Chapter XXXIX (2)
The great financial straits to which the Imperial Court was reduced during the time of the Muromachi shoguns have been already described. Both Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi made some endeavours to correct this evil state of affairs, and when Tokugawa Ieyasu came into power he adopted still more liberal methods. In 1604, he increased the revenue of the Court by 10,000 koku annually, and in the course of the next few years he caused the palace to be rebuilt on a scale of considerable grandeur. The same policy was pursued by the second shogun, Hidetada, who assigned to the ex-Emperor an income of 3000 koku and made various allowances to princes and other members of the Imperial family. The recipients of these allowances totalled 140, and it is on record that, in the year 1706, the revenues of the Imperial Court aggregated 29,000 koku; those of the ex-Emperor 15,000; those of the princes and Court nobles, 44,000; those of the Monzeki* temples, 19,000; those of the Court ladies and Imperial nuns, 7500, and those of the Court officials 2300, the whole making a total of about 120,000 koku. The income of the retired shogun alone equalled that amount, and it was enormously surpassed by the revenues of many of the daimyo. It must be noted, however, that although the rice provided for the above purposes was made a charge upon the Kinai provinces as well as upon Tamba and Omi, neither to the Emperor nor to the Imperial princes nor to the Court nobles were estates granted directly. These incomes were collected and transmitted by officials of the Bakufu, but not a tsubo of land was under the control of either sovereign or prince.
*Temples governed by Imperial princes.
Military affairs, civil administration, financial management, including the casting of coins, judicial and legislative affairs, the superintendence of temples, and so forth, were all in the hands of the Bakufu in Yedo or of provincial officials nominated by the shogun. Nothing could have been more complete than the exclusion of the Kyoto Court from the whole realm of practical government; nor could any system have contrasted more flagrantly with the theory of the Daika reforms, according to which every acre of land throughout the length and breadth of the empire was the property of the sovereign. It might have been expected that the Tokugawa shoguns would at least have endeavoured to soften this administrative effacement by pecuniary generosity; but so little of that quality did they display that the Emperor and the ex-Emperor were perpetually in a state of financial embarrassment. As for the Court nobles, their incomes did not always suffice even for the needs of every-day life, and they were obliged to have recourse to various devices, such as marrying their daughters to provincial governors or selling professional diplomas, the right of conferring which was vested in their families.
THE SEKKE, DENSO, AND SHOSHIDAI
The sole functions left to the Imperial Court were those of appointing the shogun--which of course was only formal--conferring ranks, fixing the name of year-periods, ordering the calendar, taking part in ceremonials, nominating priests and officials, and sanctioning the building of temples. Thus, the regent (kwampaku) was the sovereign's appointee. He had to be chosen in succession from one of the five families--Konoe, Takatsukasa, Kujo, Nijo, and Ichijo, to which the general name Go-sekke (the Five Regent Families) was given. But the regent was practically without power of any kind. Very different was the case of the denso, who had direct access to the Throne. Appointed by the shogun from one of seventeen families closely related to the Tokugawa, a denso, before entering upon the duties of his office, was obliged to swear that he would minutely and unreservedly report to the Bakufu everything coming to his knowledge. His principal duty was to communicate direct with the Throne. There was also another Bakufu nominee called the giso, who administered the affairs of the Imperial Court, and who held, in addition, the post of dai-nagon, chu-nagon, or sho-nagon, which offices were reserved for members of the Tokugawa family. Yet another official representing the Bakufu was the shoshidai, who managed all matters connected with the guarding of the Imperial Court and the Court nobles, at the same time transacting financial business. In the event of any disturbance occurring in Court circles in Kyoto, it was reported, first, to the shoshidai and, then, by him, to the senior officials in Yedo, while any disturbance occurring in Yedo was equally reported, first to the shoshidai and afterwards by the latter to the sovereign. The shoshidai was in fact a governor-general, with powers far superior to those of any Court noble, and his sway extended to the eight provinces in the neighbourhood of Kyoto. By means of the shoshidai all circumstances of the Imperial Court were fully conveyed to the Bakufu in Yedo and complete control was exercised over the Imperial capital and its environs. The Bakufu were careful to choose for this post a man whose loyalty and ability stood beyond question. Finally, reference may be made to the administrator of the reigning sovereign's Court (Kinri-zuki bugyo) and the administrator of the ex-Emperor's court (Sendo-zuki bugyo), both of whom were Bakufu nominees.
