Chapter XLII: Section XXXVIII: Chapter VI (4)

Paget, Sir Edward, general, sent to Spain as second-in-command, 53;
attacks Maucune, 65, 66;
taken prisoner on Salamanca retreat, 147.

Pakenham, Sir Edward, major-general, offers Wellington siege-guns for
Burgos, 40;
takes command of the 6th Division, left at Medina de Pomar, 370;
opposed to Clausel at Vittoria, 459;
superseded by Clinton, 462;
replaces Pack, 689.

Palencia, stormed by Foy, 78-81.

Palombini, general, operations of his Italian division in Castile, 260,
261;
and in Biscay, 265-7;
at Santoña, 265;
at Guernica, 266;
at siege of Castro-Urdiales, 271, 274.

Pampeluna, King Joseph at, 462;
siege of, 528-9.

Pancorbo, forts of, reduced by O’Donnell, 528.

Pannetier, general, attempts to relieve Tarragona, 501, 514-15.

Paris, general, defends Saragossa, 468;
evacuates it, 599.

Parque, The Duque del, successor of Ballasteros, commanding Army of
Andalusia, 63, 307, 311;
co-operation with Murray, 489, 502;
attacks on the Xucar, 515.

Passages, harbour, arrival of Wellington’s siege train at, 569.

Pastor, El, guerrillero chief, 254, 266, 267, 365.

Pellew, Sir Edward, admiral, makes naval demonstration off the coast
of the Ampurdam, 503;
brings Bentinck to take command at Balaguer, 520.

Penne Villemur, Conde, cavalry general, 98, 119, 132.

Picton, Sir Thomas, lieut.-general, at Vittoria, 409;
crosses the Zadorra with the 3rd Division, 411;
at Ariñez, 418;
joins Cole at Linzoain, 651;
at second battle of Sorauren, 698;
pursues Foy, 698-9.

Plässwitz, Armistice of, 360;
its effect on Wellington’s policy, 525, 737.

Ponsonby, Hon. William, major-general, brings his brigade to join
Graham, 323;
at Vittoria, 395, 419.

Popham, Sir Home, commodore, sends ammunition to Wellington at
Burgos, 39;
offers guns, 40;
his operations on coast of Biscay, 54, 55, 57, 58 _n._, 176, 177,
253-4.

Porlier, Juan Diaz, general, heads Asturian insurgents, 254;
at combat of Tolosa, 478.

Poza de la Sal, combat of, 261.

Prevost, William, colonel, sent to take the Col de Balaguer, 491, 500;
rejoins Murray, 514, 515.

Pringle, William Henry, major-general, at Villa Muriel, 80-1;
at Maya, 626;
at combat of Beunza, 703.

Provisional Battalions, controversy concerning, 232-3.

Puente Larga, combat of, 102-5.

Ramsay, Norman, captain R.A., unjust treatment of, 456-8.

Regency of Portugal, dealings of, with Wellington, 207-8, 209.

Regency of Spain, dealings of, with Wellington, 201-4;
displaced, 205;
its successors, 205.

Regent, the, George, Prince of Wales, creates Wellington field-marshal,
442.

Regent of Portugal, Prince John, 206-7.

Reille, Honoré Charles, general, commanding Army of Portugal, his
failure to cope with the guerrilleros, 190;
sends Boyer across the Esla, 327;
his position before Burgos, 354;
retreats before Hill, 356, 357, 367;
at combat of Osma, 373, 374;
at Vittoria, 393, 404, 435;
his orderly retreat, 436-9, 451;
sent to guard the frontier of France, 459;
abandons the bridge of Behobie, 487;
appointed to command the right wing of the army under Soult, 594;
checked on the Linduz, 617-21, 649;
at Sorauren, 665, 675;
at second Sorauren, 695;
retreat, 698;
at combat of Yanzi, 720-4;
at Ivantelly, 735.

Rey, Emanuel, general, at Vittoria, 401;
governor of St. Sebastian, 483, 567;
his gallant defence, 570, 574, 586.

Robinson, Frederick, major-general, at Vittoria, 406.

Roche, Philip K., general, commands Spanish division at Alicante, 275;
at battle of Castalla, 291.

Roncal, combat of, 269.

Roncesvalles, combat of, 608-20.

Ross, Robert, major-general, at Roncesvalles, 613;
at Sorauren, 656, 662;
at second Sorauren, 694;
at Echalar, 734.

Rouget, general, defends Bilbao, 267;
at combat of Tolosa, 481.

Salamanca, operations round, 111-42;
recovered by the Allied Army, 317.

Sanchez, Julius, in retreat from Burgos, 67, 68, 69;
at Ciudad Rodrigo, 153;
operations in Castile, 305, 315;
in pursuit of French, 364.

San Miguel, hornwork of, at Burgos, stormed, 27;
blown up by Wellington, 48;
again destroyed by the French, 355.

San Millan, combat of, 375.

San Muñoz, combat of, 149.

Santocildes, José Maria, general, commanding Galician army on the
Douro, 6;
evacuates Valladolid, 9;
joins in pursuit of Clausel, 16.

Santoña, relieved by Palombini, 265.

Sarrut, general, 270;
joins King Joseph before Vittoria, 365;
killed at Vittoria, 404, 425.

Scovell, George, major, Wellington’s cypher-secretary, appointed to
command Staff Corps Cavalry, 2, 37.

Silveira, Francisco, Conde de Amarante, driven from Zamora by Foy, 11;
takes command of the Portuguese Independent Division, 314;
at Vittoria, 395, 419;
in the Bastan, 527, 536;
at the combat of Beunza, 626.

Skerrett, John B., major-general, joins Hill with his column, 95;
evacuates Aranjuez, 97;
at combat of Puente Larga, 102-5;
at Vittoria, 419.

Smith, Charles, major, engineer at St. Sebastian, 565, 569, 578.

Somers-Cocks, Captain the Hon. John, storms San Miguel, 27, 28;
killed at Burgos, 38.

Somerset, Lord Fitzroy, carries Wellington’s message from Sorauren,
660.

Sorauren, first battle of, 654-80;
second battle of, 692-706;
casualties at, 738, 739.

Souham, Joseph, general, supersedes Clausel in command of Army of
Portugal, 33;
receives reinforcements, 54, 55;
advances to relieve Burgos, 64-8;
enters Burgos, 68;
his pursuit of Wellington, 68-85;
joins Soult, 121;
superseded by Drouet, 129.

