances.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

During the period of eleven weeks immediately subsequent to the battle of the Yalu, there were no military operations of a striking character. Japan was preparing to despatch a second army to Manchuria, and pending its shipment the chief duty to be discharged devolved upon the fleet, namely, the further crippling of the Port Arthur squadron in order to secure the transports against its enterprises. The object was promoted on the 13th of April by the loss of the Russian battle-ship Petropavlovsk. She struck one of the mines laid by the Japanese and sank in a few minutes, carrying the Russian admiral, Makaroff, together with about six hundred sailors, to the bottom.

This event, although it materially weakened the Port Arthur squadron, had nothing to do with the fixed programme of Admiral Togo, which programme was to block the narrow channel forming the entrance of Port Arthur by sinking merchant vessels in the fairway. Three attempts to accomplish this were made. The first was on February 24th; the second, on March 2nd-3rd. In the first essay, five steamers were employed, their crews consisting of seventy-seven volunteers. They failed. On the second occasion four steamers of at least two thousand tons each were sent in under the orders of Commander Hirose. On this occasion, again, the steamers failed to reach vital points in the channel, and their experience alone remained to compensate the loss of many lives. These two attempts were watched by the public with keen interest and high admiration. The courage and coolness displayed by officers and men alike elicited universal applause. But it was generally believed that the successful prosecution of such a design was impossible and that no further essay would be made. The Japanese, however, are not easily deterred. On the night of May 2nd, eight steamers, aggregating some 17,000 tons, were driven into the channel in the face of mines, batteries, and torpedoes, and five of them reached their allotted positions, so that the blocking of the harbour for the passage of large vessels was accomplished. The list of casualties proved very heavy. Out of 159 persons only eight officers and thirty-six men returned unhurt. The whole of the remainder, including twenty officers, were killed, wounded, or missing.

LANDING OF THE SECOND ARMY

On the very night after the accomplishment of this third blocking operation, a second Japanese army commenced to land at Pitszewo, eastward of the Liaotung peninsula. This was precisely the point chosen for a similar purpose by the Japanese in the war with China, ten years previously, and such close adherence to the former programme was condemned by some critics, especially as transports cannot get close to the shore at Pitszewo, but have to lie four miles distant, the intervening space consisting, for the most part, of mud flats. But the Japanese were perfectly familiar with every inch of the coast from the mouth of the Yalu to Port Arthur, and had the Russian commanders possessed equally accurate knowledge, they would have recognized that Pitszewo was designated by natural features as the best available landing-place, and knowing that, they might have made effective dispositions to oppose the Japanese there, whereas ten thousand men had been put on shore before any suspicion seems to have been roused in the Russian camp.

BATTLE OF KINCHOU

After its landing at Pitszewo, on May 5th and the following days, the Second Japanese Army, consisting of three divisions under General (afterwards Count) Oku, pushed westward, driving away the Russian detachments in the vicinity and securing the control of the Port Arthur railway. Then, at Kinchou, on the 26th of May, a great battle was fought. A little south of Kinchou lies a narrow neck of land connecting the Kwangtung promontory with the mainland. It is a neck only a mile and three-quarters broad, having Kinchou Bay on the northwest and Hand Bay on the southeast. On each side the ground near the sea is low, but along the centre of the neck a ridge rises, which culminates in a point about 350 feet above the sea. This point is known as Nanshan, and its commanding position is such that an army holding it blocks all access to the Kwangtung peninsula.

The problem for the Japanese was to obtain possession of this neck as the sole road of access to Port Arthur; while General Stossel, who commanded the Russian troops, knew that if the neck fell into Japanese hands, Port Arthur would become unapproachable by land. "The Nanshan position offered unusual advantages for defence, and had been diligently prepared for permanent occupation during many weeks. Ten forts of semi-permanent character had been built, and their armament showed that, on this occasion, the Russian artillery was vastly superior, both in calibre and in range, to the Japanese guns. Forts, trenches, and rifle-pits, covered by mines and wire entanglements, were constructed on every point of vantage and in separate tiers. Searchlights were also employed, and every advantage was taken of the proximity of a great fortress and its ample plant."*

*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The Times."

It will occur to the reader that war-vessels might have been advantageously used for the attack and defence of such a position, and, as a matter of fact, Russian gunboats manoeuvred in Hand Bay on the southeastern shore of the neck. But, on the western side, the shoal waters of Kinchou Bay prevented access by Japanese vessels in the face of the heavy batteries erected by the Russians on dominating sites. This splendid position was held by a Russian army mustering ten thousand strong with fifty siege-guns and sixteen quick-firers. A frontal attack seemed suicidal but was deliberately chosen. At daybreak the battle commenced, and, after sixteen hours of incessant fighting, a Japanese infantry force turned the left flank of the Russian line and the day was won. Over seven hundred Russian dead were buried by the Japanese, and into the latter's hands fell sixty-eight cannon of all calibres with ten machine-guns. The Japanese casualties totalled 4912.