THE 107TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-YOZEI (A.D. 1586-1611)
This Emperor held the sceptre throughout the memorable epoch from the death of Nobunaga till that of Ieyasu, and he continued to exercise power during six years after his abdication. It was he that conferred the post of shogun on Ieyasu and gave him his posthumous title of Tosho Gongen. His Majesty was the eldest son of the Emperor Okimachi. He surrendered the throne to his third son in 1611, dying at the age of forty-seven in 1617.
THE 108TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-MIZU-NO-O (A.D. 1611-1629)
This sovereign had for consort a daughter of the shogun Hidetada, as already described. The wedding took place in the year 1620, and its magnificence offered a theme for enthusiastic comment by contemporary historians. The shogun was careful to surround the Imperial bride with officials of his own choosing, and these, joining hands with the shoshidai and the denso, constituted an entourage which ordered everything at Kyoto in strict accordance with the interests of the Tokugawa. The new Empress was dowered with an estate much larger than that of the Emperor himself, although the latter's allowance was increased by ten thousand koku. It is related that his Majesty's impecuniosity compelled the curtailment of various ceremonies and prevented the giving of presents in the ordinary routine of social conventions, so that it became necessary to replenish the Imperial purse by lending rice and money to the citizens at high rates of interest.
A serious collision occurred during Go-Mizu-no-o's reign between the Courts of Kyoto and Yedo. The Emperor, who inclined to literature and religion, conceived a profound reverence for two Buddhist prelates of great learning and conspicuously holy lives. To these priests, Takuan and Gyokushitsu, his Majesty presented purple robes, a mark of the highest distinction, in apparently unwitting violation of the ecclesiastical laws promulgated by Ieyasu, which forbade the giving of such robes to any bonzes except those of Kennin-ji. On learning of the incident, the Bakufu summoned these prelates to Yedo, deprived them of the robes, and sent them into banishment. The Emperor, naturally much offended, declared that he would no longer occupy the throne, and in 1629, the year of the two priests' transportation, he carried out his threat, abdicating in favour of the Imperial princess, Oki, his eldest daughter by the Tokugawa Empress.
THE 109TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPRESS MYOSHO (A.D. 1629-1643)
The Princess Oki, eldest daughter of Tokufu-mon-in and the Emperor Go-Mizu-no-o, was only seven years of age when thus called on to occupy the throne. During eight hundred years no female had wielded the sceptre of Japan, and the princess was not without a brother older than herself, though born of a different mother. Thus, the announcement of the Emperor's intention created profound astonishment in the Imperial Court. The partisans of the Bakufu supported the project, but the friends of the Imperial family denounced it strenuously. Nothing moved the Emperor, however. His Majesty appears to have thought that to bestow the princess' hand on a subject and to elevate her elder brother to the throne would surely be productive of serious mischief, since the husband of the princess, supported by the Bakufu, would prove an invincible power in the State.
As for the Tokugawa statesmen, some accounts allege that they objected to the Emperor's project, but others say that when the matter was reported in Yedo, the shogun signified that his Majesty might consult his own judgment. What is certain is that the Bakufu sent to Kyoto the prime minister, Sakai Tadakiyo, with three other representatives, and that shortly after their arrival in the Imperial capital, arrangements were completed for the proposed change. The Imperial consort, Tofuku-mon-in, was declared ex-Empress with a revenue of 10,000 koku, and the little princess, who is known in history as Myosho, received an income of 20,000 koku; while to the ex-Emperor, Go-Mizu-no-o, only 3000 koku were allotted. Not until 1634, on the occasion of a visit made by Iemitsu, was this glaring contrast corrected: the shogun then increased the ex-Emperor's allowance to 7000 koku, and his Majesty continued to administer public affairs from his place of retirement until 1680, when he died hi his eighty-fifth year.
THE 110TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-KOMYO (A.D. 1643-1654)
This sovereign was a brother of the Empress Myosho but of a different mother. He was brought up by Tofuku-mon-in as though he were her real child, until he succeeded to the throne at the age of eleven, occupying it for eleven years. Form his earliest youth he showed sagacity, magnanimity, and benevolence. His love of literature was absorbing, and he studied earnestly, taking the priests of the Five Temples as his teachers. He is said to have arrived at the conclusion that a sovereign should never study any useless branch of learning, and as he failed to see the utility of Buddhism, he turned to Confucianism in preference. Moreover, dissatisfied with the old commentaries of the Han and Tang dynasties, he chose in their stead the new classics composed by Chengtsz and Chutsz; and as for Japanese literature, he condemned as grossly misleading works like the Genji Monogatari and the Ise Monogatari.