Soult, Nicolas, Jean de Dieu, marshal, duke of Dalmatia, evacuates
Andalusia, 2, 56;
advances on Madrid, 66;
his quarrel with King Joseph, 87-9;
in pursuit of Hill, 99-121;
unites with Army of Portugal and Army of the Centre, 121;
ineffective attack on Alba de Tormes, 122, 123;
operations round Salamanca, 124-39;
King Joseph’s accusations against, 140;
his pursuit of Wellington, 140-51;
turns back on the Huebra, 151;
Napoleon’s estimate of, 169;
at Toledo, 187;
recalled to France, 217, 243;
supersedes Joseph, 550, 587;
his proclamation to the troops, 588;
character and career of, 589-91;
reorganizes the army, 591-8;
seizes Maya and Roncesvalles, 620;
his report to Napoleon, 640;
repulsed at Sorauren, 663-80;
retreat, 681-705;
his discouragement, 736-7.

Soult, Pierre, general, in pursuit of Hill, 105-8;
crosses the Tormes, 131;
King Joseph’s strictures on, 140;
at Vittoria, 393, 428;
at Sorauren, 668.

Spry, William, brigadier-general, at St. Sebastian, 573, 586.

St. Sebastian, Rey governor of, 483;
Foy’s attempt to reinforce it, 484;
blockade of, 485;
siege of, 562-86;
natural features of, 562;
abortive storm of, 575-82;
its siege abandoned, 586, 606.

Staff Corps Cavalry, formation of the, 237.

Stapleton Cotton, _see_ Cotton.

Stewart, Sir William, lieut.-general, his disobedience during the
retreat from Salamanca, 150-2;
Wellington’s complaints against, 226, 227;
absent at the time of the attack on Maya, 626, 627;
returns to take command, 634;
at combat of Venta de Urroz, 711.

Stuart, Sir Charles, British minister member of Regency of Portugal,
209;
Wellington’s correspondence with, 211, 221.

Stubbs, George, colonel, commanding Portuguese brigade, at Vittoria,
414, 419;
at Sorauren, 656;
at second Sorauren, 694.

Suchet, Louis Gabriel, duke of Albufera, marshal, advances on Madrid,
66;
his quarrels with King Joseph and Soult, 88, 89;
gathering of Spanish and British armies against, 162-6;
precarious position of, 279-81;
his campaign against Murray, 281-98, 488-500;
defeated at battle of Castalla, 292-309;
marches to relieve Tarragona, 501;
finds his advance blocked by Fort Balaguer, 515;
withdraws across the Ebro, 516.

Sumbilla, combat of, 718, 719.

Tarragona, defences of, 493;
siege of, 496;
relieved by Mathieu, 517.

Thackeray, Frederick, major, senior engineer at siege of Tarragona,
497;
protests against Murray’s abandonment of the siege, 511.

Thouvenot, general, governor of Vittoria, 378, 470.

Tiebas, combat of, 262.

Tolosa, combat of, 477-81.

Tomkinson, William captain 16th Light Dragoons,
his diary of events on the Douro, 6 _n._, 14 _n._, 15 _n._,
16 _n._, 18 _n._, 28 _n._, 38 _n._;
on Reille’s retreat, 438.

Tordesillas, exploit of Captain Guingret at, 83.

Toro, French garrison of, relieved by Foy, 10;
junction of Wellington and Hill at, 331-3.

Torquemada, riotous scenes at, 77.

Torrens, Henry, colonel, military secretary to Duke of York,
Wellington’s correspondence with, 224.

Tovey, George, captain, bayonet charge of his company on the Linduz,
618.

Treillard, Jean Paul, general, at Vittoria, 428;
at Sorauren, 688.

Vacani, Camillo, historian, with Palombini, 264-8;
his account of Tarragona, 496.

Valdemoro, riotous scenes at, 102, 105.

Valladolid, occupied by Clausel, 9;
his eviction by Wellington, 14;
abandoned by Wellington, 84;
King Joseph makes it his capital, 247;
evacuated by the French, 344.

Vandeleur, J. Ormsby, major-general, at combat of San Millan, 375;
at Vittoria, 412;
storms La Hermandad, 423.

Vandermaesen, general, at Roncesvalles, 615;
at Sorauren, 668;
at second Sorauren, 695;
at combat of Sumbilla, 718;
at Echalar, 734.

Venta del Pozo, combat of, 71-4.

Venta de Urroz, combat of, 711;
casualties at, 739.

Vera, abandoned by Lamartinière, 544.

Villacampa, Pedro, general, acts under Elio, 280, 281, 298.

Villadrigo, combat of, 75.

Villafranca, combat of, 475.

Villa Muriel, combat of, 79-82.

Villareal, combat of, 473.

Villatte, general, driven from Salamanca, 316-19;
at Vittoria, 393, 402;
attacks Morillo and the 71st, 415;
retirement of, 416, 429;
Soult’s complaints of, 713;
commands Bayonne reserve, 595;
his torpor, 602, 713.

Villena, castle of, capitulates to Suchet, 287, 288.

Vittoria, battle of, 384-450;
retreat of the French from, 433-50.

Wachholz, Ludwig, captain, notes of, 432;
on combat of the Linduz, 618-19.

Waldron, John, captain, exploit of, at Castalla, 295.

Wellesley, Hon. Henry, ambassador to Spain, his correspondence with
Wellington, 196-7, 525;
his dealings with the Regency of Spain, 205.

Wellesley, Richard, marquis, resigns from Perceval Cabinet, 214.

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Marquis of, marches to Burgos, 3;
crosses the Douro, 12-13;
his pursuit of Clausel, 16-20;
siege of Burgos, 21-51;
his instructions to Hill, 57;
retreats from Burgos, 66-86;
orders Hill to retire from Madrid, 99;
his reasons for retreat, 111;
operations round Salamanca, 111-37;
retreats on Ciudad Rodrigo, 137-53;
his strictures on officers commanding divisions and brigades, 156-61;
criticism of his campaigns of 1812, 170-6;
at Freneda, 194;
made Generalissimo of Spanish armies, 196-204;
at Cadiz, 201;
on Portuguese finance, 211-13;
his relations with Whitehall, 214-24;
with the Duke of York, 223-4;
intrigues of Gordon against, 224-6;
his plan for campaign of 1813, 299-305;
plan for Tarragona expedition, 308;
leaves Hill in command of Southern Army, 320;
joins Graham, 329;
occupies Toro, 331-3;
his plan for transferring British base to the Bay of Biscay, 348-9;
for driving the French out of the Peninsula, 359;
his operations on the Ebro, 364-82;
plan of attack at Vittoria, 394;
his derogatory remarks on his army, 452, 453;
marches for Navarre, 455;
severity towards Norman Ramsay, 456-8;
pursues Clausel in vain, 467;
his orders for Murray’s expedition to Tarragona, 488;
dissatisfaction with Murray, 521;
influence of Armistice of Plässwitz on his plans, 525-6;
in the Bastan, 537-43;
in correspondence with Bathurst and Liverpool, rejects their
suggestion of transfer to Germany, 558, 561;
controversy with Melville, 567-8;
goes to St. Sebastian, 585;
his dispositions for the defence of the Pyrenees, 603-6;
concentrates against Soult, 647, 659;
his ride to Sorauren, 658-62;
prepares to attack Soult, 694;
at second Sorauren, 694-701;
pursuit of Soult, 707-40;
renounces advance into France, 737-40.