This battle finally solved the problem as to whether Japanese infantry could hold its own against Russian. "With almost everything in its favour, a strong, fresh, and confident Russian army, solidly entrenched behind almost inaccessible fortifications and supported by a formidable and superior artillery, was, in a single day, fairly swept out of its trenches."* The victorious Japanese pressed forward rapidly, and on the 30th of May obtained possession of Dalny, a base presenting incalculable advantages for the prosecution of an attack upon Port Arthur, which fortress it was now evident that the Japanese had determined to capture.

*The War in the Far East, by the Military Correspondent of "The Times."

THE BATTLE OF TELISSU

To have left the Japanese in undisturbed possession of the neck of the Liaotung peninsula would have been to abandon Port Arthur to its fate. On the other hand, the Russians ought not to have entertained any hope of their own ability to carry such a position by assault after they had signally failed to hold it in the face of attack. Nevertheless, finding it intolerable, alike to their prestige and to their sense of camaraderie, to take no measure in behalf of the great fortress and its thirty thousand defenders, they determined to march at once to its assistance. To that end celerity was all important, and on June 14th, that is to say, only eighteen days after the battle of Kinchou, a Russian army of some thirty-five thousand combatants, under the command of General Baron Stackelberg, moving down the railway to recover Kinchou and Nanshan, came into collision with the Japanese and fought the battle of Telissu. The Russian general, clinging always to the railway, advanced with such a restricted front that the Japanese, under General Oku, outflanked him, and he was driven back with a loss of about ten thousand, killed and wounded, fourteen guns, and four hundred prisoners.

NAVAL INCIDENTS

On June 15th, the very day after the Telissu victory, the Japanese met their only naval catastrophe. While their fleet was watching the enemy off Port Arthur, the battleships Hatsuse and Yashima struck mines and sank immediately. Moreover, on the same day, the cruisers Kasuga and Yoshino collided in a dense fog, and the latter vessel was sent to the bottom. As the Japanese possessed only six battle-ships, the loss of two was a serious blow, and might have emboldened the Russians to despatch a squadron from the Baltic to take the earliest possible advantage of this incident. Foreseeing this, the Japanese took care to conceal the loss of the Hatsuse and Yashima, and the fact did not become known until after the battle of Tsushima, a year later, when the Russian fleet had been practically annihilated.

Meanwhile, the Russian squadron at Vladivostok had accomplished little. This squadron consisted originally of three armoured cruisers, Gromovoi, Rossia, and Rurik, with one protected cruiser, Bogatyr. But the last-named ship ran on a rock near Vladivostok and became a total wreck in the middle of May, a month marked by many heavy losses. These cruisers made several excursions into the Sea of Japan, sinking or capturing a few Japanese merchantmen, and cleverly evading a Japanese squadron under Admiral Kamimura, detailed to watch them. But their only achievement of practical importance was the destruction of two large Japanese transports, the Hitachi Maru and the Sado Maru. In achieving this feat the Russians appeared off Tsushima in the Straits of Korea, on June 15th, and the transports which they sunk or disabled carried heavy guns for the bombardment of Port Arthur.

Of course, nothing was publicly known about the cargo of the Hitachi and her consort, but there could be no question that, in timing their attack with such remarkable accuracy, the Russians must have obtained secret information as to the movements of the transports and the nature of their cargo. Considerable criticism was uttered against Admiral Kamimura for failure to get into touch with the Vladivostok vessels during such a long interval. But much of the censure was superficial. Kamimura redeemed his reputation on the 14th of August when, in a running fight between Fusan and Vladivostok, the Rurik was sunk and the Gromovoi and Rossia were so seriously damaged as to be unable to take any further part in the war. On this occasion six hundred Russians were rescued by the Japanese from the sinking Rurik, and it was noted at the time that the Russians had made no attempt to save Japanese life at the sinking of the Hitachi Maru.

THE JAPANESE FORCES

Immediately after the landing of the army corps under General Oku and the capture of Dalny in the sequel of the battle of Kinchou, the Japanese began to pour troops into Dalny, and soon they had there three divisions under the command of General (afterwards Count) Nogi. This force was henceforth known as the Third Army, that of General Kuroki being the First, and that under General Oku, the Second. The next operation was to land another army at Takushan, which lies on the south coast of Manchuria, between Pitszewo and the estuary of the Yalu. This army was under the command of General (afterwards Count) Nozu, and its purpose was to fill the gap between the First Army and the Second. Nozu's corps thus became the Fourth Army. In fact, the Japanese repeated, in every respect, the plan of campaign pursued by them ten years previously in the war with China.