There can be no doubt that this sovereign conceived the ambition of recovering the administrative authority. His reign extended from the twenty-second year of Iemitsu's sway to the fifth of Ietsuna's, and in the troubles of that period he thought that he saw his opportunity. It is related that he devoted much attention to sword exercise, and the shoshidai Itakura Shigemune warned him that the study of military matters did not become the Imperial Court and would probably provoke a remonstrance from Yedo should the fact become known there. The Emperor taking no notice of this suggestion, Shigemune went so far as to declare his intention of committing suicide unless the fencing lessons were discontinued. Thereupon the young Emperor calmly observed: "I have never seen a military man kill himself, and the spectacle will be interesting. You had better have a platform erected in the palace grounds so that your exploit may be clearly witnessed." When this incident was reported by the shoshidai to Yedo, the Bakufu concluded that some decisive measure must be taken, but before their resolve had materialized and before the sovereign's plans had matured, he died of small-pox, in 1654, at the age of twenty-two, having accomplished nothing except the restoration and improvement of certain Court ceremonials, the enactment of a few sumptuary laws, and the abandonment of cremation in the case of Imperial personages.
THE 111TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR GO-SAIEN (A.D. 1654-1663) AND THE 112TH SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR REIGEN (A.D. 1663-1686)
Go-Saien was the sixth son of the Emperor Go-Mizu-no-o. His reign is remarkable in connexion with the attitude of the Yedo Bakufu towards the Throne. In 1657, as already related, Yedo was visited by a terrible conflagration, and another of scarcely less destructive violence occurred in the same city the following year, while, in 1661, the Imperial palace itself was burned to the ground, the same fate overtaking the principal Shinto shrine in Ise, and nearly every province suffering more or less from a similar cause. Moreover, in 1662, a series of earthquakes disturbed the country throughout a whole month, and the nation became almost demoralized in the face of these numerous calamities. Then the Bakufu took an extraordinary step. They declared that such visitations must be referred to the sovereign's want of virtue and that the only remedy lay in his abdication. The shogun, Ietsuna, was now ruling in Yedo. He sent envoys to Kyoto conveying an order for the dethronement of the Emperor, and although his Majesty was ostensibly allowed to abdicate of his own will, there could be no doubt as to the real circumstances of the case. His brother, Reigen, succeeded him, and after holding the sceptre for twenty-four years, continued to administer affairs from his place of retirement until his death, in 1732.
SANKE AND SANKYO
When Ieyasu, after the battle of Sekigahara, distributed the fiefs throughout the Empire, he gave four important estates to his own sons, namely, Echizen to Hideyasu; Owari to Tadayoshi; Mito to Nobuyoshi, and Echigo to Tadateru. Subsequently, after the deaths of Tadayoshi and Nobuyoshi, he assigned Owari to his sixth son, Yoshinao, and appointed his seventh son, Yorinobu, to the Kii fief, while to his eighth son, Yorifusa, Mito was given. These last three were called the Sanke (the Three Families). From them the successor to the shogunate was chosen in the event of failure of issue in the direct line. Afterwards this system was extended by the addition of three branch-families (Sankyo), namely those of Tayasu and Hitotsubashi by Munetake and Munetada, respectively, sons of the shogun Yoshimune, and that of Shimizu by Shigeyoshi, son of the shogun Ieshige. It was enacted that if no suitable heir to the shogunate was furnished by the Sanke, the privilege of supplying one should devolve on the Sankyo, always, however, in default of an heir in the direct line. The representatives of the Sanke had their estates and castles, but no fiefs were assigned to the Sankyo; they resided in Yedo close to the shogun's palace, and received each an annual allowance from the Bakufu treasury.
THE FEUDAL SYSTEM OF THE TOKUGAWA
It has been shown that in distributing the fiefs Ieyasu aimed at paralyzing the power of the tozama daimyo and vitalizing that of the fudai barons. This he effected, as far as concerned the tozama feudatories, by isolating them from each other, or by placing those of equal strength in juxtaposition, so that they might become rivals; while in the case of fudai barons, he established an effective system of communications between them, so that co-operation and concentration of forces were facilitated. Broadly speaking, this method had for result the planting of the tozama daimyo in the west and of the fudai barons in the east, as well as along the main roads between the two capitals. The plan worked admirably during 270 years, but at the Restoration, in 1867, the western daimyo combined to overthrow the shogunate.