Whittingham, Sir Samford, general, his Spanish division, 163, 276;
at combat of Albeyda, 282;
at battle of Castalla, 293, 294;
in the Tarragona expedition, 492.

Wimpffen, Louis, general, Spanish chief of the staff to Wellington, 201.

Xixona, plot to betray, 279.

Yanzi, combat of, 720-4.

Yecla, combat of, 286-7.

York, Frederick, Duke of, his relations with Wellington, 223;
opposes Beresford’s claims to seniority, 228, 229;
disapproves of Provisional Battalions, 232-4.

Yrurzun, combat of, 461.

Zadorra, the river, its importance in battle of Vittoria, 384;
crossed by Kempt, 407;
by Picton, 411;
Reille’s defence along, 435.

Zamora, French garrison of, relieved by Foy, 11;
occupied by Daricau, 327;
occupied by Graham, 330.

Map to illustrate the positions of the armies at the commencement of hostilities and the subsequent marches of Wellington’s Columns.]

FOOTNOTES

[1] August 23, from Madrid, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 374.

[2] Certainly Carlos de España and Morillo, probably some of the Galicians, and even some of Elio’s or Ballasteros’ troops from the South, if they proved able to feed themselves and march.

[3] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 424, to General Dumouriez, to whom Wellington often sent an illuminating note on the situation.

[4] _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 390-1. Alten had the 3rd, 4th, Light, and España’s divisions.

[5] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 377.

[6] Ibid., ix. pp. 383-4 and 386-7.

[7] Ibid., ix. p. 398.

[8] The best account of all this is in the diary for August of Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons, who was in charge of the outlying party that went to Valtanas.

[9] The actual numbers (as shown in the tables given in vol. v, Appendix xi--which I owe to Mr. Fortescue’s kindness) were July 15, 49,636; August 1, 39,301. The deficiency of about 600 cavalry lost had been more than replaced by Chauvel’s 750 sabres. There was a shortage of twenty guns of the original artillery, but Chauvel had brought up six.

[10] Dispatch printed in _King Joseph’s Correspondence_, ix. p. 64.

[11] Clausel to Clarke, August 18th, 1812.

[12] The 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 25th Léger, the 1st, 15th, 36th, 50th, 62nd, 65th, 118th, 119th, 120th Line had to cut themselves down by a battalion each: the 22nd and 101st, which had been the heaviest sufferers of all, and had each lost their eagle, were reduced from three to one battalion each. There had been seventy-four battalions in the Army of Portugal on July 1st: on August 1st there were only fifty-seven.

[13] See ‘Memorandum for General Santocildes’ of August 5. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 344-5.

[14] _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 389-90.

[15] The best account of all this is not (as might have been expected) in Foy’s dispatches to Clausel, but in a memorandum drawn up by him in 1817 at the request of Sir Howard Douglas, and printed in an appendix at the end of the life of that officer (pp. 429-30). Sir Howard had asked Foy what he intended to do on the 23rd-27th August, and got a most interesting reply.

[16] Diary of Foy, in Girod de l’Ain’s _Vie militaire du Général Foy_, p. 182.

[17] Wellington to Bathurst, August 18th.

[18] Wellington to Castaños, September 2. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 394.

[19] See especially Sir Howard Douglas’s _Memoirs_, pp. 206-7, and Tomkinson’s diary, p. 201. Napier is short and unsatisfactory at this point, and says wrongly that Clausel abandoned Valladolid on the night of the 6th. His rearguard was certainly there on the 7th.

[20] Castaños’s explanation was that Wellington’s letter of August 30, telling him to march on Valladolid, did not reach him till the 7th September, along with another supplementary letter to the same effect from Arevalo of September 3.

[21] ‘The proclamation was made from the town-hall in the square: few people of any respectability attended.’ Tomkinson, p. 202.

[22] Tomkinson, p. 203.

[23] Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Magaz, September 12. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 422.

[24] Napier, iv. p. 335.

[25] Napier was not with the main army during this march, the Light Division being left at Madrid. On the other hand Clausel had been very polite to him, and lent him some of his orders and dispatches (Napier, iv. p. 327). I fancy he was repaid in print for his courtesy. The diaries of Tomkinson, Burgoyne, D’Urban, and Sir Howard Douglas do not give the impression that the French ever stayed to manœuvre seriously, save on the 16th.

[26] Head-quarters were at Valladolid, September 9; Cigales, September 10; Dueñas, September 11; Magaz, September 12; Torquemada, September 13; Cordovilla, September 14; Villajera, September 15; Pampliega, September 16; Tardajos, September 17; Villa Toro, September 18. Ten stages in about 80 miles!

[27] Wellington to Sir E. Paget, September 20. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 436.

[28] One of the regiments withdrawn to the north after suffering at Arroyo dos Molinos, see vol. iv. p. 603.

[29] Wellington to Castaños. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 394.

[30] Wellington to George Murray. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 398.

[31] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 442.

[32] Jones, _History of the Peninsular Sieges_, i. p. 473.

[33] There were eight rank and file of the Royal Military Artificers only, of whom seven were hit during the siege, and five R.E. officers in all.

[34] By an odd misprint in Wellington’s _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 120, the order is made to allot the flank-_battalions_ instead of the flank-_companies_ to the task.

[35] This narrative of the assault, not very clearly worked out in Napier--is drawn from the accounts of Burgoyne, Jones, the anonymous ‘Private Soldier of the 42nd’ [London, 1821], and Tomkinson, the latter the special friend and confidant of Somers Cocks.

[36] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 443-4.

[37] For a dispute between the chief engineer, Burgoyne, who blamed the Portuguese, and some officers in the Portuguese service who resented his words, see Wellington, _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 123.

[38] Clarke to Marmont of August 18, and to Masséna of August 19.

[39] Napoleon to Clarke, Moscow, September 12.

[40] See Wellington to Hill of October 2. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 463.

[41] Jones, i. p. 329.

[42] Indeed the besiegers had largely depended on a dépôt of French picks and shovels found by chance in the town of Burgos, after the siege had begun.

[43] See especially Tomkinson, an old comrade of Cocks in the 16th Light Dragoons, pp. 211-17.

[44] Wellington says 18 prisoners in his return. Dubreton claimed to have taken 2 officers and 36 men in his report. Possibly the difference was mortally wounded men, who were captured but died.

[45] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 450.

[46] Ibid., ix. p. 465.

[47] See Wellington to Castaños of 7 October. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 477.

[48] See Napier, iv. p. 412, who had the fact from Sir Edward Pakenham’s own mouth.

[49] Howard Douglas’s proposal to get up big guns at once on September 20 is detailed at length in his biography, pp. 210-11. Napier has a good deal to say on it. Jones and Burgoyne tell nothing about it, but they were evidently nettled at the idea that Douglas, who had no official position in the army, should have raised a proposal and got Wellington to listen to it. I fancy that Douglas is one of the officers alluded to by Burgoyne (_Correspondence_, i. p. 234) as unauthorized persons, who volunteered useless advice. Gomm, p. 287, says, ‘we have set to work idly without having the means we might have commanded.’

[50] Burgoyne, i. p. 220.

[51] Ibid., i. p. 233.

[52] Alexander Dickson remarks in his diary, p. 772, ‘This was done to please General Clinton, and had nothing to do with the attack.’ Clinton’s troops were opposite this side of the Castle, and had as yet not been entrusted with any important duty.

[53] Jones, i. p. 357.

[54] For this dialogue, told at length, see Burgoyne’s _Correspondence_, ed. Wrottesley, i. p. 235.

[55] So I make out from the returns, but Beamish’s and Schwertfeger’s Histories of the K.G.L. both give the lesser figure of 75--still sufficiently high!

[56] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, October 26.

[57] Burgoyne’s _Correspondence_, i. p. 236.

[58] Dubreton and Belmas speak of a ‘grand nombre d’Anglais écrasés,’ the latter says 300! (Belmas, iv. pp. 501 and 548). Putting aside the fact that there were no _English_ here at all, we may remark that Burgoyne (i. p. 226) says that _three_ Spaniards were buried in the ruins, and that the loss of the Portuguese in the whole affair is put at 8 killed, 44 wounded, and 2 missing in Wellington’s report.

[59] By knocking off their remaining trunnions, which made them permanently useless. Some of the captured French field-guns from the hornwork were also destroyed.

[60] For detailed losses see table in Appendix I.

[61] See vol. v. pp. 255-6.

[62] Burgoyne commanding, John Jones the historian, Captain Williams, and Lieutenants Pitts and Reid.

[63] Burgoyne, i. p. 230.

[64] Ibid., i. p. 233. There is much more in this interesting page of Burgoyne’s explanation of the failure, which I have not space to quote.

[65] See above, pp. 3-4.

[66] Pringle was commanding the 5th Division (Leith being wounded); Bernewitz the 7th (Hope having gone home sick on September 23): Campbell, in charge of the 1st since Graham was invalided, was off duty himself for illness when relieved by Paget. Bock commanded the Cavalry Division vice Stapleton Cotton, wounded at Salamanca.

[67] Clearly expressed in letters as late as that to Hill of October 12.

[68] Viz. (figures of the Imperial Muster Rolls for October 15) Army of Portugal 32,000 infantry, 3,400 cavalry; Army of the North: Chauvel’s cavalry brigade (lent to the Army of Portugal since July) 700 sabres, Laferrière’s cavalry brigade 1,600 sabres, parts of Abbé’s and Dumoustier’s divisions 9,500 infantry. Allowing another 2,000 for artillery, sappers, &c., the total must have reached 53,000. Belmas says that Caffarelli and Souham had only 41,000 men. Napier gives them 44,000. Both these figures are far too low. No one denies that Caffarelli brought up about 10,000 men; and the Army of Portugal, by the return of October 15, had 45,000 effectives, from whom there are only to be deducted the men of the artillery park and the ‘équipages militaires.’ It must have taken forward 40,000 of all arms. See tables of October 15 in Appendix II.

[69] Wellington on the 11,000 Galicians, Hill on Carlos de España (4,000 men), Penne Villemur and Murillo (3,500 men), and the Murcian remnants under Freire and Elio, which got separated from the Alicante section of their Army and came under Hill’s charge, about 5,000.

[70] i. e. if they brought up Suchet’s troops from Valencia, beside their own armies.

[71] Wellington to Hill, October 10. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 82.

[72] Wellington to Hill, October 12. Ibid., p. 485.

[73] Wellington to Popham, October 12. Ibid., p. 486.

[74] Wellington to Mackenzie, October 13. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 487.

[75] See Wellington to Hill of October 14, and Wellington to Popham of October 17. Ibid., pp. 490 and 495.

[76] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 467.

[77] Schepeler, pp. 672-3.

[78] Wellington to Hill, October 5. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 469: ‘I do not write to General Ballasteros, because I do not know exactly where he is: but I believe he is at Alcaraz. At least I understand he was ordered there [by the Regency]. Tell him to hang upon the left flank and rear of the enemy, if they move by Albacete toward the Tagus.’

[79] Wellington to Popham. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 494.

[80] See above, pp. 1-2.

[81] Wellington says in his Dispatch to Lord Bathurst of October 26 that the Brunswick officer disobeyed orders, and was taken because he did not retire at once, as directed.

[82] Souham to Clarke, October 22.

[83] This is the figure given by Colonel Béchaud in his interesting narrative of the doings of Maucune’s division (_Études Napoléoniennes_, ii. p. 396). Martinien’s lists show 3 casualties of officers only, all in the 86th of Maucune’s division.

[84] For details see Wellington’s Order of March in _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 144-5.

[85] The wheels of the artillery were all muffled with straw. The cavalry went at a walk.

[86] So Colonel Béchaud’s narrative, quoted above, and most valuable for all this retreat.

[87] These figures look very large--and exceed Napier’s estimate of 5,000 sabres. But I can only give the strength of the French official returns, viz. Curto’s division 2,163, Boyer’s division 1,373, Merlin’s brigade 746, Laferrière’s brigade 1,662; total 5,944. All these units were engaged that day, as the French narrative shows, except that 4 only of the 6 squadrons of gendarmerie in Laferrière’s brigade were at the front.

[88] Owing to losses at Garcia Hernandez and Majadahonda the Germans were only 4 squadrons, under 450 effective sabres. The Light Dragoons of Anson, all three regiments down to 2-squadron strength, made up about 800.

[89] See vol. iv. pp. 565-9.

[90] Who was not himself any longer at their head, having been killed in a private quarrel some weeks before. His men were this day under his lieutenant Puente (Schepeler, p. 680).

[91] To Caffarelli’s high disgust: see his dispatch to Clarke of October 30, where he calls Boyer’s action a ‘fatalité que l’on ne peut conçevoir.’

[92] As Lumley did at Usagre against L’Allemand, see vol. iv. p. 412.

[93] Anson’s brigade fought, it is said, with only 600 sabres out of its original 800, owing to heavy losses in the morning, and to the dropping behind of many men on exhausted horses, who did not get up in time to form for the charge. Bock’s brigade was intact, but only 400 strong. Of the French brigade 1,600 strong on October 15 by its ‘morning state’ two squadrons out of the six of gendarmes were not present, so that the total was probably 1,250 or so engaged.