Very noticeable were the steps taken to provide facilities for communication between Yedo and Kyoto. No less than fifty-three posting stations were established along the road from the Bakufu capital to the Imperial city, and at several places barriers were set up. Among these latter, Hakone was considered specially important. The duty of guarding the barrier there was assigned to the Okubo family, who enjoyed the full confidence of the Tokugawa and who had their castle in Odawara. No one could pass this barrier without a permit. Women were examined with signal strictness, they being regarded as part of the system which required that the wives of the daimyo should live in Yedo as hostages. Thus, whereas a man was granted ingress or egress if he carried a passport signed by his own feudal chief and addressed to the guards at the barrier, a woman might not pass unless she was provided with an order signed by a Bakufu official. Moreover, female searchers were constantly on duty whose business it was to subject women travellers to a scrutiny of the strictest character, involving, even, the loosening of the coiffure. All these precautions formed part of the sankin kotai system, which proved one of the strongest buttresses of Tokugawa power. But, from the days of Ietsuna, the wives and children of the daimyo were allowed to return to their provinces, and under the eighth shogun, Yoshimune, the system of sankin kotai ceased to be binding. This was because the Tokugawa found themselves sufficiently powerful to dispense with such artificial aids.
THE FIEFS
There were certain general divisions of the feudatories. Everyone possessing a fief of 10,000 koku or upwards was called a daimyo. The title included the Sanke, the Sankyo, the gokemon (governor of Echizen), the fudai (hereditary vassals), and the tozama. These were again subdivided into three classes according to the sizes of their fiefs. In the first class stood the kokushu (called also kuni-mochi, or provincial barons) who possessed revenues of at least 300,000 koku. The second class consisted of the joshu (called also shiro-mochi, or castle-owning barons) whose incomes ranged between 100,000 and 300,000 koku. Finally, the third class was composed of the ryoshu (sometimes known as shiro-nashi, or castleless barons), whose revenues ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 koku. These feudatories might be recommended by the shogun for Court rank in Kyoto, but the highest office thus conferred was that of dainagon (great councillor), from which fact the attitude of the feudatories towards imperially conferred distinctions can be easily appreciated. Nevertheless, the rules of etiquette were strictly observed by provincial magnates attending Court functions. They had to conform carefully to the order of their precedence and with the sumptuary rules as to colour and quality of garments, and any departure from these conventions was severely punished.
SUCCESSION
If a feudatory committed some crime or died childless, the law required that he should be transferred to another province, or that his successor should suffer a considerable reduction of revenue. Experience showed, however, that as many of the feudatories died childless, there were numerous losses of fiefs, and ultimately it was enacted that a baron might adopt a successor by way of precaution, unless he deferred that step until he lay dying or sought permission to take it before he reached the age of seventeen. This meant that if any feudal chief died before reaching his seventeenth year, his estate was lost to his family. By way of correcting such a hardship, the adoption of an heir was afterwards sanctioned without reference to the age of the adopter, and it was further decided that a man of fifty or upwards might adopt a son even on his death-bed. Finally, in the year 1704, all these restrictions were virtually abolished, and especially the rule that an adopted son must necessarily belong to the family of his adopter.
SEVERITY OF THE TOKUGAWA TOWARDS THE FEUDATORIES
Although Ieyasu and his successors in the shogunate did not fail to provide large estates for their own kith and kin, they never showed any leniency in dealing with the latter's offences. Ieyasu professed to believe in the potency of justice above all administrative instruments, and certainly he himself as well as his successors obeyed that doctrine unswervingly in so far as the treatment of their own families was concerned. They did not hesitate to confiscate fiefs, to pronounce sentence of exile, or even to condemn to death. Thus, in the year of Ieyasu's decease, his sixth son, Matsudaira Tadateru, was deprived of his fief--610,000 koku--and removed from Echigo to Asama, in Ise. Tadateru's offence was that he had unjustly done a vassal of the shogun to death, and had not moved to the assistance of the Tokugawa in the Osaka War. Moreover, when his elder brother, the shogun Hidetada, repaired to the Imperial palace, Tadateru had pretended to be too ill to accompany him, though in reality he was engaged in a hunting expedition. This was the first instance of the Bakufu punishing one of their own relatives.
Another example was furnished in 1623 when Matsudaira Tadanao, lord of Echizen, was sentenced to confinement in his own house and was ordered to hand over his fief of 750,000 koku to his heir. This Tadanao was a grandson of Ieyasu, and had shown himself a strong soldier in the Osaka War. But subsequently he fell into habits of violence and lawlessness, culminating in neglect of the sankin kotai system. His uncle, the shogun Hidetada, sentenced him as above described. Under the administration of Iemitsu this unflinching attitude towards wrongdoers was maintained more relentlessly than ever. The dai nagon, Tadanaga, lord of Suruga and younger brother of Iemitsu by the same mother, received (1618) in Kai province a fief of 180,000 koku, and, seven years later, this was increased by Suruga and Totomi, bringing the whole estate up to 500,000 koku. He resided in the castle of Sumpu and led an evil life, paying no attention whatever to the remonstrances of his vassals. In 1632, Iemitsu confiscated his fief and exiled him to Takasaki in Kotsuke, where he was compelled to undergo confinement in the Yashiki of Ando Shigenaga. Fourteen months later, sentence of death was pronounced against him at the early age of twenty-eight.