[94] Most of this detail is from the admirable account of von Hodenberg, aide-de-camp to Bock, whose letter I printed in _Blackwood_ for 1913. There is a good narrative also in Martin’s _Gendarmerie d’Espagne_, pp. 317-19.

[95] In a conversation with Foy (see life of the latter, by Girod de l’Ain, p. 141) when he said that _all_ the cavalry generals of the Army of Portugal except Montbrun, Fournier, and Lamotte were ‘mauvais ou médiocres’--these others being Curto, Boyer, Cavrois, Lorcet, and Carrié.

[96] Details are worth giving. The 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. had 52 casualties, the 1st 44. In Anson’s brigade the 11th Light Dragoons lost 49, the 12th only 20, the 16th 47. The officers taken prisoners were Colonel Pelly and Lieutenant Baker of the 16th, Major Fischer (mortally wounded) of the 1st Dragoons K.G.L., and Captain Lenthe and Lieutenant Schaeffer of the 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. The two infantry battalions had 18 casualties, of whom 13 were men missing, apparently skirmishers cut off in the fight earlier in the day on the Hormaza, or footsore men who had fallen behind.

[97] H. Sydenham to Henry Wellesley, printed in _Wellington Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 464-5. Sydenham understates, however, the available force when he says that Anson had only 460 sabres and Bock only two squadrons. Hodenberg diminishes less, but still too much, when he gives Bock 300 sabres and Anson 600. The real numbers are given above.

[98] Napier, iv. p. 361. Corroboration may be had on p. 120 of the _Journal_ of Green of the 68th, who says that his colonel was much puzzled to know how so many men had succeeded in getting liquor, and that one soldier was drowned in a vat, overcome by the fumes of new wine.

[99] This was Bonnet’s old division: Chauvel had been commanding it since Bonnet was disabled at Salamanca. But he had been wounded by a chance shot at Venta del Pozo on the 23rd, and Gauthier, his senior brigadier, had taken it over.

[100] Some 27 men of the 3/1st, taken prisoners here, represent this party in the casualty list of October 25. The battalion was not otherwise seriously engaged.

[101] Who were drawn from the 4th, 30th, and 44th.

[102] For a romantic story of how one was discovered see Napier, iv. p. 363, a tale which I have not found corroborated in any other authority.

[103] I had not been able to make out how the 1/9th came to lose these prisoners till I came on the whole story in the Autobiography of Hale of the 1/9th, printed at Cirencester 1826, a rare little book, with a good account of this combat. He is my best source for it on the British side.

[104] Hale, p. 95, quoted above.

[105] I have been using for the French side mainly the elaborate and interesting narrative of Colonel Béchaud of the 66th, recently published in _Études Napoléoniennes_, ii. pp. 405-11.

[106] See Béchaud, p. 410.

[107] These modest figures of Foy’s report to Souham are much exaggerated in most French narratives of the affair.

[108] There is a full account of this business in Foy’s dispatch to Souham of the next morning, in which occur all the facts given by Guingret in his own little book. That officer’s narrative must be taken as fully correct.

[109] All this from Burgoyne, i. p. 244. Napier does not mention the earthworks, which were batteries for six guns each.

[110] There he wrote his dispatch, concerning the late combats, to Clarke. Napier never mentions Caffarelli’s departure--a curious omission.

[111] p. 437.

[112] See vol. v. pp. 538-9.

[113] Deprez, travelling with great speed, reached Paris and interviewed Clarke on September 21. The Minister, who was no friend of Soult’s, told him that neither he himself nor the King could dare to depose the Marshal without the Emperor’s permission. Deprez then posted on to Moscow, and overtook the Emperor there on October 18. Napoleon in his reply practically ignored the quarrel, contented himself with administering a general scolding to all parties, and directed them to ‘unite, and diminish as far as possible the evils that a bad system had caused.’ But who had inaugurated the system? He himself!

[114] Joseph to Clarke, September 7.

[115] See Soult to Joseph of October 11, and other days.

[116] Which were the 27th Chasseurs and 7th Polish Lancers.

[117] For details see Table of the Army of Spain of the date October 15th, in Appendix II to this volume.

[118] Joseph to Soult, Valencia, October 12.

[119] See above, vol. v. p. 332.

[120] Napier and Jourdan say that Cearra was killed; but he only suffered concussion of the brain, and survived to tell Schepeler (p. 688) how his sword and its sheath were melted into one rod of metal by the lightning which ran down the side of the couch on which he was lying at the moment.

[121] See, e. g., Schepeler (p. 689), who was present.

[122] See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 518.

[123] This is clearly stated in Wellington’s note to Hill of October 10. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 481.

[124] Ibid., p. 485.

[125] When Penne Villemur moved in, and went behind the Tagus, I cannot make out exactly. But it was before October 25th, as at that time Erskine’s British cavalry had no longer any screen in front of them.

[126] All these dispositions come from a table of routes sent to D’Urban by Jackson, Hill’s chief of the staff (Quartermaster-general), on the 24th.

[127] Jackson, Q.M.G., to D’Urban, 27th night: ‘Sir Rowland has determined to concentrate behind the Jarama, on account of the state of the fords upon the Tagus, and their number,’ &c.

[128] They had been at Arganda behind the Tajuna on the previous day, when Hill was still thinking of defending the line of the Tagus. See _Diary of Leach_, p. 287.

[129] Jackson to D’Urban, October 27: ‘Keep your patrols on the Tagus as long as they can with prudence stay there, with orders to follow the march of your main body.’ On the next day the order is varied to that quoted above.

[130] Owing to disgraceful carelessness on the part of a brigadier of the British 2nd Division much of the boat-bridge of Fuente Dueñas (which had been brought over to the north bank) had not been burnt when the troops retired. Many boats were intact; some of the French swam over, and brought back several of them. (D’Urban MSS.)

[131] Wellington to Hill, Cabezon, October 27. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 518-19.

[132] See for this Wachholz (of the Fusilier brigade), Schepeler, Purdon’s history of the 47th, &c. Wachholz’s Brunswick Company straggled so that of 60 men he found only 7 with him at night. Several were lost for good. Wellington put the colonel of the 82nd under arrest, because he had lost 80 men this day.

[133] D’Erlon’s old division now commanded by this brigadier.

[134] Always a reckless falsifier of his own losses (he said that he had only lost 2,800 men at Albuera!), Soult wrote in his dispatch that he had only about 25 wounded at the Puente Larga. The figure I give above is that of the staff-officer d’Espinchel, whose memoirs are useful for this campaign. By far the best English account is that of H. Bunbury of the 20th Portuguese (_Reminiscences of a Veteran_, i. pp. 158-63). I can only trace three of the five French officers in Martinien’s lists--Pillioud, Caulet, Fitz-James, but do not doubt d’Espinchel’s figures though his account of the combat is hard to fit in with any English version. He speaks with admiration of the steadiness of the defence.

[135] All this from Soult’s dispatch to the King of October 31, from Valdemoro, and Jourdan’s to Clarke from Madrid of November 3rd.

[136] See _Diary of Swabey, R.A._, p. 428, in _Journal of the Artillery Institution_, vol. xxii.

[137] The importance of the second evacuation of Madrid is brought out by no historian of the war except Vacani, vi. pp. 188-90. Napier barely mentions it. A curious story of the fate of certain English prisoners of Hill’s army, who were forgotten in prison, and came out again to liberty when the French army moved on, may be found in the autobiography of Harley of the 47th Regiment.

[138] Napier (iv. p. 373) says that Joseph left a garrison and his impedimenta in Madrid--I can find no trace of it in the contemporary accounts, e. g. of Romanos (_Memorias de un Setenton_) or of Harley who was about the town during the second week of November. Vacani distinctly says that Joseph had to take on even his sick (vi. p. 190). Cf. also Arteche, xi. pp. 309-12.

[139] Napier, iv. p. 373, says that Joseph went by the route of Segovia to Castile. I cannot think where he picked up this extraordinary idea. Jourdan’s dispatch of November 10 from Peñaranda gives all the facts. It was on the 5th, near Villacastin, that Soult told Joseph that Hill was about to be joined by Wellington and that the two might crush him. The King at once sent orders to Drouet to come up by forced marches from Madrid. The Army of the Centre started next day. Palombini did not get off till the 8th (Vacani, vi. p. 190), but the head of the column reached Villacastin that same day.

[140] Wellington to Hill, November 3. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 532.

[141] His first definite information as to this was from a Spaniard who on November 4 saw 3,000 French infantry marching through Torquemada towards Burgos (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 544). Even so late as November 8th he did not rely on this important news as correct.

[142] From Rueda, November 5, morning. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 537.

[143] They had really not the 50,000 on which Wellington speculated (’45,000 men I should consider rather below the number’ (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 544) ) but 60,000 or very nearly that number. But, on the day when Wellington was writing, their rear had not even started from Madrid, and Soult’s 40,000 men were strung out all along the road.

[144] As a matter of fact, using the best map of 1812 available to me (Nantiat’s), it would seem that the line Rueda-Fuentesauco-Salamanca is about 50 miles, that by Rueda-Nava del Rey-Pitiegua-Salamanca about 55 miles, while the route suggested for the French, circuitous and running in more than one place by country cross-paths, is over 65 miles long, not to speak of its being a worse route for topographical reasons.

[145] An under-estimate by several thousands. Wellington did not know of Aussenac’s brigade from Bayonne, over 3,000 men, which had now been attached provisionally to the Army of Portugal.

[146] The total which marched was 60,000, so Wellington was even more correct than he supposed in his notion that 45,000 was too small a figure.

[147] Wellington to Lord Bathurst, Pitiegua, November 8. _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 544-5.

[148] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 520.

[149] Wellington to Hill, Rueda, November 5. _Dispatches_, ix. p. 537.

[150] Ibid., p. 539.

[151] I cannot find the details of the marching orders of the divisions; but from personal diaries I seem to deduce that the 5th and 7th Divisions marched by Alaejos, the 1st and 6th by Castrejon and Vallesa, while the cavalry not only provided a rearguard but kept out flank detachments as far as Cantalapiedra on one side and the lower Guarena on the other.

[152] All this from the detailed routes of march in the dispatches of Jackson (Hill’s Q.M.G.) to D’Urban on November 4-5-6.

[153] See his dispatch of November 8 from Flores de Avila.

[154] For an adventure with these rascals, who threatened to shoot one of Hill’s aides-de-camp, see Schepeler, p. 691.

[155] The ground on which Del Parque had fought his unlucky battle in 1809.

[156] These movements from Jourdan to Clarke, of November 10, and Soult to Clarke of November 12.

[157] See the Notes of the Baden officer Riegel (vol. iii. p. 537), who complains bitterly of the piercing north wind, and the lack of wood to build fires.

[158] D’Espinchel (ii. p. 71) says that the voltigeurs got within the walls, but were expelled on each occasion. The English narratives deny that they ever closed, or reached the barricades.

[159] Soult to Joseph, 8 a.m. on the 11th, ‘bivouac sur la hauteur en arrière d’Alba de Tormes.’

[160] General Hamilton’s account of the business (Dispatch to Hill, _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 558) is very clear. There is also a good account of the Alba fighting in Colonel Gardyne’s excellent history of the 92nd.

[161] All their names verifiable from Martinien’s admirable lists of ‘_Officiers tués et blessés_.’

[162] See Jourdan’s _Mémoires_, p. 441, for the meeting.

[163] Wellington to Hill, November 10, 4.30 p.m. (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 549).

[164] Same to same, November 11 (ix. p. 550).

[165] Same to same, pp. 550-1.

[166] Jourdan to Joseph, head-quarters at Peñaranda: early on November 12.

[167] Soult to Joseph, night of November 11, from the bivouac behind Alba de Tormes.

[168] As the table of the French Armies of Spain for October 15 in the Appendix shows, the Army of the South had on that day 47,000 men under arms (omitting ‘sick’ and ‘detached’), the Army of the Centre 15,000, the Army of Portugal 45,000 (including Aussenac’s brigade and Merlin’s cavalry, both attached to it provisionally). This gives a total of 107,000, without sick or detached. The Army of Portugal may have lost 1,000 men in action at Villadrigo and Villa Muriel, &c.: the Army of the South not more than 400 at the Puente Larga, Alba de Tormes, &c. The Army of the Centre had not fought at all. A deduction has to be made for Soult’s very large body of men attached to the Artillery Park, and for a smaller number in the Army of Portugal--say 3,000 men for the two together. Souham had left a small garrison at Valladolid--perhaps 1,500 men. If we allow 5,000 men for sick and stragglers between October 20 and November 12 there must still have been a good 90,000 men present. Miot (who was present) calls the total 97,000 (iii. p. 254), making it a little too high, I imagine.

[169] Maucune and Gauthier (late Chauvel). See _Wellington Dispatches_, ix. p. 556.

[170] Souham naturally expressed his indignation. See Miot, iii. p. 252-3.

[171] D’Urban reports on November 12th: ‘Enemy’s troops in continual movement, and he made a careful reconnaissance of the river from Huerta to Exeme [above Alba].’ On the 13th he writes: ‘The enemy moved all his troops between Huerta and Alba by his left into the woods behind Exeme on the high road to Avila. From thence he can either go in that direction or cross the Tormes by fords above Alba bridge.’

[172] This fact, very important in justification of Wellington’s long stay on San Cristobal, is not mentioned in any of his dispatches. But there is a full account of the skirmish in the _Mémoire_ of Colonel Béchaud of Maucune’s Division, printed in _Études Napoléoniennes_, iii. pp. 98-9.