Other instances might be quoted showing how little mercy the Tokugawa shoguns extended to wrongdoers among their own relatives. It need hardly be said that outside clans fared no better. Anyone who gave trouble was promptly punished. Thus, in 1614, Okubo Tadachika, who had rendered good service to the Bakufu in early days, and who enjoyed the full confidence of the shogun, was deprived of his castle at Odawara and sentenced to confinement for the comparatively trifling offence of contracting a private marriage. Again, in 1622, the prime minister, Honda Masazumi, lord of Utsunomiya, lost his fief of 150,000 koku and was exiled to Dawe for the sin of rebuilding his castle without due permission, and killing a soldier of the Bakufu. To persons criticising this latter sentence as too severe, Doi Toshikatsu is recorded to have replied that any weakness shown at this early stage of the Tokugawa rule must ultimately prove fatal to the permanence of the Bakufu, and he expressed the conviction that none would approve the punishment more readily than Masazumi's dead father, Masanobu, were he still living to pass judgment.
Doubtless political expediency, not the dictates of justice, largely inspired the conduct of the Bakufu in these matters, for in proportion as the material influence of the Tokugawa increased, that of the Toyotomi diminished. In 1632, when the second shogun, Hidetada, died, it is related that the feudal barons observed the conduct of his successor, Iemitsu, with close attention, and that a feeling of some uneasiness prevailed. Iemitsu, whether obeying his own instinct or in deference to the advice of his ministers, Sakai Tadakatsu and Matsudaira Nobutsuna, summoned the feudal chiefs to his castle in Yedo and addressed them as follows: "My father and my grandfather, with your assistance and after much hardship, achieved their great enterprise to which I, who have followed the profession of arms since my childhood, now succeed. It is my purpose to treat you all without distinction as my hereditary vassals. If any of you object to be so treated, let him return to his province and take the consequences."
Date Masamune assumed the duty of replying to that very explicit statement. "There is none here," he said, "that is not grateful for the benevolence he has received at the hands of the Tokugawa. If there be such a thankless and disloyal person, and if he conceive treacherous designs, I, Masamune, will be the first to attack him and strike him down. The shogun need not move so much as one soldier." With this spirited reply all the assembled daimyo expressed their concurrence, and Iemitsu proceeded to distribute his father's legacies to the various barons and their vassals. Very soon after his accession he had to order the execution of his own brother, Tadanaga, and the banishment of Kato Tadahiro, son of the celebrated Kato Kiyomasa. The latter was punished on the ground that he sent away his family from Yedo during the time of mourning for the late shogun, Hidetada. He was deprived of his estate at Kumamoto in Higo and was exiled to Dewa province.
The punishment of these two barons is said to have been in the sequel of a device planned by Iemitsu and carried out by Doi Toshikatsu. The latter, being accused of a simulated crime, was sentenced to confinement in his mansion. Thence he addressed to all the daimyo a secret circular, urging them to revolt and undertaking to make Tadanaga shogun instead of Iemitsu. With two exceptions every baron to whose hands this circular came forwarded it to the Bakufu in Yedo. The exceptions were Tadanaga and Tadahiro, who consequently fell under the shogun's suspicion. Thereafter, it is related that some of the barons set themselves to deceive the Bakufu by various wiles. Thus, Maeda Toshinaga had recourse to the manoeuvre of allowing the hair in his nostrils to grow long, a practice which speedily earned for him the reputation of insanity, and Date Masamune conceived the device of carrying a sword with a wooden blade. The apprehensions of which such acts were indicative cannot be considered surprising in view of the severe discipline exercised by the Bakufu. Thus, during the shogunate of Hidetada, no less than forty changes are recorded to have been made among the feudatories, and in the time of Iemitsu there were thirty-five of such incidents. History relates that to be transferred from one fief to another, even without nominal loss of revenue, was regarded as a calamity of ten years' duration. All this was partly prompted by the Bakufu's policy of weakening the feudatories. To the same motive must be assigned constant orders for carrying out some costly public work.
ENGRAVING: FANS
ENGRAVING: "THE BUGAKU," ANCIENT DANCING AND MUSIC
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A history of the Japanese peopleChapter XXXIX (2)
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