[173] The reconnaissance was executed by Leith Hay, who found the French flank at Galisancho and reported its exact position. See his _Narrative_, ii. pp. 99-100.

[174] Details from Foy’s _Vie militaire_, ed. Girod de l’Ain, p. 118, and Béchaud (quoted above), pp. 99-100.

[175] His original intention to attack is clearly stated in _Dispatches_, ix. p. 559, and the statement is corroborated by D’Urban.

[176] D’Urban, an eye-witness, thinks that Wellington ought to have called up Hill and attacked, despite of all difficulties. ‘Lord Wellington arrived upon the ground at about 12 noon, and at first appeared inclined to attack what of the enemy had already passed, with the divisions and cavalry on the spot. The success of such a measure appeared certain, and would have frustrated all the enemy’s projects. However, his opinion changed: they were allowed to continue passing unmolested.’

[177] _Mémoires_, p. 448. Cf. also Napier, iv. p. 381, who seems to share the idea. ‘Why, it may be asked, did the English commander, having somewhat carelessly suffered Soult to pass the Tormes and turn his position, wait so long on the Arapiles position as to render a dangerous movement (retreat in face of the enemy and to a flank) necessary?’

[178] This horrid reminiscence I found in the unpublished letters of Hodenberg of the 1st Heavy Dragoons K.G.L., which I reprinted in _Blackwood’s Magazine_ in the year 1913.

[179] Details about the exact drawing-up of the second line and reserves seem impossible to discover. I have only accurate notes as to the position of the front line and some of the cavalry and the 1st Division.

[180] For doing this Jourdan criticized Soult for over-caution, and wasting of time, describing this measure as timid and unnecessary. _Mémoires_, p. 443.

[181] Donaldson of the 94th. _Recollections_, p. 179.

[182] The 4th Division formed the infantry rearguard on the southern road, the Light Division that on the central road.

[183] Colonel James Willoughby Gordon seems not to have been a success as quarter-master-general. Very soon after his arrival we get notes in the earlier part of the Salamanca campaign that intelligent officers ‘thought he would not stop long with the Army.’ Cf. Tomkinson, p. 224: ‘Nothing could equal the bad arrangements of the Quartermaster-General--the cavalry all retired by one road, allowing that of the enemy to follow our infantry’ [of the central column on November 18]--which was not covered, all the horse having gone on the western or left road. Wellington had a worse accusation against him than mere incapacity (of this more will be found in chap. iii of sect. xxxv)--that of sending letters home which revealed military secrets which got into the English papers. In September he made up his mind that Gordon must not see his dispatches, and must be ‘kept at as great distance as possible’ (_Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. pp. 427-8). He was sent home before the next campaign.

[184] D’Urban’s diary.

[185] See Foy, _Vie militaire_, p. 190. He was a witness to the conversation. And cf. Espinchel, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 73, who gets the hour too late and exaggerates the contact of the armies. He says that 12 of Hill’s guns opened on the French light cavalry. Cf. also Joseph to Clarke of December 20.

[186] Espinchel, ii. p. 73.

[187] Joseph to Clarke, in a long dispatch of December 20. Ducasse’s _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. pp. 119-20.

[188] See above, p. 126.

[189] For the curious adventures of Captain v. Stolzenberg commanding this little party, and of the horde which he shepherded, see Schwertfeger’s History of the K.G.L., ii. pp. 262-3.

[190] _Mémoires_ of Béchaud, quoted above, p. 101.

[191] Foy, _Vie militaire_, pp. 189-90.

[192] Soult to King Joseph, Matilla, 16th November 1812.

[193] There is a good account of the skirmish in the _Mémoires_ of Espinchel, ii. p. 73, who frankly allows that the French light cavalry were both outmanœuvred and repulsed with loss. The returns of the three French regiments show 22 killed, _no_ wounded, and 25 missing--an odd proportion. Apparently the wounded must all have been captured. The 1st Hussars K.G.L. had 7 wounded and 7 missing, the rest of Alten’s brigade under 20 casualties. This brigade was now _three_ regiments strong instead of two, having had the 2nd Hussars K.G.L. from Hill’s Army attached to it at Salamanca.

[194] Napier says that the column went through Tamames, but no 2nd, 3rd, or 4th Division diary mentions that considerable town as passed--they all speak of solitudes and oak-woods alone. Wellington’s orders on the night of November 16 (_Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. p. 157) give ‘La Neja’ as Hill’s destination, and this oddly spelt place is undoubtedly Anaya de Huebra.

[195] Memoirs of Donaldson of the 94th, pp. 181-2.

[196] See the Memoirs of Grattan of the 88th, and Bell of the 34th.

[197] See Wellington’s Marching Orders for the 17th in _Supplementary Dispatches_, xiv. pp. 157-8, for the cavalry. A perverse reading of them might make the cavalry start too early for ‘the brook which passes by La Maza and Aldehuela’, where they are told to be at dawn. They are not actually directed to wait for the infantry rearguard.

[198] There is a full account of his capture in the memoirs of Espinchel, ii. p. 77, the officer whose men took Paget prisoner.

[199] The movements of this day are made very difficult to follow by the fact that Wellington in his dispatches (ix. 464-5) calls Hill’s column the right, and the Spanish column the left, of the three in which the Army marched. Vere’s _Diary of the Marches of the 4th Division_ does the same. But these directions are only correct when the army faced about and stopped to check the French. On the march Hill’s was the left column, and the Spaniards the right. For this reason I have called them the southern and northern columns respectively.

[200] Soult to Joseph, November 17, from before San Muñoz.

[201] So the regimental histories (both good) of these corps. Napier gives one more company of the 43rd.

[202] Napier, iv. p. 385.

[203] Autobiography of Green of the 68th, p. 127.

[204] British ‘missing’ one officer (General Paget) and 111 men, Portuguese ‘missing’ 66 men.

[205] Reminiscences of Hay, 12th Light Dragoons, p. 86.

[206] Espinchel commanded that which went farthest, to the bridge in front of Santi Espiritus: he says that the whole road was lined with broken-down carts and carriages, and strewn with dead men. About 100 British stragglers were gathered in.

[207] The tale may be found with details, told from Wellington’s point of view, in _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 494. The chief offender was W. Stewart, who had succeeded to the command of the 1st Division on Paget’s capture the preceding day. The others Wellington describes as ‘new-comers’ so they must have been Oswald and Lord Dalhousie, for the other divisional commanders in this column, Clinton and C. Alten, were not in any sense ‘new-comers’. I think, therefore, that Mr. Fortescue is wrong in giving the names of the culprits as Stewart, Dalhousie, and Clinton.

[208] See Napier, iv. p. 386. But cf. Fitzroy Somerset’s version in Greville Memoirs, i. pp. 136-7.

[209] Donaldson of the 94th, p. 184. Grattan (p. 315) has a story of a Connaught Ranger who ate, in addition to his rations, six ox-heads on six successive days, and died of inflammation of the bowels.

[210] Grattan, pp. 303 and 305-6.

[211] Seventeen of the Chasseurs Britanniques were tried all together for desertion in October 1812! They were mostly Italians. And for one man recaptured and tried, how many got away safely?

[212] See _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 601-2.

[213] See _Dispatches_, ix. pp. 562 and 570.

[214] See the Life of Burgoyne, who was sent to look after the threatening symptoms, vol. i. p. 246.

[215] The troops of the Army of Portugal began to march east as early as November 20, long before Soult got back into touch with them. Jourdan to Clarke, from Salamanca, November 20.

[216] The 1st Division seems to have been quartered about the upper Mondego between Celorico and Mangualde, the 3rd in villages between Moimenta and Lamego, the 4th about São João de Pesqueira, the 5th, Pack and Bradford, in the direction of Lamego, the 6th and 7th on the lower Mondego and the Alva under the Serra da Estrella, as far as I can make out from regimental diaries. There is no general notice as to cantonments in the _Wellington Dispatches_ to help. But see General Orders for December 1, 1812, as to the post-towns for each division.

[217] Their cases are in General Orders for 1813, pp. 51-3. Each was condemned to six months’ suspension, but the members of the court martial petitioned for their pardon, on account of the privations of the time. Wellington grudgingly granted the request ‘not concurring in any way in the opinion of the court, that their cases in any way deserved this indulgence.’

[218] Bunbury, aide-de-camp to General Hamilton, referring to Wellington’s memorandum, makes solemn asseveration that his troops got no distribution whatever for those four days. The general himself had no bread. Acorns were the sole diet.

[219] Private and unpublished diary of General D’Urban.

[220] Grattan of the 88th, p. 307.

[221] Tomkinson, p. 227.

[222] They had been ordered in May 1812, but had not been distributed by November. See _Dispatches_, ix. p. 603.

[223] The figures may be found on pp. 170-1 of the Statistical ‘Ejércitos Españoles’ of 1822, referred to in other places.

[224] See Tables in Appendix. The British battalions were 1/27th and a grenadier battalion formed of companies of the regiments left in Sicily. The light battalion was formed of companies from the 3rd, 7th, 8th Line of the K.G.L. and from de Roll and Dillon. The Italians were ‘2nd Anglo-Italian Levy’. There was a field battery (British), but only 13 cavalry (20th Light Dragoons).

[225] See p. 279, below.

[226] See Suchet, _Mémoires_, ii. p. 269.

[227] The best account is in Gildea’s _History of the 81st Regiment_, pp. 104-8.

[228] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 487.

[229] 161 of the 20th Light Dragoons, and 71 of the ‘Foreign Hussars,’ a newly raised corps, mainly German, which did very creditably in 1813.

[230] Wellington to Lord Bathurst. _Dispatches_, ix, p. 535.

[231] _Dispatches_, ix. p. 545.

[232] See Wellington to H. Clinton (W. Clinton’s brother) on December 9 (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 614), and to Lord Bathurst (ibid., p. 616).

[233] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 573.

[234] These figures seem to represent about 1,400 prisoners at Rodrigo, 4,000 at Badajoz, 300 at the Almaraz forts, 600 at the Salamanca forts, 7,000 at the battle of Salamanca, 2,000 at the Retiro, 1,300 at Astorga, 700 at Guadalajara, with 2,000 more taken in smaller affairs, such as the surrenders of Consuegra and Tordesillas, the combat on the Guarena, the pursuit after Salamanca, and Hill’s operations in Estremadura.

[235] This looks a large figure, but over 150 guns were taken at Rodrigo, more than that number at Badajoz, several hundred in the Retiro, and infinite numbers in the Cadiz lines and the arsenal of Seville, not to speak of the captures at Astorga, Guadalajara, Almaraz, and in the field at Salamanca, &c.

[236] Foy, _Vie militaire_, p. 193. Napoleon to Clarke, October 19, 1812.

[237] Report of Colonel Desprez to Joseph of his interview with the Emperor at Moscow on October 19th. _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 178.

[238] Ibid., p. 179.

[239] See above, vol. v, pp. 194-5.

[240] Napier’s statement that Napoleon was thinking of this project when he declared Soult to be the ‘only military head in Spain’ is entirely unjustified by the context from which he is quoting. The Emperor therein makes no allusion to the Seville project. See Ducasse’s _Correspondance_, ix. pp. 178-9.

[241] See his letter quoted above, vol. v, pp. 255-6.

[242] Jones, _Sieges of the Peninsula_, ii. p. 430.

[243] Jones remarks that ‘we had to leave it to the valour of the troops to surmount intermediate obstacles which in a properly conducted siege would be removed by art and labour’ (_Sieges_, i. p. 163).

[244] See above, vol. v, p. 270.

[245] See above, vol. v, p. 316.

[246] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, _Dispatches_, ix. p. 574.

[247] Memorandum for Baron Alten, Madrid, 31st August 1812.

[248] The bad weather on the Tagus only began October 30th.

[249] See above, pp. 112-13.

[250] See above, p. 142.

[251] Not including 2/59th at Cadiz, but including the 1/6th, 20th, and 91st which only landed in November, and the battalions of the 1st Foot Guards which had only just joined during the Burgos retreat.

[252] The Portuguese infantry had suffered quite as heavily--cold being very trying to them, though summer heat affected them less than the British. The 20th Portuguese, starting on the retreat from Madrid with 900 men, only brought 350 to Rodrigo.

[253] 4,400 for the infantry, 350 for cavalry, plus drafts for artillery, &c.

[254] Where the new Second Guards Brigade had a dreadful epidemic of fever and dysentery, and buried 700 men. It was so thinned that it could not march even in May, and missed the Vittoria campaign.

[255] Brigades were not always kept together, the regiments being a little scattered. Individual battalions were in Baños, Bejar, Bohoyo, Montehermoso, &c.

[256] Jourdan, _Mémoires_, p. 449.

[257] See _Correspondance du Roi Joseph_, ix. p. 462.

[258] For a curious narrative of adventures in Madrid, November 4-10, by a party of English prisoners who escaped in the confusion that followed the outmarch of the French, see the Memoirs of Captain Harley of the 47th, ii. pp. 42-50.

[259] Fortunately for themselves most of King Joseph’s Spanish partisans, who fled from Madrid in July to Valencia, were still under Suchet’s charge and had not returned, or their lot would have been a hard one.

[260] _Miot de Melito_, iii. p. 258.

[261] The 2nd Division (see above, p. 90) had been taken from Soult and lent to the Army of the Centre during the operation of November. It was never given back.